/S  7 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 


AND  OTHER  PAPERS 


BY 


CHARLES   FRANCIS  ADAMS 


SECOND  EDITION,   ENLARGED. 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFL1N  AND  COMPANY 


1902 


SPRECKELS 


Copyright,  1902, 
BY  CHARLES  FRANCIS  ADAMS. 

All  rights  reserved. 


Published  May, 


PREFACE   TO   SECOND  EDITION 

THE  last  paper  included  in  the  present  volume  — 
that  entitled  "  Shall  Cromwell  have  a  Statue?  "  —  was 
not  in  the  first  edition  of  it.  The  obvious  sequel  to 
the  paper  entitled  "  Lee  at  Appomattox,"  the  occasion 
for  it  had  not  arisen  at  the  time  the  material  for 
the  earlier  edition  was  brought  together.  Read  at 
Worcester  in  October,  1901,  the  "  Lee  at  Appomat 
tox  "  was  designed  to  influence,  if  possible,  the  course 
of  events  then  taking  place  in  South  Africa,  calling  at 
tention  to  the  example  of  Lee,  thirty-six  years  before, 
under  not  dissimilar  circumstances.  Republished  in 
England,  it  excited  no  inconsiderable  notice,  and  was 
referred  to  by  Mr.  Chamberlain  in  the  House  of  Com 
mons.  Subsequently,  and  during  the  final  stages  of 
the  South  African  war,  the  capitulation  of  Lee  was 
always  in  the  minds  of  influential  members  of  the 
British  Cabinet,  and  official  instructions  were  sent  to 
Lord  Milner  to  take  it  as  an  example. 

The  future  of  South  Africa  is  hereafter  to  develop 
itself.  As  bearing  upon  its  possibilities,  it  was  of 
interest  to  ascertain  the  existing  state  of  feeling  in 
the  United  States,  now  that  a  generation  had  passed 
away  since  Appomattox.  An  invitation  to  deliver  the 
annual  oration  before  the  Phi  Beta  Kappa  Society  of 


I  00507 


iv  PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION 

the  University  of  Chicago  seemed  to  offer  a  fitting 
place,  as  well  as  a  favorable  opportunity,  for  eliciting 
an  expression.  The  paper  entitled  "  Shall  Crom 
well  have  a  Statue  ? "  was  prepared  with  this  end 
in  view.  The  result  was  undeniably  instructive.  A 
very  general  response  followed  from  all  sections  of 
the  country,  though  more  especially  from  the  South. 
The  character  of  that  response  varied.  The  response 
from  the  North  was,  as  a  rule,  couched  in  terms  of  gen 
eral  dissent  from  the  proposition ;  but  this  dissent, 
whether  uttered  through  the  press  or  by  letter,  was  in  no 
single  case  couched  in  the  declamatory,  patriotic  strain, 
at  once  injured,  indignant,  and  denunciatory  or  vitu 
perative,  which  would  no  less  assuredly  than  naturally 
have  marked  it  thirty  years  ago.  On  the  contrary,  the 
objections  urged  were  invariably  rational,  and,  in  many 
cases,  well  reasoned.  Great  personal  respect  for  Lee, 
and  even  admiration  of  him,  were  expressed ;  but  the 
noticeable  feature  was  that,  almost  without  exception, 
the  writers  reverted  to  the  days  of  slavery,  and  the 
issues  and  events  of  the  Civil  War.  The  ground  upon 
which  recognition  was  urged  in  the  address  seemed  to 
escape  notice,  though  emphasized  in  its  closing  lines. 

The  essential  and  distinctive  feature  of  the  Amer 
ican  Civil  "War,  as  contrasted  with  all  previous  strug 
gles  of  a  similar  character,  was  the  acceptance  of 
results  by  the  defeated  party  at  its  close,  and  the  sub 
sequent  rebuilding  of  an  entire  geographical  com 
munity,  socially  and  industrially,  upon  a  new  and, 


PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION  v 

in  certain  aspects,  odious  basis  imposed  on  it  by  ex 
ternal  force.  The  course  thus  instinctively  pursued 
was  indicative  of  much  political  sound  sense;  for  it 
was  due  to  a  statesmanlike  confidence  in  time,  and  the 
consciousness  of  an  inherent  race-capacity  for  leader 
ship. 

It  was  with  this  outcome  of  the  war,  and  not  with 
its  anterior  causes  or  its  vicissitudes,  that  the  name 
of  Robert  E.  Lee  should  hereafter  be  commemorated. 
As  is  well  known,  after  the  total  collapse  of  the 
Confederacy  Jefferson  Davis,  accepting  the  position 
in  which  he  found  himself  placed,  lived  and  died, 
not  without  dignity,  a  disfranchised  Confederate.  To 
make  use  of  the  ordinary  expression,  he  was  never 
"  reconstructed."  Lee,  on  the  other  hand,  in  a  way 
at  once  more  marked  and  more  dignified  than  any 
other  character  prominently  connected  with  the  Con 
federacy,  contributed  to  the  acceptance  and  rebuild 
ing  above  referred  to.  He  went  home  ;  and,  thence 
forward,  silently  minded  his  own  business.  The 
Confederate,  as  well  as  the  Unionist,  enters  as  an 
essential  factor  into  the  Nation  that  now  is,  and,  in 
future,  is  to  be.  It  is  this,  the  statue  of  Lee  in 
Washington  would  typify,  and  preserve  in  perpetual 
memory. 

C.  F.  A. 

LINCOLN,  MASS.,  August  8,  1902. 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAOB 

I.  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 1 

II.  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON:  BEFORE  AND 

AFTER 31 

III.  THE  BRITISH  "CHANGE  OF  HEART".        .        .    256 

IV.  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION     ....        274 
V.  A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY        .        .        .339 

VI.  "SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"      .        376 
INDEX  .    431 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

AND   OTHER  PAPERS 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  i 

THE  present  seems  a  sufficiently  proper  occasion, 
and  this  an  appropriate  place,  to  call  attention  to  a 
matter  perhaps  only  germane  to  the  purpose  of  this 
Society,  because  as  yet  hardly  antiquarian.  None  the 
less,  historical  in  character,  it  conveys  a  lesson  of  grave 
present  import. 

One  of  the  most  unhappy,  and,  to  those  concerned 
in  it,  disastrous  wars  since  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  is,  in 
South  Africa,  now  working  itself  to  a  close  appar 
ently  still  remote,  and  in  every  way  unsatisfactory. 
There  is  reason  to  think  that  the  conflict  was  unne 
cessary  in  its  inception ;  that  by  timely  and  judicious 
action  it  might  long  since  have  been  brought  to  a 
close ;  and  that  it  now  continues  simply  because  the 
parties  to  it  cannot  be  brought  together  to  discuss  and 
arrive  at  a  sensible  basis  of  adjustment,  —  a  basis 
upon  which  both  in  reality  would  be  not  unwilling 
to  agree.  Nevertheless,  as  the  cable  despatches  daily 

1  A  paper  read  before  the  American  Antiquarian  Society  at  its 
annual  meeting  in  Worcester,  Mass.,  Wednesday,  October  30,  1901. 


2  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

show,  the  contest  drags  wearily  along,  to  the  probable 
destruction  of  one  of  the  combatants,  to  the  great  loss 
of  the  other,  and,  so  far  as  can  be  seen,  in  utter  dis 
regard  of  the  best  interests  of  both. 

My  immediate  purpose,  however,  is  to  draw  atten 
tion  to  the  hairbreadth  escape  we  ourselves  had  from 
a  similar  experience,  now  thirty-six  years  ago,  and  to 
assign  to  whom  it  belongs  the  credit  for  that  escape. 
In  one  word,  in  the  strong  light  of  passing  events,  I 
think  it  now  opportune  to  set  forth  the  debt  of  grati 
tude  this  reunited  country  of  ours  —  Union  and  Con 
federate,  North  and  South  —  owes  to  Robert  E.  Lee, 
of  Virginia. 

Most  of  those  here  —  for  this  is  not  a  body  of  young 
men  —  remember  the  state  of  affairs  which  existed  in 
the  United  States,  especially  in  what  was  then  known 
as  the  Confederate  States,  or  the  rebellious  portion  of 
the  United  States,  in  April,  1865.  Such  as  are  not 
yet  as  mature  as  that  memory  implies  have  read  and 
heard  thereof.  It  was  in  every  respect  almost  the 
identical  state  of  affairs  which  existed  in  South  Africa 
at  the  time  of  the  capture  of  Pretoria  by  General 
Roberts,  in  June  a  year  ago. 

On  the  2d  of  April,  1865,  the  Confederate  army 
found  itself  compelled  to  abandon  the  lines  in  front 
of  Petersburg ;  and  the  same  day  —  a  very  famous 
Sabbath — Jefferson  Davis,  hastily  called  from  the 
church  services  he  was  attending,  left  Richmond  to 
find,  if  he  might,  a  new  seat  of  government,  at  Dan 
ville.  The  following  morning  our  forces  at  last 
entered  the  rebel  capital.  This  was  on  a  Monday ; 
and,  two  days  later,  the  Confederate  President  issued 
from  Danville  his  manifesto.  In  it  he  said  to  the 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  3 

people  of  the  South,  —  "  We  have  now  entered  upon 
a  new  phase  of  the  struggle.  Relieved  from  the  ne 
cessity  of  guarding  particular  points,  our  army  will 
be  free  to  move  from  point  to  point,  to  strike  the 
enemy  in  detail  far  from  his  base.  If,  by  the  stress 
of  numbers,  we  should  be  compelled  to  a  temporary 
withdrawal  from  her  [Virginia's]  limits,  or  those  of 
any  other  border  State,  we  will  return  until  the  baffled 
and  exhausted  enemy  shall  abandon  in  despair  his 
endless  and  impossible  task  of  making  slaves  of  a 
people  resolved  to  be  free."  The  policy,  and  line  of 
military  action,  thus  indicated  were  precisely  those  laid 
down  and  pursued  by  the  Boer  leaders  during  the  last 
sixteen  months. 

It  is  unnecessary  for  me  even  to  refer  to  the  series 
of  events  which  followed  our  occupation  of  Richmond, 
and  preceded  the  surrender  of  Appomattox.  It  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  on  the  Friday  which  followed 
the  momentous  Sunday,  the  capitulation  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  had  become  inevitable.  Not 
the  less  for  that,  the  course  thereafter  to  be  pursued 
as  concerned  further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
Confederacy  was  still  to  be  decided.  As  his  Danville 
proclamation  showed,  Jefferson  Davis,  though  face  to 
face  with  grave  disaster,  had  not  for  an  instant  given 
up  the  thought  of  continuing  the  struggle.  To  do  so 
was  certainly  practicable,  —  far  more  practicable  than 
now  in  South  Africa,  both  as  respects  forces  in  the 
field  and  the  area  of  country  to  be  covered  by  the 
invader.  Foreign  opinion,  for  instance,  was  on  this 
point  settled;  it  was  in  Europe  assumed  as  a  cer 
tainty  of  the  future  that  the  conquest  of  the  Confed 
eracy  was  "impossible."  The  English  journals  had 


4  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

always  maintained,  and  still  did  maintain,  that  the 
defeat  of  Lee  in  the  field,  or  even  the  surrender  of  all 
the  Confederate  armies,  would  be  but  the  close  of  one 
phase  of  the  war  and  the  opening  of  another,  —  the 
final  phase  being  a  long,  fruitless  effort  to  subdue  a 
people,  at  once  united  and  resolved,  occupying  a  re 
gion  so  vast  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  penetrate 
every  portion  of  it,  much  less  to  hold  it  in  peaceful 
subjection.  As  an  historical  fact,  on  this  point  the 
scales,  on  the  9th  of  April,  1865,  hung  wavering  in 
the  balance ;  a  mere  turn  of  the  hand  would  decide 
which  way  they  were  to  incline.  Thus,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  that  momentous  day,  it  was  an  absolutely  open 
question,  an  even  chance,  whether  the  course  which 
subsequently  was  pursued  should  be  pursued,  or 
whether  the  leaders  of  the  Confederacy  would  adopt 
the  policy  which  President  Kriiger  and  Generals 
Botha  and  De  Wet  have  in  South  Africa  more  re 
cently  adopted,  and  are  now  pursuing. 

The  decision  rested  in  the  hands  of  one  man,  the 
commander  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Fairly 
reliable  and  very  graphic  accounts  of  interviews  with 
General  Lee  during  those  trying  days  and  in  the 
morning  hours  of  April  9th  have  either  appeared  in 
print  or  been  told  in  conversation,  and  to  two  of 
these  accounts  I  propose  to  call  attention.  The  first  I 
find  in  a  book,  entitled  The  End  of  an  Era,  recently 
published  by  John  Sargent  Wise,  a  son  of  Henry 
A.  Wise,  once  prominent  in  our  national  politics. 
Though  in  1865  but  a  youth  of  nineteen,  John  S. 
Wise  was  a  hot  Confederate,  and  had  already  been 
wounded  in  battle.  At  the  time  now  in  question  he 
chanced,  according  to  his  own  account,  to  have  been 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  5 

sent  by  Jefferson  Davis,  then  on  his  way  to  Danville, 
with  despatches  to  Lee.  At  length,  after  many  hair 
breadth  escapes  from  capture,  he  reached  the  Confed 
erate  headquarters  late  in  the  night  following  the 
disastrous  battle  of  Sailor's  Creek.  By  it  the  line  of 
march  of  the  Confederate  army  towards  Danville  had 
been  intercepted,  and  it  had  been  forced  to  seek  a 
more  circuitous  route  in  the  direction  of  Lynchburg. 
"  It  was  past  midnight,"  writes  Mr.  Wise,  "  when  I 
found  General  Lee.  He  was  in  an  open  field  north 
of  Rice's  Station  and  east  of  the  High  Bridge.  A 
camp-fire  of  rails  was  burning  low.  Colonel  Charles 
Marshall  sat  in  an  ambulance  with  a  lantern  and  a 
lap-desk.  He  was  preparing  orders  at  the  dictation 
of  General  Lee,  who  stood  near,  with  one  hand  rest 
ing  on  a  wheel  and  one  foot  upon  the  end  of  a  log, 
watching  intently  the  dying  embers,  as  he  spoke  in  a 
low  tone  to  his  amanuensis." 

Explaining  his  mission  to  the  Confederate  leader, 
Mr.  Wise  passed  the  remaining  hours  of  the  night  in 
bivouac  near  by ;  and  early  in  the  morning,  the  head 
quarters  having  moved,  he  again  set  out  on  his  quest. 
It  was  now  Friday,  the  7th.  He  had  not  gone  far 
when  he  stumbled  across  his  father,  in  bivouac  with 
his  brigade.  Henry  A.  Wise  was  then  nearly  sixty 
years  of  age ;  but  the  son  found  him  wrapped  in  a 
blanket,  stretched  on  the  ground  like  a  common  soldier, 
and  asleep  among  his  men.  Essentially  a  Virginian, 
and  in  many  respects  typically  a  Southerner  and  "  fire- 
eater,"  Henry  A.  Wise  was  governor  at  the  time  of 
the  John  Brown  Harper's  Ferry  raid,  in  October, 
1859,  his  term  expiring  shortly  after  Brown's  execu 
tion.  A  member  of  the  Virginia  Convention  which, 


6  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

immediately  after  the  fall  of  Sumter,  passed  the  ordi 
nance  of  secession,  Wise,  though  an  extreme  States- 
rights  man,  had  been  in  favor  of  "  fighting  it  out  in 
the  Union,"  as  the  phrase  then  went ;  but  when  Vir 
ginia  became  plainly  bent  on  secession,  he  unhesitat 
ingly  "  went  with  his  State."  Commissioned  as  a 
brigadier-general  almost  at  once,  he  had  served  in 
the  Confederate  army  throughout  the  war,  and  was  in 
the  thick  of  the  fight  at  Sailor's  Creek.  Now,  on  the 
morning  after  that  engagement,  aroused  from  an  un 
easy  sleep  by  the  unexpected  appearance  of  his  son, 
almost  the  first  wish  he  expressed  was  to  see  General 
Lee,  and  he  asked  impetuously  of  his  whereabouts. 
The  two  started  together  to  go  to  him.  John  S.  Wise 
has  described  vividly  the  aspect  of  affairs  as  they  passed 
along  :  —  "  The  roads  and  fields  were  filled  with  strag 
glers.  They  moved  looking  behind  them,  as  if  they 
expected  to  be  attacked  and  harried  by  a  pursuing  foe. 
Demoralization,  panic,  abandonment  of  all  hope,  ap 
peared  on  every  hand.  Wagons  were  rolling  along 
without  any  order  or  system.  Caissons  and  limber- 
chests,  without  commanding  officers,  seemed  to  be 
floating  aimlessly  upon  a  tide  of  disorganization.  Ris 
ing  to  his  full  height,  casting  a  glance  around  him  like 
that  of  an  eagle,  and  sweeping  the  horizon  with  his 
long  arm  and  bony  forefinger,  my  father  exclaimed  : 
4  This  is  the  end ! '  It  is  impossible  to  convey  an  idea 
of  the  agony  and  the  bitterness  of  his  words  and  ges 
tures."  Then  follows  this  description  of  the  interview 
which  ensued :  — 

"  We  found  General  Lee  on  the  rear  portico  of  the 
house  that  I  have  mentioned.  He  had  washed  his  face 
in  a  tin  basin,  and  stood  drying  his  beard  with  a  coarse 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  7 

towel  as  we  approached.  '  General  Lee,'  exclaimed 
my  father,  4  my  poor,  brave  men  are  lying  on  yonder 
hill  more  dead  than  alive.  For  more  than  a  week  they 
have  been  fighting  day  and  night,  without  food,  and, 
by  God,  sir,  they  shall  not  move  another  step  until 
somebody  gives  them  something  to  eat ! ' 

"  c  Come  in,  general,'  said  General  Lee  soothingly. 
4  They  deserve  something  to  eat,  and  shall  have  it ;  and 
meanwhile  you  shall  share  my  breakfast.'  He  disarmed 
everything  like  defiance  by  his  kindness. 

"  It  was  but  a  few  moments,  however,  before  my 
father  launched  forth  in  a  fresh  denunciation  of  the 
conduct  of  General  Bushrod  Johnson  1  in  the  engage 
ment  of  the  sixth.  I  am  satisfied  that  General  Lee 
felt  as  he  did  ;  but,  assuming  an  air  of  mock  severity, 
he  said,  '  General,  are  you  aware  that  you  are  liable  to 
court-martial  and  execution  for  insubordination  and 
disrespect  toward  your  commanding  officer?  ' 

"  My  father  looked  at  him  with  lifted  eyebrows  and 
flashing  eyes,  and  exclaimed :  c  Shot !  You  can't  af 
ford  to  shoot  the  men  who  fight  for  cursing  those  who 
run  away.  Shot !  I  wish  you  would  shoot  me.  If 
you  don't,  some  Yankee  probably  will  within  the  next 
twenty-four  hours.' 

"  Growing  more  serious,  General  Lee  inquired  what 
he  thought  of  the  situation. 

"  «  Situation  ?  '  said  the  bold  old  man.  <  There  is 
no  situation  !  Nothing  remains,  General  Lee,  but  to 
put  your  poor  men  on  your  poor  mules  and  send  them 
home  in  time  for  spring  ploughing.  This  army  is 

1  Elsewhere  in  his  book  (pp.  358,  359),  and  in  another  connection, 
J.  S.  Wise  is  equally  severe  in  his  characterization  of  Bushrod  John- 


8  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

hopelessly  whipped,  and  is  fast  becoming  demoralized. 
These  men  have  already  endured  more  than  I  believed 
flesh  and  blood  could  stand,  and  I  say  to  you,  sir, 
emphatically,  that  to  prolong  the  struggle  is  murder, 
and  the  blood  of  every  man  who  is  killed  from  this 
time  forth  is  on  your  head,  General  Lee.' 

"This  last  expression  seemed  to  cause  General  Lee 
great  pain.  With  a  gesture  of  remonstrance,  and  even 
of  impatience,  he  protested  :  '  Oh,  general,  do  not  talk 
so  wildly.  My  burdens  are  heavy  enough.  What 
would  the  country  think  of  me,  if  I  did  what  you  sug- 
gest?' 

"  4  Country  be  d d  ! '  was  the  quick  reply. 

4  There  is  no  country.  There  has  been  no  country, 
general,  for  a  year  or  more.  You  are  the  country  to 
these  men.  They  have  fought  for  you.  They  have 
shivered  through  a  long  winter  for  you.  Without  pay 
or  clothes,  or  care  of  any  sort,  their  devotion  to  you 
and  faith  in  you  have  been  the  only  things  which  have 
held  this  army  together.  If  you  demand  the  sacrifice, 
there  are  still  left  thousands  of  us  who  will  die  for  you. 
You  know  the  game  is  desperate  beyond  redemption, 
and  that,  if  you  so  announce,  no  man  or  government 
or  people  will  gainsay  your  decision.  That  is  why  I 
repeat  that  the  blood  of  any  man  killed  hereafter  is 
upon  your  head.' 

"  General  Lee  stood  for  some  time  at  an  open  win 
dow,  looking  out  at  the  throng  now  surging  by  upon 
the  roads  and  in  the  fields,  and  made  no  response."  l 

It  will  be  remembered  that  John  Sargent  Wise  was 
individually  present  at  this  conversation,  a  youth  of 
nineteen.  I  have  as  little  respect  as  any  one  well  can 
1  The  End  of  an  Era,  pp.  433-435. 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  9 

have  for  the  recollection  of  thirty  years  since  as  a  basis 
of  history.  Nevertheless,  it  would  seem  quite  out  of 
the  question  that  a  youth  of  only  nineteen  could  have 
been  present  at  such  a  scene  as  is  here  described,  and 
that  the  words  which  then  passed,  and  the  incidents 
which  occurred,  should  not  have  been  indelibly  im 
printed  upon  his  memory.  I  am  disposed,  therefore, 
to  consider  this  reliable  historical  material.  Mean 
while,  it  so  chances  that  I  am  able  to  supplement  it  by 
similar  testimony  from  another  quarter. 

Some  years  ago  I  was,  for  a  considerable  period, 
closely  associated  with  General  E.  P.  Alexander,  who, 
in  its  time,  had  been  chief  of  artillery  in  Long- 
street's  famous  corps ;  and  it  was  General  Alexander 
who,  on  the  morning  of  July  3,  1863,  opened  on  the 
Union  line  at  Gettysburg  what  Hancock  described  as 
"  a  most  terrific  and  appalling  cannonade,"  intended 
to  prepare  the  way  for  the  advance  of  Pickett's  divi 
sion.  In  April,  1865,  General  Alexander  was,  if  my 
recollection  serves  me  right,  in  command  of  the  artil 
lery  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  In  many 
connections  I  had  found  occasion  to  notice  the  singu 
lar  tenacity  of  his  memory.  He  seemed  to  forget 
nothing ;  nor  was  he  less  accurate  in  matters  of  detail 
than  in  generalities.  He  delighted  in  reminiscence 
of  the  great  war,  and  he  recalled  its  incidents  with 
the  particularity  of  a  trained  officer  of  the  general 
staff.  He  thus  many  times,  always  with  the  same 
precision,  repeated  to  me,  or  in  my  hearing,  the  details 
of  interviews  with  Lee  during  the  retreat  from  Peters 
burg,  and  more  especially  of  one,  on  the  morning  of 
April  9th.  Of  what  he  said  I  have  since  retained 
a  vivid  memory.  During  Friday,  April  7th,  the 


10  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

day  Wise  found  his  way  to  Lee's  headquarters,  the 
weary  Confederate  army  pressed  forward,  vainly  try 
ing  to  elude  the  hot  pursuit  of  the  Union  advance, 
led  by  Sheridan.  On  Saturday,  the  8th,  according  to 
General  Alexander,  the  leading  Confederate  officers 
became  so  demoralized  that  one  of  them,  General 
Pendleton,  was  authorized  by  a  sort  of  informal  coun 
cil  to  wait  on  Lee,  and  to  tell  him  that,  a  surrender 
seeming  inevitable,  they  were  prepared  to  take  the 
responsibility  of  advising  it.  Recognizing  his  mili 
tary  obligations,  and  not  yet  convinced  that  his  com 
mand  was  hopelessly  involved,  Lee  distinctly  resented 
the  advice.  He  told  General  Pendleton  that  there 
were  too  many  men  yet  remaining  in  the  ranks  to 
think  of  laying  down  arms,  and  his  air  and  manner 
conveyed  a  rebuke. 

Twenty-four  additional  hours  of  fasting,  marching, 
and  fighting  put  a  new  face  on  the  situation.  Two 
days  before,  on  the  7th,  shortly  after  the  Wise  inter 
view,  General  Alexander  had  met  Lee  at  Farmville, 
and  a  consultation  over  the  maps  took  place.  Alex 
ander  had  then  pointed  out  Appomattox  as  "  the  dan 
ger  point,"  the  roads  to  Lynchburg  there  intersecting, 
and  the  enemy  having  the  shortest  line.  Sheridan 
did  not  lose  his  advantage,  and,  on  Sunday,  the  9th 
of  April,  Lee  found  his  further  progress  blocked. 
That  morning  General  Alexander  again  met  Lee. 
Both  realized  the  situation  fully.  Moreover,  as  chief 
of  artillery,  Alexander  was  well  aware  that  the  lim 
ber-chests  were  running  low ;  his  arm  of  the  service 
was  in  no  condition  to  go  into  another  engagement. 
Yet  the  idea  of  an  abandonment  of  the  cause  had 
never  occurred  to  him  as  among  the  probabilities. 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  11 

All  night  he  had  lain  awake,  thinking  as  to  what 
was  next  to  be  done.  Finally  he  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  there  was  but  one  course  to  pursue. 
The  Confederate  army,  while  nominally  capitulating, 
must  in  reality  disperse,  and  those  composing  it  should 
be  instructed,  whether  individually  or  as  part  of  de 
tachments,  to  get  each  man  to  his  own  State  in  the 
most  direct  way  and  shortest  possible  time,  and  report 
to  the  governor  thereof,  with  a  view  to  a  further  and 
continuous  resistance. 

Thus,  exactly  what  is  now  taking  place  in  South 
Africa  was  to  take  place  in  the  Confederacy.  Gen 
eral  Alexander  told  me  that,  as  he  passed  his  batteries 
on  his  way  to  headquarters,  the  men  called  out  to  him, 
in  cheery  tones,  that  there  were  still  some  rounds  re 
maining  in  the  caissons,  and  that  they  were  ready  to 
renew  the  fight.  He  found  Lee  seated  on  the  trunk 
of  a  fallen  tree  before  a  dying  camp-fire.  He  was 
dressed  in  uniform,  and  invited  Alexander  to  take  a 
seat  beside  him.  He  then  asked  his  opinion  of  the 
situation,  and  of  the  course  proper  to  be  pursued. 
Full  of  the  idea  which  dominated  his  mind,  Alexander 
proceeded  at  once  to  propound  his  plan,  for  it  seemed 
to  him  the  only  plan  worthy  of  consideration.  As  he 
went  on,  General  Lee,  looking  steadily  into  the  fire 
with  an  abstracted  air,  listened  patiently.  Alexander 
said  his  full  say.  A  brief  pause  ensued,  which  Lee 
finally  broke  in  somewhat  these  words :  "  No  !  Gen 
eral  Alexander,  that  will  not  do.  You  must  remem 
ber  we  are  a  Christian  people.  We  have  fought 
this  fight  as  long  as,  and  as  well  as,  we  knew  how. 
We  have  been  defeated.  For  us,  as  a  Christian 
people,  there  is  now  but  one  course  to  pursue.  We 


12  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

must  accept  the  situation  ;  these  men  must  go  home 
and  plant  a  crop,  and  we  must  proceed  to  build  up 
our  country  on  a  new  basis.  We  cannot  have  re 
course  to  the  methods  you  suggest."  I  remember 
being  deeply  impressed  with  Alexander's  comment,  as 
he  repeated  these  words  of  Lee.  They  had  evidently 
burned  themselves  into  his  memory.  He  said :  "  I 
had  nothing  to  urge  in  reply.  I  felt  that  the  man 
had  soared  way  up  above  me,  —  he  dominated  me  com 
pletely.  I  rose  from  beside  him ;  silently  mounted 
my  horse  ;  rode  back  to  my  command  ;  and  waited 
for  the  order  to  surrender." 

Then  and  there,  Lee  decided  its  course  for  the  Con 
federacy.  And  I  take  it  there  is  not  one  solitary  man 
in  the  United  States  to-day,  North  or  South,  who  does 
not  feel  that  he  decided  right. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  laid  down  its  arms  on  the  9th  of  April.  But 
General  Joseph  Johnston  was  in  command  of  another 
Confederate  army  then  confronting  Sherman,  in 
North  Carolina,  and  it  was  still  an  open  question  what 
course  he  would  pursue.  His  force  numbered  over 
40,000  combatants ;  more  than  the  entire  muster  of 
the  Boers  in  their  best  estate.  Lee's  course  decided 
Johnston's.  S.  R.  Mallory,  who  was  present  on  the 
occasion,  has  left  a  striking  account  of  a  species  of 
council  held  at  Greensboro,  North  Carolina,  on  the 
evening  of  the  10th  of  April,  by  Jefferson  Davis  and 
the  members  of  his  cabinet,  with  General  Johnston. 
Davis,  stubborn  in  temper,  and  bent  on  a  policy  of  con 
tinuous  irregular  resistance,  expressed  the  belief  that 
the  disasters  recently  sustained,  though  "  terrible," 
should  not  be  regarded  as  "  fatal."  "  I  think,"  he 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  13 

added,  "  we  can  whip  the  enemy  yet,  if  our  people 
will  turn  out."  When  he  ceased  speaking,  a  pause 
ensued.  Davis  at  last  said,  "  We  should  like  to  hear 
your  views,  General  Johnston."  Whereupon  John 
ston,  without  preface  or  introduction,  and  with  a  tone 
and  manner  almost  spiteful,  remarked  in  his  terse, 
concise,  demonstrative  way,  as  if  seeking  to  condense 
thoughts  that  were  crowding  for  utterance :  "  My 
views  are,  sir,  that  our  people  are  tired  of  the  war, 
feel  themselves  whipped,  and  will  not  fight."  l 

We  all  know  what  followed.  Lee's  great  military 
prestige  and  moral  ascendency  made  it  easy  for  some 
of  the  remaining  Confederate  commanders,  like  John 
ston,  to  follow  the  precedent  he  set ;  while  others  of 
them,  like  Kirby  Smith,  found  it  imposed  upon  them. 
A  firm  direction  had  been  given  to  the  course  of 
events ;  an  intelligible  policy  was  indicated. 

I  have  in  my  possession  a  copy  of  the  Index,  the 
weekly  journal  published  in  London  during  our  civil 
war.  The  official  organ  of  the  Confederate  agents 
in  Europe,  it  was  intended  for  the  better  enlighten 
ment  of  foreign  opinion,  more  especially  the  English 
press.  The  surrender  of  Lee  was  commented  upon 
editorially  hi  the  issue  of  that  paper  for  April  27th. 
"  The  war  is  far  from  concluded,"  it  declared.  "  A 
strenuous  resistance  and  not  surrender  was  the  un 
alterable  determination  of  the  Confederate  authorities, 
.  .  .  and  if  the  worst  comes  to  the  worst  there  is  the 
trans-Mississippi  department,  where  the  remnant  of 
[Johnston's]  army  can  find  a  shelter,  and  a  new  and 
safe  starting-point."2  On  the  llth  of  May  follow- 

1  Alfriend:  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,  pp.  622-626. 

2  Captain  Raphael  Semmes,  of  Alabama  fame,  wrote  as  follows,  in 


14  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

ing,  the  surrender  of  Johnston's  army  was  announced 
on  the  same  terms  as  that  of  Lee ;  but  in  summing  up 
the  situation,  the  Index  still  found  "  the  elements  of 
a  successful,  or,  at  least,  a  protracted  resistance."  On 
the  25th  of  May,  it  had  an  article  entitled  "  Southern 
Resistance  in  Texas,"  in  which  it  announced  that, 
"  Such  a  war  will  be  fierce,  ferocious,  and  of  long 
duration,"  -  -  in  a  word,  such  an  expiring  struggle  as 
we  are  to-day  witnessing  in  South  Africa.  In  its 
issue  of  June  1st,  the  Index  commented  on  "  The 
capture  of  President  Davis  ;  "  and  then,  and  not  until 
then,  forestalling  the  trans-Mississippi  surrender  of 
Kirby  Smith,  brought  to  it  by  the  following  mail,  it 
raised  the  wailing  cry,  "  Fuit  Ilium.  .  .  .  The  South 
has  fallen." 

Comparing  the  situation  which  then  existed  in  the 
Confederacy  with  that  now  in  South  Africa,  it  must 
also  be  remembered  that  General  Lee  assumed  the 
responsibility  he  did  assume,  and  decided  the  policy 
to  be  pursued  in  the  way  it  was  decided,  under  no 

a  private  letter  to  an  English  friend,  published  in  the  London  Morning 
Herald,  during  March,  1865 :  "  The  State  of  Texas  alone  has  within 
her  limits  all  the  materials,  and  is  fast  getting  the  appliances,  for 
equipping  and  maintaining  armies,  and  when  you  reflect  that  she  has 
three  times  as  much  territory  as  France,  and  that  countless  herds  of 
horses  and  beef  cattle  wander  over  her  boundless  prairies,  you  can 
well  imagine  with  what  contempt  this  warlike  people  regard  the  insane 
threat  of  subjugation.  If  our  armies  were  driven  to-morrow  across 
the  Mississippi  River,  we  could  still  fight  the  enemy  for  a  century  to 
come  in  Texas  alone.  So  dismiss  all  your  fears,  my  friend,  our  inde 
pendence  is  an  accomplished  fact,  let  the  war  continue  as  long  as  the 
Yankee  pleases,  and  with  what  varying  results  it  may."  In  its  issue 
of  March  15,  1865,  the  London  Times  editorially  said  :  "  These  ter 
ritories  are  too  vast  to  be  occupied,  and  the  elements  of  rebellion  they 
contain  are  too  rife  to  be  left  to  themselves.  They  may  be  penetrated 
in  every  direction,  but  we  do  not  see  how  they  are  to  be  held  or  sub 
dued." 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  15 

ameliorating  conditions.  Politically,  unconditional 
surrender  was  insisted  upon  ;  and  Lee's  surrender  was, 
politically,  unconditional.  Even  more  so  was  John 
ston's  ;  for,  in  Johnston's  case,  the  modifying  terms  of 
capitulation  agreed  on  in  the  first  place  between  him 
and  Sherman  were  roughly  disallowed  at  Washing-ton, 
and  the  truce,  by  an  order  coming  thence,  abruptly 
terminated.  Then  Johnston  did  what  Lee  had  already 
done ;  ignoring  Davis,  he  surrendered  his  army. 

In  the  case  of  the  Confederacy,  also,  an  absolutely 
unconditional  political  surrender  implied  much.  The 
Emancipation  Proclamation  of  January,  1863,  which 
confiscated  the  most  valuable  chattel  property  of  the 
Confederacy,  remained  the  irreversible  law  of  the  land. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  South  were,  moreover,  as  one 
man  disfranchised.  When  they  laid  down  their  arms 
they  had  before  them,  first,  a  military  government ; 
and,  after  that,  the  supremacy  of  their  former  slaves. 
A  harder  fate  for  a  proud  people  to  accept  could  not 
well  be  imagined.  The  bitterness  of  feeling,  the 
hatred,  was,  too,  extreme.  It  may  possibly  be  argued 
that  the  conditions  in  this  country  then  were  different 
from  those  now  in  South  Africa,  inasmuch  as  here  it 
was  a  civil  war,  —  a  conflict  between  communities  of 
the  same  race  and  speech  involving  the  vital  question 
of  the  supremacy  of  law.  This  argument,  however, 
seems  to  imply  that,  in  case  of  strife  of  this  descrip 
tion,  a  general  severity  may  fairly  be  resorted  to  in 
excess  of  that  permissible  between  nations  ;  in  other 
words,  that  we  are  justified  in  treating  our  brethren 
with  greater  harshness  than  we  would  treat  aliens 
in  blood  and  speech.  Obviously,  this  is  a  questionable 
contention. 


16  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

It  might  possibly  also  be  claimed  that  the  bitter 
ness  of  civil  war  is  not  so  insurmountable  as  that  of 
one  involving  a  question  of  race  dominance.  Yet  it 
is  difficult  to  conceive  bitterness  of  greater  intensity 
than  existed  between  the  sections  at  the  close  of  our 
civil  war.  There  is  striking  evidence  of  this  in  the 
book  of  Mr.  Wise,  from  which  I  have  already  quoted. 
Toward  its  close  he  speaks  of  the  death  of  Lincoln. 
He  then  adds  the  following :  — 

"  Perhaps  I  ought  to  chronicle  that  the  announce 
ment  was  received  with  demonstrations  of  sorrow.  If 
I  did,  I  should  be  lying  for  sentiment's  sake.  Among 
the  higher  officers  and  the  most  intelligent  and  con 
servative  men,  the  assassination  caused  a  shudder 
of  horror  at  the  heinousness  of  the  act,  and  at  the 
thought  of  its  possible  consequences ;  but  among  the 
thoughtless,  the  desperate,  and  the  ignorant,  it  was 
hailed  as  a  sort  of  retributive  justice.  In  maturer 
years  I  have  been  ashamed  of  what  I  felt  and  said 
when  I  heard  of  that  awful  calamity.  However,  men 
ought  to  be  judged  for  their  feelings  and  their  speech 
by  the  circumstances  of  their  surroundings.  For  four 
years  we  had  been  fighting.  In  that  struggle,  all  we 
loved  had  been  lost.  Lincoln  incarnated  to  us  the 
idea  of  oppression  and  conquest.  We  had  seen  his 
face  over  the  coffins  of  our  brothers  and  relatives  and 
friends,  in  the  flames  of  Richmond,  in  the  disaster  at 
Appomattox.  In  blood  and  flame  and  torture  the  tem 
ples  of  our  lives  were  tumbling  about  our  heads.  We 
were  desperate  and  vindictive,  and  whosoever  denies  it 
forgets  or  is  false.  We  greeted  his  death  in  a  spirit 
of  reckless  hate,  and  hailed  it  as  bringing  agony  and 
bitterness  to  those  who  were  the  cause  of  our  own  agony 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  17 

and  bitterness.  To  us,  Lincoln  was  an  inhuman 
monster,  Grant  a  butcher,  and  Sherman  a  fiend." 

Indeed,  recalling  the  circumstances  of  that  time,  it 
is  fairly  appalling  to  consider  what  in  1865  must  have 
occurred,  had  Kobert  E.  Lee  then  been  of  the  same 
turn  of  mind  as  was  Jefferson  Davis,  or  as  implacable 
and  unyielding  in  disposition  as  Kriiger  or  Botha 
have  more  recently  proved.  The  national  government 
had  in  arms  a  million  men,  inured  to  the  hardships 
and  accustomed  to  the  brutalities  of  war  ;  Lincoln  had 
been  freshly  assassinated  ;  the  temper  of  the  North 
was  thoroughly  aroused,  while  its  patience  was  ex 
hausted.  An  irregular  warfare  would  inevitably  have 
resulted,  a  warfare  without  quarter.1  The  Confederacy 
would  have  been  reduced  to  a  smouldering  wilder 
ness,  —  to  what  South  Africa  to-day  is.  In  such  a 
death  grapple,  the  North,  both  in  morale  and  in 
means,  would  have  suffered  only  less  than  the  South. 
From  both  sections  that  fate  was  averted. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  enter  into  any  criticism  of 
the  course  of  events  in  South  Africa,  or  of  the  policy 
there  on  either  side  pursued.  It  will  be  for  the  future 
to  decide  whether  the  prolonged,  irregular  resistance 
we  are  witnessing  is  justifiable,  or,  if  justifiable, 
whether  it  is  wise.  Neither  of  these  questions  do  I 
propose  to  discuss.  My  purpose  simply  is  to  call  at 
tention,  in  view  of  what  is  now  taking  place  elsewhere, 

1  Commenting  on  the  "  Suddenness  of  the  Collapse,"  the  Index  said, 
editorially,  in  its  issue  of  June  8,  1805  :  "  The  loss  of  the  armies  left 
no  alternative  but  private  war,  which  never  yet  redeemed  a  country 
without  foreign  help,  and  which  is  as  much  directed  against  society  as 
against  a  public  foe.  Such  a  course  was  inconsistent  with  the  genius 
of  the  Southern  people,  which  is  eminently  law-abiding  and  orderly. 
Brave  men  know  how  to  accept  defeat,  and  the  Southerners  have 
accepted  theirs,  bitter  though  it  is,  as  only  brave  men  can." 


18  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

to  the  narrow  escape  we  ourselves,  thirty-six  years 
ago,  had  from  a  similar  awful  catastrophe.  And  I 
again  say  that,  as  we  look  to-day  upon  Kr tiger  and 
Botha  and  De  Wet,  and  the  situation  existing  in  the 
Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free  State,  I  doubt  if  one 
single  man  in  the  United  States,  North  or  South,  — 
whether  he  participated  in  the  civil  war  or  was  born 
since  that  war  ended,  —  would  fail  to  acknowledge  an 
infinite  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  Confederate  leader, 
who  on  the  9th  of  April,  1865,  decided,  as  he  did 
decide,  that  the  United  States,  whether  Confederate 
or  Union,  was  a  Christian  community,  and  that  his 
duty  was  to  accept  the  responsibility  which  the  fate 
of  war  had  imposed  upon  him,  —  to  decide  in  favor  of 
a  new  national  life,  even  if  slowly  and  painfully  to  be 
built  up  by  his  own  people  under  conditions  arbitrarily 
and  by  force  imposed  on  them. 

In  one  of  the  Confederate  accounts  of  the  great 
war  l  is  to  be  found  the  following  description  of  Lee's 
return  to  his  Richmond  home  immediately  after  he 
had  at  Appomattox  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Confed 
eracy.  With  it  I  will  conclude  this  paper.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  previous  day,  the  first  of  those  paroled 
from  the  surrendered  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had 
straggled  back  to  Richmond.  The  writer  thus  goes 
on  :  "  Next  morning  a  small  group  of  horsemen  ap 
peared  on  the  further  side  of  the  pontoons.  By  some 
strange  intuition  it  was  known  that  General  Lee  was 
among  them,  and  a  crowd  collected  all  along  the  route 
he  would  take,  silent  and  bareheaded.  There  was  no 
excitement,  no  hurrahing;  but  as  the  great  chief 
passed,  a  deep,  loving  murmur,  greater  than  these, 

1  De  Leon :  Four  Years  in  Rebel  Capitals,  p.  367. 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  19 

rose  from  the  very  hearts  of  the  crowd.  Taking  off 
his  hat  and  simply  bowing  his  head,  the  man  great  in 
adversity  passed  silently  to  his  own  door  ;  it  closed 
upon  him,  and  his  people  had  seen  him  for  the  last 
time  in  his  battle  harness." 


AFTEK  preparing  the  foregoing  paper,  I  wrote  to 
General  Alexander,  asking  him  to  verify  my  recollec 
tion  of  the  account  of  what  passed  at  his  meeting  with 
General  Lee  at  Appomattox.  His  reply  did  not  reach 
me  in  time  for  the  meeting  of  the  American  Anti 
quarian  Society,  at  which  the  paper  was  read.  He 
wrote  in  part  as  follows  :  "  I  am  greatly  interested  in 
what  you  wish,  having  often  thought  and  spoken  of 
the  contrast  between  Lee's  views  of  the  duty  of  the 
leaders  of  a  people,  and  those  held  at  the  time  by 
President  Davis,  and  now  held  by  Kriiger  and  the 
Boer  leaders ;  and  I  have  written  of  it,  too,  in  my 
own  war  recollections,  which  I  am  writing  out  for  my 
children. 

"Essentially,  your  recollections  are  entirely  cor 
rect  ;  though  some  of  the  details  are  not  exact.  Two 
days  before,  I  had  talked  with  General  Lee  over  his 
map,  and  noted  Appomattox  Courthouse  as  the  4  dan 
ger  point.'  When  I  came  up  on  the  9th  to  where  he 
had  halted  on  the  road,  he  called  me  to  him,  and 
began  by  referring  to  previous  talk,  and  then  he  asked 
me,  —  '  What  shall  we  do  to-day  ? '  For  an  account 
of  our  conversation  I  will  cut  out  of  a  scrap-book  two 
pages  which  contain  a  clipping  from  the  Philadelphia 
Press  of  a  letter  I  wrote  twenty  years  ago." 

In  the  course  of  his  letter,  General  Alexander  fur 
ther  said,  —  "  The  gist  of  my  argument  to  General 
Lee  was  that  the  governors  of  the  Southern  States 
might  make  some  sort  of  c  Terms,'  which  would  bar 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  21 

trials  for  treason,  etc.  ;  and  it  was  based  on  the  as 
sumption  that  Grant  would  demand  '  unconditional 
surrender.'  And  I  certainly  think,  too,  that  Grant 
deserves  equal  praise  and  gratitude  for  his  high- 
mindedness  in  his  liberal  treatment  of  his  foe  —  more 
absolutely  at  his  mercy  than  was  Buckner  at  Fort 
Donelson,  or  Pemberton  at  Vicksburg."  .  .  . 

"  I  particularly  remember,  too,  his  (Lee's)  dwell 
ing  on  the  fact  that  the  men  were  already,  as  it  were, 
4  demoralized '  by  four  years  of  war,  and  would  but 
too  easily  become  mere  bushwhackers." 

The  clipping  referred  to  was  from  an  issue  of  the 
Press  of  July,  1881.  The  narrative  contained  in 
it,  now  not  easily  accessible,  is  of  such  interest  and 
obvious  historical  value,  as  throwing  light  on  what 
was  passing  in  Lee's  mind  at  one  of  the  most  critical 
moments  in  the  national  history,  that  I  here  reproduce 
it  in  full :  — 

"  The  morning  of  the  9th  of  April,  1865,  found  the 
Confederate  army  in  a  position  in  which  its  inevitable 
fate  was  apparent  to  every  man  in  it.  The  skirmish 
ing  which  had  begun  in  its  front  as  its  advance  guard 
reached  Appomattox  Courthouse  the  night  before  had 
developed  into  a  sharp  fight,  in  which  the  continu 
ous  firing  of  the  artillery  and  the  steady  increase  of 
the  musketry  told  to  all  that  a  heavy  force  had  been 
thrown  across  our  line  of  march,  and  that  reinforce 
ments  to  it  were  steadily  arriving.  The  long  trains 
of  wagons  and  artillery  were  at  first  halted  in  the  road 
and  then  parked  in  the  adjoining  fields,  allowing  the 
rear  of  the  column  to  close  up  and  additional  troops 
to  pass  to  the  front  to  reinforce  the  advanced  guard 
and  to  form  a  reserve  line  of  battle  in  their  rear, 


22  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

under  cover  of  which  they  might  retire  when  neces 
sary.  While  these  dispositions  were  taking  place, 
General  Lee,  who  had  dismounted  and  was  standing 
near  a  fire  on  a  hill  about  two  miles  from  the  Court 
house,  called  the  writer  to  him,  and,  inviting  him  to  a 
seat  on  a  log  near  by,  referred  to  the  situation  and 
asked  :  '  What  shall  we  do  this  morning  ?  '  Although 
this  opportunity  of  expressing  my  views  was  unex 
pected,  the  situation  itself  was  not,  for  two  days 
before,  while  near  Farmville,  in  a  consultation  with 
General  Lee  over  his  map,  the  fact  of  the  enemy's 
having  the  shortest  road  to  the  Appomattox  Court 
house  had  been  noted  and  the  probability  of  serious 
difficulty  there  anticipated,  and  in  the  mean  time 
there  had  been  ample  opportunity  for  reflection  on  all 
of  the  emergencies  that  might  arise.  Without  reply 
ing  directly  to  the  question,  however,  I  answered  first 
that  it  was  due  to  my  command  (of  artillery)  that  I 
should  tell  him  that  they  were  in  as  good  spirits, 
though  short  of  ammunition  and  with  poor  teams,  as 
they  had  ever  been,  and  had  begged,  if  it  came  to  a 
surrender,  to  be  allowed  to  expend  first  every  round 
of  ammunition  on  the  enemy,  and  surrender  only  the 
empty  ammunition  chests.  To  this  General  Lee  re 
plied  that  there  were  remaining  only  two  divisions  of 
infantry  sufficiently  well  organized  and  strong  to  be 
fully  relied  upon  (Field's  and  Mahone's),  and  that 
they  did  not  number  eight  thousand  muskets  together ; 
and  that  that  force  was  not  sufficient  to  warrant  him 
in  undertaking  a  pitched  battle.  4  Then,'  I  answered, 
4  general,  there  are  but  two  alternatives,  to  surrender 
or  to  order  the  army  to  abandon  its  trains  and  dis 
perse  in  the  woods  and  bushes,  every  man  for  himself, 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  23 

and  each  to  make  his  best  way,  with  his  arms,  either 
to  the  army  of  General  Johnston,  in  North  Carolina, 
or  home  to  the  governor  of  his  State.  We  have  all 
foreseen  the  probability  of  such  an  alternative  for  two 
days,  and  I  am  sure  I  speak  the  sentiments  of  many 
others  besides  my  own  in  urging  that  rather  than  sur 
render  the  army  you  should  allow  us  to  disperse  in 
the  woods  and  go,  every  man  for  himself.' 

"  '  What  would  you  hope  to  accomplish  by  this  ? ' 
"  I  answered  :  c  If  there  is  any  hope  at  all  for  the 
Confederacy  or  for  the  separate  States  to  make  terms 
with  the  United  States  or  for  any  foreign  assistance, 
this  course  stands  the  chances,  whatever  they  may  be ; 
while  if  this  army  surrenders  this  morning,  the  Con 
federacy  is  dead  from  that  moment.  Grant  will  turn 
150,000  fresh  men  against  Johnston,  and  with  the 
moral  effect  of  our  surrender  he  will  go,  and  Dick 
Taylor  and  Kirby  Smith  will  have  to  follow  like  a  row 
of  bricks,  while  if  we  all  take  to  dispersing  in  the 
woods,  we  inaugurate  a  new  phase  of  the  war,  which 
may  be  indefinitely  prolonged,  and  it  will  at  least 
have  great  moral  effect  in  showing  that  in  our  pledges 
to  fight  it  out  to  the  last  we  meant  what  we  said.  And 
even,  general,  if  there  is  no  hope  at  all  in  this  course 
or  in  any  other,  and  if  the  fate  of  the  Confederacy  is 
sealed  whatever  we  do,  there  is  one  other  considera 
tion  which  your  soldiers  have  a  right  to  urge  on  you, 
and  that  is  your  own  military  reputation,  in  which 
every  man  in  this  army,  officer  or  private,  feels  the 
utmost  personal  pride  and  has  a  personal  property 
that  his  children  will  prize  after  him.  The  Yankees 
brought  Grant  here  from  the  West,  after  the  failure 
of  all  their  other  generals,  as  one  who  had  whipped 


24  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

everybody  he  had  ever  fought  against,  and  they  call 
him  "  Unconditional  Surrender  "  Grant,  and  have 
been  bragging  in  advance  that  you  would  have  to  sur 
render  too.  Now,  general,  I  think  you  ought  to  spare 
us  all  the  mortification  of  having  you  to  ask  Grant  for 
terms,  and  have  him  answer  that  he  had  no  terms  to 
offer  you.' 

"I  still  remember  most  vividly  the  emotion  with 
which  I  made  this  appeal,  increasing  as  I  went  on, 
until  my  whole  heart  was  in  it ;  and  it  seemed  to  me 
at  the  moment  one  which  no  soldier  could  resist  and 
against  which  no  consideration  whatever  could  be 
urged ;  and  when  I  closed,  after  urging  my  sugges 
tions  at  greater  length  than  it  is  necessary  to  repeat, 
looking  him  in  the  face  and  speaking  with  more  bold 
ness  than  I  usually  found  in  his  presence,  I  had  not  a 
doubt  that  he  must  adopt  some  such  course  as  I  had 
urged. 

"  He  heard  me  entirely  through,  however,  very 
calmly,  and  then  asked  :  '  How  many  men  do  you 
estimate  would  escape  if  I  were  to  order  the  army  to 
disperse  ? ' 

"  I  replied  :  '  I  suppose  two  thirds  of  us  could  get 
away,  for  the  enemy  could  not  disperse  to  follow  us 
through  the  woods.' 

"  He  said :  '  We  have  here  only  about  sixteen 
thousand  men  with  arms,  and  not  all  of  those  who 
could  get  away  would  join  General  Johnston,  but  most 
of  them  would  try  and  make  their  way  to  their  homes 
and  families,  and  their  numbers  would  be  too  small  to 
be  of  any  material  service  either  to  General  Johnston  or 
to  the  governors  of  the  States.  I  recognize  fully  that 
the  surrender  of  this  army  is  the  end  of  the  Confeder- 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  25 

acy,  but  no  course  we  can  take  can  prevent  or  even 
delay  that  result.  I  have  never  believed  that  we 
would  receive  foreign  assistance,  or  get  our  liberty 
otherwise  than  by  our  own  arms.  The  end  is  now 
upon  us,  and  it  only  remains  to  decide  how  we  shall 
close  the  struggle.  But  in  deciding  this  question  we 
are  to  approach  it  not  only  as  soldiers  but  as  Christian 
men,  deciding  on  matters  which  involve  a  great  deal 
else  besides  their  own  feelings.  If  I  should  order 
this  army  to  disperse,  the  men  with  their  arms,  but 
without  organization  or  control,  and  without  provisions 
or  money,  would  soon  be  wandering  through  every 
State  in  the  Confederacy,  some  seeking  to  get  to  their 
homes,  and  some  with  no  homes  to  go  to.  Many 
would  be  compelled  to  rob  and  plunder  as  they  went 
to  save  themselves  from  starvation,  and  the  enemy's 
cavalry  would  pursue  in  small  detachments,  particu 
larly  in  efforts  to  catch  the  general  officers,  and  raid 
and  burn  over  large  districts  which  they  will  other 
wise  never  reach,  and  the  result  would  be  the  inau 
guration  of  lawlessness  and  terror  and  of  organized 
bands  of  robbers  all  over  the  South.  Now,  as  Chris 
tian  men,  we  have  not  the  right  to  bring  this  state  of 
affair^  upon  the  country,  whatever  the  sacrifice  of  per 
sonal  pride  involved.  And  as  for  myself,  you  young 
men  might  go  to  bushwhacking,  but  I  am  too  old  ; 
and  even  if  it  were  right  for  me  to  disperse  the  army, 
I  should  surrender  myself  to  General  Grant  as  the 
only  proper  course  for  one  of  my  years  and  position. 
But  I  am  glad  to  be  able  to  tell  you  one  thing  for 
your  comfort :  General  Grant  will  not  demand  an  un 
conditional  surrender,  but  offers  us  most  liberal  terms 
—  the  paroling  of  the  whole  army  not  to  fight  until 


26  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

exchanged.'  He  then  went  on  to  speak  of  the  proba 
ble  details  of  the  terms  of  surrender,  and  to  say  that 
about  10  A.  M.  he  was  to  meet  General  Grant  in  the 
rear  of  the  army,  and  would  then  accept  the  terms 
offered. 

"  Sanguine  as  I  had  been  when  he  commenced  that 
4  he  must  acquiesce  in  my  views,'  I  had  not  one  word 
to  reply  when  he  had  finished.  He  spoke  slowly  and 
deliberately,  and  with  some  feeling  ;  and  the  complete 
ness  of  the  considerations  he  advanced,  and  which  he 
dwelt  upon  with  more  detail  than  I  can  now  fully  re 
call,  speaking  particularly  of  the  women  and  children, 
as  the  greatest  sufferers  in  the  state  of  anarchy  which 
a  dispersion  of  the  army  would  bring  about,  and  his  re 
ference  to  what  would  be  his  personal  course  if  he  did 
order  such  dispersion,  all  indicated  that  the  question 
was  not  then  presented  to  his  mind  for  the  first  time. 

"  A  short  time  after  this  conversation  General  Lee 
rode  to  the  rear  of  the  army  to  meet  General  Grant 
and  arrange  the  details  of  the  surrender.  He  had 
started  about  a  half  hour  when  General  Fitz  Lee  sent 
word  to  General  Longstreet  that  he  had  broken  through 
a  portion  of  the  enemy's  line,  and  that  the  whole  army 
might  make  its  way  through.  General  Longstreet,  on 
learning  this,  directed  Colonel  Haskell  of  the  artillery,1 

1  Colonel  J.  C.  Haskell,  of  South  Carolina ;  "  a  born  and  a  resource 
ful  artilleryman,  [who]  knew  no  such  thing  as  fear."  General  Long- 
street  evidently  used  General  Alexander's  paper  in  the  Philadelphia 
Press  in  preparing  the  account,  contained  in  his  Manassas  to  Appo- 
mattox,  of  what  occurred  on  the  day  of  Lee's  surrender.  A  further  re 
ference  to  Colonel  Haskell  may  be  found  in  Wise :  The  End  of  an  Era 
(p.  360).  Long-street  says  that,  at  Apporaattox,  "  there  were  '  surren 
dered  or  paroled  '  28,356  officers  and  men."  A  week  previous  to  the 
capitulation,  Lee's  and  Johnston's  combined  forces  numbered  consid 
erably  over  100,000  combatants.  [C.  F.  A.] 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  27 

who  was  very  finely  mounted,  to  ride  after  General  Lee 
at  utmost  speed,  killing  his  horse,  if  necessary,  and  re 
call  him  before  he  could  reach  General  Grant.  Colonel 
Haskell  rode  as  directed,  and  a  short  distance  in  rear 
of  the  army  found  General  Lee  and  some  of  his  staff 
dismounted  by  the  roadside.  As  he  with  difficulty 
cheeked  his  horse,  General  Lee  came  up  quickly,  ask 
ing  what  was  the  matter ;  but,  without  waiting  for  a 
reply,  said  :  *  Oh !  I  'm  afraid  you  have  killed  your 
beautiful  mare.  What  did  you  ride  her  so  hard  for  ? ' 
On  hearing  General  Longstreet's  message,  he  asked 
some  questions  about  the  situation,  and  sent  word  to 
General  Longstreet  to  use  his  own  discretion  in  making 
any  movements ;  but  he  did  not  himself  return,  and  in 
a  short  while  another  message  was  received  that  the 
success  of  the  cavalry  under  General  Fitz  Lee  was  but 
temporary,  and  that  there  was  no  such  gap  in  the 
enemy's  line  as  had  been  supposed.  Soon  afterward 
a  message  was  brought  from  the  enemy's  picket  that 
General  Grant  had  passed  around  to  the  front  and 
would  meet  General  Lee  at  Appomattox  Courthouse, 
and  General  Lee  accordingly  returned. 

"  Meanwhile,  as  the  Confederate  line  under  General 
Gordon  was  slowly  falling  back  from  Appomattox 
Courthouse  after  as  gallant  a  fight  against  overwhelm 
ing  odds  as  it  had  ever  made,  capturing  and  bringing 
safely  off  with  it  an  entire  battery  of  the  enemy's,  Gen 
eral  Custer,  commanding  a  division  of  Federal  cavalry, 
rode  forward  with  a  flag  of  truce,  and,  the  firing  hav 
ing  ceased  on  both  sides,  was  conducted  to  General 
Longstreet  as  commanding  temporarily  in  General 
Lee's  absence.  Custer  demanded  the  surrender  of  the 
army  to  himself  and  General  Sheridan,  to  which  Gen- 


28  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

eral  Longstreet  replied  that  General  Lee  was  in  com 
munication  with  General  Grant  upon  that  subject,  and 
that  the  issue  would  be  determined  between  them. 
Custer  replied  that  he  and  Sheridan  were  independent 
of  Grant,  and  unless  the  surrender  was  made  to  them 
they  would  '  pitch  in  '  at  once.  Longstreet's  answer 
was  a  peremptory  order  [to  Custer]  at  once  [to  return] 
to  his  own  lines,  and  4  try  it  if  he  liked.'  Custer  was 
accordingly  escorted  back;  but  fire  was  not  reopened, 
and  both  lines  remained  halted,  the  Confederate  about 
a  half  mile  east  of  the  Courthouse. 

"  General  Lee,  returning  from  the  rear  shortly  after 
ward,  halted  in  a  small  field  adjoining  Sweeney's  house, 
a  little  in  rear  of  his  skirmish  line,  and,  seated  on 
some  rails  under  an  apple-tree,  awaited  a  message  from 
General  Grant.  This  apple-tree  was  not  only  entirely 
cut  up  for  mementos  within  two  days  afterward,  but 
its  very  roots  were  dug  up  and  carried  away  under 
the  false  impression  that  the  surrender  took  place 
under  it.1 

"  About  noon  a  Federal  staff  officer  rode  up  and  an 
nounced  that  General  Grant  was  at  the  Courthouse, 
and  General  Lee  with  one  of  his  staff  accompanied 
him  back.  As  he  left  the  apple-tree  General  Long- 
street's  last  words  were  :  4  Unless  he  offers  you  liberal 
terms,  general,  let  us  fight  it  out.' 

"  It  would  be  a  difficult  task  to  convey  to  one  who 

1  The  surrender  took  place  in  the  house  of  a  Mr.  McLean,  a  gentle 
man  who,  by  a  strange  coincidence,  owned  a  farm  on  Bull  Run  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  General  Beauregard's  headquarters  were  at 
McLean's  house,  just  in  the  rear  of  Blackburn's  ford,  during  the  first 
battle  fought  by  the  army,  July  18, 1861.  McLean  moved  from  Bull 
Run  to  get  himself  out  of  the  theatre  of  war.  The  last  battle  took 
place  on  his  new  farm,  and  the  surrender  in  his  new  residence. 


LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  29 

was  not  present  an  idea  of  the  feeling  of  the  Confed 
erate  army  during  the  few  hours  which  so  suddenly, 
and  so  unexpectedly  to  it,  terminated  its  existence,  and 
with  it  all  hopes  of  the  Confederacy.  Having  been 
sharply  engaged  that  very  morning,  and  its  movements 
arrested  by  the  flag  of  truce,  while  one  portion  of  it 
was  actually  fighting  and  nearly  all  the  rest,  infantry 
and  artillery,  had  just  been  formed  in  line  of  battle  in 
sight  and  range  of  the  enemy,  and  with  guns  unlim- 
bered,  it  was  impossible  to  realize  fully  that  the  war, 
with  all  its  hopes,  its  ambitions,  and  its  hardships,  was 
thus  ended.  There  was  comparatively  very  little  con 
versation,  and  men  stood  in  groups  looking  over  the 
scene  ;  but  the  groups  were  unusually  silent.  It  was 
not  at  first  generally  known  that  a  surrender  was  in 
evitable,  but  there  was  a  remarkable  pre-acquiescence 
in  whatever  General  Lee  should  determine,  and  the 
warmest  expressions  of  confidence  in  his  judgment. 
Hanks  and  discipline  were  maintained  as  usual,  and 
there  is  little  doubt  that,  had  General  Lee  decided  to 
fight  that  afternoon,  the  troops  would  not  have  disap 
pointed  him.  About  4  p.  M.  he  returned  from  the 
Courthouse,  and,  after  informing  the  principal  officers 
of  the  terms  of  the  surrender,  started  to  ride  back  to 
his  camp. 

"  The  universal  desire  to  express  fa  him  the  un 
abated  lo^  and  confidence  of  the  army  had  led  to  the 
formation  o£±he  gunners  of  a  few  battalions  of  artil 
lery  along""Ml  roadside,  with  orders  to  take  off  their 
hats  in  silence  as  he  rode  by.  When  he  approached, 
however,  the  men  could  not  be  restrained,  but  burst 
into  the  wildest  cheering,  which  the  adjacent  infantry 
lines  took  up ;  and,  breaking  ranks,  they  all  crowded 


30  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

around  him,  cheering  at  the  tops  of  their  voices.  Gen 
eral  Lee  stopped  his  horse,  and,  after  gaining  silence, 
made  the  only  speech  to  his  men  that  he  ever  made. 
He  was  very  brief,  and  gave  no  excuses  or  apologies 
for  his  surrender,  but  said  he  had  done  all  in  his 
power  for  his  men,  and  urged  them  to  go  as  quickly 
and  quietly  to  their  homes  as  possible,  to  resume 
peaceful  avocations,  and  to  be  as  good  citizens  as  they 
had  been  soldiers ;  and  this  advice  marked  the  course 
which  he  himself  pursued  so  faithfully  to  the  end." 
BOSTON,  November  6,  1901. 

NOTE.  —  While  the  foregoing-  was  passing  through  the  press,  there 
appeared  in  the  Century  magazine  for  April,  1902  (volume  Ixiii.  pp. 
921-944),  a  series  of  papers  relating  to  the  surrender  of  Appomat- 
tox.  One  of  these  papers,  entitled  ' '  Personal  Recollections  of  the 
Break-up  of  the  Confederacy,"  was  by  General  Alexander.  Another 
was  by  Colonel  Charles  Marshall,  the  military  secretary  to  General 
Lee,  referred  to  by  Mr.  John  Sargent  Wise.  (Supra,  page  5.)  In  the 
Century  paper  General  Alexander  recounts  the  circumstances  of  his 
interview  with  General  Lee  more  in  detail,  and  with  greater  exactness, 
than  in  his  contribution  to  the  Philadelphia  Press  of  twenty  years  be 
fore  ;  but  the  two  narratives  differ  in  no  material  re»pect. 


II 

THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON:  BEFORE  AND 
AFTER i 

NEGOTIATED  during  the  spring  of  1871,  and  signed 
on  the  8th  of  May  of  that  year,  the  Treaty  of  Wash 
ington  not  only  put  to  rest  questions  of  difference  of 
long  standing,  big  with  danger,  between  the  two  lead 
ing  maritime  nations  of  the  world,  but  it  incorporated 
new  principles  of  the  first  importance  into  the  body 
of  accepted  International  Law.  The  degree,  more 
over,  to  which  that  treaty  has  influenced,  and  is  now 
influencing,  the  course  of  human  affairs  and  historical 
evolution  in  both  hemispheres  is,  I  think,  little  appre 
ciated.  To  that  subject  I  propose  this  evening  to 
address  myself. 

The  time  to  make  use  of  unpublished  material  bear 
ing  on  this  period  —  material  not  found  in  newspapers, 
public  archives,  or  memoirs,  which  have  already  seen 
the  light  —  has,  moreover,  come.  So  far  as  any  con 
siderable  political  or  diplomatic  result  can  be  said  to 
be  the  work  of  one  man,  the  Treaty  of  Washington 

1  This  paper  was  originally  prepared  as  an  address,  to  be  delivered 
before  the  New  York  Historical  Society  on  its  ninety-seventh  anni 
versary,  on  the  evening-  of  Tuesday,  November  19,  1901.  Owing-  to 
the  length  to  which  it  grew  in  preparation,  it  was  on  that  occasion 
so  compressed  in  delivery  as  to  occupy  but  one  hour.  Subsequently 
revised,  it  supplied  the  material  for  a  course  of  four  lectures  before 
the  Lowell  Institute  in  Boston,  on  the  3d,  6th,  10th,  and  13th  of  the 
following  December. 


32  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

was  the  work  of  Hamilton  Fish.  Mr.  Fish  died  in 
September,  1893  —  now  over  eight  years  ago.  When 
the  treaty  was  negotiated,  General  Grant  was  Presi 
dent  ;  and  General  Grant  has  been  dead  more  than 
sixteen  years.  In  speaking  of  this  treaty,  and  describ 
ing  the  complications  which  led  up  to  it,  and  to  which 
it  incidentally  gave  rise,  frequent  reference  must  be 
made  to  Charles  Sunnier  and  John  Lothrop  Motley; 
and,  while  Mr.  Sumner  died  nearly  twenty-eight  years 
ago,  Mr.  Motley  followed  him  by  a  little  more  than 
three  years  only.  Thus,  between  the  llth  of  March, 
1874,  and  the  7th  of  September,  1893,  all  those  I  have 
named  —  prominent  actors  in  the  drama  I  am  to  de 
scribe  —  passed  from  the  stage.  They  belonged  to  a 
generation  that  is  gone.  Other  public  characters  have 
since  come  forward ;  new  issues  have  presented  them 
selves.  The  once  famous  Alabama  claims  are  now 
"  ancient  history,"  and  the  average  man  of  to-day 
hardly  knows  what  is  referred  to  when  allusion  is 
made  to  "  Consequential  Damages,"  or  "  National 
Injuries,"  in  connection  therewith ;  indeed,  why  should 
he  ? — for  when,  in  June,  1872,  that  issue  was  at  Geneva 
finally  put  to  rest,  he  who  is  now  (1901)  President  of 
the  United  States  was  a  boy  in  his  fourteenth  year. 
None  the  less,  as  the  Treaty  of  Washington  was  a  very 
memorable  historical  event,  so  President  Grant,  Sec 
retary  Fish,  Senator  Sumner,  and  Minister  Motley  are 
great  historic  figures.  Their  achievements  and  dissen 
sions  have  already  been  much  discussed,  and  will  be 
more  discussed  hereafter  ;  and  to  that  discussion  I 
propose  now  to  contribute  something.  My  theme  in 
cludes  the  closing  scene  of  a  great  drama ;  a  scene  in 
the  development  of  which  the  striking  play  of  indi 
vidual  character  will  long  retain  an  interest. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  33 

History  aside,  moreover,  the  Treaty  of  Washington 
itself  is  a  living,  and  it  may  even  be  said  a  controlling, 
factor  in  the  international  situation  of  to-day :  — 

"And  enterprises  of  great  pith  and  moment 
With  this  regard  their  currents  turn  awry, 
And  lose  the  name  of  action." 

That  treaty  was  signed  at  Washington  on  the  8th  of 
May,  1871 ;  the  battle  of  Majuba  Hill  took  place  in 
South  Africa  nine  years  from  the  following  27th  of 
February.  Separated  in  time,  and  occurring  on  dif 
ferent  sides  of  both  the  equator  and  the  Atlantic,  the 
two  events  had  little  apparent  bearing  on  each  other ; 
yet  the  settlement  effected  through  the  American  treaty 
forestalled  the  outcome  of  the  African  war. 


Between  1861  and  1865  the  United  States  was 
engaged  in  a  struggle  which  called  for  the  exertion  of 
all  the  force  at  its  command ;  as,  to  a  lesser  extent, 
Great  Britain  is  now.  The  similarity  between  the 
war  in  South  Africa  and  the  Confederate  war  in  this 
country  early  attracted  the  attention  of  English 
writers,  and  one  of  the  most  thoughtful  of  their  civil 
and  military  critics  has  put  on  record  a  detailed  com 
parison  of  the  two.1  "  Each  of  these  conflicts,"  this 
authority  asserts,  "  had  its  origin  in  conditions  of  long 
and  gradual  growth,  rendering  an  ultimate  explosion 
inevitable.  Each  of  them  deeply  affected  the  whole 
existence  of  the  communities  which  found  themselves 
in  antagonism.  In  each  case,  therefore,  the  energy 
and  the  duration  of  the  fighting  far  exceeded  the 
expectations  of  most  of  those  who  might  have  seemed 
1  Spenser  Wilkinson  :  War  and  Policy  (1900),  pp.  422-439. 


34  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

to  be  in  a  position  to  judge."  To  the  same  effect, 
another  author 1  refers  to  the  "  striking  resemblance  " 
between  the  two  struggles.  "  The  analogy,"  he  says, 
"  like  any  other  historical  analogy,  must  not  be  pressed 
too  far,  but  there  is  a  remarkable  parallelism  in  the 
general  character  of  the  political  issues,  in  the  course 
of  negotiations  preceding  war,  and  in  the  actual  con 
duct  of  the  campaigns,  a  parallelism  which  sometimes 
comes  out  in  the  most  insignificant  details."  This 
analogy  the  writer  might  advantageously  have  carried 
into  his  discussion  of  the  effect  of  both  wars  on  foreign 
opinion  at  the  time  of  each.  He  correctly  enough 
admits  that,  during  the  struggle  in  South  Africa,  — 
"  The  whole  of  Europe  almost  was  against  us,  not  so 
much  from  any  consideration  of  the  merits  of  the  case, 
as  from  the  dislike  and  jealousy  of  England  which 
have  developed  so  enormously  in  the  last  decade ; " 
but  he  significantly  adds,  —  "  In  the  United  States 
sympathies  were  much  divided."  In  fact,  during  our 
Civil  War  the  entire  sympathies  and  hearty  good-will 
of  the  great  body  of  those  composing  what  are  known 
as  the  governing  and  influential  classes  throughout 
Europe,  west  of  the  Vistula,  were  enlisted  on  the  side 
of  the  Confederacy.  In  these  classes  would  be  included 
all  those  of  rank,  members  of  the  learned  professions, 
the  commercial,  financial  and  banking  circles,  and 
officers  of  the  two  services  —  the  army  and  the  navy. 
And  then  also,  as  in  the  case  of  the  South  African 
war,  this  instructive  accord  arose,  not  "  from  any  con 
sideration  of  the  merits  of  the  case,"  but  from  "  dis 
like  and  jealousy ; "  —  the  dislike  and  jealousy  of 
American  democracy,  which  "  had  developed  so  enor- 

1  The  Times  :  History  of  the  War  in  South  Africa. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  35 

motisly  in  the  course  "  of  the  decade  or  two  immedi 
ately  preceding  the  outbreak  of  1861.  This  was  no 
ticeably  the  case  in  England  ;  there  "  sympathies  were 
much  divided,"  but  the  line  of  cleavage  was  horizontal. 
Speaking  largely,  and  allowing,  of  course,  for  numerous 
exceptional  cases,  the  more  conscientious  and  think 
ing  among  the  poor  and  lowly,  especially  of  the  non 
conformists,  instinctively  sympathized  with  the  Union 
and  the  North  ;  while  of  the  privileged  and  the  monied, 
the  commercial  and  manufacturing  classes,  it  may 
safely  be  asserted  .that  nine  out  of  ten  were  heart 
and  soul  on  the  side  of  the  rebel  and  slaveholder.  It 
is  only  necessary  for  me  further  to  premise  that  as 
respects  foreign  governments,  and  the  principles  of 
international  law  and  amity  relating  to  the  concession 
of  belligerent  rights,  —  the  recognition  of  nationality, 
neutrality,  and  participation  of  neutrals,  direct  and 
indirect,  in  the  operations  of  war,  —  the  position  of 
the  Confederacy  and  the  two  South  African  republics 
were  in  essentials  the  same.  The  latter,  it  is  true, 
were  not  maritime  countries,  so  that  no  questions  of 
blockade,  and  comparatively  few  of  contraband,  arose  ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  while  the  Confederates  were, 
as  respects  foreign  nations,  insurgents,  pure  and  simple, 
the  South  African  republics  had  governments  de  jure 
as  well  as  de  facto.  Great  Britain  claimed  over  them 
a  species  of  suzerainty  only,  undefined  at  best,  and 
plainly  questionable  by  any  power  disinclined  to  recog 
nize  it.  This  the  British  authorities l  deplore,  and 
try  to  explain  away ;  but  the  fact  is  not  denied. 

So  far,  therefore,  as  the   status  of  those  in  arms 
against  a  government  claiming  sovereignty  is  of  mo- 
1  The  Times  :  History,  vol.  i.  chap.  iv. 


36  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

ment,  the  position  of  the  South  African  republics  was, 
in  1900,  far  stronger  with  all  nations  on  terms  of 
amity  with  Great  Britain  than  was  the  position  of  the 
Confederacy  in  1861-62  with  nations  then  at  amity 
with  the  United  States.  It  consequently  followed 
that  any  precedent  created,  or  rule  laid  down,  by  a 
neutral  for  its  own  guidance  in  international  relations 
during  the  first  struggle  was  applicable  in  the  second, 
except  in  so  far  as  such  rule  or  precedent  had  been 
modified  or  set  aside  by  mutual  agreement  of  the  par 
ties  concerned  during  the  intervening  years.  What, 
then,  were  these  rules  and  precedents  established  by 
Great  Britain  in  its  dealings  with  the  United  States 
in  1861-65,  which,  unless  altered  by  mutual  consent 
during  the  intervening  time,  would  have  been  ap 
plicable  by  the  United  States  to  Great  Britain  in 
1899-1901? 

In  the  opening  pages  of  his  account  of  the  doings 
of  the  agents  of  the  Confederacy  in  Europe  during 
our  Civil  War,  Captain  James  D.  Bulloch,  of  the  Con 
federate  States  Navy,  the  most  trusted  and  efficient  of 
those  agents,  says  that  "  the  Confederate  government 
made  great  efforts  to  organize  a  naval  force  abroad ; " 
and  he  adds,  truly  enough,  that  "  the  naval  operations 
of  the  Confederate  States  which  were  [thus]  organized 
abroad  possess  an  importance  and  attraction  greater 
than  their  relative  effect  upon  the  issue  of  the  strug 
gle."  Captain  Bulloch  might  well  have  gone  further. 
He  might  have  added  that,  in  connection  with  those 
operations,  the  public  men,  high  officials,  courts  of 
law,  and  colonial  authorities  of  Great  Britain  more 
especially,  supported  by  the  press  and  general  public 
opinion  of  that  country,  labored  conjointly  and  strenu- 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  37 

ously,  blindly  and  successfully,  to  build  up  a  structure 
of  rules  and  precedents,  not  less  complete  and  solid 
than  well  calculated,  whenever  the  turn  of  Great  Brit 
ain  might  come,  —  as  come  in  time  it  surely  would,  — 
to  work  the  downfall  of  the  empire.  As  that  record 
carries  in  it  a  lesson  of  deep  significance  to  all  in 
trusted  with  the  temporary  administration  of  national 
affairs,  it  should  neither  be  forgotten  nor  ignored.  It 
is  well  that  statesmen,  also,  should  occasionally  be 
reminded  that,  with  nations  as  with  individuals,  there 
is  a  to-morrow,  and  the  whirligig  of  time  ever  brings 
on  its  revenges.  "  All  things  come  to  him  who  waits ; " 
and  the  motto  of  the  house  of  Ravenswood  was,  "  I 
bide  my  time." 

When  hostilities  broke  out  in  April,  1861,  the  so- 
called  Confederate  States  of  America  did  not  have 
within  their  own  limits  any  of  the  essentials  to  a  mari 
time  warfare.  With  a  long  coast  line  and  numerous 
harbors,  in  itself  and  by  itself,  so  far  as  aggressive  ac 
tion  was  concerned,  the  Confederacy  could  not  be,  or  be 
made,  a  base  of  naval  operations.  It  had  no  machine 
shops  nor  yards  ;  no  shipwrights,  and  no  collection  of 
material  for  shipbuilding  or  the  equipment  of  ships. 
In  the  days  when  rebellion  was  as  yet  only  incipient, 
it  was  correctly  deemed  of  prime  importance  to  get 
cruisers  ;  but  a  diligent  search  throughout  the  ports 
of  the  seceding  States  disclosed  but  one  small  steamer 
at  all  adapted  for  a  cruising  service.  Under  these  cir 
cumstances,  the  minds  of  those  composing  the  as  yet 
embryonic  government  at  Montgomery  turned  natu 
rally  to  Europe  ;  and,  in  the  early  days  of  May,  1861, 
immediately  after  the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter,  a 
scheme  was  matured  for  making  Great  Britain  the  base 


38  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

of  Confederate  naval  operations  against  the  United 
States.  The  nature  and  scope  of  the  British  statutes 
had  already  been  looked  into ;  the  probability  of  the 
early  issuance  of  a  proclamation  of  neutrality  by  the 
government  of  Great  Britain  was  considered,  and  the 
officials  of  the  Confederate  Navy  Department  were 
confident  that  the  Montgomery  government  would  be 
recognized  by  European  powers  as  a  de  facto  organi 
zation.  If  belligerent  rights  were  then  conceded  to  it, 
the  maritime  shelter  and  privileges  common  to  belli 
gerents  under  the  amity  of  nations  must,  it  was  assumed, 
be  granted  to  its  regularly  commissioned  cruisers. 

The  officials  in  question  next  looked  about  for  some 
competent  Confederate  sympathizer,  who  might  be 
despatched  to  Europe,  and  there  be  a  species  of  sec 
retary  in  partibus.  They  decided  upon  James  D. 
Bulloch,  at  the  time  a  lieutenant  in  the  United  States 
Navy,  detailed  by  the  government  for  the  command 
of  the  Bienmlle,  a  privately  owned  mail  steamer  run 
ning  between  New  York  and  New  Orleans.  A  Geor 
gian  by  birth  and  appointment,  Lieutenant  Bulloch, 
according  to  the  form  of  speech  then  much  in  vogue, 
went  with  his  State,  and  at  once,  after  Georgia  seceded, 
put  his  services  at  the  disposal  of  the  Confederate  gov 
ernment.  He  was  requested  forthwith  to  report  at 
Montgomery ;  and  there,  on  the  8th  and  9th  of  May, 
he  received  from  S.  R.  Mallory,  the  Confederate  naval 
secretary,  verbal  instructions  covering  all  essential 
points  of  procedure.  On  the  night  of  the  9th  of  May, 
Bulloch  left  Montgomery  for  Liverpool,  his  duly  des 
ignated  seat  of  operations.  Arriving  there  on  the  4th 
of  June,  Secretary  Mallory's  assistant  at  once  entered 
on  his  duties,  not  only  purchasing  naval  supplies,  but, 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  39 

before  the  close  of  the  month,  he  had  contracted  with 
a  Liverpool  shipbuilder  for  the  construction  of  a 
cruiser,  and  it  was  already  partly  in  frame.  The 
Queen's  proclamation  of  neutrality  had  then  been 
issued  some  six  weeks.  The  vessel  now  on  the  stocks 
was  at  first  called  the  Oreto ;  afterwards  it  attained 
an  international  celebrity  as  the  Florida.  Acting 
with  an  energy  which  fully  justified  his  selection  for 
the  work  of  the  Confederacy  then  in  hand  to  be  done, 
Captain  Bulloch,  on  the  1st  of  the  following  August, 
entered  into  another  contract,  this  time  with  the 
Messrs.  Laird,  under  which  the  keel  of  a  second 
cruiser  was  immediately  afterwards  laid  in  the  yards  of 
that  firm  at  Birkenhead.  The  purpose  of  the  Con 
federate  government  was  well  defined.  In  the  words 
of  Captain  Bulloch,  it  was  "  not  merely  to  buy  or 
build  a  single  ship,  but  it  was  to  maintain  a  perma 
nent  representative  of  the  Navy  Department  [in 
Great  Britain],  and  to  get  ships  and  naval  supplies 
without  hindrance  as  long  as  the  war  lasted."  The 
ports  of  the  Mersey,  the  Clyde,  and  the  Thames  were 
to  be  the  arsenals,  and  furnish  the  shipyards,  of  the 
Confederacy.  Nor  did  the  scheme  stop  here.  A  cor 
responding  branch  of  the  Confederate  Treasury  De 
partment  had  already  been  established  in  Liverpool, 
officially  designated  the  "  Depositories  "  of  that  organi 
zation  ; J  and,  regardless  of  any  pretence  of  conceal 
ment,  the  naval  representative  of  the  Confederacy  had 
an  office  in  the  premises  hired  by  its  fiscal  agents.2 

1  Bulloch:  Secret  Service  of  the  Confederate  States  in  Europe,  vol. 
i.  p.  65  ;  also  vol.  ii.  pp.  216,  416. 

2  Geneva  Arbitration :    Correspondence   concerning    Claims   against 
Great  Britain,  vol.  vi.  p.  185.    The  papers  officially  published  in  con 
nection  with  the  Geneva  Arbitration  are  voluminous  and  confusing. 


40  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

No  hindrance  to  the  operations  of  the  combined  branch 
bureaus  was  anticipated.  In  other  words,  Great  Brit 
ain  was  to  be  made  the  base  of  an  organized  maritime 
warfare  against  the  United  States,  the  Confederacy 
itself  being  confessedly  unable  to  conduct  such  a  war 
fare  from  within  its  own  limits.  The  single  question 
was,  —  Would  Great  Britain  permit  itself  to  be  thus 
utilized  for  the  construction,  equipment,  and  despatch 
of  commerce-destroyers  and  battleships  intended  to 
operate,  in  a  domestic  insurrection,  against  a  nation 
with  which  it  was  at  peace  ? 

Excepting  only  the  good  faith,  friendly  purpose, 
and  apparently  obvious  self-interest  of  a  civilized  gov 
ernment  in  the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  provisions  of  the  British  Foreign  Enlistment  Act 
of  1819  constituted  the  only  barrier  in  the  way  of  the 
consummation  of  this  extraordinary  project,  —  a  pro 
ject  which  all  will  now  agree  was  tantamount  to  a 
proposal  that,  so  far  as  commerce-destroyers  were  con 
cerned,  the  first  maritime  nation  of  the  world  should 
become  an  accomplice  before  the  fact  in  what  bore  a 
close  family  resemblance  to  piracy.  As  the  date  of 
its  enactment  (1819)  implies,  the  British  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  was  passed  at  the  time  of  the  trou 
bles  incident  to  the  separation  of  its  American  de 
pendencies  from  Spain,  and  was  designed  to  prevent 
the  fitting  out  in  British  ports  of  piratical  expeditions 

The  references  under  the  title  "  Geneva  Arbitration,"  in  the  notes  to 
this  volume,  are  to  the  original  editions  presented  to  the  tribunal  at 
Geneva.  These  papers  were  printed  between  18(59  and  1872  in  Wash 
ing-ton,  London,  Paris,  and  Geneva,  as  the  exigencies  of  the  case  re 
quired.  To  supersede  them  in  part,  Congress  (as  Cong.  Doc.,  Serial 
]Sros.  1553-155(3)  caused  four  volumes  to  be  printed,  here  cited  as 
Papers  relating  to  Treaty  of  Washington  (1872). 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  41 

against  Spanish  commerce,  under  cover  of  letters  of 
marque,  etc.,  issued  by  South  American  insurrection 
ary  governments.  Owing  to  the  long  peace  which 
ensued  on  its  passage,  the  act  had  slept  innocuously  on 
the  statute-book,  no  case  involving  a  forfeiture  ever 
having  been  brought  to  trial  under  it.  It  was  an 
instance  of  desuetude,  covering  more  than  forty  years. 
"  Labored  and  cumbrous  in  the  extreme," 1  the 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act  was,  after  the  manner  of 
English  Acts  of  Parliament,  "  overloaded  with  a  mass 
of  phrases,  alike  unprecise  and  confused,  with  so  much 
of  tedious  superfluity  of  immaterial  circumstances  "  as 
to  suggest  a  suspicion  that  it  must  have  been  "  spe 
cially  designed  to  give  scope  to  bar  chicanery,  to  facil 
itate  the  escape  of  offenders,  and  to  embarrass  and 
confound  the  officers  of  the  government  charged  with 
the  administration  of  law."2  It  was,  in  short,  one 
of  those  statutes  in  which  the  British  parliamentary 
draughtsman  has  prescriptively  revelled,  and  through 
the  clauses  of  which  judge  and  barrister  love,  as  the 
phrase  goes,  to  drive  a  coach-and-six.  But  it  so 
chanced  that,  in  the  present  case,  the  coach-and-six 
had,  as  passengers,  the  whole  British  Ministry  ;  and 
in  it  they  were  doomed  to  flounder  pitifully  along  "  in 
the  flat  morass  of  [a]  meaningless  verbosity  and  con 
fused  circumlocution."  3  Upon  the  proper  construc 
tion  of  this  notable  act,  the  Confederate  representa 
tives  at  once  sought  the  opinion  of  counsel ;  and  they 
were  presently  advised  that,  under  its  provisions,  it 
would  be  an  offence  for  a  British  subject  to  build, 

1  Montague  Bernard :  Historical  Account  of  the  Neutrality  of  Great 
Britain  during  the  American  Civil  War  (London,  1870),  p.  404. 

2  Geneva  Arbitration  :   Argument  of  the  United  States,  pp.  52,  61. 

3  Ib.,  p.  52. 


42  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

arm,  and  equip  a  vessel  to  cruise  against  the  com 
merce  of  a  friendly  state ;  but  the  mere  building  of  a 
ship,  though  with  the  full  intent  of  so  using  her,  was 
no  offence ;  nor  was  it  an  offence  to  equip  a  vessel  so 
built,  if  it  was  without  the  intent  so  to  use  her.  To 
constitute  an  offence,  the  two  acts  of  building  a  ship 
with  intent  of  hostile  use,  and  equipping  the  same, 
must  be  combined  ;  and  both  must  be  done  in  British 
waters.1  It  hence  followed  that,  under  the  act,  it 
was  lawful  for  an  English  firm  to  build  a  ship  in  a 
British  shipyard  designed  purposely  to  prey  on  Amer 
ican  commerce ;  it  was  also  lawful  to  sell  or  buy,  of 
this  same  English  firm  if  more  convenient,  the  arti 
cles  of  necessary  equipment  for  such  vessel  from  cord-* 
age  to  arms  and  ammunition ;  but  the  articles  of  war 
equipment  must  not  go  into  the  vessel,  thus  making  of 
her  a  complete  cruiser,  within  British  maritime  juris 
diction.  The  final  act  of  conjunction  must  be  effected 
at  some  distance  greater  than  one  league  from  where 
a  British  writ  ran.  Assuming  this  construction  of  the 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act  to  be  correct,  its  evasion  was 
simple.  It  could  be  enforced  practically  only  with 
a  government  strong  enough  to  decline  to  allow  its 
international  obligations  to  be  trifled  with.  If,  how 
ever,  officials  evinced  the  slightest  indifference  respect 
ing  the  enforcement  of  those  obligations,  and  much 
more  if  the  government  was  infected  by  any  spirit  of 
connivance,  the  act  at  once  became  a  statute  mockery. 
In  any  large  view  of  policy  Great  Britain  then  was, 
as  it  now  is,  under  strong  inducement  to  insist  on  the 
highest  standard  of  international  maritime  observance. 
As  the  foremost  ocean-carrier  of  the  world,  it  ill  be- 

1  Bulloch,  vol.  i.  pp.  65-67. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  43 

came  her  to  connive  at  commerce-destroying.  But,  in 
1861,  Great  Britain  had  a  divided  interest ;  and  Brit 
ish  money-making  instincts  are  well  developed.  She 
was  the  arsenal  and  shipbuilder  of  the  world,  as  well 
as  its  ocean-carrier.  Her  artisans  could  launch  from 
private  dockyards  vessels  of  any  size,  designed  for 
any  purpose,  thoroughly  equipped  whether  for  peace 
or  war  ;  and  all  at  the  shortest  possible  notice.  Under 
ordinary  circumstances,  this  was  a  legitimate  branch 
of  industry.  It  admitted,  however,  of  easy  perver 
sion  ;  and  the  question  in  1861  was  whether  the  first 
of  commercial  nations  would  permit  its  laws  to  be  so 
construed  as  to  establish  the  principle  that,  in  case  of 
war,  any  neutral  might  convert  its  ports  into  nurseries 
of  corsairs  for  the  use  or  injury  of  either  belligerent, 
or  of  both. 

It  is  now  necessary  briefly  to  recall  a  once  familiar 
record  showing  the  extent  to  which  Great  Britain  lent 
itself  to  the  scheme  of  the  Confederacy,  and  the  pre 
cedents  it  created  while  so  doing.  All  through  the 
later  summer  of  1861,  —  the  months  following  the  dis 
grace  of  Bull  Run  and  the  incident  of  the  Trent,  — 
the  work  of  Confederate  naval  construction  was  pushed 
vigorously  along  in  the  Liverpool  and  Birkenhead  ship 
yards.  Hardly  any  concealment  was  attempted  of  the 
purpose  for  which  the  Oreto  and  the  "  290  "  —  as  the 
two  vessels  were  called  or  designated  —  were  designed. 
As  the  work  on  them  progressed,  it  was  openly  super 
vised  by  agents  known  to  be  in  the  Confederate  employ, 
while  British  government  officials,  having  free  access 
to  the  yards,  looked  to  it  that  the  empty  letter  of  the 
law  was  observed.  Never  was  a  solemn  mockery  more 
carefully  enacted ;  never  was  there  a  more  insulting 


44  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

pretence  at  the  observance  of  international  obliga 
tions  ;  never  a  more  perfect  instance  of  connivance  at 
a  contemplated  crime,  though  not  so  nominated  in  the 
bond. 

The  Oreto,  or  Florida,  we  are  told  by  Captain  Bui- 
loch,  was  the  first  regularly  built  war  vessel  of  the 
Confederate  States  Navy.  "  She  has,"  he  wrote  at 
the  time,  "  been  twice  inspected  by  the  Custom  House 
authorities,  in  compliance  with  specific  orders  from  the 
Foreign  Office.  .  .  .  The  hammock-nettings,  ports, 
and  general  appearance  of  the  ship  sufficiently  indicate 
the  ultimate  object  of  her  construction,  but  .  .  .  regis 
tered  as  an  English  ship,  in  the  name  of  an  English 
man,  commanded  by  an  Englishman,  with  a  regular 
official  number  under  the  direction  of  the  Board  of 
Trade,  she  seems  to  be  perfectly  secure  against  cap 
ture  or  interference,  until  an  attempt  is  made  to  arm 
her."  Another  vessel,  carrying  the  armament  of  this 
contemplated  commerce-destroyer,  left  England  at  so 
nearly  the  same  time  as  the  Oreto  that  those  in 
charge  of  the  latter  increased  her  speed,  being  appre 
hensive  that  their  consort  would  arrive  first  at  the 
point  of  rendezvous.  Making  Nassau,  an  English 
port,  the  last  pretence  at  concealment  as  to  character 
and  destination  disappeared,  in  consequence  of  the 
heedless  talk  of  a  Confederate  officer  there  to  join 
her.  A  portion  of  her  crew,  also,  immediately  re 
ported  to  the  British  naval  commander  at  the  station 
that  the  vessel's  destination  could  not  be  ascertained. 
She  was  seized;  but,  after  some  legal  forms  and  a 
pretence  of  a  hearing,  a  decree  of  restoration  was 
entered.  Subsequently,  before  being  herself  destroyed, 
she  captured,  and  burnt  or  bonded,  some  forty  ves- 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  45 

sels  carrying  the  United  States  flag.     A  precedent 
complete  at  every  point  had  been  created. 

Relying  on  the  advice  of  counsel  and  the  experience 
gained  in  the  case  of  the  Florida,  there  was  absolutely 
110  concealment  of  purpose  even  attempted  as  respects 
the  Alabama.  Built  under  a  contract  entered  into 
with  the  avowed  agent  of  the  Confederacy,  that  the 
"  290 "  was  designed  as  a  Confederate  commerce- 
destroyer  was  town  talk  in  Liverpool,  —  "  quite  noto 
rious,"  as  the  American  consul  expressed  it.  She  was 
launched  on  the  15th  of  May,  1862,  as  the  Enrica, 
with  "  no  attempt,"  as  Captain  Bulloch  testifies,  "  to 
deceive  any  one  by  any  pretence  whatever."  Every 
thing  was  done  in  the  "  ordinary  commonplace  way  ;  " 
and,  as  Bulloch  afterwards  wrote,  he  "  always  at 
tributed  the  success  of  getting  the  Alabama  finished 
as  a  sea-going  ship,  and  then  despatched,  to  the  fact 
that  no  mystery  or  disguise  was  attempted."  l  John 
Laird,  Sons  &  Co.,  of  Birkenhead,  the  contracting 
shipwrights,  knew  perfectly  well  that  they  were  build 
ing  a  cruiser  for  the  Confederate  government,  spe 
cially  constructed  as  a  commerce-destroyer ;  and  they 
carefully  observed  what  their  counsel  advised  them 
was  the  law  of  the  land.  They  simply  built  a  vessel 
designed  to  do  certain  work  in  a  war  then  in  pro 
gress  ;  the  equipment  of  that  vessel,  including  its  arma 
ment,  was  in  course  of  preparation  elsewhere.  Of 
that  they  knew  nothing.  They  were  not  informed ; 
nor,  naturally,  did  they  care  to  ask.  The  vessel  and 
her  equipment  would  come  together  outside  of  British 
jurisdiction.  Such  was  the  law  ;  Great  Britain  lived 
under  a  government  of  law ;  and  "  to  strain  the  law  " 
1  Bulloch,  vol.  i.  p.  229. 


46  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

the  government  was  then  in  no  way  inclined.  The 
agents  of  the  Confederacy,  moreover,  "  had  the  means 
of  knowing  with  well-nigh  absolute  certainty  what  was 
the  state  of  the  negotiations  between  the  United 
States  Minister  and  Her  Majesty's  Government."  l 
The  work  of  completion  was,  however,  pressed  forward 
with  significant  energy  after  the  launching  of  the 
vessel ;  so  that,  by  the  middle  of  June,  she  went  out 
on  a  trial  trip.  An  Englishman,  having  a  Board  of 
Trade  certificate,  was  then  engaged  "  merely  to  take 
the  ship  to  an  appointed  place  without  the  United 
Kingdom,"2  where  she  was  to  meet  a  consort  bearing 
her  armament. 

This  was  in  Liverpool ;  meanwhile  the  proposed  com 
merce-destroyer's  armament  was  in  course  of  prepara 
tion  at  London,  and  included  "  everything  required 
for  the  complete  equipment  of  a  man-of-war."  The 
goods,  when  ready,  were  "  packed,  marked,  and  held  for 
shipping  orders."  The  Agrippina,  a  suitable  barque 
of  400  tons  measurement,  was  then  purchased,  and 
quietly  loaded.  Between  the  two  vessels  —  the  one 
building  on  the  Mersey,  the  other  taking  on  board  a 
cargo  in  the  Thames  —  there  was  no  apparent  connec 
tion.  Every  arrangement  for  the  destruction  of  the 
commerce  of  a  nation  at  peace  with  Great  Britain  was 
being  made  under  the  eyes  of  the  customs  officials,  but 
with  scrupulous  regard  to  the  provisions  of  the  For 
eign  Enlistment  Act. 

A  single  word  from  the  British  Foreign  Office  would 
then  have  sufficed  to  put  a  stop  to  the  whole  scheme. 
That  office  was  fully  advised  by  the  American  Minister 

1  Bulloch,  vol.  i.  pp.  229,  260,  261. 

2  16.,  vol.  i.  p.  231. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  47 

of  what  was  common  town  talk  at  Liverpool.  The 
Confederate  agent  there  in  charge  of  operations  was 
as  well  known  as  the  Collector  of  the  Port ;  probably 
much  more  frequently  pointed  out,  and  curiously  ob 
served.  Had  those  then  officially  responsible  for  Great 
Britain's  honor  and  interests  been  in  earnest,  public 
notice  would  have  been  given  to  all  concerned,  includ 
ing  belligerents,  —  under  the  designation  of  evil-dis 
posed  persons, — that  Her  Majesty's  Government  did 
not  propose  to  have  Great  Britain's  neutrality  trifled 
with,  or  the  laws  evaded.  Her  ports  were  not  to  be 
made,  by  either  belligerent,  directly  or  through  eva 
sion,  a  basis  of  naval  operations  against  the  other. 
Any  ship  constructed  for  warlike  purposes,  upon  the 
builders  of  which  notice  had  been  served  at  the  appli 
cation  of  either  belligerent,  would  be  held  affected  by 
such  notice  ;  and  thereafter,  in  case  of  evasion,  would 
not  be  entitled  to  the  rights  of  hospitality  in  any  Brit 
ish  waters.  Whether,  under  the  principles  of  inter 
national  law,  such  vessel  could  be  held  so  tainted  by 
evasion  after  notice  as  to  be  subject  to  seizure  and 
detention  whenever  and  wherever  found  within  British 
jurisdiction,  would  be  matter  of  further  consideration. 
This  course  was  one  authorized  by  international  law, 
and  well  understood  at  the  time.  At  a  later  day,  the 
Attorney-General,  for  instance,  in  debate  declared,  — 
"  I  have  not  the  least  doubt  that  we  have  a  right,  if 
we  thought  fit,  to  exclude  from  our  own  ports  any  par 
ticular  ship  or  class  of  ships,  if  we  consider  that  they 
have  violated  our  neutrality."  l  And,  three  months  be 
fore  the  first  law  adviser  of  the  Crown  thus  expressed 

1  House  of  Commons,  May  13,  1864.     Geneva  Arbitration  :   Corre 
spondence,  etc.,  vol.  v.  p.  583  ;  see,  also,  Ib.,  p.  571.     The  situation  was 


48  THE   TREATY   OF  WASHINGTON 

himself,  Mr.  William  Vernon  Harcourt,  then  first 
coming  into  notice  as  a  writer  on  questions  of  interna 
tional  law  under  the  pseudonym  of  "  Historians, "  had 
said  in  a  letter  published  in  the  Times,  —  "  It  is  a  sound 
and  salutary  rule  of  international  practice,  established 
by  the  Americans  themselves  in  1794,  that  vessels 
which  have  been  equipped  in  violation  of  the  laws  of 
a  neutral  state  shall  be  excluded  from  that  hospitality 
which  is  extended  to  other  belligerent  cruisers,  on 
whose  origin  there  is  no  such  taint.  ...  I  think  that 
to  deny  to  the  Florida  and  the  Alabama  access  to 
our  ports  would  be  the  legitimate  and  dignified  man 
ner  of  expressing  our  disapproval  of  the  fraud  which 
has  been  practised  on  our  neutrality.  If  we  abstain 
from  taking  such  a  course,  I  fear  we  may  justly  lie 
under  the  imputation  of  having  done  less  to  vindicate 
our  good  faith  than  the  American  government  con 
sented  at  our  instance,  on  former  occasions,  to  do." 1 

novel,  and  the  solution  of  the  difficulty  through  "  notice  "  does  not 
seem  to  have  suggested  itself  to  the  government.  Writing  long  after 
the  event,  Lord  Selborne,  who,  as  Sir  Roundell  Palmer,  was,  during 
the  Rebellion,  the  chief  law  adviser  of  the  Crown,  thus  expressed 
himself  :  —  "  [The  neutral]  might,  indeed,  by  previous  notice,  exclude 
all  or  any  particular  ships  of  war  of  either  belligerent  from  his  ports  ; 
and  it  might  be  a  reasonable  opinion,  that  an  exclusion  of  a  particular 
ship  on  the  ground  that  she  had  been  equipped  within  his  territory, 
contrary  to  his  neutrality  laws,  would  be  justifiable."  (Memorials, 
Part  II.,  Personal  and  Political,  1865-95,  vol.  i.  p.  268.)  Viscount 
D'ltajuba,  in  his  opinion  at  Geneva,  formulated  the  rule  in  its  full 
extent :  —  "  This  principle  of  seizure,  of  detention,  or  at  any  rate  of 
preliminary  notice  that  a  vessel,  under  such  circumstances,  will  not 
be  received  in  the  ports  of  the  neutral  whose  neutrality  she  has  vio 
lated,  is  fair  and  salutary.  .  .  .  The  commission  with  which  such  a 
vessel  is  provided  is  insufficient  to  protect  her  as  against  the  neutral 
whose  neutrality  she  has  violated."  Papers  Relating  to  Treaty  of 
Washington  (1872),  vol.  iv.  pp.  97,  98. 

1  London  Times,  February  17,  1864.     Geneva  Arbitration:   Corre 
spondence,  etc.,  vol.  iv.  pp.  203, 204.    This  point  was  vigorously  insisted 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  49 

Finally,  England's  Chief  Justice  laid  down  the  rule  in 
the  following  broad  terms,  —  "A  sovereign  has  abso 
lute  dominion  in  and  over  his  own  ports  and  waters. 
He  can  permit  the  entrance  into  them  to  the  ships  of 
other  nations,  or  refuse  it ;  he  can  grant  it  to  some, 
can  deny  it  to  others  ;  he  can  subject  it  to  such  restric 
tions,  conditions,  or  regulations  as  he  pleases.  But, 
by  the  universal  comity  of  nations,  in  the  absence  of 
such  restrictions  or  prohibition,  the  ports  and  waters 
of  every  nation  are  open  to  all  comers."  1 

Unless,  therefore,  the  British  Ministry  was  willing 
to  stand  forward  as  openly  conniving  at  proceedings 
calculated  to  bring  into  contempt  the  law  and  the 
Queen's  proclamation,  the  course  to  be  pursued  was 
plain  ;  and  the  mere  declaration  of  a  purpose  to  pur 
sue  that  course,  while  it  would  not  in  the  slightest  have 
interfered  with  legitimate  ship  construction,  would 
have  put  an  instant  and  effectual  stop  to  the  building 
and  equipment  of  commerce-destroyers.  The  law,  even 
as  it  then  stood,  was  sufficient,  had  the  government 
only  declared  a  purpose.  Had  the  will  been  there,  a 
way  had  not  been  far  to  seek. 

No  such  notice  was  conveyed.  In  vain  the  Ameri 
can  Minister  protested.  No  evidence  as  to  the  charac 
ter  of  the  proposed  cruiser,  or  the  purpose  for  which 

upon  by  Mr.  Cobden  in  his  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  April 
24,  1863.  "  Why,"  he  said,  "  do  you  not  forbid  the  reentry  of  those 
vessels  into  your  ports,  that  left  them,  manned  by  a  majority  of  Eng 
lish  sailors,  in  violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  ?  Would  any 
person  have  a  right  to  complain  of  that  ?  Proclaim  the  vessels  that 
thus  steal  away  from  your  ports,  outlaws,  so  far  as  your  ports  are  con 
cerned."  Speeches  (London,  1870),  vol.  ii.  p.  97. 

1  Papers  relating  to  Treaty  of  Washington  (1872),  vol.  iv.  pp.  416- 
418.  Supplement  to  the  London  Gazette,  September  24,  1872,  pp. 
4263,  4264. 


50  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

she  was  designed,  possible  for  him  to  adduce,  was  ad 
judged  satisfactory  ;  and,  finally,  when  the  case  became 
so  flagrant  that  action  could  not  in  decency  be  delayed, 
a  timely  intimation  reached  the  Confederate  agent 
through  some  unknown  channel,  and,  on  the  29th  of 
July,  1862,  the  Alabama  went  out  on  a  trial  trip  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Mersey,  from  which  she  did  not 
return.1  With  British  papers,  and  flying  the  Brit 
ish  flag,  she  two  days  later  got  under  weigh  for 
the  Azores.  At  almost  the  some  hour,  moving  under 
orders  from  the  Confederate  European  naval  bureau 
at  Liverpool,  her  consort,  the  Agrippina,  loaded  with 
munitions  and  equipment,  cleared  from  London.  The 
two  met  at  the  place  designated  ;  and  there,  outside 
of  British  jurisdiction,  the  stores,  arms,  and  equipment 
were  duly  transferred.  A  few  days  later,  the  forms 
of  transfer  having  been  gone  through  with,  the  British 
master  turned  the  ship  over  to  the  Confederate  com 
mander,  his  commission  was  read,  and  the  Confederate 

1  Much  has  been  written,  and  more  said,  as  to  the  particular  person 
upon  whom  rested  responsibility  for  the  evasion  of  the  Alabama.  Col 
lusion  on  the  part  of  officers  has  been  charged,  and  it  was  at  one  time 
even  alleged  that  Mr.  S.  Price  Edwards,  then  collector  of  the  port  of 
Liverpool,  had  been  the  recipient  of  a  bribe.  This  is  emphatically 
denied  by  Captain  Bulloch  (vol.  i.  pp.  258-264),  and  no  evidence  has 
ever  come  tolight  upon  which  to  rest  such  an  improbable  imputation. 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  following  intensely  characteristic 
avowal  of  Earl  Russell,  in  his  volume  of  Recollections  and  Suggestions, 
published  in  1875,  has  a  refreshing  sound.  Such  curt  frankness  causes 
a  feeling  of  respect  for  the  individual  man  to  predominate  over  any, 
or  all,  other  sentiments.  The  passage  referred  to  (p.  407)  is  as  fol 
lows  :  —  "I  assent  entirely  to  the  opinions  of  the  Lord  Chief  Justice 
of  England  [in  his  award  in  the  Geneva  Arbitration]  that  the  Ala 
bama  ought  to  have  been  detained  during  the  four  days  in  which  I 
was  waiting  for  the  opinion  of  the  Law  Officers.  But  I  think  that  the 
fault  was  not  that  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Customs  [as  asserted 
by  Lord  Cockburn]  ;  it  was  my  fault,  as  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs." 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  51 

flag  run  up.  Upon  which  somewhat  empty  ceremonies, 
the  "  290,"  now  the  Alabama,  stood  purified  of  any 
evasion  of  English  law,  and,  as  a  duly  commissioned 
foreign  man-of-war,  was  thereafter  entitled  to  all  bel 
ligerent  rights  and  hospitalities  within  British  jurisdic 
tion.  Incredible  as  it  now  must  seem  to  Englishmen 
as  well  as  to  us,  a  British  Ministry,  of  which  Lord 
Palmerston  was  the  head,  then  professed  itself  impo 
tent  to  assert  the  majesty,  or  even  the  dignity,  of  the 
law.  It  had  been  made  the  dupe  of  what  Lord  Cock- 
burn  afterwards  not  inaptly  termed  "  contrivances," 
—  "  the  artifices  and  tricks,  to  which  the  unscrupulous 
cunning  of  the  Confederate  agents  did  not  hesitate  to 
resort  in  violation  of  British  neutrality ;  "  *  and  yet 
the  poor  victim  of  these  "  artifices  and  tricks  "  pro 
fessed  itself  utterly  unable  to  make  itself  respected, 
much  less  to  vindicate  its  authority.  At  a  later  day 
Earl  Russell  recovered  the  use  of  his  faculties  and 
his  command  of  language.  He  then,  though  the  law 
had  not  in  the  mean  time  been  changed,  found  means 
to  let  the  Confederate  agents  understand  that  "  such 
shifts  and  stratagems  "  were  "  totally  unjustifiable  and 
manifestly  offensive  to  the  British  Crown."  2 

Such  are  the  simple  facts  in  the  case.  And  now, 
looking  back  through  the  perspective  of  forty  years, 
and  speaking  with  all  moderation,  is  it  unfair  to  ask, 
—  Was  any  great  nation  ever  guilty  of  a  more  wan 
ton,  a  more  obtuse,  or  a  more  criminal  dereliction? 
The  world's  great  ocean-carrier  permitted  a  belliger- 

1  Supplement  to  the  London  Gazette,  September  24,  1872,  p.  4231. 
Papers  relating  to  Treaty  of  Washington  (1872),  vol.  iv.  p.  377. 

2  Earl  Russell  to  Messrs.  Mason,  Slidell,  and  Mann,  February  13, 
1865.     Geneva  Arbitration  :  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  631. 


52  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

ent  of  its  own  creation  to  sail  a  commerce-destroyer 
through  its  statutes ;  and  then,  because  of  an  empty 
formality  observed  in  a  desert  mid-ocean  rendezvous, 
which  chanced  to  be  under  Portuguese  jurisdiction,1 
set  up  a  pretence,  which  can  only  be  adequately  char 
acterized  as  both  brazen  and  sneaking,  that  in  afford 
ing  protection  and  hospitality  to  the  vessel  thus  exist 
ing  through  a  contemptuous  evasion  of  its  own  law, 
Great  Britain  did  not  stand  an  accomplice  in  com 
merce-destroying.2  "  Shall  the  blessed  sun  of  heaven 
prove  a  micher  and  eat  blackberries  ?  —  a  question  not 
to  be  asked.  Shall  the  son  of  England  prove  a  thief, 
and  take  purses  ?  —  a  question  to  be  asked." 

1  Bulloch,  vol.  i.  p.  117. 

2  Something  bearing-  a  close  family  resemblance  to  this  plea  of 
impotency  to  resent  a  fraud  practised  on  itself  in  contempt  of  law, 
or  to  vindicate  the  majesty  of  the  Crown,  was  advanced  by  Dr.  Ber 
nard,  in  defence  of  the  Palmerston-Russell  Ministry,  even  as  late  as 
1870.     The  rule  of  international  law  he  first  laid  down  correctly :  — 
"  Every   Sovereign  has   a  general  right  to   exclude    from    his  ports 
either  all  ships-of-war,  or  any  particular  ship,  or  to  impose  on  ad 
mission  any  conditions  he  may  think  fit ;  although  the  exclusion  of  a 
particular   ship  would  be  unjust   and  offensive,   unless    reasonable 
grounds  could  be   shown  for  it."     (Historical  Account,  p.  413.)     He 
then  admits  (16.,  p.  437)  that :  —  "  The  various  contrivances  by  which 
[the  Confederate  commerce-destroyers]  were  procured   and  sent  to 
sea  were  discreditable  to  the  Confederate  Government,  and  offensive 
and  injurious   to   Great  Britain.     Such  enterprises  were,  and  were 
known  to  be,  calculated  to  embroil  the  country  with  the  United  States  ; 
they  were  carried  into  effect  by  artifices  which  must  be  accounted 
unworthy  of  any  body  of  persons  calling  themselves   a  Government 
—  of  any  community  making  pretensions  to  the  rank  of  an  independ 
ent  people.     Every  transaction   was  veiled  in  secrecy,  and  masked 
under  a  fictitious  purchase,  or  a  false  destination.     By  such  devices  it 
was  intended  to  blind  the  eyes  of  the  government  of  Great  Britain." 
Moreover,  —  "  It  would  be  erroneous,  I  conceive,  to  contend  that  the 
taint  of  illegality,  if  any,  adhering  to  the  Alabama,  was  ever  'deposited,' 
as  the  phrase  is,  by  the  termination  of  her  original  cruise.     She  never 
made  but  one  cruise."     (Ib.,  p.  414  n.)    All  this,  it  might  naturally  be 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  53 

It  is  not  necessary  further  to  follow  the  law  of 
Great  Britain  as  then  laid  down,  or  to  enumerate 
the  precedents  created  under  it.  One  thing  led  to 
another.  In  the  autumn  of  1861  Captain  Bulloch 
ran  the  blockade,  and,  visiting  Eichmond,  conferred 
with  his  chief,  the  Secretary  of  the  Confederate  Navy. 
He  then  learned  that  the  designs  of  the  Richmond  gov 
ernment,  as  respects  naval  operations  from  a  British 
base,  had  "  assumed  a  broader  range." 1  Secretary 
Mallory  now  contemplated  the  construction  in  Great 
Britain  of  "  the  best  type  of  armored  vessels  for  oper 
ations  on  the  coast  ...  to  open  and  protect  the 
blockaded  ports.  ...  It  was  impossible  to  build  them 
in  the  Confederate  States  —  neither  the  materials  nor 
the  mechanics  were  there;  and  besides,  even  if  iron 

inferred,  would  constitute,  if  anything-  could  constitute,  "reasonable 
grounds  "  for  the  exclusion  of  the  vessel  in  question  from  the  ports 
of  the  country  so  outraged.  Instead,  however,  of  reaching1  that  obvi 
ous  conclusion,  the  learned  publicist  concluded  that  to  exclude  the 
ship  so  offending1  would  have  been  "  a  measure  likely  to  be  embar 
rassed  by  some  difficulties  ;  "  and  that  for  the  losses  occasioned  by 
failure  to  resent  an  outrage  on  itself,  "  the  British  nation  is  not  justly 
responsible." 

In  justice  to  Earl  Russell  it  should  be  said  that,  on  the  suggestion 
of  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  he  did  propose  to  the  Cabinet  that  the  colonial 
authorities  should  be  instructed  to  detain  the  "290,"  or  the  Alabama, 
if  she  should  come  within  their  power,  and  he  even  drew  up  a  despatch 
to  that  effect.  All  the  other  members  of  the  Cabinet  were,  however, 
against  this  course,  and  the  despatch  was  not  sent.  Lord  Westbury, 
the  Chancellor,  was  "  vehement "  against  it.  (Spencer  Walpole  : 
Lord  John  Russell,  vol.  ii.  p.  355.  See,  also,  Sir  Roundell  Palmer  : 
Memorials,  1706-1865,  vol.  ii.  p.  431.)  In  this  case  it  does  not  appear 
that  the  order  of  detention  was  intended  to  apply  to  the  vessel  after 
its  transfer  in  other  waters  to  the  Confederate  authorities.  Pre 
sumably,  it  was  limited  to  the  "  290,"  or  Enrica,  in  case  she  fol 
lowed  the  course  of  the  Oreto,  going-  direct  from  the  port  of  evasion 
to  some  other  port  within  British  jurisdiction.  This  the  "  290  "  did 
not  do. 

1  Bulloch,  vol.  i.  p.  377. 


54  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

and  skilled  artisans  had  been  within  reach,  there  was 
not  a  mill  in  the  country  to  roll  the  plates,  nor  fur 
naces  and  machinery  to  forge  them,  nor  shops  to  make 
the  engines."  l  This  was  a  distinct  step  in  advance  ; 
also  a  long  one.  It  might  almost  be  called  a  stride. 
Earl  Russell  had  declared  that  one  great  object  of  the 
British  government  was  to  preserve  "for  the  nation 
the  legitimate  and  lucrative  trade  of  shipbuilding ;  " 
and  if  it  was  "  legitimate  "  to  construct  a  single  com 
merce-destroyer  to  take  part  in  hostilities  then  going 
on,  why  was  it  not  legitimate  to  construct  a  squadron 
of  turreted  iron-dads  ?  It  certainly  was  more  "  lucra 
tive."  In  the  words  of  Mr.  Gladstone,  then  Chan 
cellor  of  the  Exchequer,  the  Confederate  leaders,  hav 
ing  made  an  army,  "  are  making,  it  appears,  a  navy ;  " 
and  the  "  lucrative  trade  "  of  constructing  that  navy 
naturally  fell  to  the  shipwrights  of  the  Mersey.  The 
Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain  now,  also,  boldly 
took  the  ground  in  parliamentary  debate  —  speak 
ing,  of  course,  for  the  Government  —  that  of  this  no 
belligerent  had  any  cause  to  complain.  "  As  a  mer 
cantile  transaction,"  British  merchants  and  manu 
facturers  were  at  liberty  to  supply,  and  had  a  right 
to  supply,  one  or  both  of  "  the  belligerents,  not  only 
with  arms  and  cannon,  but  also  with  ships  destined 
for  warlike  purposes." 2  To  the  same  effect  the 

1  Bulloch,  vol.  i.  p.  380. 

2  House  of  Commons,  July  23,  1863.     Geneva  Arbitration  :   Corre 
spondence,  etc.,  vol.  v.  p.  695.     "  It  is  quite  as  much  within  the  Inter 
national  Law  to  sell  ships  of  war  to  another  nation  as  it  is  to  sell  any 
munitions  of  war."     (Lord  Robert  Cecil,  now  (1902)  Marquis  of  Salis 
bury,  House  of  Commons,  May  13, 1864.)     Per  contra,  in  April,  1863, 
Mr.    Cobden   drew  the    distinction    forcibly.     He    declared   the    two 
questions   totally  distinct.     ' '  There  is  no  law   in  this  country  that 
prohibits   the   buying-   and    selling   or   manufacturing   or   exporting 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  55 

Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  informed  the  United 
States  Minister  that,  "  except  on  the  ground  of  any 
proved  violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  .  .  . 
Her  Majesty's  Government  cannot  interfere  with 
commercial  dealings  between  British  subjects  and  the 
so-styled  Confederate  States,  whether  the  subject  of 
those  dealings  be  money  or  contraband  goods,  or  even 
ships  adapted  for  warlike  purposes."  "  The  cabinet," 
he  moreover  on  another  occasion  stated,  "  were  of 
opinion  that  the  law  [thus  set  forth]  was  sufficient; 
but  that  legal  evidence  could  not  always  be  pro 
cured."  1  Of  the  sufficiency  of  that  evidence,  the 
Government,  acting  through  its  legal  advisers,  was 
the  sole  judge.  As  such,  it  demanded  legal  proof  of 
a  character  sufficient  not  only  to  justify  a  criminal 
indictment,  but  to  furnish  reasonable  grounds  for 
securing  a  conviction  thereon.  The  imputation  and 
strong  circumstances  which  led  directly  to  the  door  of 
proof  gave,  in  this  case,  no  satisfaction.  Facts  of 
unquestioned  notoriety  could  not  be  adduced,  —  "  no 
toriety  "  was  not  evidence.2  A  petty  jury  in  an  Eng 
lish  criminal  court  became  thus  the  final  arbiter  of 
Britain's  international  obligations.  If  that  august 

arms  and  munitions  of  war.  ...  I  am  astonished,"  he  went  on,  in 
terms  peculiarly  Cobdenesque,  "  that  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Seward 
should  have  mixed  that  question  up  in  their  correspondence  with  that 
of  equipments  for  war.  I  will  not  say  that  I  was  astonished  at  Mr. 
Seward,  because  he  writes  so  much  that  he  is  in  danger  of  writing1  on 
every  subject,  and  on  every  side  of  a  subject ;  but  I  am  astonished 
that  Mr.  Adams  should  have  mixed  this  question  up  with  what  is 
really  a  vital  question  —  that  of  furnishing  and  equipping1  ships  of 
war."  Speeches  (London,  1870),  vol.  ii.  pp.  84,  85. 

1  Russell  to  Lyons,  March  27,  1863.     Geneva  Arbitration:  Cor- 
resp'ondertce,  «tc.,  vol.-i-.  p.  585. 

2  Geneva  Arbitration  :  Treaty  of  Washington  Papers  (1872),  vol.  iv. 
pp.  377,  479 ;  see,  also,  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  iv.  p.  530. 


56  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

tribunal  pronounced  a  case  not  proven,  though  the  real 
facts  were  common  town  talk,  the  law  was  not  violated, 
and,  whatever  acts  of  maritime  wrong  and  ocean  out 
rage  followed,  foreign  nations  had  no  grounds  for 
reclamation.  And  this  was  gravely  pronounced  law ; 
"  Ay,  marry ;  crowncr's  quest  law !  " 

Here,  indeed,  was  the  inherent,  fundamental  defect 
of  the  British  position,  —  what  was  afterwards  de 
scribed  as  the  "  insularity  "  of  the  British  contentions. 
Unable  to  rise  above  the  conception  of  a  municipal 
rule  of  conduct,  the  governmental  vision  was  bounded 
on  the  one  side  by  a  jury  box,  and  on  the  other  by  the 
benches  of  the  House  of  Commons.  Uncertainty, 
closely  bordering  on  vacillation,  naturally  resulted ; 
for  Earl  Russell  had  a  firm  grasp  neither  on  the  prin 
ciples  of  international  law  involved,  nor  on  the  ques 
tions  of  policy.  On  the  one  hand,  he  wished  to  pre 
serve  for  the  shipwrights  of  the  Mersey  and  the  Clyde 
that  "  trade  of  shipbuilding,  in  which  our  people  excel, 
and  which  is  to  great  numbers  of  them  a  source  of 
honest  livelihood  ;  "  1  but,  on  the  other,  in  an  appar 
ently  unguarded  moment,  he  admitted  that  it  was 
"  the  duty  of  nations  in  amity  with  each  other  not  to 
suffer  their  good  faith  to  be  violated  by  ill-disposed 
persons  within  their  borders,  merely  from  the  ineffi 
ciency  of  their  prohibitory  policy."  One  day  he  would 
write  to  Mr.  Adams  that  the  government  found  itself 
"  unable  to  go  beyond  the  law,  municipal  and  inter 
national,"  —  a  proposition  which  few  would  be  disposed 
to  controvert  ;  and  then,  twelve  days  later,  he  went 
through  a  similar  form  of  reply,  assigning  "  the  letter 

1  Russell  to  Adams,  October  20, 1863.  Geneva  Arbitration :  Cor 
respondence,  etc.,  vol.  iii.  p.  201. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  57 

of  the  existing  [meaning,  apparently,  the  municipal] 
law  "  l  as  the  extreme  of  interference.2 

At  last,  011  full  reflection  and  at  a  subsequent  day, 
he  settled  on  a  defence  of  his  action  which  was  almost 
humorously  illustrative  of  "  insularity."  He  trium 
phantly  declared,  in  complete  and  final  justification 
thereof,  that  the  object  of  the  Palmerston-Russell  Min 
istry  throughout  was  "  to  preserve  for  the  subject  the 
security  of  trial  by  jury,  and  for  the  nation  the  legiti 
mate  and  lucrative  trade  of  shipbuilding  "  !  3  British 
Shipyards  and  Trial  by  Jury !  —  here,  indeed,  was 
a  hustings  cry.  When  he  formulated  it,  no  trial  was 
impending ;  no  general  election  was  imminent ;  he 
was  himself  permanently  retired  from  official  life.  Yet 
instinctively,  and  in  obedience  to  a  lifelong  parlia 
mentary  habit,  his  mind  reverted  to  time-honored  po 
litical  catch-words.  Invoking  them,  a  British  ministry 
could  face  with  confidence  either  the  benches  of  the 
Opposition  or  the  ordeal  of  the  constituencies.  The 

1  Earl  Russell  to  Mr.  Adams,  October  4  and  16,  1862.     Geneva  Ar 
bitration  :   Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  vi.  pp.  426-420. 

2  Subsequently  Lord  Selborne  expressed  himself  on  this  point,  as 
follows  :  —  "It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  no  one  in  this  country  con 
tended  for  a  proposition  so  plainly  untenable  as  that  municipal  law  is 
a  proper  and  sufficient  measure  of  the  neutral  rights  and  obligations 
of  nations."     (Memorials,  Part  L,  1766-1865,  vol.  ii.  p.  413.)     This 
was  written  subsequent  to  the  Geneva  Arbitration  ;  the  converse  was 
certainly  assumed  at  Geneva  (Treaty  of  Washington  Papers,  etc.  (1872), 
vol.  iii.  pp.  19-24),  and  it  is   difficult  in  reading  the  Alabama  corre 
spondence  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  Earl  Russell  was  not  clear 
in  thought  and  expression,  and  his  difficulty  arose  from  his  inability 
to  grasp  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  was  under  an  obligation  beyond 
any  established  by  act  of  Parliament.     He  did  not  really  attain  to  a 
clear  perception  of  this  principle  until  actually  confronted  with  the 
issue  presented  by  the  case  of  the  Laird  rams.     It  seems  to  have 
been  an  instance  of  education  in  the  elements  of  international  law,  so 
gradual  as  to  be  suggestive  of  extreme  reluctance  under  instruction. 

3  Speeches  and  Despatches  (1870), -vol.  ii.  p.  266. 


58  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

cry  was  epigrammatic  ;  any  one  could  understand  it ; 
it  did  not  admit  of  an  answer,  —  at  least,  not  at  West 
minster  nor  at  the  polling-booths. 

But  to  those  of  other  nations,  called  on  to  stand 
impassively  by  while  their  merchant-marine  vanished 
in  smoke,  this  sturdy  British  appeal  carried  in  it  a 
somewhat  empty,  not  to  say  mocking,  sound.  Trial 
by  jury  might  be  the  palladium  of  the  British  consti 
tution  ;  shipbuilding  was  unquestionably  a  lucrative 
craft :  but  when  the  last  became  an  instrument  for 
utilizing  Great  Britain  as  a  base  of  naval  warfare  in 
the  hands  of  one  belligerent  against  another,  between 
whom,  being  at  peace  with  each,  Great  Britain  pro 
fessed  to  maintain  a  perfect  and  even-handed  neutral 
ity;  and  when  trial  by  jury,  through  pre-ordained 
verdicts  of  "  not  proven,"  was  perverted  into  an  accom 
plice  before  the  fact  in  piracy,  —  when  these  things 
came  about,  foreign  nations  would  not  improbably 
find  themselves  compelled  to  have  recourse  to  such 
other  means  of  self-preservation  as  the  law  of  nations 
might  afford.  The  hustings  and  jury  box  were  not 
the  final  arbiters  between  warring  States. 

Those  tribunals,  moreover,  highly  respectable,  no 
doubt,  as  well  as  ancient,  were  distinctly  insular. 
They  had  no  place  in  the  code.  On  the  contrary,  the 
principle  of  international  law  controlling  the  situation 
was  plain.  As  laid  down  by  the  leading  English  pub 
licist  of  that  day,  it  read  as  follows : — "  Each  State  has 
a  right  to  expect  from  another  the  observance  of  inter 
national  obligations,  without  regard  to  what  may  be  the 
municipal  means  which  it  possesses  for  enforcing  this 
observance."  l  But,  with  one  eye  always  fixed  on  the 

1  Phillimore  :  International  Law,  vol.  i.,  preface  to  second  edition, 
p.  21,  cited  in  Geneva  Arbitration  :  Argument  of  United  States,  p.  35. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  59 

Opposition  benches  at  Westminster,  and  the  other 
wandering  in  the  direction  of  the  Lancashire  jury  box, 
Earl  Russell  instinctively  contended  that  the  interna 
tional  obligations  of  Great  Britain  were  coterminous 
with  its  parliamentary  enactments.  If  the  law  of  Eng 
land  did  not  provide  adequate  protection  for  the  rights 
of  foreign  nations,  it  might  indeed  be  changed  ;  but, 
until  changed,  it  was  most  unreasonable  for  the  re 
presentatives  of  those  nations  to  present  claims  and 
complaints  to  Her  Majesty's  Government.  The  gov 
ernment,  responsible  to  Parliament  and  the  jury,  had 
done  its  best.  Against  it  no  charge  of  inefficiency 
would  lie.  The  fact  that  Great  Britain  was  being 
made  the  base  of  naval  warfare  was  ignored,  —  al 
though  notorious,  "  not  proven,"  -  —  and  the  trade  in 
ships  was  pronounced  no  more  contraband  than  that 
in  guns.  It  is  almost  unnecessary  to  say  that  this 
rule  also  is  one  which,  in  its  converse  operation,  might 
not  infrequently  lead  to  inopportune  results. 

The  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  of  1819  was  then 
passed  in  review.  It  was  pronounced  "  effectual  for 
all  reasonable  purposes,  and  to  the  full  extent  to  which 
international  law  or  comity  can  require."  1  In  the 
opinion  of  the  Government,  there  was  no  occasion  for 
its  amendment  or  strengthening.  No  move  was  made 
to  that  end  ;  no  recommendation  submitted  to  Parlia 
ment.  On  the  contrary,  when  in  March,  1863,  the 
neutrality  laws  were  in  debate,  Lord  Palmerston  did 
not  hesitate  to  declare  from  the  ministerial  benches,  if 
the  cry  that  those  laws  were  manifestly  defective  was 
raised  "  for  the  purpose  of  driving  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 

1  Mr.  Hammond  to  Messrs.  Lamport  and  others,  July  6,  1863.  Ge 
neva  Arbitration :  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  673. 


60  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

ernment  to  do  something  .  .  .  which  may  be  derogatory 
to  the  dignity  of  the  country,  in  the  way  of  altering 
our  laws  for  the  purpose  of  pleasing  another  govern 
ment,  then  all  I  can  say  is  that  such  a  course  is  not 
likely  to  accomplish  its  purpose ;  .  .  .  but  the  people 
and  Government  of  the  United  States  .  .  .  must  not 
imagine  that  any  cry  which  may  be  raised  will  induce 
us  to  come  down  to  this  House  with  a  proposal  to  alter 
the  law."  l  Thus  another  door  of  future  possible  escape 
was  on  this  occasion  closed,  so  to  speak  with  a  slam, 
by  the  British  Premier.  The  law,  however  manifestly 
defective,  was  not  to  be  changed  to  please  any  one. 

Meanwhile,  as  if  to  make  the  record  at  all  points 
complete,  and  to  show  how  very  defective  this  immu 
table  law  was,  the  courts  passed  upon  the  much  dis 
cussed  Act.  Under  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  by  the 
United  States  Minister  a  test  case  had  been  arranged. 
It  was  tried  before  a  jury  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer 
on  the  22d  of  June,  1863,  the  Laird  iron-clads  being 
then  still  on  the  ways,  but  in  an  advanced  stage  of 
construction.  The  vessel  thus  seized  and  proceeded 
against,  in  order  to  obtain  a  construction  of  the  forty- 
four  years  old  statute,  was  the  Alexandra.  This  vessel 
was  being  built  with  a  view  to  warlike  equipment. 
Of  that  no  denial  was  possible.  That  she  was  in 
tended  for  use  in  the  Confederate  service  was  a  moral 
certainty.  The  Alabama  was  at  that  time  in  its  full 
career  of  destruction,  —  carrying  out  the  declared 
purpose  of  its  commander,  to  "burn,  sink,  and  de 
stroy."  Before  her  ravages  the  merchant  marine  of 
the  United  States  was  fast  disappearing,  —  the  ships 

^  Debate  of  March  27,  1868.  Geneva  Arbitration :  Correspondence, 
etc.,  vol.  iv.  pp.  530,  531.  See,  also,  Russell  to  Adams,  September 
25,  1863.  16.,  vol.  i.  p.  674. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  61 

composing  it  either  going  up  in  smoke,  or  being  trans 
ferred  to  other  flags.  With  all  these  facts  admitted, 
or  of  common  knowledge,  the  Lord  Chief  Baron  pre 
siding  at  the  Alexandra  trial  proceeded  to  instruct 
the  jury  on  the  law.  The  Foreign  Enlistment  Act 
was,  he  told  them,  not  designed  for  the  protection  of 
belligerent  powers,  or  to  prevent  Great  Britain  being 
made  the  base  of  naval  operations  directed  against 
nations  with  which  that  country  was  at  peace.  The 
purpose  of  the  Act  was  solely  to  prevent  hostile  naval 
encounters  within  British  waters ;  and,  to  that  end,  it 
forbade  such  equipment  of  the  completed  ship  as  would 
make  possible  immediate  hostile  operations,  it  might 
be,  "  before  they  left  the  port."  Such  things  had 
happened  ;  "  and  that  has  been  the  occasion  of  this 
statute."  He  closed  with  these  words:  —  "If  you  think 
the  object  was  to  build  a  ship  in  obedience  to  an  order, 
and  in  compliance  with  a  contract,  leaving  those  who 
bought  it  to  make  what  use  they  thought  fit  of  it,  then 
it  appears  to  me  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  has  not 
been  in  any  degree  broken." 

Under  such  an  interpretation  of  the  statute,  the 
jury,  of  course,  rendered  a  verdict  for  the  defendants ; 
and  that  verdict  the  audience  in  the  court-room  re 
ceived  with  an  outburst  of  applause.  This  outburst 
of  applause  was  significant ;  more  significant  than 
even  the  charge  of  the  judge.  Expressive  of  the 
feelings  of  the  British  people,  it  pointed  directly  to 
the  root  of  the  trouble.  The  trial  took  place  towards 
the  close  of  June,  1863,  —  a  few  days  only  before 
Gettysburg  ;  and,  at  that  time,  England,  so  far  as  the 
United  States  was  concerned,  had  reached  a  state  of 
mind  Elizabethan  rather  than  Victorian.  The  buc- 


62  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

caneering  blood  —  the  blood  of  Drake,  of  Cavendish, 
and  of  Frobisher  —  was  stirring  in  British  veins. 
The  Alabama  then  stood  high  in  public  admiration, 
—  a  British  built  ship,  manned  by  a  British  crew, 
armed  with  British  guns,  it  was  successfully  eluding 
the  "  Yankee  "  ships  of  war,  and  destroying  a  rival 
commercial  marine.  Wherever  the  British  jurisdic 
tion  extended,  the  Alabama  was  a  welcome  sojourner 
from  the  weary  sea.1  The  company  on  the  decks  of 
British  mail  steamers  cheered  her  to  the  echo  as  they 
passed. 

Speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  24th  of 
April,  1863,  Mr.  Cobden  dryly  observed  of  the  Eng 
lish  people,  —  "  We  generally  sympathize  with  every 
body's  rebels  but  our  own  ; "  and  passing  utterances 
in  both  Europe  and  this  country  relating  to  opera 
tions  now  in  progress,  whether  in  South  Africa  or  on 
the  islands  of  the  Pacific,  point  distinctly  to  the  gen 
eral  truth  of  the  remark.  The  sympathy,  and  the  lack 
of  sympathy,  referred  to  are  in  no  way  peculiar  to  the 
people  of  Great  Britain.  But,  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  human  nature  thus  alluded  to,  so  strong 
among  the  influential  classes  of  Great  Britain  was  the 
feeling  of  sympathy  for  the  South  in  1863,  and  so 
intense  was  the  enmity  to  the  Union,  mixed  with  a 
contempt  as  outspoken  as  it  was  ill-advised,  that  those 
sentiments  were  well-nigh  all-pervasive.  Speaking 
shortly  after,  Mr.  Cobden  again  said :  —  "I  declare  to 
you  that,  looking  at  what  is  called  in  a  cant  phrase  in 
London,  '  society  ; '  looking  at  society  —  and  society, 
I  must  tell  you,  means  the  upper  ten  thousand,  with 
whom  members  of  Parliament  are  liable  to  come  in 
1  Geneva  Arbitration :  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  vi.  pp.  494-501. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  63 

contact  at  the  clubs  and  elsewhere  in  London  ;  look 
ing  at  what  is  called  '  society  '  -  -  looking  at  the  rul 
ing  class,  if  we  may  use  the  phrase,  that  meet  in  the 
purlieus  of  London,  nineteen-twentieths  of  them  were 
firmly  convinced  from  the  first  that  the  Civil  War  in 
America  could  only  end  in  separation." 1  Captain 
Bulloch  asserted  twenty  years  later  that,  being  thrown 
while  in  England  a  good  deal  among  army  and  navy 
men,  "  I  never  met  one  of  either  service  who  did  not 
warmly  sympathize  with  the  South ;  "  2  and  he  fur 
ther  expressed  his  belief  that  this  was  the  feeling  of 
"  at  least  five  out  of  every  seven  in  the  middle  and 
upper  classes." 3  To  the  like  effect,  Mr.  G.  W.  P. 
Bentinck  —  a  member  of  Parliament  —  declared  in  a 
speech  at  Kings  Lynn,  October  31,  1862,  that,  as  far 
as  his  experience  went,  "  throughout  the  length  and 
breadth  of  the  land,  wherever  I  have  travelled,  I  never 
yet  have  met  the  man  who  has  not  at  once  said,  — 
4  My  wishes  are  with  the  Southerners ; '  "  and  he  went 
on  to  add  that  this  feeling  was  mainly  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  Southerner  was  "  fighting  against  one  of  the 
most  grinding,  one  of  the  most  galling,  one  of  the  most 
irritating  attempts  to  establish  tyrannical  government 
that  ever  disgraced  the  history  of  the  world."  4  Mr. 

1  At  Rochdale,  November  24, 1863.    Speeches  (London,  1870),  vol. 
ii.  p.  103. 

2  Bulloch,  vol.  ii.  p.  303. 

3  J6.,  vol.  i.  p.  294. 

4  Mr.  G.  W.  P.  Bentinck  was  a  member  of  Parliament  in  his  day, 
and  doubtless  esteemed  by  others,  as  by  himself,  a  man  not  -wholly 
devoid  of  intelligence,  nor,  perhaps,  of  judgment  even.     In  the  light 
of  comments  now  frequently  heard  throughout  continental  Europe, 
and  also  in  America,  on  the  methods  of  warfare  pursued  by  the  Eng 
lish  in  South  Africa,  the  following  extract  from  the  closing  sentences 
of  Mr.  Bentinck's  speech  on  the  occasion  referred  to  is  suggestive. 
Every  struggle  seems,  in  the  opinion  of  observers  in  sympathy  with 


64  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

Gladstone's  unfortunate  utterance  at  about  the  same 
time  passed  into  history ;  from  which  it  failed  not 
afterwards  to  return  sorely  to  plague  him.  "  We  may 
anticipate  with  certainty  the  success  of  the  Southern 
States  so  far  as  regards  their  separation  from  the 
North.  .  .  .  That  event  is  as  certain  as  any  event  yet 
future  and  contingent  can  be  ;  "  1  and  again,  ten  months 
later,  he  said  in  Parliament,  —  "  We  do  not  believe 
that  the  restoration  of  the  American  Union  by  force 
is  attainable.  I  believe  that  the  public  opinion  of  this 
country  is  unanimous  upon  that  subject.  ...  I  do  not 
think  there  is  any  real  or  serious  ground  for  doubt  as 
to  the  issue  of  this  contest."2  Four  months  previous, 
Mr.  Gladstone's  associate  in  the  cabinet,  Earl  Russell, 

the  worsted  combatant,  to  be  marked  by  atrocities  theretofore  unpre 
cedented  in  civilized  warfare.  Mr.  Bentinck  thus  delivered  himself  : 
—  "  So  long1,  I  say,  as  such  acts,  in  open  defiance  of  all  humanity  and 
all  civilization,  are  performed  and  are  avowed  by  the  government  of 
the  Northern  States,  they  cease  to  have  a  claim  to  be  ranked  among 
civilized  nations.  I  am  not  asserting  that  there  are  not  hundreds  and 
thousands  of  men  in  the  Northern  States  who  are  men  of  education,  of 
right,  and  of  Christian  feeling,  of  civilized  habits  and  ideas.  Far  be  it 
from  me  to  make  so  unfounded  an  assertion.  But  there  is  a  further 
lesson  to  be  learned.  The  result  of  these  much  vaunted  institutions, 
which  we  have  heard  praised  before,  and  which  we  shall  again  hear 
praised  by  the  hired  spouters  of  associations,  is  this,  that  the  nation 
becomes  so  brutalized  that  the  civilized  man  disappears ;  he  is  afraid 
to  put  himself  forward ;  he  is  ashamed  of  his  country ;  he  has  no 
voice  in  the  conduct  of  her  affairs ;  and  the  whole  nation  is  turned 
over  to  the  control  of  men  such  as  Lincoln  and  Butler,  whom  I  do  not 
hesitate  to  denounce,  after  their  conduct  in  the  last  few  months,  as 
men  who  are  a  disgrace  to  civilization." 

The  whole  of  this  interesting,  and  extremely  suggestive,  speech  cau 
be  found  in  the  columns  of  the  London  Morning  Post,  of  November  4, 
1862. 

1  Speech  at  Newcastle,  October  7,  1862.    London  Times,  October  9, 
1862. 

2  House  of  Commons,  June  30,  1863.     Geneva  Arbitration  :  Corre 
spondence,  etc.,  vol.  v.  p.  666. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  65 

had  lent  emphasis  to  this  opinion  by  declaring  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  —  "  There  may  be  one  end  of  the  war 
that  would  prove  a  calamity  to  the  United  States  and 
to  the  world,  and  especially  calamitous  to  the  negro 
race  in  those  countries,  and  that  would  be  the  subjuga 
tion  of  the  South  by  the  North."  l  With  this  idea  that 
there  could  be  but  one  outcome  of  the  struggle  firmly 
established  in  their  minds,  influential  members  of  the 
Cabinet  did  not  urge  recognition  simply  because,  in 
view  of  the  certainty  of  the  result,  they  deemed  such 
action  unnecessary  and  impolitic.2  The  whole  British 
policy  during  the  Civil  War  was  shaped  with  a  view 
to  this  future  state  of  affairs,  and  the  creation  of  bad 
precedents  was  ignored  accordingly.  The  Union  was 
to  be  divided  into  two  republics,  unfriendly  to  each 
other.  There  was  to  be  one  democratic,  free-labor 
republic,  or  more  probably  two  such,  lying  between 
the  British  possessions  on  the  north,  and  a  slave-labor, 
cotton-growing  republic  on  the  south;  the  latter,  almost 
of  necessity,  acting  in  close  harmony  of  interest,  com 
mercial  and  political,  with  Great  Britain.  For  Great 
Britain,  eternity  itself  had  thus  no  day  of  reckoning. 
Relying  on  this  simple  faith  in  a  certain  future,  — 
this  absolute  confidence  that  the  expected  only  could 
occur,  —  utterances  like  the  following  appeared  in  the 
editorial  columns  of  the  Morning  Post,  the  London 
journal  understood  most  closely  to  reflect  the  opinions 
of  the  Prime  Minister  :  —  "  From  the  ruling  of  the 
judge  [in  the  case  of  the  Alexandra]  it  appeared  that 
the  Confederate  government  might  with  ease  obtain 

1  House  of  Lords,  February  5,  1863.     Geneva  Arbitration :  Corre 
spondence,  etc.,  vol.  iv.  p.  535. 

2  Bulloch,  vol.  ii.  p.  5. 


66  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

as  many  vessels  in  this  country  as  they  pleased  with 
out  in  any  manner  violating  our  laws.  It  may  be  a 
great  hardship  to  the  Federals  that  their  opponents 
should  be  enabled  to  create  a  navy  in  foreign  ports, 
but,  like  many  other  hardships  entailed  on  belligerents, 
it  must  be  submitted  to  ; "  while,  five  months  before, 
this  same  organ  of  "  society "  and  the  "  influential 
classes"  had  reached  the  comfortable  conclusion  that, 
so  far  as  the  Alabama  was  concerned,  the  fact  "  she 
sails  upon  the  ocean  is  one  of  those  chances  of  war 
to  which  the  government  of  the  United  States  ought 
with  dignity  and  resignation  to  submit."  1 


II 

Fortunately  for  maritime  law,  fortunately  for  itself, 
the  British  government  paused  at  this  point.  The 
"  Laird  rams,"  as  they  were  now  known,  presented  a 
test  case.  London  "  society "  and  the  irresponsible 
press  of  Great  Britain  might,  like  the  audience  in  the 
Court  of  Exchequer,  applaud  the  charge  of  the  Lord 
Chief  Baron,  and  gladly  accept  the  law  he  laid  down 
that  it  was  legal  for  a  belligerent  to  create  a  navy  in 
a  neutral  port ;  but,  none  the  less,  in  the  words  of  one 
of  the  dissenting  Barons,  by  the  rulings  of  the  Court 
"the  spirit  of  international  law  [had  been]  violated,  and 
the  spirit  and  letter  of  the  statute  evaded."  2  There 

1  Morning  Post,  March  14,  August  10,  1863. 

2  "  A  very  learned  judge  has   said  that  we  might   drive,  not  a 
coach-and-six,  but  a  whole  fleet  of  ships  through  that  [Foreign  En 
listment]  Act  of  Parliament.     If  that  be  a  correct  description  of  our 
law,  then  I  say  we  ought  to  have  the  law  made  more  clear  and  intel 
ligible."     Earl  Russell  in  the  House  of  Lords,  February  16,  1864. 
Geneva  Arbitration  :  Correspondence,  etc. ,  vol.  v.  p.  528. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  67 

was  no  longer  any  danger,  scarcely  any  inconvenience, 
in  a  belligerent  fitting  out  a  vessel  of  war  in  a  Brit 
ish  port,  and  sailing  t  directly  thence  to  begin  a  hostile 
cruise.1  This,  indeed,  was  at  that  very  time  actually  in 
preparation.  Theretofore  the  cases  had  been  those  of 
individual  commerce-destroyers  only.  Now,  an  arma 
ment  was  in  course  of  construction  in  a  British  port, 
intended  for  a  naval  operation  of  magnitude  against 
a  foreign  belligerent  with  which  Great  Britain  was 
at  peace.  The  vessels  composing  it  were,  moreover, 
equipped  with  weapons  of  offensive  warfare  —  their 
beaks.  Their  purpose  and  destination  could  not  be 
proven  in  any  legal  proceedings  ;  but,  known  of  all 
men,  they  were  hardly  concealed  by  fraudulent  bills 
of  sale.  The  law  as  laid  down  by  the  Lord  Chief 
Baron  in  the  case  of  the  Alexandra  might,  therefore, 
as  "  crowner's  quest  law,"  be  of  the  very  first  class ; 
but  for  Her  Majesty's  Government,  such  a  construc- 

1  The  construction  of  such  cruisers  was,  moreover,  for  the  ship 
wright,  an  uncommonly  safe,  as  well  as  profitable,  business  ;  and  under 
the  practical  working1  of  the  law  as  it  then  stood,  the  more  the  inter 
ference,  the  greater  the  profit.  This  was  curiously  illustrated  in 
the  case  of  the  Laird  iron-clads.  The  original  contract  price  for  the 
two  vessels  was  £187,500.  (Bulloch,  vol.  i.  p.  386.)  Owing  to  fear 
of  a  seizure  by  the  Government,  the  contract  was  transferred  to  a 
French  banker  named  Bravay,  who  professed  to  represent  the  Pacha 
of  Egypt.  A  gratuity  of  .£5000  was  paid  to  the  Messrs.  Laird  as 
a  consideration  for  their  consent  to  tSis  transfer.  (Ib.,  p.  404.)  It 
then  became  apparent  that  the  transfer  was  a  mere  cover  for  fraud, 
and  the  vessels  were  seized.  In  the  existing  state  of  public  opinion, 
the  Government  was  unwilling  to  go  to  a  jury,  —  in  fact,  after  the 
ruling  of  the  Chief  Baron  in  the  Alexandra  trial,  it  could  not  have 
done  so  with  any  chance  of  a  condemnation,  —  and  accordingly  it  pro 
ceeded  to  negotiate  for  the  purchase  of  the  vessels  on  its  own  account. 
The  Messrs.  Laird  now  asked  for  them  £300,000,  and  in  the  end 
actually  got  £220,000.  (Lord  Selborne  :  Memorials,  Part  L,  1766- 
1865,  vol.  ii.  p.  450.)  Thus,  contrary  to  the  usual  experience,  the 
more  their  business  was  interfered  with,  the  richer  they  became. 


68  THE    TREATY    OF    WASHINGTON 

tion  of  the  law  —  an  act  in  the  statute-book  of  Great 
Britain  —  obviously  involved  serious  consequences. 
Were  they  prepared  to  go  to  the  journey's  end  on  the 
road  thus  pointed  out  ?  To  what  might  it  lead  ?  To 
what  might  it  not  lead  ? 

Into  the  causes  of  the  change  of  policy  which  now 
took  place  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  enter.  The  law 
was  expounded  in  the  Alexandra  case  on  the  24th  of 
June,  1863  ;  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  fought, 
and  Vicksburg  surrendered,  on  the  3d  and  4th  of 
the  following  July  ;  three  months  later,  on  the  9th 
of  October,  the  detention  of  the  Laird  iron-clads 
was  ordered.  After  the  rulings  of  the  court  in  the 
Alexandra  case,  there  can  be  no  question  that  in 
this  instance  the  law  was  "  strained."  In  due  time 
the  proceeding  was  made  the  ground  of  attack  on  the 
government  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament,  on  the 
ground  that  the  detention  was  in  violation  of  law,  and 
without  sufficient  proofs.  In  these  debates  the  spokes 
men  of  the  government  at  last  took  the  proper  ground. 
They  admitted  that  Great  Britain  was  under  an  obli 
gation  to  give  to  the  United  States  its  rights  under 
the  law  of  nations,  whether  acts  of  Parliament  fur 
nished  the  means  of  so  doing  or  not.  The  position 
thus  at  last  assumed  was  approved  by  a  comparatively 
small  majority.  A  surprise  to  the  American  Minister 
then  representing  the  country  in  London,  the  deten 
tion  of  the  iron-clads  thus  marked  a  radical  change  in 
the  policy  pursued  by  the  Palmerston-Russell  Ministry. 
Earl  Russell  apparently  now  first  realized  the  fact  he 
afterwards  announced  in  Parliament,  "  that  in  this 
conflict  the  Confederate  States  have  no  ports,  except 
those  of  the  Mersey  and  the  Clyde,  from  which  to  fit 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  69 

out  ships  to  cruise  against  the  Federals  ;  "  l  and  it 
seems  to  have  dawned  upon  him  that,  in  the  case  of 
future  hostilities,  other  nations  besides  Great  Britain 
had  ports,  and,  in  certain  not  impossible  contingencies, 
those  ports  might  become  bases  —  perhaps  inconven 
ient  bases  —  of  maritime  warfare,  as  were  now  those 
of  the  Mersey  and  the  Clyde.  It  was  a  thing  much  to 
be  deplored  that  rules  did  work  both  ways,  and  that 
curses,  like  chickens,  would  come  home  to  roost ;  but, 
this  being  so,  it  behooved  prudent  statesmen  to  give 
a  certain  degree  of  consideration  to  the  precedents 
they  were  creating. 

Whether  Earl  Russell  reasoned  in  this  wise  or  not, 
certain  it  is  that  after  September,  1863,  Great  Britain 
ceased  to  be  available  as  a  base  of  Confederate  naval 
operations.  The  moment  it  felt  so  disposed,  Her 
Majesty's  Government  found  means  to  cause  the  neu 
trality  of  Great  Britain  to  be  respected.  My  own  be 
lief,  derived  from  a  tolerably  thorough  study  of  the 
period,  is  that  numerous  causes  contributed  to  that 
change.  Among  the  more  potent  of  these  I  should 
enumerate  the  stirring  of  the  British  conscience  which 
followed  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  of  September, 
1862  ;  the  conviction,  already  referred  to,  that  any 
decisive  action  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  was  unne 
cessary  as  well  as  impolitic,  the  ultimate  success  of  the 
Confederacy  being  a  foregone  conclusion  ;  the  troubled 
state  of  affairs  on  the  Continent  as  respects  both  Po 
land  and  Denmark ;  and,  above  all,  the  honest  anger 
of  Earl  Eussell  at  the  consequences  which  had  ensued 
from  the  evasion  of  the  Alabama.  The  precedent  he 

1  House  of   Lords,   April   26,  1864.     Geneva  Arbitration:  Corre 
spondence,  etc.,  vol.  v.  p.  535. 


70  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

had  himself  helped  to  create  startled  him,  —  he  recoiled 
in  presence  of  its  logical  consequences ;  and,  in  view 
of  the  complications  then  existing  on  the  Continent,  or 
there  in  obvious  process  of  development,  the  great 
financial  and  commercial  interests  of  Great  Britain 
showed  signs  of  awakening.  Awkward  questions  were 
shortly  in  order  ;  and,  on  the  evening  of  the  13th 
of  May,  1864,  the  head  of  the  great  commercial  house 
of  Barings  fairly  startled  the  country  by  rising  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  suggesting  certain  queries  to 
the  Government,  —  queries,  now,  thirty-seven  years 
later,  of  much  significance  in  connection  with  events 
in  South  Africa.  "  I  am,"  Mr.  Baring  said,  "  desir 
ous  of  inviting  the  attention  of  the  House  to  the  situa 
tion  in  which  this  country  will  be  if  the  precedents  now 
established  are  acted  upon  in  the  event  of  our  being 
involved  in  war,  while  other  States  are  neutral.  Under 
the  present  construction  of  our  municipal  law  there  is 
no  necessity  that  a  belligerent  should  have  a  port  or 
even  a  seashore.  Provided  she  has  money,  or  that 
money  is  supplied  to  her  by  a  neutral,  she  may  fit  out 
vessels,  and  those  vessels  need  not  go  to  the  country 
to  which  they  are  said  to  belong,  but  may  go  about 
the  seas  dealing  destruction  to  British  shipping  and 
property.  Take  the  case,  which  I  hope  we  shall  avoid, 
of  our  being  at  war  with  Germany.  There  would,  as 
things  now  stand,  be  nothing  to  prevent  the  Diet  of 
Frankfort  from  having  a  fleet.  A  number  of  the  small 
States  of  Germany  might  unite  together,  and  become 
a  great  naval  power.  Money  is  all  that  is  required 
for  the  purpose  ;  and  Saxony,  without  a  seashore,  might 
have  a  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  without  any 
docks,  who  might  have  a  large  fleet  at  his  disposal. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  71 

The  only  answer  we  could  make  under  those  circum 
stances  to  France  and  the  United  States,  who  as  neu 
trals  might  fit  out  vessels  against  us  on  the  pretence 
that  they  were  German  cruisers,  was  that  we  would 
go  to  war  with  them  •  so  that  by  the  course  of  policy 
which  we  are  pursuing  we  render  ourselves  liable  to 
the  alternative  of  having  our  property  completely  de 
stroyed,  or  entering  into  a  contest  with  every  neutral 
Power  in  the  world.  We  ought,  under  these  circum 
stances,  to  ask  ourselves  what  we  have  at  stake.  I  will 
not  trouble  the  House  with  statistics  on  the  point,  but 
we  all  know  that  our  commerce  is  to  be  found  ex 
tending  itself  to  every  sea,  that  our  vessels  float  in  the 
waters  of  every  clime,  that  even  with  our  cruisers  afloat 
it  would  not  be  easy  to  pick  up  an  Alabama,  and  that 
the  destruction  of  our  property  might  go  on  despite  all 
our  powers  and  resources.  What  would  be  the  result  ? 
That  we  must  submit  to  the  destruction  of  our  property, 
or  that  our  shipping  interests  must  withdraw  their 
ships  from  the  ocean.  That  is  a  danger,  the  appre 
hension  of  which  is  not  confined  to  myself,  but  is 
shared  by  many  who  are  far  better  able  to  form  a  judg 
ment  than  I  am.  Recollect  that  your  shipping  is 
nearly  twice  as  large  as  that  of  the  United  States.  If 
you  follow  the  principle  you  are  now  adopting  as  re 
gards  the  United  States,  you  must  be  prepared  to  stand 
the  consequences ;  so  strongly  was  this  felt  by  ship 
owners  that  memorials  have  already  been  addressed  to 
the  Government  upon  the  subject.  .  .  .  Last  night  the 
honorable  Member  for  Liverpool  presented  a  peti 
tion,  signed  by  almost  all  the  great  ship-owners  of  that 
place,  enforcing  the  same  view  and  expressing  the  same 
anxiety.  I  am  a  little  surprised  at  this  manifestation, 


72  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

because  what  is  happening  around  us  is  a  source  of 
great  profit  to  our  ship-owners  ;  but  it  is  a  proof  that 
they  are  sensible  that  the  future  danger  will  far  pre 
ponderate  over  the  present  benefit  and  advantages."  1 

When  too  late,  it  thus  dawned  even  on  the  ship 
builders  of  the  Mersey  that,  for  a  great  commercial 
people,  confederacy  with  corsairs  might  be  a  danger 
ous,  even  if  not,  in  their  own  eyes,  a  discreditable 
vocation.  Firms  openly  dealing  in  burglars'  tools  are 
not  regarded  as  reputable. 

But  one  way  of  escape  from  their  own  precedents 
might  yet  remain.  It  was  always  the  contention  of 
Mr.  Charles  Sumner  that  a  neutral-built  ship-of-war 
could  not  be  commissioned  by  a  belligerent  on  the 
high  seas.  It  was  and  remained  a  pirate,  —  the  com 
mon  enemy  of  mankind,  —  until  its  arrival  at  a  port 
of  the  belligerent  to  which  it  belonged,  where  alone, 
after  "  depositing  its  taint,"  it  could  be  fitted  out  and 
commissioned  as  a  ship-of-war.2  As  any  port  will  do 
in  a  storm,  and  drowning  men  proverbially  clutch  at 
straws,  it  is  possible  to  imagine  a  British  ship-owner, 
as  he  foresaw  in  vision  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange 
Free  State  involved  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  appro 
priating  this  contention,  and  trying  to  incorporate  it 
into  the  International  Code.  He  would  then  have  pro 
ceeded  to  argue  somewhat  as  follows  :  —  "  Mr.  Baring 
was  a  banker,  not  a  publicist.  As  a  publicist  he  was 
wrong.  A  non-maritime  nation  cannot  be  a  maritime 
belligerent,"  etc.,  etc.  But,  during  the  course  of  our 
Civil  War,  the  British  authorities,  legal  and  political, 

1  Geneva  Arbitration  :  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  v.  p.  579. 

2  Works,  vol.  vii.  pp.  358, 452-460 ;  vol.  xiii.  p.  68.   Pierce :  Sumner, 
vol.  iv.  p.  394. 


-v 

>.')  y 

*%/£- 

r##  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  73 

seemed  to  take  pleasure  in  shutting  against  themselves 
every  possible  outlet  of  future  escape.  So,  in  this  case, 
referring  to  the  contention  of  Mr.  Sumner,  the  Attor 
ney-General,  speaking  after  Mr.  Baring,  expressed 
himself  as  follows  :  —  "  To  say  that  a  country  whose 
ports  are  blockaded  is  not  at  liberty  to  avail  herself 
of  all  the  resources  which  may  be  at  her  command 
in  other  parts  of  the  world,  that  she  may  not  buy  ships 
in  neutral  territory  and  commission  them  as  ships  of 
war  without  bringing  them  to  her  own  country  first, 
is  a  doctrine  which  is  quite  preposterous,  and  all 
the  arguments  founded  upon  such  a  doctrine  only 
tend  to  throw  dust  into  men's  eyes,  and  to  mislead 
them."  i 

The  morning  following  this  significant  debate  the 
tone  of  Lord  Palmerston's  London  organ  underwent 
a  notable  change.  Grant  and  Lee  were  that  day 
confronting  each  other  in  the  Wilderness,  resting  for 
a  brief  space  after  the  fearful  wrestle  of  Spottsylvania; 
in  London,  the  conference  over  the  Schleswig-Holstein 
struggle  was  in  session,  and  the  feelings  of  Great 
Britain  were  deeply  enlisted  on  behalf  of  Denmark, 
borne  down  by  the  united  weight  of  Prussia  and 
Austria.  So,  in  view  of  immediate  possible  hostili 
ties,  the  Post  now  exclaimed,  —  "  We  are  essentially 
a  maritime  power,  and  are  bound  by  every  motive  of 
self-interest  to  watch  with  jealousy  the  observance  of 
neutral  maritime  obligations.  We  may  be  at  war 
ourselves  ;  we  have  a  future  [South  Africa!]  to  which 
to  look  forward,  and  we  must  keep  in  mind  the  pre 
cept  which  inculcates  the  necessity  of  doing  to  others 
as  we  would  be  done  by.  .  .  .  War  is  no  longer  con- 

1  Geneva  Arbitration  :  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  v.  p.  583. 


74  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

sidered  by  the  commercial  classes  an  impossibility; 
and  the  ship-owners  of  Liverpool  are  considering  what 
is  to  become  of  their  property  should  we  unhappily 
become  involved  in  war,  and  innumerable  Alcibamas 
issue  from  neutral  [American]  ports  to  prey  upon 
British  commerce  throughout  the  world.  Suppose  that 
circumstances  obliged  us  to  espouse  the  cause  of  Den 
mark  against  her  ruthless  enemies,  would  not  the 
German  States  hasten  to  follow  the  bad  example  set 
them  by  the  Confederates,  and  at  which  the  inefficiency 
of  our  law  obliges  us  to  connive  ?  "  And  the  London 
organ  of  "  society  "  and  the  "  influential  classes  "  then 
added  this  sentence,  which,  under  certain  conditions 
actually  existing  thirty-five  years  later,  would  have 
been  of  very  pregnant  significance  :  —  "  Some  petty 
principality  which  boasts  of  a  standing  army  of  five 
hundred  men,  but  not  of  a  single  foot  of  sea-coast 
[e.  g.  the  Transvaal,  the  Orange  Free  State],  might 
fit  out  cruisers  in  neutral  \_e.  g.  American]  ports  to 
burn,. sink,  and  destroy  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain; 
and  the  enormous  amount  of  damage  which  may  be 
done  in  a  very  short  time,  even  by  a  single  vessel,  we 
know  from  the  history  of  the  Alabama"  1 

Thus  when  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  closed,  the 
trans-Atlantic  outlook  was,  for  Great  Britain,  omi 
nous  in  the  extreme.  Just  that  had  come  about  which 
English  public  men  and  British  newspapers  had  wea 
ried  themselves  with  asseverating  could  not  possibly 
happen.  The  Times  and  Morning  Post  especially 
had  loaded  the  record  with  predictions,  every  one 
of  which  the  event  falsified;  and,  in  doing  so,  they 
had  gone  out  of  their  way  to  generate  bitter  ill- 
1  The  Post,  May  14  and  18,  1864. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  75 

feeling  by  the  arrogant  expression  of  a  contemptuous 
dislike  peculiarly  British  and  offensive.  For  example, 
the  Times,  "  well  aware  that  its  articles  weigh  in 
America  more  heavily  than  despatches,"  first  referred 
to  us  as  "  this  insensate  and  degenerate  :  people,"  and 
then  proceeded  to  denounce  "  this  hateful  and  atro 
cious  war,  .  .  .  this  horrible  war,"  which  it  declared 
was  of  such  a  character  that  its  defenders  could  not 
find  in  all  Europe  a  single  society  where  they  could 
make  themselves  heard.2  In  the  same  common  temper, 
the  Standard,  reviewing  the  results  of  the  conflict  on 
the  very  day  that  Vicksburg,  unknown  to  it,  had  sur- 

1  The  "  degeneracy  "  of  the  American  was,  at  this  time,  the  sub 
ject  of  much  lachrymose  contemplation  on  the  part  of  British  jour 
nalistic  scribes.     A  writer  in  that  highly  respectable  quarterly,  the 
North  British  Review,  thus  delivered  himself,   for   instance,   in  its 
February  number  for  1862  (p.  248)  :  —  "In  nearly  every  element  of 
political  and  moral,  as  distinguished  from  material,  civilization,  the 
deterioration  of  America  since  the  days   of  Washington  had  been 
appallingly  rapid  and  decisive.     It  had  ceased  to  be  the  land  of  pro 
gress,  and  had  become  in  a  peculiar  manner  the  land  of  retrogression 
and  degeneracy." 

2  July  9,  12,  1862.     The  course  and  language  of  the  Times  at  this 
period  were  peculiarly  ill-advised.     American   opinion  on  that  point 
might  be  considered  prejudiced  ;  but  Mr.  Leslie  Stephen,  then  a  mail 
of  thirty-three,  has  since  established  a  world-wide  reputation  as  a 
critic  on  questions  of  taste.    Mr.  Stephen,  in  1865,  thus  expressed  him 
self  in  a  pamphlet  (pp.  105, 106)  entitled  The  "  Times  "  on  the  American 
War  :  A  Historical  Study  ;  a  production  not  included  in  his  recognized 
writings,  and  long  since  forgotten  :  —  "  But  my  complaint  against  the 
Times  is  that  its  total  ignorance  of  the  quarrel,  and  the  presumption 
with  which  it  pronounced  upon  its  merits,  led  to  its  pouring  out  a 
ceaseless  flood  of  scurrilous  abuse,  couched,  indeed,  in  decent  lan 
guage,  but  as  essentially  insulting  as  the  brutal  vulgarities  of  the  New 
York  Herald.     No  American  —  I  will  not  say  with  the  feelings  of  a 
gentleman,  for  of  course  there  are  no  gentlemen  in  America  —  but  no 
American  with  enough  of  the  common  feelings  of  humanity  to  resent 
the  insult  when  you  spit  in  his  face  could  fail  to  be  wounded,  and,  so 
far  as  he  took  the  voice  of  the  Times  for  the  voice  of  England,  to  be 
irritated  against  England." 


76  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

rendered,  declared,  — "  We  have  learned  to  dislike, 
and  almost  to  despise  the  North ;  to  sympathize  with, 
and  cordially  to  admire,  the  South.  We  have  learned 
that  the  South  is,  on  the  whole,  in  the  right ;  that 
the  North  is  altogether,  wilfully  and  wickedly  in  the 
wrong."  But  these  expressions  of  heartfelt  contempt 
were  not  confined  to  the  London  press.  Liverpool, 
for  instance,  was  conspicuous  as  a  hot-bed  of  Confed 
erate  sympathy;  and,  as  early  as  August,  1861,  the 
leading  journal  of  that  city  expressed  itself  as  follows  : 
—  "  We  have  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  vast  major 
ity  of  the  people  of  this  country,  certainly  of  the  peo 
ple  of  Liverpool,  are  in  favor  of  the  cause  espoused  by 
the  Secessionists.  The  defeat  of  the  Federalists  gives 
unmixed  pleasure ;  the  success  of  the  Confederates  is 
ardently  hoped,  nay,  confidently  predicted."  A  year 
later,  the  London  Post  referred  in  the  same  tone 
to  those  whom  it  saw  fit,  in  the  rarefied  and  luminous 
atmosphere  of  its  own  exalted  wisdom,  to  describe  as 
"  the  infatuated  people  across  the  Atlantic."  "  The 
whole  history  of  the  war  is  a  history  of  mistakes  on 
the  Federal  side.  Blinded  by  self-conceit,  influenced 
by  passion,  reckless  of  the  lessons  of  history,  and  deaf 
to  warnings  which  every  one  else  could  hear  and 
tremble  at,  the  people  of  the  North  plunged  into  hos 
tilities  with  their  fellow-citizens  without  so  much  as  a 
definite  idea  what  they  were  fighting  for,  or  on  what 
condition  they  would  cease  fighting.  They  went  to 
war  without  a  cause,  they  have  fought  without  a  plan, 
and  they  are  prosecuting  it  still  without  a  principle." 
It  would  then  pleasantly  allude  to  the  "suicidal  frenzy" 
of  a  contest  in  which  two  sections  were  striving  "with 
a  ferocity  unknown  since  the  times  when  Indian 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  11 

scalped  Indian  on  the  same  continent ;  "  and  sorrow 
fully  add,  —  "  American  pride  contemptuously  dis 
dains  to  consider  what  may  be  thought  of  its  pro 
ceedings  by  the  intelligent  in  this  country ;  inflated 
self-sufficiency  scorns  alike  the  friendly  advice  of  the 
disinterested  and  the  indignant  censures  of  a  disap 
proving  world."  And  then,  finally,  when  its  every 
prevision  had  proved  wrong,  and  all  its  predictions 
were  falsified,  as  it  contemplated  the  total  collapse  of 
the  Confederacy,  this  organ  of  "  society "  and  the 
44  influential  classes  "  innocently  observed  :  —  "  The 
antipathy  entertained  by  the  United  States  toward 
England  has,  owing  to  circumstances  entirely  beyond 
our  control,  and  into  which  it  is  unnecessary  now  to 
enter,  been  fanned  into  a  fiercer  flame  during  the 
progress  of  the  war ; "  1  and  it  now  spoke  of  Great 
Britain  as  "  the  mother  country  !  " 

Kecorded    utterances   of   this    character   could   be 
multiplied  indefinitely ; 2  I  take  these  few,  selected  at 

1  May  15,  1865. 

2  Those  of  the  Post,  read  a  generation  after  the  event,  and  in  the 
light   of    passing   South   African   events,   are    simply   inconceivable. 
They  reflect  a  degree  of  ignorance,  and  a  malignity  of  disposition, 
difficult  to  account  for.      Take,  for  instance,  the  following  :  —  "  Yet 
what  wild  tribe,  from  the  Red  River  or  the  South  Sea  Islands,  dan 
cing  round  its  fires,  and  goading  each  other  to  fury  by  its  cries,  could 
exceed  in  deliberate  cruelty  and  implacability  the  citizens  of  Wash 
ington  on  the  occasion  to  which  we  refer  ?  "    (August  10, 1862.)    The 
"  occasion  "  was  a  "  war-meeting  "  at  that  time  held,  "  under  the  au 
spices  of  President  Lincoln."     "  But  as  the  contest  went  on,  it  was 
soon  seen  how  little  slavery  had  to  do  with  it ;  and  even  Europe,  to  a 
man,  has  lost  every  spark  of  interest  in  the  Federal  cause.     Sympathy 
goes  continuously  southward."     (August  29,  1862.)     "We  doubt  if 
there  could  be  found  in  the  entire  universe  a  more  degrading  spectacle 
than  that  of  a  regiment  of  negro  soldiers  fighting  in  support  of  the 
Federal  government."    (September  22,  1862.)    k'  A  proclamation  would 
almost  suffice  to  dislodge  Abraham  Lincoln.  .  .  .  We  believe  that  if 


78  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

random,  merely  to  illustrate  the  extreme  difficulty 
of  the  position  into  which  the  precedents  and  declara 
tions  she  herself  had  established,  and  put  freely  on 
record,  brought  Great  Britain  at  the  close  of  our  Civil 
War.  It  is  useless  to  say  that,  as  between  nations, 
irresponsible  utterances  through  the  press  and  from  the 
platform  are  entitled  to  no  consideration,  and  should 
not  be  recalled.  They,  none  the  less,  are  a  fact ;  and 
they  are  not  forgotten.  On  the  contrary,  they  rankle. 
They  did  so  in  1865. 

Happily,  however,  for  the  peace  of  the  world,  a  few 
great  facts  then  stood  forth,  established  and  of  record  ; 
and  it  is  these  prominent  facts  which  influence  popular 
feeling.  English  built  ships  —  English  manned  and 
English  armed  —  had  swept  the  American  merchant 
marine  from  the  seas ;  but,  most  fortunately,  an  Ameri 
can  man-of-war  of  not  unequal  size  had,  within  sight 
of  English  shores,  sent  to  the  bottom  of  the  British 
Channel  the  single  one  of  those  commerce-destroyers 
which  had  ventured  to  trust  itself  within  the  range  of 

President  Davis  were  to  assume  the  functions  of  President  of  the 
United  States,  the  population  of  the  North  would  gladly  accept  this 
ready  mode  of  preserving  the  integrity  of  the  country,  and  at  once 
acknowledge  his  authority."  (September  24,  1862.)  "  It  is  easy  to 
conceive,  though  it  may  be  difficult  to  express,  the  language  in  which 
future  historians  will  speak  of  this  deplorable  contest.  Foolish  it  has 
been,  without  a  parallel  in  the  annals  of  human  folly.  Aimless  it 
has  been,  when  the  utter  hopelessness  of  the  object  with  which  it  was 
prosecuted  is  borne  in  mind.  In  no  previous  wars  has  the  sacrifice  of 
human  life  been  proportionally  greater ;  in  none  has  the  expenditure 
been  so  wantonly,  so  profligately,  extravagant.  There  remains,  how 
ever,  one  term  which  must  still  be  applied.  It  has  been  profitless. 
Life,  money,  and  national  credit  have  all  been  frittered  away  to  pro 
cure —  nothing!"  (October  2,1862.)  It  is  difficult  now  to  recall 
these,  and  endless  similar  lucubrations,  without  mirth  ;  then  they 
hurt.  And  they  were  meant  to  hurt.  Perhaps  the  cruelest  possible 
revenge  for  such  utterances  is,  subsequently,  and  in  the  cold  light  of 
actualities,  to  confront  the  utterer  with  them. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  79 

our  guns.  In  this  there  was  much  balm.  Again,  Amer 
ica  was  weary  of  strife,  and  longed  for  rest ;  and  it 
could  well  afford  to  bide  its  time  in  view  of  the  changed 
tone  and  apprehensive  glances  which  now  came  across 
the  Atlantic  from  those  whose  forecast  had  deceived 
them  into  a  position  so  obviously  false.  In  common 
parlance,  Great  Britain  had  made  her  bed ;  she  might 
now  safely  be  left  to  a  prolonged  nightmare  as  she  lay 
in  it.  The  United  States  —  no  longer  an  "  insensate 
and  degenerate  people "  —  could  wait  in  confidence. 
Its  time  was  sure  to  come. 

Great  Britain,  also,  was  most  uncomfortably  of  this 
same  opinion.  The  more  her  public  men  reflected  on 
the  positions  taken  by  the  Palmerston-Russell  Min 
istry,  and  the  precedents  therein  created,  the  worse 
they  seemed,  and  the  less  propitious  the  outlook.  The 
reckoning  was  long;  and  it  was  chalked  plainly  on 
the  wall.  It  was  never  lost  to  sight  nor  out  of  mind. 
The  tendency  of  events  was  obvious.  They  all  pointed 
'to  retaliation  in  kind  ;  for,  in  the  summer  of  1866,  the 
House  of  Representatives  at  Washington  passed,  with 
out  one  dissenting  vote,  a  bill  to  repeal  the  inhibitions 
contained  in  the  American  neutrality  laws  against 
the  fitting  out  of  ships  for  belligerents.  The  threat 
was  overt ;  Great  Britain  deprecatingly  met  it  by  the 
passage,  in  1870,  of  a  new  and  stringent  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act. 

Just  six  years  elapsed  between  the  close  of  the  War 
of  the  Rebellion  (May,  1865)  and  the  signing  of  the 
Treaty  of  Washington  (May,  1871).  For  Great 
Britain  those  were  years  of  rapid  education  toward  a 
new  code  of  international  law.  Considering  the  in 
terval  traversed,  the  time  of  traversing  it  cannot  be 


80  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

said  to  have  been  long.  When,  in  the  midst  of  the  Civil 
War,  tidings  of  the  depredations  of  the  British  built 
Confederate  commerce-destroyers  reached  America, 
instructions  were  sent  to  the  Minister  of  the  United 
States  in  London  to  demand  reparation.  To  this  de 
mand  Earl  Russell,  then  Foreign  Secretary,  in  due  time 
responded.  Not  only  did  he  deny  any  liability,  legal 
or  moral,  but  he  concluded  his  reply  with  this  highly 
significant,  not  to  say  petulant  remark  :  • —  "I  have 
only,  in  conclusion,  to  express  my  hope  that  you  may 
not  be  instructed  again  to  put  forward  claims  which 
Her  Majesty's  Government  cannot  admit  to  be 
founded  on  any  grounds  of  law  or  justice."  l 

The  discussion  seemed  closed ;  Great  Britain  had 
apparently  taken  her  stand.  In  the  words  of  the 
Foreign  Secretary,  —  "  Her  Majesty's  Government 
entirely  disclaim  all  responsibility  for  any  acts  of  the 
Alabama"  2  This  was  in  March,  1863.  On  the  19th 
of  June,  1864,  the  depredations  of  the  Alabama 
were  brought  to  a  summary  close.  When  the  Con 
federate  Secretary  of  War  at  Richmond  heard  of  the 
loss  thus  sustained,  he  wrote  immediately  (July  18) 
to  the  Liverpool  bureau  of  his  department :  "  You 
must  supply  her  place  if  possible,  a  measure  [now] 
of  paramount  importance."  3  This  despatch  reached 
its  destination  on  the  3 Oth  of  August,  and  on  the  20th 
of  October  the  head  of  the  bureau  had  "  the  great 
satisfaction  of  reporting  the  safe  departure  on  the 
8th  inst."  of  the  Shenandoah  from  London,  and  its 

1  Dip.  Cor.,  1863,  p.  380.     Russell  to  Adams,  September  14,  1863. 
Geneva  Arbitration  :    Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  iii.  p.  164. 

2  Russell  to  Adams,  March  9,  1863.     Geneva  Arbitration :  Corre 
spondence,  etc.,  vol.  iii.  p.  122. 

8  Bulloch,  vol.  ii.  p.  112. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  81 

consort,  the  Laurel,  from  Liverpool,  "  within  a  few 
hours  of  each  other  ;  "  and  this  in  spite  of  "  embar 
rassing  and  annoying  inquiries  from  the  Customs 
and  Board  of  Trade  officials."  l  The  Shenandoah  now 
took  up  the  work  of  destruction  which  the  Alabama 
was  no  longer  in  position  to  continue.  It  thus  de 
volved  on  the  American  Minister  to  present  further 
demands  on  the  Foreign  Secretary.  But,  in  the  mean 
time,  the  situation  had  materially  changed.  The  cor 
respondence  over  the  depredations  of  the  Alabama 
was  abruptly  closed  by  Earl  Russell  seven  weeks  be 
fore  the  unfortunate  battle  of  Chancellorsville ;  Lee 
surrendered  at  Appomattox  just  two  days  after  Mr. 
Adams  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  Foreign  Secretary 
the  depredations  of  the  Shenandoah. 

A  long  correspondence  ensued,  which  was  closed  on 
the  2d  of  the  following  December  by  Lord  Clarendon, 
Earl  Russell's  successor  as  Foreign  Secretary.  His 
despatch  was  brief ;  but  in  it  he  observed,  "  that  no 
armed  vessel  departed  during  the  war  from  a  British 
port  to  cruise  against  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States ;  "  and  he  further  maintained  that  throughout 
the  war  "  the  British  government  have  steadily  and 
honestly  discharged  all  the  duties  incumbent  on  them 
as  a  neutral  power,  and  have  never  deviated  from  the 
obligations  imposed  on  them  by  international  law." 2 
And  yet  in  this  correspondence  the  first  step  in  the 
direction  of  a  settlement  was  taken,  —  a  step  curiously 
characteristic  of  Earl  Russell.  As  indicative  also  of 
the  amount  of  progress  as  yet  made  on  the  long  road  to 
be  traversed,  it  was  the  reverse  of  encouraging.  Earl 

1  Bulloch,  vol.  ii.  pp.  131-133. 

2  Geneva  Arbitration :  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  iii.  p.  625. 


82  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

Russell  had  brought  Great  Britain  into  a  position  from 
which  she  had  in  some  way  to  be  extricated.  The 
events  of  April  and  May,  1865,  in  America  were  very 
significant  when  viewed  in  their  bearing  on  the  fast 
rising  European  complications  incident  to  the  blood- 
and-iron  policy  to  which  Count  Bismarck  was  deliber 
ately  giving  shape.  Dark  clouds,  ominous  of  coming 
storm,  were  hanging  on  the  European  horizon ;  while 
America,  powerful  and  at  peace,  lowered  angrily 
British-ward  from  across  the  Atlantic.  It  was  a  con 
tinuous,  ever-present  menace,  to  be  averted  only  when 
approached  in  a  large  way.  One  course  —  one  course 
alone —  was  open  to  the  British  statesmen.  But  to  see 
and  follow  it  called  for  an  eye  and  mind  and  pen 
very  different,  and  far  more  quick  and  facile,  than  the 
eye,  mind,  and  pen  with  which  nature  had  seen  fit  to 
endow  the  younger  scion  of  the  ducal  house  of  Bed 
ford. 

Had  he  been  equal  to  the  situation,  it  was  then  in 
the  power  of  Earl  Russell  to  extricate  Great  Britain 
from  the  position  into  which  he  had  brought  her,  and 
out  of  the  nettle,  danger,  to  pluck  the  flower,  safety. 
Nor  would  it  have  been  difficult  so  to  do ;  and  that 
without  the  abandonment  of  any  position  he  had  taken. 
Weary  of  battle  and  satiated  with  success,  America 
was  then  in  complaisant  mood.  A  complete  victor  is 
always  inclined  to  be  magnanimous,  and  that  was  a 
time  when,  as  Mr.  Sumner  afterwards  expressed  it, 
"  we  would  have  accepted  very  little."  1  Taking  ad 
vantage  of  this  national  mental  mood,  it  would  have 
been  possible  for  Earl  Russell  then,  while  extricating 
Great  Britain  from  a  false  position,  to  have  at  once 

1  Pierce  :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  p.  384. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  83 

obliterated  the  recollection  of  the  past  and  forestalled 
the  Treaty  of  Washington,  securing  at  the  same  time 
the  adoption  at  little  cost  of  a  new  principle  of  inter 
national  law  obviously  in  the  interest  of  Great  Britain. 
Still  insisting  in  his  correspondence  with  the  American 
Minister  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  had,  in  the 
language  of  his  successor,  "  steadily  and  honestly  dis 
charged  all  the  duties  incumbent  on  them  as  a  neutral 
power,"  and  hence  had  incurred  no  liability  under  any 
recognized  principle  or  precedent  of  international  law 
for  depredations  committed  by  Her  Majesty's  subjects 
beyond  her  jurisdiction,  —  adhering  firmly  to  this  con 
tention,  he  might  have  gone  on  to  recognize,  in  the 
light  of  a  record  which  he  had  already  over  and  over 
admitted  was  a  "scandal"  and  "a  reproach  to  our 
laws,"  that  a  radical  change  in  the  international  code 
was  obviously  desirable,  and  that  the  time  for  it  had 
come.  The  neutral  should  be  responsible  for  results 
whenever,  after  due  notice  of  a  contemplated  infrac 
tion  was  given  (as  in  the  cases  of  the  Florida  and 
Alabama),  she  permitted  her  territory  to  be  made  by 
one  belligerent  the  base  of  operations  against  another. 
The  laws  ought,  he  would  have  admitted,  to  be  ade 
quate  to  such  an  emergency ;  and  they  should  be  en 
forced.  He  might  well  then  have  expressed  the  honest 
regret  Great  Britain  felt  that  her  laws  had  during  our 
rebellion  proved  inadequate,  and  a  proper  sense  of  the 
grievous  injury  the  United  States  had  in  consequence 
sustained.  The  rest  of  the  way  out  would  then  have 
been  plain.  In  view  of  Great  Britain's  commercial 
and  maritime  interests,  she  could  well  afford  to  incur 
large  pecuniary  sacrifices  to  secure  the  future  protec 
tion  involved  in  the  change  of  international  law  con- 


84  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

tended  for  by  the  American  government.  She  could 
not  ask  that  protection  for  the  future  with  no  regard 
to  the  past.  That  Great  Britain  had  incurred  to  a 
certain  extent  a  moral  obligation  through  the  insuf 
ficiency  of  her  statutes,  combined  with  the  unsatisfac 
tory  state  of  international  law,  could  not  be  denied  in 
view  of  the  oft  recorded  admission  that  the  cases  of  the 
Confederate  commerce-destroyers  were  a  "  scandal " 
and  a  "  reproach."  Under  these  circumstances,  Great 
Britain  was  prepared  to  assent  to  the  modifications  of 
international  law  now  contended  for  by  the  United 
States ;  and,  to  secure  the  manifest  future  advantage 
involved  in  their  adoption,  would  agree,  subject  to 
reasonable  limitations  as  to  extent  of  liability,  etc.,  to 
have  those  principles  operate  retrospectively  in  the  case 
of  such  Confederate  commerce-destroyers  as  had,  after 
notice  given,  sailed  from  British  ports  of  origin  during 
the  Civil  War. 

In  the  light  of  what  afterwards  occurred,  including 
the  Treaty  of  Washington  and  the  results  of  the 
Geneva  Arbitration,  it  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  the 
astonishment  with  which  the  American  Minister  would 
have  read  a  despatch  couched  in  these  terms,  and  the 
gratification  with  which  the  American  people  would 
have  hailed  it.  It  would  have  been,  in  the  reverse,  a 
repetition  of  the  Trent  experience,  —  the  honest  ac 
knowledgment  of  a  false  attitude.  The  clouds  would  at 
once  have  rolled  away.  While  the  national  pride  of 
Great  Britain  would  have  suffered  no  hurt,  that  of  the 
United  States  would  have  been  immensely  flattered. 
The  one  country  would  have  got  itself  gracefully,  and 
cheaply,  out  of  an  impossible  position.  It  would  have 
secured  an  advantage  of  inestimable  future  value  at  a 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  85 

cost  in  reality  nominal,  and  a  cost  which  it  afterwards 
had  to  pay ;  the  other  party  would  have  achieved  a  great 
diplomatic  victory,  crowning  and  happily  rounding  out 
its  military  successes.  Most  unfortunately,  as  the  re 
sult  showed,  Earl  Russell  did  not  have  it  in  him  thus 
to  rise  to  the  occasion.  On  the  contrary,  with  that 
curious  conventional  conservatism  which  seems  innate 
in  a  certain  class  of  English  public  men,  —  an  inability 
to  recognize  their  own  interests  if  presented  in  unac 
customed  form,  —  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  de 
clined  to  consider  those  very  changes  in  the  law  which 
Parliament  five  years  later  voluntarily  adopted,  and 
which,  seven  years  later,  Great  Britain  agreed  to  in 
corporate  in  a  solemn  treaty.  The  proposed  liability 
for  the  abuse  of  neutrality  by  belligerents,  so  invalu 
able  to  England,  Lord  Russell  now  characterized  as 
"most  burdensome,  and,  indeed,  most  dangerous;" 
while,  with  a  simplicity  almost  humorous,  he  ejacu 
lated,  —  "  Surely,  we  are  not  bound  to  go  on  making 
new  laws,  at?  infinitum,  because  new  occasions  arise."  1 
So,  high-toned  Englishman  as  he  was,  Lord  Russell, 
guided  by  his  instincts  and  traditions,  as  Prime  Min 
ister  characteristically  went  on  to  make  perceptibly 
worse  what,  as  Foreign  Secretary,  he  had  already 
made  quite  sufficiently  bad.  He  did  not  aggrandize, 
he  distinctly  belittled,  his  case.  In  reply  to  the  re 
newed  demands  of  the  American  Minister,  he  sug 
gested,  in  a  most  casual  way,  the  appointment  of  a 
joint  commission,  to  which  should  be  referred  "  all 
claims  arising  during  the  late  Civil  War  [his  note  was 
dated  August  30,  nearly  four  months  after  the  cap- 

1  Russell  to  Adams,  August  30,  1865.     Geneva  Arbitration :  Cor 
respondence,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  677  ;  vol.  iii.  p.  561. 


86  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

ture  of  Jefferson  Davis],  which  the  two  powers  shall 
agree  to  refer."  1  The  correspondence  was  at  once 
published  in  the  Gazette  ;  and,  so  general  was  the  pro 
position  of  reference,  that  the  Times,  in  commenting 
editorially  on  it  the  morning  after  publication,  ad 
mitted  the  desirability  of  a  settlement,  and  construed 
the  proposal  of  a  commission  as  designed  to  embrace 
all  the  American  claims.  The  "  Thunderer's  "  utter 
ance  on  this  point  might  be  inspired,  —  a  feeler  of 
public  opinion ;  a  possible  way  out  seemed  to  open. 
Earl  Kussell  characteristically  lost  no  time  in  closing 
it.  At  a  later  day,  after  the  Alabama  claims  had  been 
arbitrated  and  paid,  his  Lordship  asserted  that  he  had 
always  been  willing  to  have  them  assumed,  or,  as  he 
expressed  it,  would  "  at  once  have  agreed  to  arbitra 
tion,"  could  he  have  received  assurances  on  certain 
controverted  issues,  involving,  as  he  considered,  the 
honor  and  dignity  of  Great  Britain.2  This  was  clearly 
an  afterthought  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events. 
No  suggestion  of  that  nature  was  ever  made  by  him 
to  Mr.  Adams;  and  when,  in  October,  1865,  such  a 
possible  construction  was  put  upon  his  despatches,  he 
made  haste  to  repudiate  it.  In  fact,  Earl  Kussell, 
still  Foreign  Secretary,  but  soon  to  become  Premier, 
was  not  yet  ready  to  take  the  first  step  in  the  edu 
cational  process  marked  out  for  Great  Britain.  The 
dose  was,  indeed,  a  bitter  one ;  no  wonder  Lord  Rus 
sell  contemplated  it  with  a  wry  face. 

So  the  Foreign  Secretary,  in  October,  1865,  lost  no 
time  in  firmly  closing  the  door  which  seemed  opening. 
The  day  following  the  editorial  implication  of  the 

1  Geneva  Arbitration  :    Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  iii.  p.  562. 

2  Recollections  and  Suggestions,  p.  278. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  87 

Times,  there  appeared  in  its  columns  an  official  correc 
tion.  The  correctness  of  the  implication  was  denied. 
As  Mr.  Adams  wrote  in  his  diary,  the  proposal  of  a 
joint  commission,  thus  explained,  "really  stands  as 
an  offer  to  refer  the  British  claims,  and  a  facile  re 
fusal  to  include  ours.  Wonderful  liberality  !  "  And, 
a  few  days  later,  he  added :  —  "  The  issue  of  the  pre 
sent  complication  now  is  that  Great  Britain  stands  as 
asking  for  a  commission  through  which  to  procure  a 
settlement  of  claims  advanced  by  herself,  at  the  same 
time  that  she  refuses  at  the  threshold  to  permit  the 
introduction  of  all  the  material  demands  we  have 
against  her.  Thus  the  British  position  passes  all  the 
time  from  bad  to  worse.  The  original  blunder,  in 
spired  by  the  over-eagerness  to  see  us  divided,  has 
impelled  a  neutral  policy,  carried  to  such  extremes  of 
encouragement  to  one  belligerent  as  seemingly  to  haz 
ard  the  security  of  British  commerce,  whenever  the 
country  shall  become  involved  in  a  war.  The  sense 
of  this  inspires  the  powers  of  eastern  Europe  with 
vastly  increased  confidence  in  pursuing  their  particu 
lar  objects.  It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  whatever 
views  Russia  may  ultimately  have  on  Constantinople 
will  be  much  fortified  by  a  consciousness  of  the  diver 
sion  which  it  might  make  through  the  neutral  ports 
of  the  United  States  against  the  British  commerce  of 
one  half  of  the  globe.  We  lose  nothing  by  the  passage 
of  time  ;  Great  Britain  does." 

This  somewhat  obvious  view  of  the  situation  evi 
dently  suggested  itself  to  the  mind  of  Earl  Russell's 
successor  in  the  Foreign  Office,  for  Earl  Russell,  on 
the  death  of  Lord  Palmerston,  in  the  autumn  of  1865, 
became  Prime  Minister.  So,  one  day  in  the  following 


88  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

December,  Mr.  Adams  was  summoned  to  an  official 
interview  with  the  new  Secretary.  The  conversation 
at  this  interview,  after  the  matters  immediately  in  hand 
were  disposed  of,  passed  to  the  general  and  well-worn 
subject  of  the  neutrality  observed  by  Great  Britain 
during  the  struggle  which,  seven  months  before,  had 
come  to  its  close.  Lord  Clarendon,  Mr.  Adams  wrote, 
insisted  that  the  neutrality  "  had  been  perfectly  kept ; 
and  I  signifying  my  conviction  that  a  similar  observa 
tion  of  it,  as  between  two  countries  so  closely  adjacent 
as  Great  Britain  and  France,  would  lead  to  a  declara 
tion  of  war  by  the  injured  party  in  twenty-four  hours. 
Here  we  might  have  closed  the  conference,  but  his 
Lordship  proceeded  to  continue  it  by  remarking  that 
he  had  it  on  his  mind  to  make  a  suggestion.  He 
would  do  so.  He  went  on  to  express  his  long  convic 
tion  of  the  expediency  of  a  union  of  sentiment  and 
policy  between  two  great  nations  of  the  same  race. 
He  hoped  to  see  them  harmonize,  after  the  immediate 
irritation  consequent  upon  the  late  struggle  should 
have  passed  away,  more  than  ever  before.  There 
were  many  things  in  what  was  called  International 
Law  that  are  now  in  a  vague  and  unsatisfactory  con 
dition  ;  it  would,  therefore,  seem  very  desirable  that 
by  some  form  of  joint  consultation,  more  or  less  exten 
sive,  these  points  could  be  fixed  on  something  like  a 
permanent  basis.  He  inquired  of  me  whether  I  thought 
my  government  would  be  at  all  inclined  to  entertain 
the  idea.  I  replied  that  the  object  was  certainly  de 
sirable  ;  but  that,  in  the  precise  state  in  which  things 
had  been  left,  I  could  give  no  opinion  on  the  question 
proposed.  All  that  I  could  do  was  to  report  it ;  and 
that  not  in  any  official  way.  His  Lordship  talked  a 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  89 

little  grandly  about  our  overlooking  the  past,  letting 
bygones  be  bygones,  and  considering  these  questions 
solely  on  their  abstract  importance  as  settling  great 
principles.  He  said  that  two  such  very  great  coun 
tries  could  scarcely  be  expected  to  stoop  to  concessions 
or  admissions  in  regard  to  one  another.  Would  I 
reflect  upon  the  whole  matter.  All  this  time  I  was 
rather  a  listener  than  a  speaker,  and  committed  myself 
to  nothing  but  vague  professions.  The  fact  stares  up 
that  this  government  is  not  easy  at  the  way  the  case 
has  been  left  by  Lord  Russell,  and  desires  to  get  out 
of  it  without  mortification.  My  own  opinion  is  rather 
against  any  effort  to  help  them  out.  I  ought  to  note 
that  yesterday  Mr.  W.  E.  Forster  called  to  see  me 
for  the  purpose  of  urging  precisely  the  same  tentative 
experiment  at  Washington.  He  reasoned  with  me 
more  frankly,  in  the  same  strain,  and  evidently  con 
templated  a  more  complete  process  of  rectification  of 
the  blunder  than  Lord  Clarendon  could  hint.  I  also 
talked  to  him  with  more  freedom,  in  a  strain  of  great 
indifference  about  arriving  at  any  result ;  the  advan 
tage  was  on  our  side,  and  I  saw  no  prospect  of  its 
diminishing  with  time.  He  ended  by  asking  me  to 
think  a  little  longer  about  a  mode  of  running  the 
negotiation ;  for,  if  it  could  be  done,  he  felt  sure  that 
enough  power  could  be  applied  to  bring  this  govern 
ment  to  consent  to  it.  I  replied  that  all  that  could 
be  done  now  must  pass  through  private  channels. 
The  record  was  made  up,  and  I  had  no  inclination  to 
disturb  it." 

This  call  of  Mr.  Forster  at  that  particular  junc 
ture  was  significant  ;  for  Mr.  Forster  less  than  a 
month  before  had  gone  into  Earl  Russell's  Ministry, 


90  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

becoming  Under-Secretary  for  the  Colonies ;  and  Mr. 
Forster  was  well  known  to  be  a  friend  of  the  United 
States.  Badly  compromised  by  Lord  Russell's  blun 
dering  committals,  the  government  at  last  appreciated 
the  situation,  and  was  feeling  for  a  way  out.  The 
position  now  taken  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  Mr. 
Forster  was  clearly  suggestive  of  the  subsequent  John 
son-Clarendon  Convention.  Nothing,  however,  imme 
diately  resulted.  Lord  Clarendon  had,  indeed,  at  the 
time  of  his  talk  with  Mr.  Adams,  already  put  his  sug 
gestion  in  shape  to  be  formally  submitted  to  Secretary 
Seward  through  the  British  Minister  at  Washington  ; 
and  when,  six  weeks  later,  his  despatch  appeared  in 
the  Blue  Book,  Mr.  Adams  wrote :  "  The  object  is 
now  evident.  It  is  to  blunt  the  effect  of  Lord  Rus 
sell's  original  blunder,  and  try  to  throw  the  odium  of 
it  back  by  a  new  offer,  which  we  must  decline.  The 
contrivance  will  scarcely  work.  It  is  certainly  civil 
to  propose  that  we  should  bear  all  the  consequences 
of  their  policy,  and  consent  to  secure  them  against 
any  future  application  of  it  to  themselves. 

As  showing  how  very  sensitive  to  the  situation  in 
which  they  had  been  placed  the  English  now  were, 
Mr.  Adams  two  days  later  mentioned  a  long  conversa 
tion  with  Mr.  Oliphant,  a  member  of  Parliament,  then 
just  back  from  a  visit  to  America.  The  Fenian  move 
ment  was  at  that  time  much  in  evidence  through  its 
British  dynamite  demonstrations,  and  the  Irish  in  the 
United  States  were  consequently  in  a  state  of  chronic 
excitement.  Mr.  Oliphant  called  in  regard  to  it. 
After  some  discussion  of  that  matter,  the  conversation 
drifted  to  the  policy  pursued  by  the  British  govern 
ment  toward  the  United  States,  of  which  Mr.  Oli- 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  91 

phant  "  evidently  had  not  approved.  It  should  have 
been  either  positive  intervention,  or  positive  amity. 
The  effort  to  avoid  both  had  excited  nothing  but  ill- 
will  from  both  parties  in  the  war.  One  Southern 
man  whom  he  had  met  had  gone  so  far  as  to  declare 
that  he  was  ready  to  fight  England  even  on  the  case 
of  the  Alabama.  I  briefly  reviewed  the  course  taken, 
and  pointed  out  the  time  when  the  cordiality  between 
the  countries  could  have  been  fully  established.  It 
was  not  improved ;  and  now  I  had  little  hope  of  re 
storing  it  for  many  years."  It  was  during  the  ensu 
ing  summer  that  the  lower  house  of  Congress  passed 
by  acclamation  the  bill  already  referred  to,  repealing 
the  inhibitions  of  the  neutrality  laws. 

A  change  of  ministry  at  this  time  took  place  in 
Great  Britain.  Earl  Russell,  with  the  Liberals,  went 
out  of  office,  and  Lord  Derby,  at  the  head  of  the 
Conservatives,  came  in.  Lord  Stanley,  the  oldest  son 
of  the  new  Premier,  succeeded  Lord  Clarendon  in  the 
Foreign  Office,  and  again  the  old  straw  was  threshed 
over.  A  distinct  step  was,  however,  now  marked  in 
advance.  The  new  Prime  Minister  took  occasion  to 
intimate  publicly  that  a  proposition  for  the  arrange 
ment  of  the  Alabama  claims  would  be  favorably 
entertained ;  and  the  Times,  of  course  under  inspira 
tion,  even  went  so  far  as  to  admit  that  Earl  Russell's 
position  on  that  subject  was  based  on  a  "  somewhat 
narrow  and  one-sided  view  of  the  question  at  issue. 
It  was  not  safe,"  it  now  went  on  to  say,  "  for  Great 
Britain  to  make  neutrals  the  sole  and  final  judges  of 
their  own  obligations."  This  was  a  distinct  enlarge 
ment  of  the  "  insular "  view.  It  amounted  to  an 
abandonment  of  the  contention  that  a  petty  jury  in 


92  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

an  English  cyimmal  court  was  the  tribunal  of  last 
resort  on  all  questions  involving  the  international 
obligations  of  Great  Britain. 

The  intertninaWe  diplomatic  correspondence  then 
began  afresh;  and,  in  the  course  of  it,  Secretary 
Seward  rested  the  case  of  the  United  States  largely 
on  what  both  he  and  Mr.  Adams  termed  "  the  pre 
mature  and  injurious  proclamation  of  belligerency " 
issued  by  the  British  government  in  May,  1861. 
This  he  pronounced  the  fruitful  source  whence  all 
subsequent  evil  came.  Lord  Stanley  took  issue  with 
him  on  that  point.  He  did  not  deny  a  responsibility 
for  the  going  forth  of  Confederate  commerce-destroy 
ers  from  British  ports,  and  a  certain  liability  for  the 
damages  by  them  caused;  but,  he  contended,  the  Brit 
ish  government  could  not  consent  to  arbitrate  the 
question  whether  the  Confederacy  was  prematurely 
recognized  as  a  belligerent.  The  recognition  of  belli 
gerency  in  any  given  case  was,  he  contended,  a  matter 
necessarily  resting  in  the  discretion  of  a  sovereign, 
neutr:)]  power.  He  intimated,  however,  a  willingness 
to  arbitrate  all  other  questions  at  issue. 

In  view  of  the  position  always  from  the  commence 
ment  taken  by  the  American  Secretary  of  State  and 
his  representative  in  London,  this  limited  arbitration 
could  not  be  satisfactory.  Time  and  again  Secretary 
and  Minister  had  emphasized  the  impropriety  and  un 
friendliness  of  the  Queen's  proclamation  of  May  13, 
1861,  and  the  consequences  thereof,  so  momentous  as 
scarcely  to  admif  of  computation.  Accordingly,  the 
discussion  again  halted.  In  July,  1868,  Mr.  Reverdy 
Johnson  of  Maryland  succeeded  Mr.  Adams  in  Lon 
don  ;  and,  once  more,  negotiations  were  renewed.  But 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  93 

now  the  British  government  had  so  far  progressed 
towards  its  ultimate  and  inevitable  destination  that, 
a  discreet  silence  being  on  both  sides  observed  in  the 
matter  of  the  proclamation  of  May,  1861,  a  conven 
tion  was  readily  agreed  to  covering  all  claims  of  the 
citizens  and  subjects  of  the  two  countries  against 
the  government  of  each.  While  this  treaty  was  in 
course  of  negotiation,  another  change  of  ministry  took 
place  in  Great  Britain ;  and  Mr.  Gladstone,  who  had 
been  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  throughout  the 
Civil  War,  became  Premier,  Earl  Russell  being  now 
finally  retired  from  official  life.  Lord  Clarendon  was 
again  placed  in  charge  of  the  Foreign  Office.  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  form  of  convention  agreed  to 
by  Lord  Derby  was  revised  by  his  successor  in  such  a 
way  as  to  make  it  satisfactory  to  Secretary  Seward, 
and,  on  the  14th  of  January,  1869,  it  received  the 
signatures  of  Mr.  Johnson  and  Lord  Clarendon.  It 
was  known  as  the  Johnson -Clarendon  Convention. 

In  hurrying  this  important  negotiation  to  so  quick 
a  close,  both  Secretary  Seward  and  Reverdy  Johnson 
were  much  influenced  by  a  natural  ambition.  They 
both  greatly  desired  that  a  settlement  of  the  moment 
ous  issues  between  the  two  English-speaking  nations 
should  be  effected  through  their  individual  agency. 
Mr.  Seward  especially  was  eager  in  his  wish  to  carry 
to  a  final  solution  the  most  difficult  of  the  many  intri 
cate  complications  which  dated  back  to  the  first  weeks 
of  his  occupation  of  the  State  Department.  Accord 
ingly,  he  did  not  now  repeat  his  somewhat  rhetorical 
arraignment  of  Great  Britain  in  the  correspondence  of 
two  years  before,  because  of  the  proclamation  of  1861. 
No  longer  did  he  roar  so  as  to  do  the  genuine  Anieri- 


94  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

can's  heart  good  to  hear  him,  but  he  did  so  aggravate 
his  voice  as  to  roar  as  gently  as  a  sucking  dove ;  he 
roared  as  't  were  a  nightingale.  It  thus  became  sim 
ply  a  question  of  the  settlement  of  the  money  claims  of 
individual  citizens  and  subjects  of  one  country  against 
the  government  of  another.  Lord  Stanley's  contention 
on  the  recognition  of  belligerency  issue  was  tacitly  ac 
cepted  as  sound.  This,  as  will  presently  appear,  im 
plied  a  great  deal.  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether 
that  primal  offence  —  that  original  sin  which 

"  Brought  death  into  the  world  and  all  our  woe  "  — 

could  thus  lightly  and  in  silence  be  relegated  to  the 
limbo  of  things  unimportant,  and  so,  quite  forgotten. 

The  negotiation  had  been  entered  upon  in  Septem 
ber,  1868  ;  the  convention  was  executed  in  January  fol 
lowing.  But  in  the  interim  a  presidential  election  had 
taken  place  in  the  United  States  ;  and,  when  the  treaty 
reached  America,  the  administration  of  Andrew  John 
son  was,  in  a  few  weeks  only,  to  be  replaced  by  that  of 
General  Grant.  Secretary  Seward  would  then  cease 
to  be  at  the  head  of  the  Department  of  State  ;  and,  as 
he  now  wrote  to  Revercly  Johnson,  "  the  confused  light 
of  an  incoming  administration  was  spreading  itself  over 
the  country,  rendering  the  consideration  of  political, 
subjects  irksome,  if  not  inconvenient."  Charles  Sumner 
was  at  that  time  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  a  position  he  had  held  through  eight 
years.  As  chairman  of  that  committee,  the  fate  of  the 
treaty  rested  largely  with  him.  The  President-elect, 
with  no  very  precise  policy  in  his  mind  to  be  pursued 
on  the  issues  involved,  wished  to  have  the  claims  con 
vention  go  over  until  his  administration  was  installed  ,• 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  95 

and  when,  in  February,  the  convention  was  taken  up 
in  the  Senate  committee,  all  its  members  expressed 
themselves  as  opposed  to  its  ratification.  "  We  begin 
to-day,"  Mr.  Sumner  then  said,  referring  to  the  rejec 
tion  of  the  proposed  settlement  as  a  foregone  conclu 
sion,  "an  international  debate,  the  greatest  of  our 
history,  and,  before  it  is  finished,  in  all  probability  the 
greatest  of  all  history."  l 


III 

It  was  now  that  Mr.  Fish  came  upon  the  scene,  — 
the  successor  of  Secretary  Seward  in  the  Department 
of  State.  And  here,  perhaps,  it  would  be  proper  for 
me  to  say  that  I  had  no  personal  acquaintance  with 
Mr.  Fish.  I  never  met  him  but  once.  In  the  summer 
of  1890,1  think  it  was,  some  years  preceding  his  death, 
I  passed  a  morning  with  him  by  appointment  at  his 
country  home  at  Garrison,  going  there  to  obtain  from 
him,  if  I  could,  some  information  on  a  subject  I 
was  then  at  work  on.  Beyond  this,  I  knew  him  only 
as  a  public  character,  more  or  less  actively  engaged  in 
political  life  through  twenty-five  exceptionally  event 
ful  years. 

Held  in  its  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations,  the 
Johnson-Clarendon  Convention  was  not  acted  upon  by 
the  Senate,  at  the  time  sitting  in  executive  session, 
until  the  13th  of  April,  1869.  It  was  then  rejected 
by  a  practically  unanimous  vote  (54  to  1)  following  an 
elaborate  speech  in  condemnation  of  it  by  the  chairman 
of  the  committee  having  it  in  charge.  That  speech 
was  important.  It  marked  a  possible  parting  of  the 

1  Pierce :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  p.  384. 


96  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

ways.  In  that  speech,  and  by  means  of  it,  Mr.  Sum- 
iier  not  only  undid,  and  more  than  undid,  all  that  yet 
had  been  done  looking  to  an  amicable  adjustment  of 
the  questions  at  issue  between  the  two  nations,  but  he 
hedged  thick  with  difficulties  any  future  approach  to 
such  an  adjustment.  To  appreciate  this,  the  essential 
feature  of  the  Clarendon-Johnson  Convention  must  be 
borne  constantly  in  mind. 

As  I  have  already  said,  that  convention  provided 
only  for  the  settlement  of  the  claims  of  individuals. 
All  questions  of  liability  were  to  be  referred  to  arbi 
tration.  The  right  of  Great  Britain  to  judge  for  it 
self  as  to  the  time  and  manner  of  the  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy  as  a  belligerent  power  was  not  called  in 
question,  or  submitted  to  arbitrament,,  A  settlement 
was  thus  made  possible ;  indeed,  the  way  to  a  settle 
ment  was  opened  wide.  The  concession  was  also 
proper  ;  for,  viewed  historically,  and  with  a  calm  regard 
for  recognized  principles  of  international  law,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  long  and  strenuously  urged  conten 
tion  of  Secretary  Seward  and  Mr.  Adams  over  what 
they  described  as  the  "  premature  and  injurious  pro 
clamation  of  belligerency,"  and  the  consequences  of  the 
precipitancy  of  Great  Britain  in  the  early  stages  of  the 
Rebellion,  was  by  them  carried  to  an  undue  length. 
Indisputably,  the  British  Ministry  did  issue  the  very 
important  proclamation  of  May,  1861,  with  undue 
haste  ;  and,  in  so  doing,  they  were  presumably  actu 
ated  by  a  motive  they  could  not  declare.  The  newly 
accredited  American  Minister  had  not  then  reached 
London ;  but  he  was  known  to  be  on  his  way,  and,  in 
fact,  saw  the  just  issued  proclamation  in  the  Gazette 
the  morning  of  his  arrival.  The  intention  of  the 


THE  TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  97 

government  may  fairly  be  inferred.  It  apparently 
was  that  this  question  should  be  disposed  of,  —  be  an 
accomplished  fact,  —  in  advance  of  any  protests.  It 
had  been  decided  on  ;  discussion  was  useless.  This 
was  neither  usual  nor  courteous.  It  was,  moreover,  in 
direct  disregard  of  assurances  given  :  and,  in  the  ex 
cited  state  of  the  American  public  mind  at  that  time, 
while  it  was  passionately  denounced,  evil  auguries  were 
drawn  from  it.  Yet  it  by  no  means  followed  that  the 
step  was  taken  in  an  unfriendly  spirit,  or  that  it  in 
fact  worked  any  real  prejudice  to  the  Union  cause. 
That  it  was  a  grievous  blow,  given  with  a  hostile  intent, 
and  the  source  of  infinite  subsequent  trouble  and  loss 
to  the  United  States  government,  Secretary  Seward 
and  Mr.  Adams  always  afterwards  maintained  ;  and, 
during  the  war,  very  properly  maintained.  But  for 
it,  they  asserted  and  seem  even  to  have"  persuaded 
themselves,  the  Rebellion  would  have  collapsed  in  its 
infancy.  Because  of  it,  the  struggling  insurrection 
grew  into  a  mighty  conflict,  and  was  prolonged  to  at 
least  twice  the  length  of  life  it  otherwise  would  have 
attained.  For  this,  they  then  proceeded  to  argue, 
and  for  the  loss  of  life  and  treasure  in  it  involved, 
Great  Britain  stood  morally  accountable ;  or,  as  Secre 
tary  Seward  years  afterwards  saw  fit  to  phrase  it,  in 
rhetoric  which  now  impresses  one  as  neither  sober  nor 
well  considered,  it  was  Her  Majesty's  proclamation 
which  conferred  "  upon  the  insurrection  the  pregnant 
baptismal  name  of  Civil  War." 

There  then  was,  and  there  now  is,  nothing  on  which 
to  base  so  extreme  an  assumption.  On  the  contrary, 
the  historical  evidence  tends  indisputably  to  show  that, 
though  designedly  precipitate,  the  proclamation  was 


98  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

issued  with  no  unfriendly  intent.  On  this  point,  the 
statement  of  William  E.  Forster  is  conclusive.  Mr. 
Forster,  then  a  newly  elected  member  of  Parliament, 
himself  urged  the  issuance  of  the  proclamation,  and 
looked  upon  it  as  a  point  gained  for  the  cause  of  the 
Union  ; l  and  eight  years  later  he  declared  that  "  from 
personal  recollection  and  knowledge  "  he  could  testify 
that  "  the  proclamation  was  not  made  with  unfriendly 
animus  "  to  the  United  States.  On  the  contrary,  he 
showed  it  was  issued  "  in  accordance  with  the  earnest 
wishes  of  himself  and  other  friends  of  the  North."  2 

The  principle  of  international  law  involved  is  simple, 
and  founded  on  good  sense.  In  no  case  and  under  no 
circumstances  can  a  declaration  of  neutrality,  which 
carries  with  it  of  necessity  a  recognition  of  the  fact 
of  belligerency,  be  a  wrong  to  a  power  which  is  itself 
exercising,  or  has  assumed  to  exercise  against  neutrals, 
any  of  the  rights  of  war.  Exclusion  by  blockade, 
search  for  contraband,  and  capture  as  prize  on  the 
high  seas  are  distinct  acts  of  war.  All  these  rights 
the  government  of  the  United  States  claimed,  and 
exercised,  after  the  19th  of  April,  1861.  It  is  diffi 
cult  to  see  how  foreign  governments,  in  view  of  the 
consequent  interruptions  of  commerce  and  seizure  of 
property,  could  long  ignore  such  an  abnormal  state 
of  affairs.  They  might,  from  an  excess  of  comity,  do 
so  for  a  few  weeks,  and  until  the  state  of  war  and  its 
consequences  became  fixed  and  manifold ;  but  of  this 
they  were  of  necessity  the  judges.3 

Neither  is  there  any  ground  not  admitting  of  dis 
pute  on  which  to  argue  that  the  issuance  by  the  British 

1  Reid  :  Forster,  vol.  i.  p.  335.  2  li.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  12,  21. 

3  See  Appendix  A,  infra  p.  199. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  99 

government  of  the  proclamation  of  May,  1861,  how 
ever  premature,  and  with  whatever  intent,  was  pro 
ductive  of  any  injury  to  the  United  States.  On 
the  contrary,  it  has  been  plausibly  contended  that 
it  worked  in  the  end  most  potently  in  favor  of  the 
Union  cause.1  It  is  obvious  that  the  proclamation 
could  not  in  any  event  have  been  withheld  more  than 
ninety  days ;  for  within  that  period  the  Confederacy 
had  at  Manassas  incontrovertibly  established  its  posi 
tion  as  a  belligerent,  and  the  Confederate  flag  on  the 
high  seas,  combined  with  a  Union  blockade  of  three 
thousand  miles  of  hostile  coast,  was  evidence  not  easily 
explained  away  of  a  de  facto  government  on  land. 
Under  such  conditions,  it  is  idle  to  maintain  that  the 
recognition  of  belligerency  did  not  fairly  rest  in  the 
discretion  of  neutrals.  Moreover,  had  the  recognition 
been  delayed  until  after  the  disgrace  of  Bull  Run,  it 
would  in  all  probability  have  been  complete,  and  have 
extended  to  a  recognition  of  nationality  as  well  as  of 
mere  de  facto  belligerency.  Nor,  finally,  is  there  any 
thing  in  the  record,  as  since  more  fully  developed, 
which  justifies  a  belief  that  the  struggle  would  have 
been  shorter  even  by  a  month,  or  in  any  degree  less 
costly  as  respects  either  life  or  treasure,  had  the  Con 
federacy  never  been  buoyed  up  by  the  confident  hope 
of  foreign  recognition,  and  consequent  aid  from  with 
out.  The  evidence  is  indeed  all  the  other  way.  As 
since  developed,  it  is  fairly  conclusive  that,  almost  to 
the  end,  and  unquestionably  down  to  the  close  of 
1863,  while  the  Confederates,  rank  and  file  as  well 
as  leaders  civil  and  military,  confidently  counted  on 
being  able,  through  the  potency  of  their  cotton  con- 

1  Life  ofC.  F.  Adams,  American  Statesmen  Series,  pp.  171-174. 


100  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

trol,  to  compel  an  even  reluctant  European  recogni 
tion,1  yet  they  never  for  a  moment  doubted  their 
ability  to  maintain  themselves  in  arms  and  achieve 
independence  without  extraneous  aid  of  any  kind. 
Thirty  years  in  preparation,  calling  into  action  all  the 
resources  of  a  singularly  masterful  and  impulsive  race, 
numbering  millions  and  occupying  a  highly  defensible 
territory  of  enormous  area,  the  Confederate  rebellion 
was  never  that  sickly,  accidental  foster-child  of  Great 
Britain  which,  in  all  their  diplomatic  contentions, 
Secretary  Seward  and  Senator  Sumner  tried  so  hard 
to  make  it  out,  —  a  mere  bantling  dandled  into  pre 
mature  existence  by  an  incomplete  foreign  recognition. 
On  the  contrary,  from  start  to  finish,  it  was  Titanic 
in  proportions  and  spirit.  It  presented  every  feature 
of  war  on  the  largest  scale,  domestic  and  foreign.  From 
the  outset,  neutral  interests  were  involved  ;  European 
opinion  was  by  both  sides  invoked.  In  face  of  such 
conditions  and  facts  as  these,  to  go  on,  to  the  end  of 
the  chapter,  asserting  that  such'  a  complete  and  for 
midable  embodiment  of  all  -  pervasive  warlike  energy 
should,  through  years,  have  been  ignored  as  an  exist- 

1  The  evidence  on  this  point,  though  now  largely  forgotten,  is  over 
whelming.  Jefferson  Davis,  in  common  with  the  great  mass  of  the 
people  of  the  Confederacy,  had  an  implicit  —  an  almost  childlike  faith 
in  the  commercial,  and  consequent  political,  siipremacy  of  cotton. 
They  wanted  no  other  ally.  They  went  the  full  length  gone  by  J. 
H.  Hammond  of  South  Carolina  when,  on  the  4th  of  March,  1858, 
he  thus  expressed  himself  in  the  Senate  at  Washington  :  —  "  Without 
firing  a  gun,  without  drawing  a  sword,  should  [the  States  of  the  North] 
make  war  on  us,  we  could  bring  the  whole  world  to  our  feet.  What 
would  happen  if  no  cotton  was  furnished  for  three  years  ?  I  will  not 
stop  to  depict  what  every  one  can  imagine  ;  but  this  is  certain,  Eng 
land  would  topple  headlong,  and  carry  the  whole  civilized  world  with 
her.  No,  you  dare  not  make  war  on  cotton.  No  power  on  earth  dares 
to  make  war  on  it  —  Cotton  is  King !  " 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  101 

ing  fact  by  all  foreign  nations,  and  refused  a  recog 
nition  even  as  belligerent,  was,  historically  speaking, 
the  reverse  of  creditable  —  it  was  puerile.  Yet,  after 
this  unparalleled  struggle  had  been  brought  to  a  close, 
Secretary  Seward  had  the  assurance  to  assert  in  a 
despatch  to  Mr.  Adams,  written  in  January,  1867  :  — 
"  Before  the  Queen's  proclamation  of  neutrality  the 
disturbance  in  the  United  States  was  merely  a  local 
insurrection.  It  wanted  the  name  of  war  to  enable  it 
to  be  a  civil  war  and  to  live ;  "  and  this  was  merely 
the  persistent  iteration  of  a  similar  statement  likewise 
made  to  Mr.  Adams  shortly  prior  to  the  1862  disasters 
at  Shiloh  and  before  Richmond  :  —  "If  Great  Britain 
should  revoke  her  decree  conceding  belligerent  rights 
to  the  insurgents  to-day,  this  civil  strife  .  .  .  would 
end  to-morrow."  l 

The  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention  was  open  to 
criticism  at  many  points,  and  its  rejection  by  the  Sen 
ate  was  altogether  defensible.  It  did,  however,  have 
one  merit,  it  quietly  relegated  to  oblivion  the  alto 
gether  untenable  positions  just  referred  to.  By  so 
much  the  discussion  approached  a  rational  basis.  Un 
fortunately,  it  was  upon  that  very  feature  of  the  set 
tlement  Mr.  Sumner  characteristically  directed  his 
criticism,  and  brought  his  rhetoric  to  bear.  In  so 
doing  he  gave  the  debate  a  violent  wrench,  forcing  it 
back  into  its  former  impossible  phase ;  and,  in  so  far 
as  in  him  lay,  he  put  obstacles,  well-nigh  insuperable, 
in  the  way  of  any  future  approach  to  an  adjustment. 
Recurring  in  his  speech,  subsequently  published  by 
order  of  the  Senate,  to  the  sentimental  grounds  of 
complaint  because  of  conjectural  injuries  resulting 
1  Dip.  Cor.  1862,  p.  43.  See  Appendix  B,  infra,  p.  204. 


102  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

from  precipitate  action  based  on  an  assumed  un 
friendly  purpose  in  the  issuance  of  the  proclamation 
of  May  13,  1861,  he  proceeded  to  do  what  his  great 
model  Burke  had  declared  himself  unwilling  to  do, 
—  he  framed  an  indictment  of  a  whole  people,  —  an 
indictment  of  many  counts,  some  small,  others  gran 
diose,  all  set  forth  in  rhetoric  inconte stably  Sumner- 
esque.  In  1869  he  fairly  outdid  Seward  in  1862. 
Because  of  the  proclamation,  and  because  of  that 
solely,  he  pronounced  Great  Britain  responsible  not 
only  for  the  losses  incurred  through  the  depredations 
of  all  British  built  Confederate  commerce-destroyers, 
but  for  all  consequent  losses  and  injuries,  conjectural 
and  consequential,  computable  or  impossible  of  com 
putation,  including  the  entire  cost  of  the  Civil  War 
during  half  its  length,  and  an  estimate  of  the  value 
of  a  large  and  increasing  proportion  of  the  world's 
carrying  trade.  The  "  war  prolongation  "  claim,  as 
it  was  called,  Mr.  Gladstone  afterwards  estimated  as 
alone  amounting  to  eight  thousand  million  dollars 
(Xl^OO^OO^OO).1  From  lack  of  information  only, 
Mr.  Sumner  failed  to  include  a  trifle  of  an  hundred 
millions,  which  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
had,  in  1864,  put  down  as  the  increased  expenditure 
imposed  on  the  United  States  by  the  naval  opera 
tions  set  on  foot  by  his  department  alone ; 2  but  he 
counterbalanced  this  omission  by  including  an  hun 
dred  and  ten  millions  on  account  of  "  our  natural 
increase  in  [a  certain]  branch  of  industry  which  an 
intelligent  statistician  "  had  told  him  we  might  have 
looked  for,  if,  etc.,  etc.  He  then  triumphantly  added, 
"  Of  course  this  (1110,000,000)  is  only  an  item  in 

1  Reid  :   Forster,  vol.  ii.  p.  24.  2  Bulloch,  vol.  ii.  p.  112. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  103 

our  bill."  l  The  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  then  put  himself  on  record  deliber 
ately,  and  not  in  the  heat  of  debate,  as  estimating  the 
money  liability  of  Great  Britain,  because  of  the  issu 
ance  of  the  proclamation  of  May  13,  1861,  at  twenty- 
five  hundred  millions  of  dollars ;  and  he  clinched  the 
matter  by  declaring  that  "  whatever  may  be  the  final 
settlement  of  these  great  accounts,  such  must  be  the 
judgment  in  any  chancery  which  consults  the  simple 
equity  of  the  case."  And  this  proposition  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States  now  by  formal  vote  approved, 
promulgating  it  to  the  world  as  its  own. 

No  one  in  the  United  States  was  at  that  time  so 
familiar  with  the  issues  between  the  two  countries,  or 
so  qualified  to  speak  understandingly  of  them,  as  Mr. 
Adams,  from  his  Boston  retirement  then  watching  the 
course  of  events  with  a  deep  and  natural  interest.  On 
reading  Mr.  Sumner's  speech,  and  noting  the  unanim 
ity  of  the  vote  by  which  the  Senate  had  rejected  the 
convention,  he  wrote,  —  "  The  practical  effect  of  this 
is  to  raise  the  scale  of  our  demands  of  reparation  so 
very  high  that  there  is  no  chance  of  negotiation  left, 
unless  the  English  have  lost  all  their  spirit  and  char 
acter.  The  position  in  which  it  places  Mr.  Bright 
and  our  old  friends  in  the  struggle  is  awkward  to  the 
last  degree.  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith,  who  was  at  the 
meeting  of  the  [Massachusetts]  Historical  Society 
[which  chanced  that  day  to  be  held] ,  spoke  of  it  to  me 
with  some  feeling.  The  whole  affair  is  ominous  of 
the  change  going  on  in  our  form  of  government ;  for 
this  is  a  pronunciamento  from  the  Senate  as  the  treaty- 
making  power.  There  were  intimations  made  to  me 

1  Works,  vol.  xiii.  p.  83. 


104  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

in  conversation  that  the  end  of  it  all  was  to  be  the 
annexation  of  Canada  by  way  of  full  indemnity. 
Movements  were  going  on  in  that  region  to  accelerate 
the  result.  I  suppose  that  event  is  inevitable  at  some 
time  ;  but  I  doubt  whether  it  will  come  in  just  that 
form.  Great  Britain  will  not  confess  a  wrong,  and 
sell  Canada  as  the  price  of  a  release  from  punishment. 
...  I  begin  to  be  apprehensive  that  the  drift  of  this 
government  under  the  effect  of  that  speech  will  be  to 
a  misunderstanding ;  and,  not  improbably,  an  ultimate 
seizure  of  Canada  by  way  of  indemnification."  To 
the  same  effect  the  British  Minister  at  Washington, 
Mr.  Thornton,  was  apprising  his  government  that, 
in  the  Senate  debate  held  in  executive  session,  Mr. 
Sumner  was  followed  by  a  few  other  Senators,  all 
speaking  in  the  same  sense.  Mr.  Chandler,  Senator 
from  Michigan,  seeming  to  be  most  violent  against 
England,  indicating  his  desire  that  Great  Britain 
should  possess  no  territory  on  the  American  Conti 
nent. 

General  Grant  was  now  fairly  entered  on  his  first 
presidential  term,  and  Mr.  Fish  had,  for  some  five 
weeks,  been  Secretary  of  State.  So  far  as  concerned 
an  amicable  settlement  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  the  outlook  was  unpropitious;  less  pro 
pitious,  in  fact,  than  at  any  previous  time.  The  new 
President  was  a  military  man,  and,  in  the  language  of 
Mr.  Sumner,  he  was  "  known  to  feel  intensely  on  the 
Alabama  question."  At  the  close  of  the  war  he  had 
expressed  himself  in  a  way  hostile  to  Great  Britain,  not 
caring  whether  she  "  paid  '  our  little  bill '  or  not ;  upon 
the  whole  he  would  rather  she  should  not,  as  that 
would  leave  the  precedent  of  her  conduct  in  full  force 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  105 

for  us  to  follow,  and  he  wished  it  understood  that  we 
should  follow  it."  During  the  war,  he  had  been  accus 
tomed  to  regard  Great  Britain  as  "  an  enemy,"  and  the 
mischief  caused  by  her  course  he  thought  not  capable 
of  overstatement;  and,  in  May,  1869,  Simmer  wrote 
that  the  President's  views  were  in  close  conformity 
with  those  set  forth  in  his  speech,  and  that  after  its 
delivery  General  Grant  had  thanked  and  congratulated 
him.1  Everything,  consequently,  now  seemed  to  indi 
cate  that  events  must  take  the  course  thus  marked  out 
for  them.  Great  Britain  would  have  to  face  the  con 
tingencies  of  the  future  weighted  down  by  the  policy 
followed  by  Palmer ston  and  Russell,  and  confronted 
by  the  precedents  of  the  Florida,  the  Alabama,  and 
the  Shenandoah.  She  had  taken  her  position  in 
1861-65,  defiantly  proclaiming  that,  for  her,  condi 
tions  could  never  be  reversed,  the  womb  of  the  future 
contained  no  day  of  reckoning,  —  no  South  Africa. 

Into  the  details  of  what  now  ensued,  it  is  not  neces 
sary  here  to  enter.  They  are  matter  of  history  ;  and 
as  such,  sufficiently  familiar.  I  shall  pass  rapidly 
over  even  the  Motley  imbroglio,  coming  directly  to  the 
difficulty  between  Mr.  Fish  and  Mr.  Sumner,  —  high 
officials  both,  the  one  Secretary  of  State,  the  other 
chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions.  In  regard  to  this  difficulty  much  has  been 
written ;  more  said.  In  discussing  it,  whether  by 
pen  or  word  of  mouth,  no  little  temper  has  been  dis 
played  ; 2  but,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  its  significance 
in  an  historical  way  has  never  been  developed.  As 
I  look  upon  it,  it  was  an  essential  element,  —  almost 

1  Pierce:  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  pp.  255,  389,  393,410. 

2  See,  for  example,  Pierce  :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  p.  469. 


106  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

a  necessary  preliminary  to  that  readjustment  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  now  so  influ 
ential  a  factor  in  the  international  relations  of  four 
continents. 

The  divergence  between  the  two  was  almost  imme 
diate.  The  position  of  Mr.  Fish,  as  head  of  the  State 
Department,  was,  so  far  as  Mr.  Sunnier  was  concerned, 
one  of  great  and  constantly  increasing  difficulty.  The 
latter  had  then  been  seventeen  years  a  member  of  the 
Senate,  and,  during  eight  of  the  seventeen,  chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  Secretary 
Seward  had  been  Mr.  Sumner's  senior  in  the  Senate, 
and  afterwards  Secretary  of  State  from  the  commence 
ment  of  Sumner's  chairmanship  of  his  committee. 
Naturally,  therefore,  though  he  had  often  been  bitter 
in  his  attacks  on  the  Secretary,  —  at  times,  indeed, 
more  suo,  indulging  even  in  language  which  knew  no 
limit  of  moderation,1  —  he  regarded  him  with  very  dif 
ferent  eyes  from  those  through  which  he  cast  glances 
of  a  somewhat  downward  kind  on  Seward's  successor 
in  office.  In  earlier  senatorial  days,  when  they  sat 
together  in  that  body  during  the  Pierce  administra 
tion,  Mr.  Fish  had  always  evinced  much  deference 
to  Sumner's  scholarly  and  social  attributes,  and  had 
treated  him  with  a  consideration  which  the  latter  not 
impossibly  misconstrued.  The  evidence  is  clear  and 
of  record  that,  when  unexpectedly  called  to  take 
charge  of  the  State  Department,  Mr.  Fish  was  solicit 
ous  as  to  Sumner's  feeling  towards  him,  and  anxious 
to  assure  himself  of  the  latter's  cooperation  and  even 
guidance.  Meanwhile,  though  wholly  unconscious  of 
the  fact,  Mr.  Sumner  could  not  help  regarding  Mr. 
1  Adams  :  B.  H.  Dana,  vol.  ii.  pp.  258,  259. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON          107 

Fish  as  a  tyro,  and  was  not  disposed  to  credit  him 
with  any  very  clearly  defined  ideas  of  his  own.1  He 
assumed,  as  matter  of  course,  that  at  last  the  shaping 
of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  country  would  by  seniority 
devolve  upon  him.  The  appointment  of  Mr.  Motley 
to  succeed  Mr.  Reverdy  Johnson  in  the  English  mis 
sion  undoubtedly  confirmed  him  in  this  opinion.  Mr. 
Motley  was  his  appointee.  That  the  new  plenipoten 
tiary  regarded  himself  as  such  at  once  became  appar 
ent  ;  for,  immediately  after  his  confirmation,  he  pre 
pared  a  memoir  suggestive  of  the  instructions  to  be 
given  him.  The  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention  had 
just  been  rejected  ;  the  course  now  to  be  pursued  was 
under  advisement ;  Mr.  Sumner's  recent  speech  was 
still  matter  of  general  discussion.  The  new  President 
was  understood  to  have  no  very  clearly  defined  ideas 
on  the  subject ;  it  was  assumed  that  Mr.  Fish  was 
equally  susceptible  to  direction.  Mr.  Motley,  there 
fore,  looked  to  Mr.  Sumner  for  inspiration.  In  his 
memorandum  he  suggested  that  it  was  not  advisable 
at  present  to  attempt  any  renewal  of  negotiations. 
And  then  he  fell  back  on  the  proclamation  of  May, 
1861  ;  proceeding  to  dilate  on  that  wrong  committed 
by  Great  Britain,  —  a  wrong  so  deeply  felt  by  the 
American  people !  This  sense  of  wrong  had  now  been 
declared  gravely,  solemnly,  without  passion  ;  and  the 
sense  of  it  was  not  to  be  expunged  by  a  mere  money 
payment  to  reimburse  a  few  captures  and  conflagra 
tions  at  sea.  And  here,  for  the  present,  he  proposed 
to  let  the  matter  rest.  A  time  might  come  when 
Great  Britain  would  see  her  fault,  and  be  disposed  to 
confess  it.  Reparation  of  some  sort  would  then  nat- 

1  Pierce  :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  pp.  375,  378. 


108  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

urally  follow ;  but,  meanwhile,  it  was  not  for  the 
United  States  to  press  the  matter  further. 

Distinct  indications  of  a  divergence  of  opinion  as  to 
the  course  to  be  pursued  were  at  once  apparent.  The 
President,  acting  as  yet  under  the  influence  of  Mr. 
Sumner,  wished  Mr.  Motley  to  proceed  forthwith  to 
his  post ;  Mr.  Fish  inclined  to  delay  his  going.  Mean 
while  the  Secretary  was  at  work  on  the  new  Minister's 
letter  of  instructions  ;  and  in  them  he  clearly  did  not 
draw  his  inspiration  from  the  Motley  memoir.  On 
the  contrary,  referring  to  the  fate  of  the  Johnson- 
Clarendon  Convention  in  the  Senate,  he  proceeded  to 
say  that,  because  of  this  action,  the  government  of  the 
United  States  did  not  abandon  "  the  hope  of  an  early, 
satisfactory,  and  friendly  settlement  of  the  questions 
depending  between  the  two  governments."  The  sus 
pension  of  negotiations,  he  added,  would,  the  President 
hoped,  be  regarded  by  Her  Majesty's  Government,  as 
it  was  by  him,  "  as  wholly  in  the  interest,  and  solely 
with  a  view,  to  an  early  and  friendly  settlement." 
The  Secretary  then  went  on  to  open  the  way  to  such 
a  settlement  by  defining,  in  terms  presently  to  be  re 
ferred  to,  the  views  of  the  President  on  the  effect  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  Queen's  proclamation  of  May,  1861. 

At  this  point,  the  reason  became  apparent  why  Mr. 
Fish  was  in  no  haste  to  have  the  newly  appointed  Min 
ister  proceed  at  once  to  London.  The  Secretary  was 
in  a  dilemma.  The  rule  of  action  he  was  about  to  lay 
down  as  that  which  should  have  guided  the  British 
government  in  1861  must  control  the  United  States 
in  1869.  That  was  obvious  ;  but,  in  1869,  the  United 
States  was  itself  the  interested  observer  of  an  insur 
rection  in  the  neighboring  island  of  Cuba ;  and,  more- 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          109 

over,  the  new  President  was  not  backward  in  express 
ing*  the  warm  sympathy  he  felt  for  the  insurgents 
against  Spanish  colonial  misrule.  He  wished  also  to 
forward  their  cause.  That  wish  would  find  natural  ex 
pression  in  a  recognition  of  belligerent  rights.  General 
Grant  was  a  man  of  decided  mind ;  he  was  very  per 
sistent  ;  his  ways  were  military  ;  and,  as  to  principles 
of  international  law,  his  knowledge  of  them  can  hardly 
be  said  to  have  been  so  much  limited  as  totally  want 
ing.  He  inclined  strongly  to  a  policy  of  territorial 
expansion  ;  but  his  views  were  in  the  direction  of  the 
tropics,  —  the  Antilles  and  Mexico,  —  rather  than  to 
wards  Canada  and  the  north.  As  the  event,  however, 
showed,  once  his  mind  was  finally  made  up  and  his 
feelings  enlisted,  it  was  not  easy  to  divert  him  from  his 
end.  In  the  matter  of  foreign  policy,  the  course  he 
now  had  in  mind,  though  neither  of  the  two  at  first 
realized  the  fact,  involved  of  necessity  and  from  the 
outset  a  struggle  with  Mr.  Sumner ;  and,  to  one  who 
knew  the  men,  appreciating  their  characteristics  and 
understanding  their  methods,  it  was  plain  that  the 
struggle  would  be  bitter,  prolonged  and  unrelenting. 

As  different  in  their  mental  attributes  as  in  their 
physical  appearance,  while  Mr.  Sumner  was,  intellectu 
ally,  morally  and  physically,  much  the  finer  and  more 
imposing  human  product,  Grant  had  counterbalancing 
qualities  which  made  him,  in  certain  fields,  the  more 
formidable  opponent.  With  immense  will,  he  was 
taciturn  ;  Sumner,  on  the  contrary,  in  no  way  deficient 
in  will,  was  a  man  of  many  words,  —  a  rhetorician. 
In  action  and  among  men,  Grant's  self-control  was 
perfect,  —  amounting  to  complete  apparent  imperturb 
ability.  Unassuming,  singularly  devoid  of  self-con- 


110  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

sciousness,  in  presence  of  an  emergency  his  blood  never 
seemed  to  quicken,  his  face  became  only  the  more  set 
—  tenacity  personified  ;  whereas  Suinner,  —  when  mor 
ally  excited,  the  rush  of  his  words,  his  deep,  tremulous 
utterance,  and  the  light  in  his  eye  did  not  impart 
conviction  or  inspire  respect.  Doubts  would  suggest 
themselves  to  the  unsympathetic,  or  only  partially 
sympathetic,  listener  whether  the  man  was  of  alto 
gether  balanced  mind.  At  such  times,  Mr.  Sumner 
did  not  appreciate  the  force  of  language,  nor,  indeed, 
know  what  he  said  ;  and,  quite  unconsciously  on  his 
part,  he  assumed  an  attitude  of  moral  superiority  and 
intellectual  certainty,  in  110  way  compatible  with  a 
proper  appreciation  of  the  equality  of  others.  In  the 
mind  of  a  man  like  Grant,  these  peculiarities  excited 
obstinacy,  anger  and  contempt.  Thus,  an  agitator  and 
exponent  of  ideas,  Mr.  Sumner  might  and  did  stimu 
late  masses,  but  never,  man  or  boy,  was  he  a  leader 
among  equals.  Moreover,  as  one  of  his  truest  friends 
and  warmest  admirers  said  of  him,  he  was  prone  to  re 
gard  difference  of  opinion  as  a  moral  delinquency.1 
Grant,  on  the  contrary,  not  retentive  of  enmities,  re 
gardless  of  consistency,  and  of  coarse  moral  as  well  as 
physical  fibre,  moved  towards  his  ends  with  a  stubborn 
persistency  which  carried  others  along  with  him,  and 
against  which  a  perfervid,  rhetorical  opposition  was 
apt  to  prove  unavailing. 

Mr.  Fish  stood  between  the  two.  So  far  as  ques 
tions  of  foreign  policy,  and  problems  of  international 
law,  were  concerned,  though,  as  the  result  unmistakably 

1  "  A  man  who  did  not  believe  there  was  another  side  to  the  ques 
tion,  who  would  treat  difference  of  opinion  almost  as  moral  delin 
quency."  George  William  Curtis,  in  \ 
Orations  and  Addresses,  vol.  iii.  p.  230. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  111 

showed,  well  grounded  in  fundamental  principles  and 
with  a  grasp  of  general  conditions  at  once  firm  and 
correct,  there  is  no  evidence  that,  before  his  quite 
unexpected  summons  to  the  Department  of  State,  the 
new  Secretary  had  felt  called  upon  to  form  definite 
conclusions.  Mr.  Fish  was,  however,  not  only  a  law 
yer  by  profession,  but,  without  any  claim  to  being 
what  is  known  as  a  jurist  or  publicist,  his  thought 
had  a  distinctly  legal  turn.  No  more  doctrinaire 
than  mercantile  or  philanthropic,  his  was  essentially  a 
practical  mind,  strongly  infused  with  saving  common 
sense.  By  nature  cautious  and  conservative,  not  an 
imaginative  man,  having  passed  his  whole  life  in  a  New 
York  social  and  commercial  environment,  he  would 
have  inclined  to  proceed  slowly  in  any  path  of  national 
expansion,  most  of  all  in  one  heading  towards  the 
tropics,  and  an  admixture  of  half-breeds.  So  far  as 
Great  Britain  was  concerned,  he  would,  on  the  other 
hand,  be  disposed  to  effect,  if  he  could,  an  amicable, 
business-like  settlement  on  rational  terms.  From  the 
beginning  he  was  inclined  to  think  Mr.  Sumner  had 
in  his  speech  gone  too  far,  —  that  the  positions  he  had 
taken  were  not  altogether  tenable.  The  British  pro 
clamation  of  May,  1861,  he  regarded  as  a  "grievous 
wrong  "  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  ;  but 
he  assented  to  the  position  of  Lord  Stanley  that  issu 
ing  it  was  within  the  strict  right  of  the  neutral,  and 
the  question  of  time  was  one  of  judgment.  As  he 
wrote  to  a  friend  in  May,  1869,  four  weeks  after  Mr. 
Sumner  had  enunciated  very  different  views  in  his 
Senate  speech,  the  proclamation  could  be  made  subject 
of  complaint  only  as  leading  in  its  execution  and  en 
forcement  to  the  fitting  out  of  the  Alabama,  etc.,  and 


112  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

the  moral  support  given  in  England  to  the  rebel  cause. 
"  Sumner's  speech  was  able  and  eloquent,  and  perhaps 
not  without  a  good  effect.  .  .  .  Although  the  only 
speech  made  in  the  debate,  it  was  not  the  argument 
of  all  who  agreed  in  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  and 
we  cannot  stand  upon  it  in  all  its  points."  l  Within 
a  week  of  the  rejection  of  the  Johnson-Clarendon 
Convention  he  wrote  to  another  friend,  —  "Whenever 
negotiations  are  resumed,  the  atmosphere  and  the  sur 
roundings  of  this  side  of  the  water  are  more  favorable 
to  a  proper  solution  of  the  question  than  the  dinner- 
tables  and  the  public  banque tings  of  England." 

Thus,  from  the  very  commencement,  there  was  an 
essential  divergence  of  view  between  the  Secretary  of 
State  and  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts,  as  well  as 
between  the  latter  and  the  President.  As  between 
Charles  Sumner  and  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  past  friendly 
relations,  similar  social  connections,  and  common  tastes 
would  decidedly  have  drawn  Mr.  Fish  towards  the 
former  ;  but,  by  nature  loyal,  he  was  distinctly  repelled 
by  Mr.  Sumner's  demeanor. 

I  have  dwelt  on  these  personal  factors,  and  diver 
gences  of  view  and  aim,  for  they  must  be  kept  con 
stantly  in  mind  in  considering  what  was  now  to  occur. 
They  account  for  much  otherwise  quite  inexplicable. 
In  history  as  a  whole,  —  the  inexhaustible  story  of 
man's  development  from  what  he  once  was  to  what  he 
now  is,  —  the  individual  as  a  factor  is  so  far  minimized 
that  the  most  considerable  unit  might  probably  have 
been  left  out  of  the  account,  and  yet  the  result  be  in 
no  material  respect  other  than  it  is.  Exceptional  forces 
and  individual  traits  counterbalance  each  other,  tend- 

1  See  Appendix  C,  infra,  p.  206. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  113 

ing  always  to  average  results.  With  episodes  it  is  far 
otherwise.  In  them  the  individual  has  free  play  ;  and, 
accordingly,  the  personal  factor  counts.  The  Treaty 
of  Washington  was  an  episode.  In  dealing  with  the 
conditions  which  led  up  to  that  treaty,  the  minds  of 
Charles  Sumner  and  Hamilton  Fish  naturally  moved 
on  different  lines  ;  while  it  so  chanced  that  the  likes 
and  dislikes,  the  objectives,  surroundings  and  methods 
of  Ulysses  S.  Grant , —  disturbing  factors,  —  largely 
affected  the  result. 


IV 

In  the  years  1869  and  1870,  as  indeed  throughout 
his  public  life,  Charles  Surnner  was  intent  on  the  Afri 
can,  and  questions  of  human  right ;  and  consequently, 
while,  in  the  matter  of  territorial  expansion,  he  might 
look  vaguely  to  Canada  and  a  Greater  American  policy, 
he  would  instinctively  be  opposed  to  any  movement  in 
the  direction  of  the  tropics.  President  Grant,  on  the 
contrary,  from  the  beginning  of  his  first  presidential 
term,  was  bent  on  early  acquisitions  in  the  West  In 
dies,  and  disposed  to  adopt  a  summary  tone  towards 
Spain.  As  respects  Great  Britain,  his  attitude,  one 
of  comparative  indifference,  admitted  of  almost  indefi 
nite  shaping.  Mr.  Fish,  new,  and  not  comfortable,  in 
his  unsolicited  position,  was  inclined  to  be  influenced, 
—  almost  to  be  led,  by  Sumner ;  but  he  at  the  same 
time  looked  to  Grant  as  the  head  of  an  administration, 
in  which  he  himself  held  the  place  of  precedence,  and 
was  disposed  to  give  to  his  chief  a  thoroughly  loyal 
support.  New  in  their  positions,  and,  so  far  as  Grant 
was  concerned,  strange  to  each  other,  they  had  all  to 


114  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

find  their  bearings.  Under  such  circumstances,  inex 
perienced  in  foreign  affairs  and  unduly  distrustful  of 
himself  on  questions  of  international  law,  the  new 
Secretary  seems  in  some  degree  to  have  turned  to 
Caleb  Gushing  ;  nor  could  he,  among  men  then  avail 
able  at  Washington,  have  found  a  more  competent  or 
tactful  adviser.  Of  decided  parts,  with  good  attain 
ments  and  remarkable  powers  of  acquisition,  Caleb 
Gushing  was  a  man  of  large  experience,  much  human 
insight,  and,  while  given  to  manipulation,  he  was  not 
hampered  either  in  council  or  in  action  by  any  excess 
of  moral  sensibility.  He  understood  the  situation ; 
and  he  understood  Mr.  Sumner. 

In  the  matter  of  the  Queen's  proclamation  of  May, 
1861,  and  the  concession  of  belligerent  rights,  it  was 
thus  a  case  of  alternatives,  —  the  rule  of  British  ac 
countability  to  be  laid  down  for  the  new  administration 
must  not  stand  in  the  way  of  a  more  than  possible  line 
of  aggressive  action  towards  Spain.  That  the  instruc 
tions  now  prepared  for  Mr.  Motley  were  more  rational 
than  the  positions  assumed  by  Mr.  Sumner  four  weeks 
before,  mast  be  admitted ;  they  were  also  more  in  ac 
cordance  with  recognized  principles  of  international 
law.  In  his  Senate  speech  Mr.  Sumner  had  contended 
that,  because  of  the  proclamation,  the  liability  of  Great 
Britain  must  be  fixed  at  amounts  scarcely  calculable 
in  money,  —  a  damage  "  immense  and  infinite,"  -  —  "  a 
massive  grievance,"  all  dependent  on  "  this  extraordi 
nary  manifesto,"  the  "  ill-omened,"  the  "  fatal "  pro 
clamation  which  "  had  opened  the  floodgates  to  infinite 
woes."  Mr.  Fish,  with  the  Cuban  situation  obviously 
in  mind,  declared,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  President 
recognized  "  the  right  of  every  power,  when  a  civil  con- 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  115 

flict  lias  arisen  in  another  state,  and  lias  attained  a 
sufficient  complexity,  magnitude  and  completeness,  to 
define  its  own  relations  and  those  of  its  citizens  and 
subjects  toward  the  parties  to  the  conflict,  so  far  as 
their  rights  and  interests  are  necessarily  affected  by 
the  conflict."  Then  followed  some  saving  clauses,  care 
fully  framed  ;  but,  as  already  foreshadowed  in  Mr. 
Fish's  correspondence,  the  precipitate  character  of  the 
u  unfriendly  "  proclamation  was  dwelt  upon  only  as 
showing  "  the  beginning  and  the  animus  of  that  course 
of  conduct  which  resulted  so  disastrously  to  the  United 
States."  In  the  original  draught,  these  instructions  had 
been  even  more  explicit  on  this  point ;  and,  for  that 
reason,  had  led  to  a  characteristic  remonstrance  on  the 
part  of  Mr.  Sunnier.  Having  early  got  some  inkling 
of  their  character,  he  at  once  went  to  the  house  of  Mr. 
Davis,  and  there,  speaking  to  the  Assistant  Secretary 
in  aloud  voice,  tremulous  and  vibrating  with  excitement, 
he  had  exclaimed,  —  "  Is  it  the  purpose  of  this  Admin 
istration  to  sacrifice  me,  —  me,  a  Senator  from  Massa 
chusetts  ?  "  —and  later  he  wrote  to  the  Secretary  him 
self,  declaring  his  dissent  "  from  the  course  proposed," 
on  the  ground  that  "  as  chairman  of  the  Senate  com 
mittee  I  ought  not  in  any  way  to  be  a  party  to  a  state 
ment  which  abandons  or  enfeebles  any  of  the  just 
grounds  of  my  country  as  already  expounded  by  Seward, 
Adams,  and  myself."  To  this  more  than  merely  im 
plied  threat,  Mr.  Fish  had  contented  himself  by  reply 
ing  that,  whether  the  modifications  were  of  greater  or 
of  less  significance,  they  could  "  hardly  be  of  sufficient 
importance  to  break  up  an  effort  at  negotiation,  or  to 
break  down  an  Administration."  l  Mr.  Gushing  here 

1  Davis :  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  pp.  31-34,  114-116. 


116  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

intervened,  and  his  skilful  hand  temporarily  adjusted 
the  difficulty.1  The  adjustment  was,  however,  only 
temporary.  The  inevitable  could  not  be  averted,  and 
coming  events  already  cast  their  shadows  before. 

To  revive  in  detail  the  painful  Motley  imbroglio  of 
1870  is  not  necessary  for  present  purposes.  Suffice 
it  to  say  that,  when  he  reached  England,  Mr.  Motley 
was,  apparently,  quite  unable  to  clear  his  mind  of  what 
might,  perhaps,  not  inaptly  be  described  as  the  Procla 
mation  Legend ;  and,  both  in  his  official  interviews  with 
the  British  Foreign  Secretary  and  in  social  intercourse, 
he  failed  to  follow,  and  apparently  did  not  grasp,  the 
spirit  of  his  instructions.  Confessing  to  a  "  despondent 
feeling  "  as  to  the  "  possibility  of  the  two  nations  ever 
understanding  each  other,  —  of  the  difficulty,  at  this 
present  moment,  of  their  looking  into  each  other's 
hearts,"  -  —he,  in  his  first  interview  with  Lord  Claren 
don,  fell  heavily  back  on  the  ubiquitous  and  everlasting 
proclamation,  as  the  "  fountain-head  of  the*  disasters 
which  had  been  caused  to  the  American  people,  both 
individually  and  collectively,  by  the  hands  of  English 
men."  Historically  untrue  and  diplomatically  injudi 
cious,  this  tone  and  stand  evinced,  on  the  part  of  Mr. 
Motley,  an  inability  to  see  things  in  connection  with 
his  mission  otherwise  than  as  seen  by  Mr.  Simmer. 
His  misapprehension  of  the  objects  his  official  supe 
rior  had  in  view  was  obvious  and  complete. 

Grant  afterwards  said  that  when  Mr.  Motley's  de 
spatch  containing  his  report  of  this  interview  reached 
Washington,  it  made  him  very  angry,  adding,  as  it  did, 
"insult"  to  "injury."  This  statement,  though  made 
some  eight  years  after  the  event,2  is  altogether  probable 

1  Pierce  :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  p.  405. 

2  Interview  at  Edinburgh,  New  York  Herald,  September  25,  1877. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  117 

in  view  of  the  somewhat  complicated,  if  extremely  in 
teresting,  state  of  affairs  then  existing  at  Washington. 
But  to  a  complete  understanding  of  what  can  only 
be  described  as  Mr.  Motley's  most  unfortunate  diplo 
matic  faux  pas,  it  is  necessary  here  to  diverge  from 
the  narrative. 

The  despatch  of  the  new  Minister  containing  the 
report  of  his  first  conference  with  Lord  Clarendon 
reached  the  Department  of  State  in  due  course  of 
time,  and  was  acknowledged  by  the  Secretary  on  the 
28th  of  June.  In  the  course  of  the  Edinburgh  inter 
view  of  eight  years  later,  just  referred  to,  Grant  said, 
—  "As  soon  as  I  heard  of  [the  tenor  of  Motley's  con 
versation  with  Clarendon]  I  went  over  to  the  State 
Department,  and  told  Governor  Fish  to  dismiss  Motley 
at  once.  ...  I  have  been  sorry  many  a  time  since 
that  I  did  not  stick  to  my  first  determination."  Grant 
was,  indeed,  as  he  stated,  "  very  angry  "  on  this  occa 
sion.  Nor,  in  the  light  of  what  is  now  known,  was 
the  cause  of  his  anger  far  to  seek.  It  was  due  to  the 
state  of  affairs  in  Cuba,  and  the  course  he  then  had 
in  mind  to  pursue  in  respect  thereto. 

One  of  the  inherent  defects  of  Grant  as  a  civil 
administrator  was  what  Mr.  Sumner,  at  a  later  day, 
termed  his  "  aide-de-campish  "  tendency.  As  President 
he  was  surrounded,  and  greatly  influenced,  by  his  old 
field  associates,  —  at  once  the  terror  and  despair  of  his 
constitutional  advisers  and  official  associates.  The  best, 
and  by  far  the  most  influential,  of  this  White  House 
staff  was  General  Rawlins,  Grant's  first  Secretary  of 
War.  He,  at  least,  held  an  official  position  ;  most  of 

The  report  of  the  conversation  was,  in  this  case,  authorized,  and  pre 
pared  by  John  Russell  Young1,  Grant's  recognized  travelling  companion. 


118  THE   TREATY   OF  WASHINGTON 

the  others  were  irregular  army  assignments,  holding 
no  position  at  the  White  House  recognized  by  law.1 
During  the  early  months  of  Grant's  first  administra 
tion,  the  Secretary  of  War,  though  in  declining  health, 
was  greatly  concerned  over  the  course  of  events  in 
Cuba.  As  afterwards  appeared,  he  had  even  a  money 
interest  in  the  success  of  the  insurrection  then  on  foot 
in  the  island.  With  his  customary  energy,  he  pressed 
the  cause  of  the  insurgents  on  the  President,  demand 
ing  their  recognition  as  belligerents.  For  this  no 
grounds  existed.  As  Secretary  Fish  afterwards  pri 
vately  wrote, — "  They  have  no  army,  .  .  .  no  courts, 
do  not  occupy  a  single  town,  or  hamlet,  to  say  nothing 
of  a  seaport,  .  .  .  carrying  on  a  purely  guerrilla  war 
fare,  burning  estates  and  attacking  convoys,  etc.  .  .  . 
There  has  been  nothing  that  has  amounted  to  c  WTar.' 
Belligerency  is  a  fact.  Great  Britain  or  France  might 
just  as  well  have  recognized  belligerency  for  the  Black 
Hawk  War."  None  the  less,  so  far  did  General  liaw- 
lins's  urgency  prevail  on  the  President  that,  as  Mr. 
Motley's  malign  diplomatic  star  would  have  it,  the 
detailed  report  of  his  arraignment  of  the  Queen's  pro 
clamation  of  1861  reached  Washington  at  the  very 
time  when  the  President  was  himself  meditating,  and 
the  Secretary  of  State  was  apprehending,  a  similar 
proclamation  as  respects  the  Cuban  insurgents.  Nor 
merely  that.  A  few  weeks  later,  the  President  not 
only  caused  such  a  proclamation  to  be  drawn  up,  but 
signed  it  himself,  directed  the  Secretary  of  State  to 
affix  to  it  the  official  seal,  and  then  to  promulgate  it. 

1  J.  D.  Cox  :  "  How  Judge  Hoar  ceased  to  be  Attorney-General," 
Atlantic  Monthly  Magazine  (August,  1895),  vol.  Ixxvi.  p.  162  ;  Sumner: 
"Republicanism  vs.  Grantism,"  Works,  vol.  xv.  pp.  131-138. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  119 

This  was  on  the  19th  of  August.  Mr.  Bancroft  Davis, 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  was  intrusted  with 
the  order  for  the  purpose  of  affixing  the  seal,  —  it 
having  been  signed  in  the  cabin  of  the  Fall  River 
boat,  —  and  with  it  returned  to  Washington ;  and 
there,  in  obedience  to  the  direction  of  Mr.  Fish,  he 
deposited  the  document  in  a  safe  place,  to  await  fur 
ther  directions.  In  that  "  safe  place  "  this  proclama 
tion,  vital  to  Cuba's  insurrectionists  and,  probably,  to 
the  country's  peace,  rested  for  months  and  years.  It 
never  was  promulgated.1 

With  Grant,  an  order  was  an  order  ;  and  an  order, 


1  Some  facts  concerning  this  singular  episode,  copied  from  Mr. 
Fish's  diary  by  his  son,  Hamilton  Fish,  were  published  in  an  Asso 
ciated  Press  despatch,  from  Albany,  in  the  New  York  papers  of 
March  16,  1896.  Writing-  a  year  after  the  occurrences  referred  to  in 
the  text,  July  10,  1870,  Mr.  Fish  said  that  Grant  made  use  of  these 
expressions  to  him,  —  "  On  two  important  occasions,  at  least,  your 
steadiness  and  wisdom  have  kept  me  from  mistakes  into  which  I 
should  have  fallen."  Mr.  Fish  then  added,  these  two  occasions  were 
"  one  preventing1  the  issuing-,  last  August  and  September,  of  the  pro 
clamation  of  Cuban  belligerency,  which  he  had  signed,  and  which 
he  wrote  me  a  note  instructing  me  to  sign  (which  I  did)  and  to  issue 
(which  I  did  not),  and,  second,  the  Cuban  message  of  June  13" 
(1870).  The  message  last  referred  to  (Messages,  etc.,  of  the  Pre 
sidents,  vol.  vii.  p.  64),  setting  forth  a  definite  policy  as  respects  Cuba 
and  Spain,  was  at  the  time  a  great  relief  to  the  members  of  the 
Cabinet.  It  amounted  to  a  complete  change  of  administration  front, 
brought  about  by  the  insistence  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  almost 
as  the  alternative  to  his  resignation.  Though  very  reluctant  to  yield 
on  this  point,  the  President  finally  did  so,  affixing  his  signature  to  the 
message  as  drawn  up  by  the  Secretary.  In  response  to  a  request 
therefor,  the  family  of  Mr.  Fish  have  kindly  furnished  me  extracts 
from  the  diary  relating  to  this  interesting  bit  of  history,  supplement 
ary  to  those  already  published  by  Mr.  Hamilton  Fish,  in  the  Asso 
ciated  Press  despatch  above  referred  to.  These  are  of  such  value, 
and  so  extremely  creditable  to  Mr.  Fish,  that  they  are  printed  in 
full,  together  with  those  previously  published  by  Mr.  Fish's  son,  in 
Appendix  E  (infra,  p.  215)  of  this  paper. 


120  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

something  to  be  obeyed.  Why,  in  this  case,  the  order 
was  not  obeyed,  or  some  one  held  to  strict  account  for 
disobedience,  does  not  appear.  He  seems  to  have  for 
gotten  all  about  it  at  the  time ;  and,  subsequently,  he 
expressed  much  gratification  at  this  failure  of  memory. 
In  point  of  fact  he,  at  that  particular  juncture,  had 
other  things  to  think  of.  It  was  the  vacation  season, 
and  he  was  away  from  Washington,  —  at  Newport,  in 
New  York,  and  in  the  mountains  of  western  Penn 
sylvania  ;  Mr.  Fish  was  at  his  country  place,  at  Gar 
rison  on  the  Hudson  ;  General  Rawlins  was  ill  at 
Washington,  —  dying,  in  the  last  stages  of  pulmonary 
consumption.  It  so  chanced  that  Messrs.  Jay  Gould 
and  James  Fisk,  Jr.,  of  New  York  had  made  up 
their  minds  that  this  particular  period  was  one  favor 
able  for  the  execution  of  a  great  financial  stroke. 
They  proceeded  accordingly,  and  their  operations  cul 
minated  in  the  famous  "  Gold  Corner,"  and  the  long- 
remembered  Wall  Street  "  Black  Friday  "  of  Septem 
ber  24, 1869.  Never  fastidious  in  the  selection  of  his 
company,  the  President  had  been  brought  into  some 
sort  of  an  association  with  these  men  through  his 
brother-in-law,  Abel  R.  Corbin,  a  resident  of  New 
York.  Him  they  had  fairly  entangled  in  their  meshes  ; 
through  him  they  were  scheming  to  ensnare  the  Pre 
sident.1  They  did  not  succeed ;  but  they  did  influ 
ence  his  action  as  President,  and  they  threw  the  whole 
financial  machinery  of  the  country,  including  that  of 
the  United  States  government,  into  confusion.  For 
some  time  public  attention  was  concentrated  on  them 
and  their  misdoings,  to  the  utter  exclusion  of  all  else, 

1  Henry  Adams  :    Chapters  of  Erie,  The  New  York  Gold  Conspiracy, 
pp.  100-134.    See,  also,  infra,  p.  224. 


THE    TREATY    OF    WASHINGTON         121 

including  Cuba.  It  was  Grant's  first  experience  with 
men  of  that  stamp  in  Wall  Street ;  well  for  him  had 
it  been  his  last. 

Thus  the  last  formal  act  preliminary  to  the  issuance 
of  a  proclamation  of  Cuban  belligerency  was  performed 
during  the  evening  of  August  19  ;  the  Secretary  of 
War  died  on  the  9th  of  the  month  following  ;  fifteen 
days  later  was  Wall  Street's  "Black  Friday."  The 
Rawlins  pressure  on  Grant  had  then  ceased;  thenceforth 
the  proclamation  slept,  innocuous,  in  the  safe  of  the 
Department  of  State.  But,  though  thus  pigeon-holed, 
it  might  well  have  been  issued  at  any  time  subsequent 
to  the  1 9th  of  August ;  and  that  it  was  not  so  issued 
was  due,  apparently,  to  the  fact  that  Secretary  Fish 
withheld  it  during  the  President's  vacation  absence 
from  Washington.  Grant's  thoughts  chanced  then  to 
be  otherwise  directed,  and  subsequent  events  made  the 
action  he  had  decided  on  manifestly  inexpedient. 

Eeturning  to  Mr.  Motley  and  the  report  of  his  first 
conversation  with  Lord  Clarendon,  it  is  now  quite 
apparent  why  Grant  was  "very  angry  indeed"  when 
he  first  heard  of  it.  The  diplomacy  of  Mr.  Motley 
certainly  was  not  happy.  With  a  degree  of  fortuitous 
infelicity  truly  remarkable,  it  was  most  nicely  calcu 
lated  to  compromise  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
of  State.  By  the  merest  chance  did  it  fail  so  to  do. 
The  lesson  could  not  have  been  lost ;  and  it  was  small 
matter  of  surprise  that  Mr.  Motley  was  promptly 
relieved  from  the  necessity  of  further  discussing  the 
Alabama  claims,  and  the  Queen's  proclamation  of 
May,  1861,  in  its  connection  therewith.  However 
Mr.  Fish  felt  about  Cuba,  —  and  on  that  subject  his 
views  were  quite  well  defined,  —  he  could  have  enter- 


122  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

tained  no  wish  to  have  his  representative  in  London 
get  him  into  a  position  which  might  not  improbably 
demand  of  him  much  awkward  explanation,  founded 
on  distinctions  not  at  once  apparent.1  However,  as  it 
was  almost  immediately  decided  that,  so  far  as  the 
settlement  of  outstanding  difficulties  between  the  two 
nations  was  concerned,  any  future  negotiations  should 
be  conducted  in  Washington,  Mr.  Motley  ceased  at 
this  point  to  be  a  factor  in  the  course  of  events. 

Now,  however,  an  extremely  adroit,  though  unoffi 
cial,  intermediary  appeared  on  the  stage  ;  and  his 
presence  almost  immediately  made  itself  felt.  Born 
in  Scotland  in  1820,  and  emigrating  with  his  parents 

1  Though  a  man  of  extensive  research,  Mr.  Stunner,  unlike  Mr. 
Fish  in  that  respect,  had  not  a  legal  mind.  He  prided  himself  on 
his  acquaintance  with  International  Law  ;  but,  when  occasion  arose, 
he  instinctively  evolved  his  law  from  his  inner  consciousness,  and  it 
rarely  failed  to  meet  the  emergency.  The  difficulty  with  it  was  that 
it  was  apt  to  be  of  a  code  peculiarly  his  own.  and  not  found  in  the 
books  usually  accepted  as  authoritative.  It  was  so  in  the  case  of 
foreign  built  Confederate  cruisers ;  it  was  so  as  respects  the  Queen's 
proclamation  of  May,  1861  ;  it  was  so  as  respects  national,  as  con 
tradistinguished  from  private,  claims.  An  accomplished  litterateur 
and  brilliant  historian,  Mr.  Motley  was  unacquainted  with  law,  and 
quite  innocent  of  any  legal  instinct.  When,  therefore,  Mr.  Motley 
undertook  to  expound  Mr.  Sumner's  jurisprudence,  the  result  might 
not  improbably  be  something  for  which  a  matter-of-fact  government 
would  not  care  always  to  be  held  responsible.  In  the  present  case, 
Mr.  Motley  in  June  descanted  most  eloquently  to  Lord  Clarendon 
on  the  sin  of  commission  involved  in  the  premature  recognition 
of  Confederate  belligerency  by  the  British  government;  but,  six 
months  later,  President  Grant  declared  that  a  "  nation  is  its  own 
judge,  when  to  accord  the  rights  of  belligerency,  either  to  a  people 
struggling  to  free  themselves  from  a  government  they  believe  to 
be  oppressive,  or  to  independent  nations  at  war  with  each  other." 
(Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  vii.  p.  32.)  Even  this 
discrepancy  was  unquestionably  embarrassing  ;  a  Cuban  proclamation 
actually  outstanding  would  obviously  have  aggravated  the  embarrass 
ment. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  123 

to  America  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  Sir  John  Rose,  or 
Mr.  Eose  as  he  still  was  in  1869,  had  been  for  a  num 
ber  of  years  prominent  in  Canadian  public  life.  A 
natural  diplomat  of  a  high  order,  he  was  at  this  time 
acting  as  British  commissioner  on  the  joint  tribunal 
provided  by  the  treaty  of  1863  to  arbitrate  the  claims 
of  the  Hudson's  Bay  and  Puget  Sound  companies.  Mr. 
Caleb  Gushing  was  of  counsel  in  that  business,  and 
relations  of  a  friendly  nature  grew  up  between  him  and 
the  British  arbitrator.  Whether  already  privately  au 
thorized  so  to  do  or  not,  Mr.  Rose,  who  was  very  solicit 
ous  of  an  arrangement  between  the  two  nations,  skil 
fully  instilled  into  Mr.  Gushing  a  belief  that  he,  Mr. 
Rose,  might  be  of  use  in  the  delicate  work  of  reopening 
negotiations  on  new  lines.  Accordingly,  on  the  26th 
of  June,  —  not  eleven  weeks  from  the  rejection  of  the 
Johnson-Clarendon  Convention,  and  sixteen  days  after 
Mr.  Motley's  despondent  interview  with  Lord  Clar 
endon  just  referred  to,  —  Mr.  Gushing,  then  in  Wash 
ington,  wrote  to  Mr.  Rose,  in  Ottawa.  Referring  to 
previous  letters  between  them,  he  now  told  him  that 
he  had  that  day  seen  Secretary  Fish,  and  had  arranged 
for  Mr.  Rose  to  meet  him.  "  I  am,"  he  wrote,  "  not 
sanguine  of  immediate  conclusion  of  such  a  treaty  as 
either  you  or  I  might  desire.  But  I  think  the  time 
has  arrived  to  commence,  trusting  that  discretion,  pa 
tience,  and  good-will  on  both  sides  may  eventuate,  in 
this  important  matter,  satisfactorily  to  the  two  govern 
ments."  l  Accordingly,  on  the  8th  of  July,  Mr.  Rose 

1  In  this  letter  Mr.  Gushing-  significantly  went  on  to  say,  —  "  In  view 
of  the  disposition  which  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  has  recently 
shown  to  assume  more  than  its  due,  or  at  least  than  its  usual  part,  in 
the  determination  of  international  questions,  you  will  appreciate  the 
Unreadiness  of  the  Executive,  at  the  present  time,  to  take  upon  itself 


124  THE  TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

called  on  the  Secretary  in  Washington.  The  first  of 
the  interviews  which  led  up  to  the  Treaty  of  Wash 
ington  two  years  later  took  place  next  day  at  Mr. 
Fish's  dinner-table.  The  basis  of  a  settlement  was 
then  discussed,  and  that  subsequently  reached  out 
lined  by  Mr.  Fish,  who  laid  especial  emphasis  on  the 
necessity  of  "some  kind  expression  of  regret"  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain  over  the  course  pursued  in 
the  Civil  War.  The  two  even  went  so  far  as  to  con 
sider  the  details  of  negotiation.  The  expediency  of  a 
special  commission  to  dispose  of  the  matter  was  dis 
cussed,  and,  among  others,  the  names  of  the  Duke  of 
Argyll  and  John  Bright  were  canvassed  in  connection 
therewith. 

Immediately  after  this  interview  Mr.  Eose  went  to 
England.  His  official  and  personal  relations  with  men 
high  in  influence  were  close ;  and,  moreover,  another 
personage  of  growing  consequence  in  English  minis 
terial  circles  was  now  at  work  laboring  earnestly  and 
assiduously  to  promote  an  adjustment.  In  1869 
(  William  E.  Forster  was  fast  rising  into  the  front 
rank  of  English  public  men.  President  of  the  Privy 
Council  in  Mr.  Gladstone's  first  Ministry,  he  was  act 
ing  as  Minister  of  Education.  Nine  years  later,  in  the 
second  Gladstone  Ministry,  he  was  to  occupy  the  crucial 
position  of  Secretary  for  Ireland.  Always,  from  his 
first  entrance  into  public  life  in  1861,  an  earnest,  out- 

any  spontaneous  or  doubtful  ventures,  especially  on  the  side  of  Eng 
land."  The  reference  was,  of  course,  to  Mr.  Sumner,  and  pointed  to 
an  already  developing  source  of  trouble.  Grant's  first  presidential  term 
was  yet  in  its  fourth  month  only.  On  the  "  disposition  "  referred  to 
by  Mr.  Gushing,  see  the  paper  by  A.  M.  Low,  entitled  "  The  Oligarchy 
of  the  Senate,"  in  the  North  American  Review  for  February,  1902, 
vol.  174,  pp.  238-243. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  125 

spoken,  consistent  and  insistent  friend  of  democratic 
United  States,  —  during  the  Civil  War  the  one  in  that 
small  group  of  friends  held  by  Mr.  Adams  in  "  most 
esteem,"  l  --  Mr.  Forster  was  now  strenuous  in  his 
advocacy  of  a  comprehensive  settlement  of  the  issues 
arising  out  of  the  Rebellion,  and  the  honest  admission 
by  Great  Britain  of  the  ill-considered  policy  then  pur 
sued.  His  name  also  had  been  discussed  by  Mr.  Fish 
and  Mr.  Rose  as  one  of  the  proposed  special  mission. 
Within  less  than  two  months,  therefore,  of  the  re 
jection  of  the  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention,  the 
Treaty  of  Washington  was  in  the  air  ;  and,  curiously 
enough,  within  a  month  of  the  time  when  Mr.  Motley 
in  London  was  confessing  to  Lord  Clarendon  his 
"  despondent  feeling  "  in  view  of  the  "  path  surrounded 
by  perils,"  and  talking  of  "  grave  and  disastrous 
misunderstandings  and  cruel  wars,"  Secretary  Fish 
and  Mr.  Rose,  comfortably  seated  at  a  dinner-table 
in  Washington,  were  quietly  paving  the  way  to  a  com 
plete  understanding.  Nothing  more  occurred  during 
that  summer  ;  but,  in  the  course  of  it,  Mr.  Fish  thus 
expressed  his  views  in  a  letter  to  a  correspondent,  — 
an  expression  at  this  early  date  to  which  subsequent 
events  lent  much  significance  :  —  "  The  two  English- 
speaking  progressive  liberal  Governments  of  the  world 
should  not,  must  not,  be  divided  —  better  let  this 
question  rest  for  some  years  even  (if  that  be  neces 
sary)  than  risk  failure  in  another  attempt  at  settle 
ment.  I  do  not  say  this  because  I  wish  to  postpone  a 
settlement  —  on  the  contrary,  I  should  esteem  it  the 
greatest  glory,  and  greatest  happiness  of  my  life,  if  it 
could  be  settled  while  I  remain  in  official  position ; 

1  Reid  :  Forster,  vol.  ii.  p.  10. 


126  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

and  I  should  esteem  it  the  greatest  benefit  to  my 
country  to  bring  it  to  an  early  settlement.  ...  I  want 
to  have  the  question  settled.  I  would  not,  if  I  could, 
impose  any  humiliating  condition  on  Great  Britain. 
I  would  not  be  a  party  to  anything  that  proposes 
to  '  threaten '  her.  I  believe  that  she  is  great  enough 
to  be  just ;  and  I  trust  that  she  is  wise  enough  to 
maintain  her  own  greatness.  No  greatness  is  incon 
sistent  with  some  errors.  Mr.  Bright  thinks  she  was 
drawn  into  errors  —  so  do  we.  If  she  can  be  brought 
to  think  so,  it  will  not  be  necessary  for  her  to  say  so  ; 
—  at  least  not  to  say  it  very  loudly.  It  may  be  said 
by  a  definition  of  what  shall  be  Maritime  International 
Law  in  the  future,  and  a  few  kind  words.  She  will 
want  in  the  future  what  we  have  claimed.  Thus  she 
will  be  benefited  —  we  satisfied."  Written  in  the 
early  days  of  September,  1869,  this  letter  set  forth 
clearly  the  position  of  Mr.  Fish  :  it  also  correctly 
foreshadowed  the  course  of  the  diplomacy  which  had 
already  been  entered  upon. 

During  the  autumn  of  1869  the  Alabama  claims, 
and  the  unsatisfactory  relations  of  the  country  with 
Great  Britain,  were  discussed  at  more  than  one  Cabi 
net  meeting  in  Washington.  At  this  time,  while  the 
Secretary  of  State  professed  himself  as  ready  to  nego 
tiate  whenever  England  came  forward  with  a  fairly 
satisfactory  proposition,  the  President  favored  a  policy 
of  delay.  Presently,  Mr.  Rose  was  again  heard  from. 
The  letter  he  now  wrote  has  since  often  been  referred 
to  and  much  commented  upon,  though  it  was  over 
twenty  years  before  its  authorship  was  revealed.1  In 

1  By  Mr.  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis,  in  his  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama 
Claims,  p.  48. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  127 

it  he  said,  —  "I  have  had  conversations  in  more  than 
one  quarter,  —  which  you  will  readily  understand 
without  my  naming  them,  and  have  conveyed  my 
own  belief,  that  a  kindly  word,  or  an  expression  o£ 
regret,  such  as  would  not  involve  an  acknowledgment 
of  wrong,  was  likely  to  be  more  potential  than  the  most 
irrefragable  reasoning  on  principles  of  international 
law.''  Mr.  Rose  then  went  on  to  touch  upon  a  very 
delicate  topic,  —  Mr.  Motley's  general  London  presen 
tation  of  his  country's  attitude.  "  Is  your  representa 
tive  here,"  he  added,  "  a  gentleman  of  the  most  con 
ciliatory  spirit  ?  .  .  .  Does  he  not  —  perhaps  naturally 

—  let  the  fear  of  imitating  his  predecessor  influence 
his  course  so  as  to  make  his  initiative  hardly  as  much 
characterized  by  consideration  for  the  sensibilities  of 
the  people  of  this  country,  as  of  his  own  ?  .  .  .  I  think 
I  understood  you  to  say,  that  you  thought  negotiations 
would  be  more  likely  to  be  attended  with  satisfactory 
results,  if  they  were  transferred  to,  and  were  concluded 
at,  Washington  ;  because  you  could  from  time  to  time 
communicate  confidentially  with  leading  Senators,  and 
know  how  far  you  could  carry  that  body  with  you. 
.  .  .  But  again  is  your  representative  of  that  mind  ? 

—  and  how  is  it  to  be  brought  about  ?     By  a  new,  or 
a  special  envoy  —  as  you  spoke  of  —  or  quietly  through 
Mr.  Thornton  ?  ...  If  I  am  right  in  my  impression 
that  you  would  prefer  Washington  and  a  new  man, 
and  you  think  it  worth  while  to  enable  me  to  repeat 
that  suggestion  as  one  from  myself  in  the  proper  quar 
ter,  a  line  from  you  —  or  if  you  prefer  it,  a  word  by 
the  cable,  will  enable  me  to  do  so." 

Eight  days  later,  on  the  llth  of  the  same  month, 
Mr.  Rose  again  wrote  to  Mr.  Fish,  calling  his  atten- 


128  THE    TREATY    OF    WASHINGTON 

tion  to  the  speech  of  Mr.  Gladstone  at  the  Guildhall, 
which,  he  said,  "  hardly  conveys  the  impression  his 
tone  conveyed  with  reference  to  United  States  affairs. 
There  was  an  earnest  tone  of  friendship  that  is  hardly 
reproduced."  1 

At  the  time  these  letters  reached  Mr.  Fish,  the 
relations  between  him  and  Mr.  Sumner  were  close, 
and  still  friendly.  The  Secretary  spoke  to  the  Senator 
freely  of  Mr.  Rose's  visits,  and  consulted  with  him 
over  every  step  taken.  Knowing  that  Mr.  Sumner 
and  Mr.  Motley  were  constantly  interchanging  let 
ters,  he  took  occasion  to  advise  Mr.  Sumner  of  the 
intimations  which  had  thus  reached  him,  giving,  of 
course,  no  names,  but  saying  simply  that  they  were 
from  a  reliable  quarter.  The  well-meant  hint  was 
more  than  disregarded,  Mr.  Sumner  contenting  himself 
with  contemptuous  references  to  the  once  celebrated 
McCracken  episode.2  Years  afterwards,  in  the  same 
spirit,  Mr.  Motley's  biographer  sneeringly  referred  to 
the  still  unnamed  writer  of  the  Rose  letters  as  "a 
faithless  friend,  a  disguised  enemy,  a  secret  emissary, 
or  an  injudicious  alarmist."  3 

The  reply  of  Mr.  Fish  to  the  letters  of  Mr.  Rose 
revealed  the  difficulties  of  the  Secretary's  position. 
The  individuality  of  Mr.  Sumner  made  itself  felt  at 
every  point.  In  London,  Mr.  Motley  reflected  the 
views  of  the  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  rather  than  those  of  the  Secretary 
of  State ;  in  Washington,  the  personal  relations  of 
Mr.  Sumner  with  the  British  Minister  were  such  as 

1  See  Appendix  D,  infra,  p.  212. 

2  Davis  :  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  128. 

3  O.  W.  Holmes  :  Memoir  of  John  Lothrop  Motley  (1879),  pp.  178, 
179. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  129 

to  render  the  latter  undesirable  at  least  as  a  medium 
of  negotiation.  Referring  first  to  his  intimations  con 
cerning  Mr.  Motley,  Mr.  Fish  replied  to  Mr.  Rose  as 
follows :  — 

"  Your  questions  respecting  our  Minister,  I  fear 
may  have  been  justified  by  some  indiscretion  of  ex 
pression,  or  of  manner,  but  I  hope  only  indiscretions 
of  that  nature.  Intimations  of  such  had  reached  me. 
I  have  reason  to  hope  that  if  there  have  been  ^uch 
manifestations,  they  may  not  recur.  Whatever  there 
may  have  appeared,  I  cannot  doubt  his  desire  to  aid 
in  bringing  the  two  Governments  into  perfect  accord. 
.  .  .  I  have  the  highest  regard«for  Mr.  Thornton, 
and  find  him  in  all  my  intercourse,  courteous,  frank, 
and  true.  A  gentleman  with  whom  I  deal  and  treat 
with  the  most  unreserved  confidence.  He  had,  how 
ever,  given  offence  to  Mr.  Sumner  (chairman  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations),  whose  posi 
tion  with  reference  to  any  future  negotiation  you  un 
derstand.  I  chance  to  know  that  Mr.  Sumner  feels 
deeply  aggrieved  by  some  things  which  Mr.  Thornton 
has  written  home,  and  although  he  would  not  con 
sciously  allow  a  personal  grief  of  that  nature  to  preju 
dice  his  action  in  an  official  intercourse  with  the 
representative  of  a  State,  he  might  unconsciously  be 
led  to  criticism  unfavorable  to  positions  which  would 
be  viewed  differently,  if  occupied  by  some  other  per 
son.  ...  I  am  very  decidedly  of  opinion  that  when 
ever  negotiations  are  to  be  renewed,  they  would  be 
more  likely  to  result  favorably  here  than  in  London. 
I  have  so  instructed  Mr.  Motley  to  say,  if  he  be  ques 
tioned  on  the  subject." 

Such  was  the  posture  of  affairs  at  the  close  of  the 


130  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

year  1869.  Events  now  moved  rapidly,  and  the  gen 
eral  situation  became  more  and  more  complicated.  In 
Europe,  the  war-clouds  which  preceded  the  Franco- 
Prussian  storm-burst  of  1870  were  gathering;  in 
America,  President  Grant  was,  persistently  as  ear 
nestly,  pressing  his  schemes  of  West  Indian  annexa 
tion.  In  London,  Mr.  Rose  was  informally  sounding 
the  members  of  the  government  to  ascertain  how  far 
they  were  willing  to  go ;  in  Washington,  Mr.  Thorn 
ton  was  pressing  the  Secretary  "  with  much  earnest 
ness  to  give  him  an  intimation  of  what  would  be 
accepted "  by  the  United  States.  The  outbreak  of 
hostilities  between  France  and  Germany  six  months 
later  brought  matters,  so  far  as  Great  Britain  was 
concerned,  fairly  to  a  crisis.  In  presence  of  serious 
continental  complications,  —  in  imminent  danger  of 
being  drawn  into  the  vortex  of  conflict,  —  Great  Brit 
ain  found  itself  face  to  face  with  the  Alabama  prece 
dents.  Like  "  blood-bolter'd  "  Banquo,  they  would  not 
down.  The  position  was  one  not  likely  to  escape  the 
keen  eye  of  Count  Bismarck.  England's  hands  were 
tied.  Internationally,  she  was  obviously  a  negligible 
quantity.  The  principles  laid  down  and  precedents 
established  only  six  years  before  were  patent,  —  fresh 
in  the  minds  of  all.  Her  Majesty's  Government  re 
membered  them ;  Count  Bismarck  was  advised  of 
them  ;  each  was  well  aware  of  the  other's  knowledge. 
The  Ministry  were  accordingly  in  an  extraordinarily 
receptive  mental  condition. 

On  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  the  situation  compli 
cated  itself  no  less  rapidly.  Colonel  Babcock,  one  of 
the  group  of  young  army  officers  already  referred  to, 
who,  having  been  members  of  General  Grant's  niili- 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  131 

tary  staff,  were  retained,  under  detail,  near  his  person 
during  his  presidency,  had  been  sent  down  by  him  to 
examine,  as  an  engineer,  the  bay  of  Samana,  and  to 
report  upon  it  as  a  coaling  station.  Presently  he  got 
back,  and,  at  the  next  meeting  of  the  Cabinet,  the 
President  paralyzed  his  official  advisers  by  announc 
ing,  in  a  casual  sort  of  way,  "  Babcock  has  returned, 
as  you  see,  and  has  brought  a  treaty  of  annexation." 
To  say  that  never  before  in  the  whole  history  of  the 
government  had  any  President  made  such  a  naive 
exhibition  is  quite  within  safe  bounds.  Ignorance 
of  law  and  usage,  and  an  utter  absence  of  the  sense 
of  propriety,  were  about  equally  pronounced.  A  sub 
ordinate  officer  of  engineers,  sent  to  a  West  Indian 
island  to  make  a  report  on  a  coaling  station,  had  not 
only  undertaken  to  negotiate  a  formal  treaty  for  the 
annexation  of  an  entire  foreign  country  to  the  United 
States,  but  had  actually  executed  it,  entitling  himself 
in  the  solemn  instrument  "  Aide-de-camp  "  to  His  Ex 
cellency,  and  his  "  special  agent  to  the  Dominican  Re 
public."  Instead  of  charitably  concealing  the  mingled 
assurance  and  incompetency  of  the  young  man  under 
a  private  rebuke,  the  President  now  adopted  as  his 
own  this  pronounced  opera  bouffe  performance,  irre 
sistibly  suggestive  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Gerolstein. 
Sent  to  examine  a  harbor,  the  President's  aide  had 
undertaken  to  annex  a  negro  republic !  This  being  so, 
there  is  small  occasion  for  surprise  that,  when  the 
President  brought  the  matter  up  in  cabinet  meeting, 
the  gaze  of  all  about  the  table  involuntarily  turned 
toward  the  Secretary  of  State.  Mr.  Fish  sat  "  impas 
sive,  and  his  eyes  were  fixed  on  the  portfolio  before 
him."  Had  it  not  been  somewhat  appalling,  the  sit- 


132  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

nation  would  have  been  farcical  in  the  extreme.  As 
it  was,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  even  Judge 
Hoar's  strong  sense  of  humor  rose  to  the  occasion. 
The  startling  bit  of  information  thus  conveyed  by  the 
President  was  received  in  expressive  silence,  broken 
at  last  by  a  single  hesitating  query,  which  remained 
unanswered.  The  atmosphere  of  general  disapproval 
was,  however,  pervasive,  and  painfully  apparent;  so 
nothing  more  was  then  said,  nor  was  the  matter  ever 
again  submitted  to  the  assembled  Cabinet.1  None 
the  less,  the  idea  of  annexation  had  taken  possession 
of  the  presidential  mind,  and  from  that  time  Grant 
became  intent  upon  it ;  and  intent  in  his  character 
istic  way.  It  was  a  cardinal  point  in  his  policy. 
Obviously,  the  support  of  the  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  was  very  necessary 
to  the  success  of  the  scheme,  for  the  treaty,  however 
irregularly  negotiated,  must  go  to  the  Senate  for  rati 
fication  ;  a  foreign  country  and  its  people  could  not 
be  annexed  by  a  proclamation  of  the  Commander- 
in-chief,  even  though  countersigned  by  an  aide-de 
camp.  So,  warned  by  his  Cabinet  experience,  as  well 
as  by  the  fate  of  the  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention, 
the  President-General  made  up  his  mind  to  exert  all 
his  influence  on  the  chairman  of  the  committee ;  and, 
consequently,  in  the  early  days  of  January,  he,  the 
Chief  Executive  of  the  United  States,  dropped  in  one 
evening  at  Mr.  Sumner's  house,  while  the  latter  was 
at  dinner  with  some  friends,  and  sought  to  enlist  his 
influence,  —  designating  him  repeatedly  as  chairman 
of  the  "  Senate  Judiciary  Committee,"  —  in  support  of 

1  Cox:  "  How  Judge  Hoar  ceased  to  be  Attorney-General,"  Atlan 
tic  Monthly  Magazine  (August,  1895),  vol.  Ixxvi.  pp.  165-167. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          133 

what  afterwards  became  known  as  President  Grant's 
Dominican  policy.  What  followed  is  familiar  his 
tory.  During  the  immediately  ensuing  months  there 
took  place  a  complete  division  between  the  two  men. 
They  thereafter  became  not  only  politically  opposed, 
but  bitter  personal  enemies. 

To  all  outward  appearances,  during  those  months, 
no  advance  whatever  was  being  made  towards  an 
adjustment  with  Great  Britain  ;  but,  in  point  of  fact, 
both  time  and  conditions  were  rapidly  ripening.  In. 
the  early  days  of  September,  1870,  the  Imperial  gov 
ernment  of  France  collapsed  at  Sedan  ;  and,  on  the 
13th  of  that  month,  M.  Thiers  arrived  in  London 
soliciting  on  behalf  of  the  new  French  republic  the 
aid  and  good  offices  of  Great  Britain.  His  mission 
was,  of  course,  fruitless ;  but,  none  the  less,  it  could 
not  but  emphasize  in  the  minds  of  those  composing 
the  Ministry  the  difficulty  of  England's  position.  If 
it  failed  so  to  do,  a  forcible  reminder  from  America 
was  imminent,  and  followed  almost  immediately.  In 
December,  with  Paris  blockaded  by  the  Prussians, 
France  was  brought  face  to  face  with  dismemberment. 
The  general  European  situation  was,  from  an  English 
point  of  view,  disquieting  in  the  extreme.  At  just 
this  juncture,  within  one  week  of  the  day  on  which  his 
Parliament  called  on  the  Prussian  King  to  become 
Emperor  of  Germany,  and  the  French  delegate  gov 
ernment,  to  avoid  a  German  army  operating  in  the 
heart  of  the  country,  removed  its  sittings  from  Tours 
to  Bordeaux,  —  at  just  this  juncture  (December  5) 
President  Grant  took  occasion  to  incorporate  the  fol 
lowing  distinctly  minatory  passage,  draughted  by  his 
Secretary  of  State,  into  his  annual  message :  — 


134          THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

"  I  regret  to  say  that  no  conclusion  has  been  reached 
for  the  adjustment  of  the  claims  against  Great  Britain 
growing  out  of  the  course  adopted  by  that  Govern 
ment  during  the  Rebellion.  The  cabinet  of  London, 
so  far  as  its  views  have  been  expressed,  does  not 
appear  to  be  willing  to  concede  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  was  guilty  of  any  negligence,  or  did  or 
permitted  any  act  during  the  war  by  which  the  United 
States  has  just  cause  of  complaint.  Our  firm  and 
unalterable  convictions  are  directly  the  reverse.  I 
therefore  recommend  to  Congress  to  authorize  the 
appointment  of  a  commission  to  take  proof  of  the 
amount  and  the  ownership  of  these  several  claims,  on 
notice  to  the  representative  of  Her  Majesty  at  Wash 
ington,  and  that  authority  be  given  for  the  settlement 
of  these  claims  by  the  United  States,  so  that  the 
Government  shall  have  the  ownership  of  the  private 
claims,  as  well  as  the  responsible  control  of  all  the 
demands  against  Great  Britain.  It  cannot  be  neces 
sary  to  add  that  whenever  Her  Majesty's  Government 
shall  entertain  a  desire  for  a  full  and  friendly  adjust 
ment  of  these  claims,  the  United  States  will  enter 
upon  their  consideration  with  an  earnest  desire  for  a 
conclusion  consistent  ,with  the  honor  and  dignity  of 
both  nations." 

The  hint  thus  forcibly  given  was  not  lost  in  Lon 
don.  The  educational  process  was  now  complete.  The 
message,  or  that  portion  of  it  which  most  interested 
the  British  public,  appeared  in  the  London  journals 
of  December  6,  and  was  widely  commented  upon. 
It  was  characterized  as  "  menacing "  in  tone,  and 
"  thoroughly  unpromising  of  any  friendly  settlement." 
Significantly  enough,  in  another  column  of  the  same 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  135 

issue  of  the  Times  appeared  the  headline,  "  Rouen  and 
Orleans  have  fallen !  "  while  the  paper  was  crowded  with 
letters  descriptive  of  the  conflicts  at  Gravelotte  and 
Metz,  together  with  accounts  of  the  investment  of  Paris 
and  of  Gambetta's  harangues  at  Tours.  The  general 
continental  situation  was  even  more  "  menacing  "  than 
the  message  of  the  American  President.  In  any  event, 
the  steps  of  diplomacy,  ordinarily  so  very  sedate,  were 
now  quickened  to  an  unusual,  not  to  say  unprecedented, 
pace.  Indeed,  the  gait  now  struck  in  London  bore, 
so  to  speak,  a  close  resemblance  to  a  run.  Exactly 
five  weeks  later,  on  the  9th  of  January,  1871,  Mr. 
Rose  was  again  in  Washington.  Coming  ostensibly 
on  business  relating  to  the  Dominion  of  Canada, 
he  was  in  reality  at  last  fully  empowered  to  open 
negotiations  looking  to  an  immediate  settlement.  The 
very  evening  of  the  day  he  arrived,  Mr.  Rose  dined 
with  Mr.  Fish.  The  after-dinner  talk  between  the 
two,  lasting  some  five  or  six  hours,  resulted  in  a  con 
fidential  memorandum.1  More  carefully  formulated 
by  Mr.  Rose  the  following  day,  this  paper  reached 
Mr.  Fish  on  the  llth  of  January.  He  expressed  him 
self,  on  acknowledging  its  receipt,  as  inspired  with 
hope. 

Hamilton  Fish  was  no  more  ambitious  than  imagi 
native.  Though  he  held  the  position  of  Secretary 
of  State  during  both  of  the  Grant  administrations, 
he  did  so  with  a  genuine  and  well-understood  reluc 
tance,  and  was  always  contemplating  an  early  retire 
ment.  At  this  juncture,  however,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  his  ambition  was  fired.  That  which  a  year 
before  he  had  pronounced  as,  among  things  possible, 
1  Davis  :  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  59. 


136  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

"  the  greatest  glory  and  the  greatest  happiness  "  of 
his  life,  was  within  his  reach.  He  was  to  be  the 
official  medium  through  which  a  settlement  of  the 
questions  between  "  the  two  English-speaking,  pro 
gressive  liberal "  countries  was  to  be  effected.  That 
was  to  be  his  monument.  To  a  certain  extent,  also, 
conditions  favored  him.  Mr.  Simmer  and  his  Senate 
speech  on  the  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention  were 
the  great  obstacles  in  the  way.  For,  as  Mr.  Fish  had 
himself  expressed  it  a  year  previous,  — "  The  elo 
quence,  and  the  display  of  learning  and  of  research 
in  [that]  speech,  and  —  perhaps  above  all  —  the 
gratification  of  the  laudable  pride  of  a  people  in  being 
told  of  the  magnitude  of  wealth  in  reserve  for  them 
in  the  way  of  damages  due  from  a  wealthy  debtor, 
captivated  some,  and  deluded  more."  Of  this  wide 
spread  popular  feeling,  reinforced  by  the  anti-British 
and  Fenian  sentiment  then  very  prevalent,  account  had 
to  be  taken.  Strangely  enough,  moreover,  Mr.  Sum- 
ner's  lukewarmness  as  respects  any  settlement  at  that 
time,  much  more  his  possible  opposition  to  one  origi 
nating  with  the  State  Department,  indirectly  forwarded 
that  result ;  for,  as  already  seen,  the  President  and  the 
Massachusetts  Senator  were  now  in  open  conflict  over 
the  former's  Dominican  policy.  In  that  struggle  Sec 
retary  Fish  had  most  properly,  if  he  remained  in  office, 
reconciled  himself  to  siding  with  his  official  head.  The 
Motley  imbroglio  had  followed.  With  the  most  friendly 
feeling  towards  Mr.  Motley  personally,  and  sincerely 
desirous  of  avoiding  so  far  as  possible  any  difficulty 
with  Mr.  Sumner,  Mr.  Fish's  expressed  wish  was  to 
continue  Mr.  Motley  in  his  position,  taking  from  him 
all  part  in  the  proposed  negotiation,  and  giving  him 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  137 

explicit  instructions  in  no  way  to  refer  to  it,  or  seek 
to  influence  it.  He  was  practically  to  be  reduced  to  a 
functional  representative.  To  this  the  President  would 
not  assent.  He  insisted  that  Mr.  Motley  represented 
Mr.  Sumner  more  than  he  did  the  Administration, 
and  he  declared  in  a  cabinet  meeting,  at  which  the 
matter  was  discussed,  that  he  would  "  not  allow  Sum 
ner  to  ride  over  "  him.  The  Secretary  continued  to 
plead  and  urge,  but  in  vain.  The  President  was  im 
placable.  It  was  then  suggested  that  Mr.  Sumner 
should  himself  be  nominated  to  succeed  Motley,  and 
General  Butler,  then  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
and  Mr.  Cameron,  Senator  from  Pennsylvania,  called 
on  the  Secretary  to  advocate  this  solution  of  the  diffi 
culty.  They  pronounced  Sumner  unpractical  and  arro 
gant,  and  urged  that  he  should  be  got  out  of  the 
way  by  any  practicable  method.  This  suggestion  also 
was  discussed  at  a  cabinet  meeting,  and  the  President 
expressed  a  willingness  to  make  the  nomination,  011 
condition  that  Sumner  would  resign  from  the  Senate ; 
but  he  also  intimated  a  grim  determination  to  remove 
him  from  his  new  office  as  soon  as  he  had  been  con 
firmed  in  it.  At  last  Mr.  Fish  was  compelled  to 
yield;  and,  under  the  President's  explicit  direction, 
he  wrote  to  Mr.  Motley  a  private  letter,  couched  in 
the  most  friendly  language,  in  which  he  intimated  as 
clearly  as  he  could  that  so  doing  was  most  painful  to 
him,  but  he  must  ask  for  a  resignation.  The  incident 
had  no  historical  significance,  but  was  very  character 
istic  of  Grant.  The  method  of  procedure  was  his,  — 
less  abrupt,  less  marked  by  military  curtness  than  three 
similar  dismissals  from  his  Cabinet ;  but,  owing  to  Mr. 
Motley's  international  position  and  literary  prestige, 


138  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

such  an  unwonted  proceeding  at  the  time  excited  much 
comment,  while  it  has  since  been  exhaustively  dis 
cussed.  Grant  gave  his  own  explanation  of  it,1  and 
diplomatists,2  biographers,3  and  essayists4  have  each 
in  turn  passed  judgment  upon  it.  Under  these  cir 
cumstances,  it  is  sufficient  here  to  say  that  whatever 
was  then  done,  was  done  by  General  Grant's  impera 
tive  order,  and  solely  because  of  Mr.  Motley's  inti 
mate  personal  relations  with  Mr.  Sumner,  and  the 
latter's  opposition  to  the  President's  Dominican  policy. 
The  urgent  and  repeated  remonstrances  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  State  were  of  no  avail.  Utterly  unqualified  for 
political  life,  and  only  partially  adapted  for  diplomacy, 
Mr.  Motley  was  thus  doomed  to  illustrate  the  truth  of 
Hamlet's  remark  as  to  the  danger  incurred  by  him  of 
lesser  weight  who  chances 

"  Between  the  pass  and  fell  incensed  points 
Of  mighty  opposites." 

It  may,  however,  be  pertinent  to  say,  that,  in  view  of  the 
close  personal  relations  existing  between  Mr.  Sumner 
and  Mr.  Motley,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the  latter 
could  have  been  allowed  to  remain  at  London,  the 
supposed  representative  of  the  United  States,  with  the 
Massachusetts  Senator  in  open  opposition  to  the  Ad 
ministration.  Indeed,  bearing  in  mind  the  whole  situa 
tion  as  it  then  existed,  there  seems  reason  to  conclude 
that  the  President,  with  his  instinctive  strategic  sense, 

1  In  the  conversation,  already  referred  to,  with  Young1,  at  Edin 
burgh,  September  11,  1877,  three  months  after  Mr.  Motley's  death; 
reported  in  the  New  York  Herald  of  the  25th  of  the  same  month. 

2  "  Motley's  Appeal  to  History,"  by  John  Jay.    An  Address  before 
the  New  York  Historical  Society  ;  subsequently  printed  in  the  Inter 
national  Review  (1877),  vol.  iv.  pp.  838-854. 

3  Pierce  :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  pp.  446-451. 

4  O.  W.  Holmes  :  Memoir  of  Motley  (1879),  pp.  155-190. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  139 

grasped  the  essential  fact  in  the  case  more  firmly  than 
did  the  Secretary.  The  immediate  control  of  the  exter 
nal  relations  of  the  government,  and  the  shaping  of 
its  foreign  policy,  were  fast  passing  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  executive,  and  into  those  of  a  Senate  committee. 
This  tendency  had  to  be  checked.  The  correspondence 
between  Senator  Sumner  and  Minister  Motley  has 
never  been  published,  and  it  is  questionable  whether 
it  now  exists.  A  few  brief  extracts  from  Sumner's 
letters  to  Motley  are  to  be  found  in  Pierce's  biography 
of  the  former ;  but  Motley's  letters  to  Sumner  were 
looked  upon  by  Mr.  Pierce  as  "  absolutely  confiden 
tial,"  and  of  them  he  made  no  use.  Those  are  not 
now  to  be  found  in  the  files  ;  but  the  few  short  excerpts 
from  the  Sumner  letters,  which  have  been  printed, 
are  very  suggestive.  They  show  conclusively  the 
nature  of  the  intercourse.  It  was  intimately  semi-offi 
cial.  Difficulty  from  this  source  had  from  the  outset 
been  foreseen  ;  for  when,  immediately  after  his  appoint 
ment  to  the  English  mission,  Mr.  Motley  was  in  Bos 
ton,  he  naturally  called  on  Mr.  Adams,  seeking  light 
on  the  course  best  to  be  pursued  in  his  new  position. 
Referring  to  the  interview,  Mr.  Adams  then  wrote, — 
"  His  embarrassment  is  considerable  in  one  particular 
which  never  affected  me,  and  that  is  in  having  two 
masters.  Mr.  Seward  never  permitted  any  interfer 
ence  of  the  Senate,  or  Mr.  Sumner,  with  his  direction 
of  the  policy."  Under  these  circumstances,  when  the 
break  between  Grant  and  Sumner  became  pronounced, 
the  displacement  of  Motley  almost  of  necessity  fol 
lowed.  The  executive  had  to  resume  its  functions  ; 
and,  to  do  so  effectively,  it  must  be  represented  by 
agents  in  whom  it  had  confidence,  and  who  were  not 


140  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

in  the  confidence  of  its  opponents.  It  is  somewhat 
strange  that  Mr.  Motley  should  have  had  no  suspicion 
of  so  obvious  a  fact. 

His  failure  to  suspect  it,  and  follow  the  reluctant 
suggestion  of  the  Secretary,  affronted,  none  the  less, 
the  military  instincts  of  the  President,  whose  anger 
towards  the  Massachusetts  Senator  was  now  at  white 
heat.  It  was  even  publicly  said  that  he  had  de 
clared  to  a  Senator  that,  were  he  not  President,  he 
"would  call  [Mr.  Sumner]  to  account."1  He  had, 
also,  cause  for  wrath ;  not  only  was  there  notoriously 
very  "  free  talk  "  about  the  President  at  Mr.  Sum- 
ner's  table,2  but  those  holding  confidential  relations  at 
the  White  House  —  the  military  household  —  openly 
asserted  that  Mr.  Sumner  had  more  than  intimated 
that  he,  Grant,  was  intoxicated  when,  early  in  Janu 
ary,  1870,  he  had  made  his  memorable  after-dinner 
call  at  his,  the  Senator's,  house.  The  Senator  from 
Massachusetts  could  not  forthwith  be  called  "  to 
account ;  "  the  Minister  to  Great  Britain  could,  in  a 
way.  So,  when  Mr.  Motley  refused  to  resign,  his 
removal  was  ordered.  This  the  Secretary  delayed,  for 
he  expected  then  himself  shortly  to  retire,  and  was 
more  than  willing  to  leave  the  final  act  of  displace 
ment  to  his  successor.  At  the  last  moment  he  was, 
however,  prevailed  upon  to  continue  in  office,  sorely 
against  his  own  wishes  ;  and  what  then,  as  respects 
the  English  mission,  occurred,  is  matter  of  record. 
That  the  patience  of  the  Secretary  had  been  sorely 
tried  during  the  intervening  time,  does  not  admit  of 
question.  To  this  subject,  and  the  probable  cause  of 

1  Suraner:    Works,  vol.  xiv.  p.  256. 

2  Davis :  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  56. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  141 

his  irritation,  I  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  presently. 
Unfortunately,  as  is  apt  to  be  the  case  with  those  of 
Netherlandish  blood,  though  slow  to  wrath,  Mr.  Fish's 
anger,  once  aroused,  was  neither  easily  appeased  nor 
kept  within  conventional  bounds  ;  and  now  it  extended 
beyond  its  immediate  cause.  He  felt  aggrieved  over 
the  course  pursued  by  Mr.  Motley.  In  it  he  saw  no 
regard  for  the  difficulties  of  the  position  in  which 
he  himself  stood  ;  and  he  was  especially  provoked  by 
the  minister's  voluminous  record  of  the  circumstances 
attending  his  displacement,  placed  by  him  on  the  files 
of  the  Department,  and  entitled  "  End  of  Mission." 
Accordingly,  Mr.  Fish's  long-contained  anger  found 
expression  in  the  well-known  letter,  addressed  to  Mr. 
Mo  ran,  secretary  of  the  legation  at  London,  and  then 
acting  as  charge  d'affaires.  This  letter,  in  a  first 
draught,  was  read  by  the  Secretary  to  the  President, 
in  presence  of  Vice-President  Colfax  and  Senator 
Conkling,  before  it  was  despatched ;  and,  while  the 
last-named  gave  to  it  his  approval,  the  President  not 
only  declined  to  allow  certain  alterations  suggested  by 
Mr.  Colfax  to  be  made,  but  expressed  his  wish  that 
not  a  word  in  the  paper  be  changed. 

Immaterial  as  all  this  may  at  first  seem,  it  had  a 
close  and  important  bearing  on  the  negotiations  pre 
liminary  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  now  fairly 
initiated.  In  this  case,  indeed,  one  negotiation  may 
be  said  to  have  hung  upon  the  fate  of  another ;  for, 
though  the  outcome  of  Colonel  Babcock's  diplomacy 
had  not  again  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
Cabinet,  it  was  an  open  secret  that  all  those  composing 
it  were  by  no  means  earnest  in  support  thereof.  The 
White  House  hangers-on  and  tale-bearers  were  also 


142  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

abnormally  busy,  even  for  them.  The  newspapers 
consequently  teemed  with  rumors  ;  the  atmosphere  was 
rife  with  gossip.  General  Grant  was  not  the  man 
long  to  submit  to  this  state  of  things ;  if  nought  else, 
he  was  a  disciplinarian.  So  he  presently  intimated, 
with  much  show  of  feeling,  that  certain  members  of 
his  Cabinet  —  more  particularly  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  the  Attorney-General,  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Interior  —  Messrs.  Boutwell,  Hoar,  and  Cox  - 
were  not  giving  the  support  he  deemed  proper  to  the 
San  Domingo  treaty.  The  first  he  declared  was  op 
posed  to  the  treaty ;  the  second  said  "  nothing  in  its 
favor,  but  sneers  at  it ;  "  the  third  did  not  open  his 
mouth  to  utter  a  word  in  its  support.  A  few  days 
later  he  brought  up  this  cause  of  complaint  in  a  cabi 
net  meeting,  plainly  saying  that  he  wished  all  the 
members  of  his  Cabinet,  and  all  his  friends,  to  use 
every  proper  effort  to  aid  him.  He  went  on  to  state 
that  he  did  not  propose  to  let  those  who  opposed  him 
in  this  matter  "  name  Ministers  to  London,"  etc.,  etc., 
and  he  then  entered  on  a  warm  defence  of  Colonel 
Babcock,  proclaiming  his  belief  in  the  utter  falsity 
of  the  charges  made  against  that  officer.  After  some 
further  discussion,  and  a  general  expression  of  approval 
of  the  plan  of  holding  members  of  the  party  to  the 
support  of  an  administration  policy,  the  matter  was 
allowed  to  drop.  This  was  on  the  14th  of  June.  The 
very  next  day  the  resignation  of  the  Attorney- General 
was  called  for,  in  the  way  and  under  the  circumstances 
his  colleague,  General  Cox,  afterwards  described  in 
the  pages  of  The  Atlantic  Monthly.  Evidently,  the 
President-General  was  disciplining  his  Cabinet.1  A 

1  It  is  proper  to  say  that  the  President  assigned  for  this  proceeding 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  143 

day  or  two  later  he  called  in  the  evening  on  Mr.  Fish 
at  his  house,  and,  in  the  course  of  the  conversation 
which  ensued,  took  occasion  to  express  his  sense  of  the 
support  the  Secretary  had  given  his  favorite  measure, 
and  to  intimate  a  sense  of  obligation  therefor.  He 
probably  felt  this  the  more,  as  he  was  not  unaware 
that  Secretary  Fish  had  taken  the  course  he  did  solely 
from  a  sense  of  loyalty,  and  in  opposition  to  his  own 
better  judgment.  Mr.  Fish  had  finally  brought  him 
self  to  regard  the  treaty  as  a  measure  of  policy 
inaugurated  by  the  head  of  the  Administration  ;  and, 
after  that  policy  was  fairly  entered  upon,  did  what 
he  properly  could  to  forward  it.  This,  also,  not 
withstanding  the  fact  that  the  treaty  had  been  most 
irregularly  negotiated  in  derogation  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  State,  and  that  it  was  in  charge  of  persons 
whose  standing  had  in  no  degree  increased  public 
confidence.1  But,  in  dealing  historically  with  Presi 
dent  Grant,  and  seeking  to  explain  both  the  influ 
ences  which  operated  upon  him  and  his  methods  of 
procedure,  the  fact  must  ever  be  kept  in  mind  that 
he  was  essentially  a  soldier,  and  not  a  civilian.  As  a 
soldier,  he  achieved  all  his  successes,  and  they  were 
great ;  as  a  civilian,  his  life  was  a  conspicuous  failure. 

different  reasons  to  various  people.  The  reason  stated  in  the  text  was 
that  clearly  intimated  to  Secretary  Fish.  Secretary  Boutwell  was 
given  to  understand  that  the  change  was  made  because  divers  Sen 
ators  declared  themselves  as  not  on  speaking1  terms  with  the  Attorney- 
General,  and  refused  to  visit  his  department  while  he  was  at  its  head  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  Secretary  Cox  was  told  that  it  was  thought  desirable 
to  have  one  representative  from  the  South  in  the  Cabinet,  rather  than 
two  from  Massachusetts.  All  these  reasons  may  have  had  weight  in 
the  President's  mind;  and,  in  selection  for  immediate  use,  he  took 
into  more  or  less  careful  consideration  the  individual  with  whom  he 
was  talking. 

1  See  Appendix  E,  infra,  p.  222. 


144  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

In  his  military  capacity,  exacting  obedience,  he  ap 
preciated  loyalty.  As  a  civilian,  he  looked  upon 
the  members  of  his  cabinet  as  upon  a  headquarters 
staff,  and,  while  he  enforced  discipline  by  curt  dis 
missal,  he  rewarded  fidelity  by  return  in  kind.  It  was 
so  now  :  Hoar,  he  abruptly  dismissed  ;  to  Fish,  he  gave 
a  reciprocal  support.  As  the  Secretary  of  State  had 
proved  loyal  to  him  in  the  Dominican  matter,  he,  in 
return,  stood  ready  to  adopt  any  policy  towards  Great 
Britain  the  Secretary  might  see  fit  to  recommend. 
If,  moreover,  such  a  policy  implied  of  necessity  a 
conflict  with  Mr.  Sumner,  it  would,  for  that  very 
reason,  be  only  the  more  acceptable.  The  President 
thus  became  a  tower  of  strength  in  the  proposed  nego 
tiation. 

Still  while,  on  the  whole,  the  conditions  contribut 
ing  to  success  seemed  to  predominate,  the  fate  of  the 
Johnson-Clarendon  Convention  had  to  be  borne  in 
mind.  Mr.  Sumner  was  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  To  defeat  the 
result  of  a  negotiation,  it  was  necessary  to  control  but 
a  third  of  the  Senate ;  and  his  influence  in  that  body 
had  recently  been  emphasized  by  the  rejection  of  the 
Dominican  treaty,  in  favor  of  which  the  President 
had  made  use  of  every  form  of  argument  and  induce 
ment  within  the  power  of  an  executive  to  employ. 
So,  after  the  proposal  of  Sir  John  Rose  had  been  dis 
cussed  by  the  Secretary  with  Senator  Conkling  and 
General  Schenck,  the  newly  designated  minister  to 
England,  it  was  agreed  that  Mr.  Fish  should  seek 
an  interview  with  the  Massachusetts  Senator,  and,  by 
a  great  show  of  consideration,  see  if  he  could  not  be 
induced  to  look  favorably  on  the  scheme. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  145 

What  ensued  was  not  only  historically  interesting, 
but  to  the  last  degree  characteristic  ;  it  was,  moreover, 
altogether  unprecedented.  The  Secretary  of  State 
actually  sounded  the  way  to  an  interview  with  the 
chairman  of  a  Senate  committee  through  another 
member  of  that  committee,  —  a  species  of  "  mutual 
friend,"  -  —  the  interview  in  question  to  take  place, 
not  at  the  Department  of  State,  but  at  the  house  of 
the  autocratic  chairman.1  The  meeting  was  arranged 
accordingly ;  and,  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  of 
January,  six  days  only  after  Sir  John  Rose's  arrival 
in  Washington,  Mr.  Fish,  with  Sir  John's  confidential 
memorandum  in  his  pocket,  stood  at  Mr.  Sumner's 
door.  In  the  meeting  that  ensued  the  business  in 
hand  was  discussed.  At  the  close  of  the  interview, 
Mr.  Sumner  expressed  a  wish  to  take  further  time  in 
which  to  consider  the  matter,  but  promised  an  answer 
shortly.  Thereupon  the  Secretary  took  his  leave.2 

1  Davis  :  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  133. 

2  In  answer  to  a  request  for  any  entry  in  the  diary  of  Mr.  Fish  relat 
ing  to  what  passed  at  this  interview,  I  have  received  the  following 
from  the  family  of  Mr.  Fish,  with  permission  to  use  it :  — 

"1871.  January  15.  Sunday.  Call  upon  Sumner;  introduce  the 
question  and  read  to  him  Rose's  '  Confidential  Memorandum.'  He 
declaims  ;  Boutwell  comes  in  at  this  point,  conversation  continued. 
Sumner  insists  that  it  should  be  understood  in  advance  what  Great 
Britain  is  willing1  to  agree  to,  on  the  several  questions.  Boutwell 
says  he  has  learnt  through  the  Bankers  that  Great  Britain  intends  to 
concede  the  inshore  Fisheries  in  consideration  of  our  yielding  San 
Juan.  I  say  that  cannot  be  conceded ;  the  West  will  be  united 
against  the  cession  of  San  Juan. 

"  I  try  to  obtain  from  Sumner  an  expression  of  opinion  as  to  the  an 
swer  to  be  given  to  Rose  ;  ask  what  will  be  the  candid  judgment  of 
the  world  when  it  is  known  that  Great  Britain  makes  the  overtures 
she  has  made,  if  she  accompany  them  with  a  distinct  understanding  that 
her  liability  for  the  acts  of  the  Alabama  is  to  be  admitted  if  the 
United  States  decline  the  negotiation.  Refer  to  the  danger  of  actual 
collision  on  the  Fishery  grounds,  and  the  serious  complications  that 
would  ensue. 


146  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

Then,  in  due  time,  followed  one  of  the  most  curious 
incidents  in  diplomatic  history,  an  incident  than  which 
few  could  more  strikingly  illustrate  the  changes  which 
in  a  comparatively  short  space  of  time  take  place  in 
public  opinion,  and  the  estimate  in  which  things  are 
held.  Two  days  later,  on  the  17th  of  January,  Sec 
retary  Fish  received  from  Senator  Sumner  a  brief, 
initialed  memorandum,  embodying  this,  to  those  of  the 
present  time,  fairly  astounding  proposition  : l  — 

"  Finally  I  tell  him  that  I  have  come  officially  to  him  as  chairman 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  ask  his  opinion  and 
advice  ;  that  I  am  entitled  to  it,  as  I  must  give  an  answer,  etc. 

"  He  says  that  it  requires  much  reflection,  etc. 

"  I  then  on  leaving  him  request  him  to  consider  the  subject,  and  to 
let  me  know  his  opinion  within  a  day  or  two. 

"  In  the  evening  I  call  upon  Gov.  Morton  at  the  National.  Explain 
the  proposition  to  him,  and  read  him  Rose's  '  Confidential  Memoran 
dum.'  He  thinks  the  Alabama  question  ought  to  be  settled,  and  the 
sooner  the  better  ;  that  it  would  justify  the  President  in  convening 
an  extra  session  of  the  Senate.  Thinks  the  country  would  regard 
the  recognition  by  Great  Britain  of  liability  for  the  Alabama,  and 
reference  of  the  question  of  liability  as  to  the  other  vessels  as  satis 
factory  ;  that  the  public  mind  considers  the  Alabama  as  embrac 
ing  the  whole  class  of  questions  ;  but  he  says  that  beside  the  actual 
losses  by  the  Alabama,  Great  Britain  should  assume  the  expenses  of 
this  Government  in  endeavoring  to  capture  her  ;  that  this  would  be 
regarded  as  '  consequential '  damage,  and  would  satisfy  the  public 
expectation  on  that  point. 

"  I  ask  whether  a  treaty  on  that  basis  could  be  ratified  by  the  Senate 
against  Sumner's  opposition.  He  thinks  it  would.  Says  Casserly  fol 
lows  Sumner,  so  does  Schurz  and  Patterson  ;  on  mentioning  that  Pat 
terson  had  been  consulted  and  approved,  he  replies,  that  '  gives  a 
majority  of  the  committee,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  Senate.'  " 

In  the  Appendix  to  the  American  Case,  submitted  to  the  tribu 
nal  at  Geneva,  the  expenses  incurred  by  the  United  States  govern 
ment  in  its  efforts  to  capture  the  British  built  commerce-destroyers 
was  estimated,  and  reimbursement  on  that  account  was  demanded 
as  a  consequential  injury.  The  expense  incurred  was  estimated  at 
$7,080,478.70.  (Geneva  Arbitration  ;  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  vii. 
p.  120,  table.)  The  claim  was  disallowed. 

1  Moore :  International  Arbitrations,  vol.  i.  p.  525. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  147 

"  First.  —  The  idea  of  Sir  John  Rose  is  that  all 
questions  and  causes  of  irritation  between  England 
and  the  United  States  should  be  removed  absolutely 
and  forever,  that  we  may  be  at  peace  really,  and  good 
neighbors,  and  to  this  end  all  points  of  difference 
should  be  considered  together.  Nothing  could  be 
better  than  this  initial  idea.  It  should  be  the  start 
ing-point. 

"  Second.  —  The  greatest  trouble,  if  not  peril,  be 
ing  a  constant  source  of  anxiety  and  disturbance,  is 
from  Fenianism,  which  is  excited  by  the  British  flag 
in  Canada.  Therefore  the  withdrawal  of  the  British 
flag  cannot  be  abandoned  as  a  condition  or  prelimi 
nary  of  such  a  settlement  as  is  now  proposed.  To 
make  the  settlement  complete,  the  withdrawal  should 
be  from  this  hemisphere,  including  provinces  and  is 
lands." 


Since  his  death,  nearly  thirty  years  ago,  Charles 
Sumner  has  been  made  the  subject  of  one  of  the  most 
elaborate  biographies  in  the  language.  Patient  and 
painstaking  to  the  last  degree,  nothing  seems  to  have 
escaped  the  notice  of  Mr.  Pierce,  and  the  one  conspic 
uous  fault  of  his  work  is  its  extreme  length.  Con 
ceived  on  a  scale  which  assumes  in  the  reader  an 
interest  in  the  subject,  and  an  indifference  to  toil, 
commensurate  with  those  of  the  author,  it  was  carried 
to  completion  in  strict  conformity  with  the  initial  plan. 
The  official  biography  of  Lincoln  by  Messrs.  Nicolay 
and  Hay  is  not  inaptly  called  by  them  "  A  History ;  " 
and  its  ten  substantial  volumes,  averaging  over  450 
pages  each,  defy  perusal.  Life  simply  does  not  suffice 


148  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

for  literature  laid  out  on  such  a  Brobdingnagian  scale  ; 
all  sense  of  proportion  is  absent  from  it.  Yet  the  ten 
volumes  of  the  Lincoln  include  but  a  quarter  part 
more  reading  matter  than  Mr.  Pierce's  four.  On  a 
rough  estimate,  it  is  computed  that  these  fourteen 
volumes  contain  some  two  million  words.  The  most 
remarkable,  and  highly  characteristic,  memorandum 
just  quoted  is  expressed  in  about  220  words ;  and  yet 
for  it  Mr.  Pierce  found  no  space  in  his  four  solid 
volumes.  He  refers  to  it  indeed,  showing  that  he  was 
aware  of  its  existence ;  but  he  does  so  briefly,  and 
somewhat  lightly,  in  his  text,1  though  laboring  painfully 
over  it  in  an  appendix.2  Mr.  Storey,  in  his  smaller 
biography  of  Sumner,  makes  no  reference  at  all  to  it ; 
apparently  it  had  failed  to  attract  his  notice.  And  yet, 
that  memorandum  is  of  much  historical  significance. 
A  species  of  electric  flash,  it  reveals  what  then  was, 
and  long  had  been,  in  Sumner's  mind.  It  makes 
intelligible  what  would  otherwise  remain  well-nigh 
incomprehensible  ;  if,  indeed,  not  altogether  so. 

To  those  of  this  generation,  —  especially  to  us  with 
the  war  in  South  Africa  going  on  before  our  eyes,  — 
it  would  seem  as  if  the  first  perusal  of  that  memoran 
dum  of  January  17  must  have  suggested  to  Mr.  Fish 
grave  doubts  as  to  Mr.  Sumner's  sanity.  It  reads 
like  an  attempt  at  clumsy  ridicule.  The  Secretary  of 
State  had  gone  to  an  influential  Senator  in  a  serious 
spirit,  suggesting  a  business  settlement  of  grave  inter 
national  complications  ;  and  he  was  met  by  a  proposi 
tion  which  at  once  put  negotiation  out  of  the  question. 
What  could  the  man  mean  ?  Apparently,  he  could 

1  Pierce  :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  pp.  480,  481. 

2  Ib.,  pp.  635-638. 


THE  TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  149 

only  mean  that  he  did  not  intend  to  permit  any  ad 
justment  to  be  effected,  if  in  his  power  to  prevent. 
Such  unquestionably  is  the  impression  this  paper  now 
conveys.  Meanwhile,  strange  as  it  seems,  when  re 
ceived  it  could  have  occasioned  Mr.  Fish  no  especial 
wonder ;  except,  perhaps,  in  its  wide  inclusiveness,  it 
suggested  nothing  new,  nothing  altogether  beyond  the 
pale  of  reasonable  expectation,  much  less  of  discus 
sion.  It  brought  no  novel  consideration  into  debate. 
Surprising  now,  this  statement  measures  the  revolu 
tion  in  sentiment  as  respects  dependencies  which  has 
taken  place  during  the  last  thirty  years. 

"  From  1840  to,  say,  1870,  the  almost  universal 
belief  of  thoughtful  Englishmen  was  that  the  colonies 
contributed  nothing  or  little  to  the  strength  of  Eng 
land.  AVe  were  bound,  it  was  thought,  in  honor,  to 
protect  them  ;  the  mother  country  should  see  that  her 
children  were  on  the  road  to  become  fit  for  independ 
ence  ;  the  day  for  separation  would  inevitably  come ; 
the  parting,  when  it  took  place,  should  be  on  friendly 
terms  ;  but  the  separation  would  be  beneficial,  for 
both  parent  and  children.  Even  a  Conservative  min 
ister  spoke,  or  wrote,  it  is  said,  about  our  '  wretched 
colonies.'  To-day  the  whole  tone  of  feeling  is  changed  ; 
her  colonies  are,  it  is  constantly  asserted,  both  the 
glory  and  the  strength  of  Great  Britain.  Not  the 
extremest  Radical  ventures  to  hint  a  separation."  l  To 
similar  effect  another  authority,  an  American,  refer 
ring  to  the  same  period,  says,  —  "  We  find  England 
declining  to  accept  New  Zealand  when  offered  to  her 
by  English  settlers  ;  treating  Australia  as  a  financial 

1  Letter  signed  "  An  Observer,"  dated  Oxford,  August  22,  1901,  in 
New  York  Nation  of  September  12,  1901. 


150  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

burden,  useful  only  as  a  dumping-ground  for  crimi 
nals  ;  discussing  in  Parliament  whether  India  be 
worth  defending;  questioning  the  value  of  Hong- 
Kong,  and  even  refusing  to  be  responsible  for  terri 
tories  in  South  Africa."  1  So  late  even  as  1881,  ten 
years  after  the  negotiation  of  the  Treaty  of  Washing 
ton,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  this  feeling — the 
conviction  of  the  little  worth  of  dependencies  —  in 
spired  the  policy  pursued  towards  the  South  African 
republics  by  the  second  Gladstone  administration, 
after  the  disaster  of  Majuba  Hill. 

In  the  mind  of  Mr.  Sumner,  the  ultimate,  and,  as 
he  in  1870  believed,  not  remote  withdrawal  of  all 
European  flags,  including,  of  course,  the  British,  from 
the  western  hemisphere,  was  a  logical  development  of 
the  Monroe  doctrine.  That  doctrine,  as  originally  set 
forth,  was  merely  a  first  enunciation,  and  in  its  sim 
plest  form,  of  a  principle  which  not  only  admitted  of 
great  development,  but  was  in  the  direct  line  of  what 
is  known  as  Manifest  Destiny.  Secretary  Seward's 
Alaska  acquisition,  bringing  to  an  end  Russian  do 
minion  in  America,  created  a  precedent.  One  Euro 
pean  flag  then  disappeared  from  the  New  World. 
Covering  areas  of  consequence,  those  of  Spain  and 
Great  Britain  only  remained ;  and  more  than  twenty 
years  before,  Richard  Cobden.  had  written  to  Sumner, 
—  "  I  agree  with  you  that  Nature  has  decided  that 
Canada  and  the  United  States  must  become  one  for 
all  purposes  of  inter-communication.  ...  If  the  peo 
ple  of  Canada  are  tolerably  unanimous  in  wishing  to 
sever  the  very  slight  thread  which  now  binds  them 
to  this  country,  I  see  no  reason  why,  if  good  faith  and 

1  Poultney  Bigelow:  The  Children  of  the  Nations,  p.  332. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  151 

ordinary  temper  be  observed,  it  should  not  be  done 
amicably."  Charles  Stunner  did  not  belong  to  the 
Bismarckian  school  of  statesmanship,  —  he  was  no 
welder  in  blood  and  iron  ;  and  these  words  of  Cobden 
furnished  the  key  of  the  situation  as  it  lay  in  his 
essentially  doctrinaire  mind.  He,  accordingly,  looked 
forward  with  confidence  to  the  incorporation  of  the 
British  possessions  into  the  American  Union ;  but,  as 
Mr.  Pierce  truly  enough  says,  he  always  insisted  that 
it  "  should  be  made  by  peaceful  annexation,  by  the 
voluntary  act  of  England,  and  with  the  cordial  assent 
of  the  colonists."  1  Nor,  in  April,  1869,  when  he 
delivered  his  National  Claims  or  Consequential  Dam 
ages  speech  in  the  Senate,  did  this  result  seem  to 
him  remote.  Five  months  later,  still  borne  forward 
on  the  crest  of  a  flooding  tide,  —  little  prescient  of 
the  immediate  future,  —  he  quoted  before  the  Massa 
chusetts  State  Republican  convention  Cobden's  words 
of  prophecy,  and  triumphantly  exclaimed,  —  "  The 
end  is  certain  ;  nor  shall  we  wait  long  for  its  mighty 
fulfilment.  In  the  procession  of  events  it  is  now  at 
hand,  and  he  is  blind  who  does  not  discern  it."  2 

Read  with  this  clue  in  mind,  Mr.  Sumner's  utter 
ances  between  1869  and  1871  —  including  his  speech 
on  the  Johnson-Clarendon  negotiation,  his  address  be 
fore  the  Massachusetts  Republican  convention  in  the 
following  September,  and  his  memorandum  to  Secre 
tary  Fish  of  sixteen  months  later — become  intelligible, 
and  are  consecutive.  The  claims  against  Great  Brit-' 
ain,  mounting  into  the  thousands  of  millions,  were' 
formulated  and  advanced  by  him  as  no  vulgar  pot- 

1  Pierce  :   Sumner,  vol.  iv.  p.  637. 

2  Works,  vol.  xiii.  p.  129.     See,  also,  vol.  xii.  p.  173. 


152  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

house  score,  to  be  itemized,  and  added  up  in  the  form 
of  a  bill,  and  so  presented  for  payment.  On  the  con 
trary,  they  were  merely  one  item  in  the  statement  of 
a  "  massive  grievance,"  become  matter  of  gravest  in 
ternational  debate.  The  settlement  was  to  be  com 
mensurate.  Comprehensive,  grandiose  even,  it  was  to 
include  a  hemispheric  flag-withdrawal,  as  well  as  a 
revision  of  the  rules  of  international  law.  The  ad 
justment  of  mere  money  claims  was  a  matter  of  alto 
gether  minor  consideration  ;  indeed,  such  might  well 
in  the  end  become  makeweights,  —  mere  pawns  in  the 
mighty  game. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  unexpected  was  sure 
to  occur  in  the  practical  unfolding  of  this  picturesque 
programme.  Indeed,  a  very  forcible  suggestion  of  the 
practical  danger  involved  in  it,  just  so  long  as  the 
average  man  is  what  he  is,  was  brought  home  to  the 
Senator  from  Massachusetts  when  he  resumed  his  seat 
in  executive  session  after  completing  his  speech  on  the 
Johnson-Clarendon  Convention,  —  the  carefully  pre 
pared  opening  of  the  great  world  debate.  Mr.  Zacha- 
riah  Chandler  of  Michigan  subsequently  took  the 
floor.  He  was  a  Senator  much  more  closely  than  Mr. 
Sumner  representative  of  the  average  American  public 
man.  And  Mr.  Chandler  proceeded  unconsciously  to 
furnish  an  illustration  of  the  practical  outcome  of 
Mr.  Stunner's  scheme  as  he,  the  average  American, 
understood  it.  He  entirely  concurred  in  Mr.  Simmer's 
presentation  of  national  injuries,  consequential  dam 
ages,  and  a  sense  of  "  massive  grievance."  "  If  Great 
Britain,"  he  then  went  on  to  say,  "  should  meet  us  in 
a  friendly  spirit,  acknowledge  her  wrong,  and  cede  all 
her  interests  in  the  Canadas  in  settlement  of  these 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  153 

claims,  we  will  have  perpetuate  peace  with  her  ;  but,  if 
she  does  not,  we  must  conquer  peace.  We  cannot 
afford  to  have  an  enemy's  base  so  near  us.  Tt  is  a 
national  necessity  that  we  should  have  the  British 
possessions.  He  hoped  such  a  negotiation  would  be 
opened,  and  that  it  would  be  a  peaceful  one ;  but,  if 
it  should  not  be,  and  England  insists  on  war,  then 
let  the  war  be  '  short,  sharp,  and  decisive.'  "  1  The 

1  See  report  of  debate  in  New  York  Tribune,  April  21, 1869.  There 
is  reason  to  believe  that,  in  this  utterance,  Mr.  Chandler  more  nearly 
reflected  the  original  views  of  General  Grant  than  did  Mr.  Sumner,  or, 
subsequently,  Mr.  Fish.  Always  military,  Grant,  as  President,  looked 
upon  the  accession  of  the  British  Dominion  to  the  American  Union  as 
both  inevitable  and  highly  desirable  for  all  concerned.  He  was  what 
is  now  known  as  a  thorough  expansionist.  Hence,  when  the  Civil 
War  closed,  he  was  in  favor  of  an  immediate  invasion  of  Mexico. 
(Around  the  World  with  General  Grant,  vol.  ii.  p.  163.)  As  President, 
he  later  proceeded  to  annex  islands  in  the  West  Indies  in  the  wholly 
unceremonious  fashion  already  described  in  this  paper.  He  had  fully 
considered  a  Canadian  campaign,  and  was  of  opinion  that  "  if  Sheri 
dan,  for  instance,  with  our  resources,  could  not  have  taken  Canada  in 
thirty  days,  he  should  have  been  cashiered."  (Ib.,  p.  167.)  Mr.  Sum 
ner  never  contemplated  forcible  annexation  as  the  result  of  a  war 
with  Great  Britain  growing  out  of  his  theory  of  national  injuries.  He 
did  look  to  a  voluntary  and  peaceable  consolidation  of  adjacent  Eng 
lish-speaking  territories  and  their  inhabitants.  Grant  also  looked  for 
such  a  consolidation,  but  was  quite  ready  to  have  it  come  about  as  the 
result  of  a  campaign,  and  incidental  beneficent  compulsion.  Again, 
Secretary  Fish  stood  between  the  two.  Mr.  Sumner's  policy  was,  under 
the  circumstances,  fraught  with  immediate  danger.  He  was  for  keep 
ing  the  questions  at  issue  open,  a  cause  of  possible  rupture  at  any 
moment ;  and  for  that  rupture  Grant  always  stood  ready.  This  the 
English  Minister  (Sir  Edward  Thornton)  perfectly  understood.  Hence 
his  eagerness  to  effect  a  settlement.  Grant,  meanwhile,  was  indiffer 
ent,  and  Sumner,  unconsciously,  was  playing  into  his  hands.  Finally, 
as  the  result  of  a  quarrel  with  Sumner,  Grant  gave  Fish  a  free  hand. 
He  might  effect  a  settlement  if  he  could  ;  but  if,  for  any  reason,  he 
failed  in  so  doing,  recourse  would  be  had  to  the  other  plan  of  pro- 
cediire.  The  Secretary  might  then  stand  aside,  and  the  Commander- 
in-chief  would  settle  the  question  of  claims  against  Great  Britain, 
individual  and  national,  through  a  process  never  contemplated  by  the 


154  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

report  of  these  utterances  was  at  once  transmitted  by 
the  British  Minister  to  his  government ;  and,  taken  in 
connection  with  Mr.  Simmer's  arraignment,  and  his 
presentation  of  consequential  damages,  furnished  those 
composing  that  government,  as  well  as  Professor  Gold- 
win  Smith,  with  much  food  for  thought.1 

The  policy  proper  to  be  pursued  in  the  years  fol 
lowing  1869  rapidly  assumed  shape  in  Mr.  Simmer's 
mind.  He  worked  it  out  in  every  detail.  As,  shortly 
after,  he  wrote  to  his  friend,  Dr.  S.  G.  Howe,  —  "  I 
look  to  annexation  at  the  North.  I  wish  to  have  that 
whole  zone  from  Newfoundland  to  Vancouver."  It 
was  with  this  result  distinctly  present  to  him,  and  as 
a  first  step  thereto,  that  he  secured  the  English  mis 
sion  for  Mr.  Motley.  Through  Motley  he  thought  to 
work.  He,  chairman  of  the  United  States  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  was  to  mould  and 
shape  the  future  of  a  hemisphere,  —  President,  Secre- 

Massachusetts  Senator.  It  is  not  suggested  that  evidence  in  support 
of  this  statement  can  be  adduced  ;  or  even  exists.  That,  however, 
Grant's  extreme  personal  dislike  for  Mr.  Sumner,  and  his  sense  of 
obligation  to  Mr.  Fish,  greatly  influenced  his  action  on  the  question 
of  a  settlement  with  Great  Britain,  admits  of  no  doubt.  It  gave  Mr. 
Fish  the  opportunity,  of  which  he  availed  himself.  The  alternative 
Grant  always  had  in  mind  in  the  event  of  his  Secretary's  failure,  or 
British  recalcitrancy,  is  alone  open  to  question. 

1  It  was  unquestionably  to  this  utterance  of  Senator  Chandler's, 
and  to  counteract  its  effect,  that  Mr.  Sumner  used  the  following  lan 
guage,  in  his  speech  of  five  months  later,  just  referred  to:  — "  Some 
times  there  are  whispers  of  territorial  compensation,  and  Canada  is 
named  as  the  consideration.  But  he  knows  England  little,  and  little 
also  of  that  great  English  liberty  from  Magna  Charta  to  the  Somerset 
case,  who  supposes  that  this  nation  could  undertake  any  such  transfer. 
And  he  knows  our  country  little,  and  little  also  of  that  great  liberty 
that  is  ours,  who  supposes  that  we  could  receive  such  a  transfer.  On 
each  side  there  is  impossibility.  Territory  may  be  conveyed,  but  not 
a  people.  I  allude  to  this  suggestion  only  because,  appearing  in  the 
public  press,  it  has  been  answered  from  England." 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  155 

tary  of  State,  and  Her  Majesty's  Ministers  being  as 
clay  in  his  potter  hands,  with  Motley  for  the  deftly 
turning  wheel.  Concerning  this  project  he  seems  dur 
ing  the  summer  of  1869  to  have  been  in  almost  daily 
correspondence  with  his  friend  near  the  Court  of  St. 
James,  and  in  frequent  conference  with  Secretary 
Fish  at  Washington.  On  June  11  he  wrote  to  the 
former  that  the  Secretary  had,  two  days  before,  sounded 
the  British  Minister  on  the  subject  of  Canada,  the 
American  claims  on  Great  Britain  beino-  too  lar°'e  to 

o  o 

admit  of  a  money  settlement.  Sir  Edward  Thornton, 
he  went  on,  had  replied  that  England  "  did  not  wish  to 
keep  Canada,  but  could  not  part  with  it  without  the 
consent  of  the  population."  The  Secretary  next  wanted 
Mr.  Sumner  to  state  the  amount  of  claims ;  to  which 
he  had  replied  that  he  did  not  regard  it  as  the  proper 
time  for  so  doing.  This  letter,  it  so  chanced,  was 
dated  the  very  day  after  Mr.  Motley's  first  unfortunate 
interview  with  the  British  Foreign  Secretary;  and 
that  diplomatic  jeremiad  might  not  inaptly  have  con 
cluded  with  a  premonitory  hint  of  what  his  mentor 
and  guide  was  on  the  morrow  to  write,  —  a  hint  of 
the  nature  suggested  by  Mr.  Schurz  in  a  letter  to 
Secretary  Fish,1  written  at  this  very  time.  Then,  only 
four  days  later,  —  on  the  15th  of  June,  —  Mr.  Sum 
ner  again  advises  his  correspondent  of  a  dinner-table 
talk  with  men  in  high  official  circles,  and  significantly 
adds, —  "  All  feel  that  your  position  is  as  historic  as  any 
described  by  your  pen.  England  must  listen,  and  at 
last  yield.  I  do  not  despair  seeing  the  debate  end  — 
(1)  In  the  withdrawal  of  England  from  this  hemi 
sphere  ;  (2)  In  remodelling  maritime  international  law. 
1  Infra,  Appendix  C,  p.  209. 


156  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

Such  a  consummation  would  place  our  republic  at  the 
head  of  the  civilized  world."  Here  was  110  whisper 
of  mere  money  claims ;  and,  five  days  after,  he  writes 
in  the  same  spirit,  referring  apparently  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  State,  —  "  With  more  experience  at  Wash 
ington,  our  front  would  have  been  more  perfect."  1 
The  "  debate  "  referred  to  was,  of  course,  that  "  inter 
national  debate,  the  greatest  of  our  history,  and,  before 
it  is  finished,  in  all  probability  the  greatest  of  all 
history."  Thus,  in  June,  1869,  the  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  was  sending 
what  were  in  effect  unofficial  instructions  to  a  facile 
national  representative,  couched,  be  it  noticed,  in  the 
very  words  used  by  the  writer  eighteen  months  later 
in  the  memorandum  just  quoted. 

In  one  of  these  letters,  it  will  be  observed,  Mr.  Sum- 
ner  told  Motley  that  Secretary  Fish  had  that  day 
sounded  the  British  Minister  as  to  a  possible  cession 
of  Canada  in  liquidation  of  our  national  claims,  and 
appeasement  of  our  sense  of  "  massive  grievance."  2 
The  statement  was  correct ;  and  not  only  at  this  junc 
ture,  but  repeatedly,  was  a  comprehensive  settlement  on 
such  a  basis  urged  on  the  British  government.  Both 
President  and  Secretary  were  thus  of  one  mind  with 
Mr.  Sumner.  In  November,  1869,  for  instance,  four 
months  after  Sir  John  Rose's  first  visit  to  Washington, 
and  at  the  very  time  he  was  writing  to  Mr.  Fish  about 
Mr.  Motley's  attitude  in  London,  an  entire  cabinet 
meeting  was  occupied  in  a  discussion  of  the  Alabama 
claims.  The  President  then  suggested  the  possibility 
of  Great  Britain  quitting  Canada ;  and  he  intimated 

1  Pierce  :   Sumner,  vol.  iv.  pp.  409-412. 

2  16.,  vol.  iv.  p.  409. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  157 

his  belief  that,  in  such  case,  we  ought  to  be  satisfied 
with  the  payment  'for  the  losses  actually  sustained 
through  the  Confederate  commerce-destroyers,  com 
bined  with  a  settlement  satisfactory  to  us  of  the  prin 
ciples  of  maritime  neutrality  law.  A  few  days  later 
he  expressed  his  unwillingness  at  that  time  to  adjust 
the  claims  ;  he  wished  them  kept  open  until  Great  Brit 
ain  was  ready  to  give  up  Canada.  When  certain 
members  of  the  Cabinet  thereupon  assured  him  that 
Great  Britain  looked  upon  Canada  as  a  source  of  weak 
ness,  quoting  Lord  Carlisle  and  Sir  Edward  Thornton, 
the  President  at  once  replied,  —  "  If  that  be  so,  I 
would  be  willing  to  settle  at  once."  During  the  fol 
lowing  weeks,  —  December,  1869,  and  January,  1870, 

—  the  subject  was  frequently  discussed  between  Secre 
tary  Fish   and    Sir   Edward  Thornton.     The   former 
urged   on  the  latter  the  entire  withdrawal  of  Great 
Britain  from  Canada,  and  an  immediate  settlement  of 
all  claims  on  that  basis.     To  this  Sir  Edward  replied, 

—  "  Oh,  you  know  that  we  cannot  do.    The  Canadians 
find  fault  with  me  for  saying  so  openly  as  I  do  that 
we  are  ready  to  let  them  go  whenever  they  shall  wish ; 
but  they  do  not  desire  it."     In  its  issue  of  December 
18,  1869,  while  these  conversations,  taking  place  in 
Washington,  were  duly  reported  in  Downing  Street, 
the  Times,  probably  inspired,  expressed  itself  as  fol 
lows  :  —  "  Suppose   the   colonists   met  together,  and, 
after  deliberating,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  they 
were  a  very  long  way  off:  from  the  United  Kingdom, .  .  . 
and  that  every  natural  motive  of  contiguity,  similar 
ity  of  interests,  and  facility  of  administration  induced 
them  to  think  it  more  convenient  to  slip  into  the  Union 
than  into  the  Dominion.     Should  we  oppose  their  de- 


158  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

termination  ?  We  all  know  we  should  not  attempt 
to  withstand  it,  if  it  were  clearly  and  intelligibly  pro 
nounced.  .  .  .  Instead  of  the  Colonies  being  the  de 
pendencies  of  the  Mother  Country,  the  Mother  Country 
has  become  the  Dependency  of  the  Colonies.  We  are 
tied,  while  they,  are  loose.  We  are  subject  to  danger, 
while  they  are  free."  And  a  few  months  later,  when 
the  Dominion  undertook  to  find  fault  with  some  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  the  same 
organ  of  English  opinion  thus  frankly  delivered  itself : 
—  "  From  this  day  forth  look  after  your  own  business 
yourself ;  you  are  big  enough,  you  are  strong  enough, 
you  are  intelligent  enough,  and,  if  there  were  any  de 
ficiency  in  any  of  these  points,  it  would  be  supplied  by 
the  education  of  self-reliance.  We  are  both  now  in  a 
false  position,  and  the  time  has  arrived  when  we  should 
be  relieved  from  it.  Take  up  your  freedom ;  your  days 
of  apprenticeship  are  over."  In  view  of  such  utter 
ances  as  these  from  the  leading  organs  of  the  mother 
country,  Mr.  Sumner  certainly  had  grounds  for  as 
suming  that  a  not  unwilling  hemispheric  flag-with 
drawal  by  Great  Britain  was  more  than  probable  in  the 
early  future. 

Returning  to  what  took  place  in  Washington  in 
March,  1870,  on  the  eve  of  the  Franco-Prussian  war, 
Secretary  Fish  had  another  long  conversation  with  Sir 
Edward  Thornton,  which  showed  forcibly  how  conscious 
those  composing  the  English  Ministry  were  of  the 
falseness  of  Great  Britain's  position,  and  of  the  immi 
nence  of  danger.  The  Secretary  again  urged  on  the 
Minister  that  her  American  provinces  were  to  Great 
Britain  a  menace  of  danger ;  and  that  a  cause  of  irri 
tation,  and  of  possible  complication,  would,  especially 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  159 

in  those  times  of  Fenianism,  be  removed,  should  they 
be  made  independent.  To  this  Mr.  Thornton  replied, 
—  "  It  is  impossible  for  Great  Britain  to  inaugurate 
a  separation.  They  are  willing,  and  even  desirous,  to 
have  one.  Europe  may  at  any  moment  be  convulsed  ; 
and,  if  England  became  involved,  it  would  be  impossi 
ble  to  prevent  retaliation,  and  the  ocean  would  swarm 
with  Alabamas.  England  would  then  be  compelled 
to  declare  war."  The  Secretary  consoled  him  by  agree 
ing  that  commerce-destroyers  would  then  be  fitted  out 
in  spite  of  all  the  government  might,  or  could,  attempt 
to  prevent  them. 

Up  to  this  point  the  chairman  of  the  Senate  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations,  the  President,  the  Sec 
retary  of  State,  and  the  members  of  the  Cabinet 
generally  had  gone  on  in  happy  concurrence.  They 
had  the  same  end  in  view.  But  now  the  cleavage 
between  President  and  Senator  rapidly  widened.  A 
week  only  after  the  conversation  with  Sir  Edward 
Thornton  last  referred  to,  General  Grant  cautioned 
Mr.  Fish  against  communicating  to  Mr.  Sumner  any 
confidential  or  important  information  received  at  the 
State  Department.  Later,  he  became  persuaded  that 
the  Massachusetts  Senator  was  constitutionally  un 
truthful;  but,  as  yet,  he  considered  him  only  unfair  and 
inaccurate.  The  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  ceased,  however,  to  be  thereafter 
a  direct  factor  in  the  negotiation  with  Great  Britain. 

Thus  far,  in  pursuance  of  the  policy  dimly  outlined 
in  the  executive  session  debate  on  the  Johnson-Clar 
endon  Convention,  the  two  questions  of  a  settlement 
of  claims  and  Canadian  independence  had  been  kept 
closely  associated.  They  were  now  to  be  separated. 


160  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

Yet  the  change  was  gradual ;  for  Mr.  Simmer's  policy 
had  a  strong  hold  011  the  minds  of  both  President  and 
Secretary.1  Even  as  late  as  September,  1870,  only 
five  months  before  the  Treaty  of  Washington  was 
negotiated,  Secretary  Fish  and  Sir  Edward  Thornton 
had  another  conversation  on  the  subject  of  Canadian 
independence.  It  originated  in  one  of  the  endless 
squabbles  over  the  Fisheries.  The  Secretary  intimated 
his  belief  that  the  solution  of  that  question  would 
be  found  in  a  separation  of  the  Dominion  from  the 
mother  country.  Thereupon  Mr.  Thornton  repeated 
what  he  had,  he  declared,  often  said  before,  —  that 
Great  Britain  was  willing,  and  even  anxious,  to  have 
the  colonies  become  independent ;  but  could  do  no 
thing  to  force  independence  on  them.  He  then  added, 
—  "  It  is  impossible  to  connect  the  question  of  Ca 
nadian  independence  with  the  Alabama  claims  ;  not 
even  to  the  extent  of  providing  for  the  reference  of 
the  question  of  independence  to  a  popular  vote  of  the 
people  of  the  Dominion.  Independence,"  he  added, 
"means  annexation.  They  are  one  and  the  same 
thing."  This  conversation,  it  will  be  observed,  took 

1  In  his  first  annual  message  to  Congress,  December  6,  I860  (Mes 
sages  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  vii.  p.  32),  General  Grant  thus  expressed 
himself,  —  the  Secretary  of  State  undoubtedly  having  draughted  the 
paragraph:  —  "The  United  States  have  no  disposition  to  interfere 
with  the  existing  relations  of  Spain  to  her  colonial  possessions  on  this 
continent.  They  believe  that  in  due  time  Spain  and  other  European 
powers  will  find  their  interest  in  terminating  those  relations,  and  estab 
lishing  their  present  dependencies  as  independent  powers  —  members 
of  the  family  of  nations."  Seven  months  later  (July  14,  1870),  the 
President  transmitted  to  the  Senate,  in  reply  to  a  resolution,  a  report 
from  the  Secretary  of  State,  in  which  was  the  following  :  — "  This 
policy  .  .  .  looks  hopefully  to  the  time  when,  by  the  voluntary  de 
parture  of  European  governments  from  this  continent  and  the  adjacent 
inlands,  America  shall  be  wholly  American."  (Ib.,  p.  74.) 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  161 

place  on  the  very  day  the  investment  of  Paris  by  the 
victorious  German  army  was  pronounced  complete. 
In  the  existing  European  situation  everything  was 
possible,  anything  might  be  anticipated. 

Though  his  resignation  had  been  requested,  Mr. 
Motley  still  remained  in  London.  His  early  removal 
was  contemplated  by  the  President,  and  the  question 
of  who  should  replace  him  was  under  consideration. 
The  appointment  was  offered  to  O.  P.  Morton,  then  a 
Senator  from  Indiana.  Wholly  the  President's,  the 
selection  was  the  reverse  of  happy.  Governor  Mor 
ton  was  inclined  to  accept;  but  he  desired  first  to 
know  whether  he  would,  as  Minister,  have  the  Ala 
bama  claims  settlement  intrusted  to  him.  The  Presi 
dent  then  talked  the  matter  over  with  Secretary  Fish, 
and  what  he  said  showed  clearly  the  hold  which  Sum- 
ner's  views  had  on  him.  He  proposed  that  the  new 
Minister  should  attempt  a  negotiation  based  on  the 
following  concessions  by  Great  Britain  :  (1)  the  pay 
ment  of  actual  losses  incurred  through  the  depre 
dations  of  British  Confederate  commerce-destroyers  : 

(2)  a  satisfactory  revision  of  the  principles  of  inter 
national  law  as   between  the   two   governments ;  and 

(3)  the  submission  to  the  voters  of  the  Dominion  of 
the  question  of  independence.     In  commenting  imme 
diately    afterwards    on    this    conversation,    Mr.    Fish 
wrote,  —  "  The  President  evidently  expects  these  Pro 
vinces  to  be  annexed  to  the  United  States  during  his 
administration.     I  hope    that   it    may  be    so.     That 
such  is  their  eventual  destiny,  I  do  not  doubt ;  but 
whether  so  soon  as  the  President  expects  may  be  a 
question."     Owing  to  the  result  of  an  election  in  In 
diana  held  shortly  after,  it  was   deemed  inexpedient 


162  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

for  Governor  Morton  to  vacate  his  seat  in  the  Senate. 
He  consequently  declined  further  to  consider  a  dip 
lomatic  position.  Though  in  no  way  germane  to  the 
subject  of  this  paper,  it  is  interesting  to  know  that 
it  was  to  fill  the  vacancy  thus  existing  that  General 
Butler  shortly  after  brought  forward  the  name  of 
Wendell  Phillips.  The  President,  Mr.  Fish  noted, 
"  very  evidently  will  not  consider  him  within  the 
range  of  possibilities  of  appointment." 

The  pressure  for  some  settlement  now  brought  to 
bear  on  the  British  government  was  day  by  day  be 
coming  greater.  About  the  middle  of  November  the 
Russian  Minister  took  occasion  to  suggest  to  Secre 
tary  Fish,  in  a  neighborly  sort  of  way,  that  the 
present  time  —  that  of  the  Franco-Prussian  war  — 
was  most  opportune  to  press  on  Great  Britain  an 
immediate  settlement  of  the  Alabama  claims.  Two 
weeks  later  the  message  of  the  President  was  sent 
to  Congress,  with  the  significant  paragraph  already 
quoted.  In  his  next  talk  with  Sir  Edward  Thorn 
ton,  Secretary  Fish  alluded  to  the  suggestion  made 
to  him  by  the  Russian  Minister,  and  Sir  Edward, 
in  return,  frankly  asked  him  what  the  United  States 
wanted.  And  now  at  last  the  negotiation  took  a  new 
and  final  turn.  The  Secretary,  dropping  Canada 
from  the  discussion,  asked  merely  an  expression  of 
regret  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  an  acceptable  de 
claration  of  principles  of  international  law,  and  pay 
ment  of  claims.  This  conversation  took  place  on  the 
20th  of  November  ;  nineteen  days  later,  on  the  9th  of 
December,  at  a  cabinet  meeting  held  that  day,  Sec 
retary  Fish  read  in  confidence  a  private  letter  to  him 
from  Sir  John  Rose,  "  intimating  that  the  British 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON          1G3 

cabinet  is  disposed  to  enter  on  negotiations."  It 
would  tlms  appear  that  the  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a 
renewed  negotiation  had  been  the  purpose  of  the 
United  States  to  combine  in  some  way  a  settlement  of 
money  claims,  private  and  national,  with  a  movement 
looking  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  flag,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  from  the  North  American  continent.  The 
moment  this  suggestion  was  withheld,  the  British  cabi 
net  lost  no  time  in  signifying  its  readiness  to  negoti 
ate.  None  the  less,  the  whole  scheme  of  Mr.  Sunnier, 
underlying  his  famous  speech  of  April  13,  1869,  and 
the  appointment  of  Mr.  Motley  to  the  English  mis 
sion,  was  thereby  and  thenceforth  definitely  aban 
doned.  In  his  memorandum,  therefore,  the  chairman  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Kelations  demanded 
nothing  altogether  new  ;  he  merely,  stating  the  case 
in  its  widest  form,  insisted  upon  adherence  to  a  famil 
iar  policy  long  before  formulated.  None  the  less,  there 
is  a  wide  difference  between  the  concession  of  its 
independence  to  a  particular  dependency,  no  matter 
how  considerable,  and  the  somewhat  scenic,  and  obvi 
ously  compulsory,  withdrawal  of  a  nation's  flag  from 
half  the  globe.  In  Mr.  Sumner's  imagination,  the 
British  drum-beat  was  no  more  to  follow  the  rising 
sun. 


VI 

The  narrative  now  returns  to  the  point  when  Mr. 
Sumner's  memorandum  of  January  17  reached  the 
Secretary  of  State.  Mr.  Davis  says,  "  I  well  remem 
ber  Mr.  Fish's  astonishment  when  he  received  this 
document.  At  first  he  almost  thought  any  attempt 


164  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

at  negotiation  would  prove  futile." l  Probably  the 
word  "  dismay  "  would  describe  more  accurately  than 
"  astonishment "  Mr.  Fish's  state  of  mind  at  this 
juncture.  Undoubtedly,  he  had,  time  and  time  again, 
discussed  with  Mr.  Sumner  the  whole  question  of 
European  withdrawal  from  America,  altogether  or  in 
part,  whether  from  Canada  alone  or  from  the  hemi 
sphere.  He  had  referred  to  it  publicly  in  the  pas 
sages  already  quoted  from  the  President's  messages. 
The  proposition,  therefore,  can  have  excited  no  u  as 
tonishment  "  in  him.  It  might  well,  however,  have 
caused  a  feeling  of  dismay,  for  it  threatened  to  bring 
to  an  abrupt  close  the  incipient  negotiation  he  so 
much  had  at  heart.  It  was  phrased  also  as  an  ulti 
matum.  Closing  the  door  to  discussion,  it  precipitated 
into  the  immediate  present  the  academic  problem  of  a 
possibly  remote  future.  After  full  talk,  and  subse 
quent  mature  reflection,  the  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  gave  it  as  his  judgment  that  the  demand, 
known  to  be  at  that  time  impossible  of  concession,  ' 
"  cannot  be  abandoned  as  a  condition  or  preliminary." 
Language  could  scarcely  be  stronger.  The  Secre 
tary  had  cause  for  discouragement.  His  failure  had 
been  complete.  But,  whatever  may  have  been  the 
sensations  of  the  Secretary  when  gasping  under  the 
first  effects  of  this  icy  douche,  those  of  the  Presi 
dent  must  also  be  taken  into  account.  He  was  es 
sentially  the  man  for  that  situation.  He  was  in  his 
element.  What  followed  bore  unmistakably  the  im 
press  of  his  handiwork  ;  for,  to  the  military  eye,  one 
thing  must  at  once  have  been  apparent.  The  situ 
ation  was  simplified  ;  his  opponent  had  put  himself 

1  Davis  :  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  137. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  165 

in  his  power.  Instinctively,  he  grasped  the  oppor 
tunity.  The  natural,  indeed  the  only  inference  to  be 
drawn  from  the  memorandum,  was  that  the  chairman 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  in 
tended  to  put  an  immediate  stop  to  the  proposed 
negotiation,  if  in  his  power  so  to  do.  The  considera 
tions  influencing  him  were  obvious.  The  course  of 
procedure  now  suggested  was  wholly  at  variance  with 
the  policy  outlined  by  him.  In  June,  1869,  he  had 
written  to  Mr.  Motley,  —  "I  should  make  no  ' claim ' 
or  '  demand '  for  the  present  ; "  and  to  Caleb  Gushing 
a  month  later,  —  "Our  case,  in  length  and  breadth, 
with  all  details,  should  be  stated  to  England  without 
any  demand  of  any  kind.''  And  now,  in  January, 
1871,  he  did  not  regard  the  conditions  of  a  success 
ful  and  satisfactory  settlement  with  Great  Britain,  on 
the  basis  he  had  in  view,  as  being  any  more  propi 
tious  than  in  June,  1869.  Eighteen  months  only 
had  elapsed.  The  fruit  was  not  yet  ripe;  —  then  why 
shake  the  tree  ?  That  "  international  debate,  the 
greatest  of  our  history,  and  before  it  is  finished,  in  all 
probability  the  greatest  of  all  history,"  seemed  draw 
ing  to  a  lame  and  impotent,  because  premature,  con 
clusion.  His  memorandum  was,  therefore,  an  attempt 
at  a  checkmate.  By  formulating  demands  which  he 
knew  would  not  be  entertained,  he  hoped  at  once 
to  end  the  proposed  negotiation.  The  country  would 
then  await  some  more  convenient  occasion,  when, 
Great  Britain  being  entirely  willing,  a  mild  com 
pulsion  in  favor  of  independence  could  be  brought 
to  bear  upon  her  American  dependencies.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  issue  presented  in  this  memorandum 
was  clear  and  not  to  be  evaded,  —  Was  the  Executive 


166  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

to  shape  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  ; 
or  was  it  to  receive  its  inspiration  from  the  room  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Kelations?  Either 
that  committee  must  be  brought  into  line  with  the 
State  Department,  or  the  Secretary  of  State  should 
accept  his  position  as  a  chairman's  clerk. 

A  delicate  question  between  the  executive  and  legis 
lative  departments  of  the  government  —  a  question  as 
old  as  the  Constitution  —  was  thus  involved.  What 
constituted  an  attempt  at  improper  interference  by 
one  department  with  the  functions  and  organization 
of  the  other  ?  It  is  obvious  that,  in  a  representative 
government  under  the  party  system,  where  both  the 
legislative  and  the  executive  departments  are  con 
trolled  by  the  same  party  organization,  the  legislative 
committees  should  be  so  organized  as  to  act  in  rea 
sonable  accord  with  the  responsible  executive.  It  is 
a  purely  practical  question.  The  executive  cannot,  of 
course,  directly  interfere  in  the  organization  of  the 
legislative  body  ;  but  it  has  a  perfect  right  to  demand 
of  its  friends  and  supporters  in  the  legislative  bodies 
that  those  having  charge  through  committees  of  the 
business  of  those  bodies  should  be  in  virtual  harmony 
with  the  Administration.  Certainly,  they  should  not 
be  in  avowed  hostility  to  it.  As  Grant  himself 
later  said,1  it  was  indeed  a  singular  spectacle  "  to  find 
a  Senate  with  the  large  majority  of  its  members  in 
sympathy  with  the  Administration,  and  with  its  chair 
man  of  the  Foreign  Committee  in  direct  opposition  to 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  Administration,  in  theory  and 
detail."  There  was  force  in  this  statement,  and  the 
President  was  fully  justified  in  asking  of  his  party  a 
1  At  Edinburgh,  New  York  Herald,  September  25,  1877. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          167 

release  from  a  position  of  such  obvious  embarrassment. 
Indeed,  under  any  proper  construction  of  functions, 
those  thus  rinding  themselves  in  virtual  opposition 
might  well  decline  committee  appointments  necessarily 
placing  them  in  a  position  where  they  feel  under  com 
pulsion  to  thwart  and  hamper  the  measures  of  the  party 
of  which  they  nominally  are  members.  Such  should,  in 
parliamentary  parlance,  take  their  places  below  the 
gangway.  In  the  winter  of  1870-71  Mr.  Sumner  was 
in  that  position.  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations,  on  cardinal  features  of  foreign 
policy  he  was  notoriously  in  proclaimed  opposition. 
Such  being  the  case,  it  is  at  least  an  open  question 
whether,  in  view  of  the  executive  functions  of  the  Sen 
ate,  he  should  not  have  voluntarily  declined  longer  to 
serve  as  chairman  of  that  particular  committee.  His 
serving  was  clearly  an  obstruction  to  the  Administra 
tion,  and  its  friends  constituted  a  large  majority  of 
the  Senate  ;  it  would,  moreover,  be  perfectly  possi 
ble  for  him  to  exert  his  influence  both  in  the  cham 
ber  and  in  the  committee-room  without  being  the  offi 
cial  head  of  the  committee,  intrusted  as  such  with  the 
care  of  measures  on  the  defeat  of  which  he  was  intent. 
He  was  in  an  obviously  false  position.  The  practice 
under  our  government  is  the  other  way.  Senatorial 
courtesy  and  seniority,  it  is  well  known,  prevail ; 
and  Secretaries  must  govern  themselves  accordingly. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Sumner  and  his 
chairmanship  in  1870-71,  this  practice  was  carried 
to  its  extreme  limit ;  and,  after  the  presidential  can 
vass  of  the  following  year,  he  must  necessarily,  and 
by  common  consent,  have  been  superseded.  Even 
now,  indeed,  when,  having  been  active  in  opposition 


168  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

to  one  measure  of  foreign  policy  by  which  the  Presi 
dent  set  great  store,  he  declared  himself  in  advance 
opposed  to  another  measure  of  yet  greater  moment, 
the  future  was  plainly  foreshadowed.  A  wholly  im 
possible  preliminary  condition  to  the  proposed  measure 
must,  he  declared,  be  insisted  upon,  —  or,  once  more 
to  quote  his  own  words,  "  cannot  be  abandoned." 

In  January,  1871,  the  Forty-first  Congress  was 
fast  drawing  to  its  close.  Chosen  at  the  election 
which  made  Grant  President  for  the  first  time,  that 
Congress  was  overwhelmingly  Republican  ;  so  much  so 
that,  of  seventy-two  Senators  admitted  to  seats,  sixty- 
one  were  supporters  of  the  Administration.  And 
yet,  in  a  "body  thus  made  up,  —  a  body  in  which 
the  opposition  numbered  but  eleven  members,  —  not 
one  in  six,  —  a  treaty  in  behalf  of  the  ratification  of 
which  the  President  had  exerted  all  his  influence, 
personal  and  official,  had  failed  to  secure  even  a 
majority  vote.  The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  regardless  of  private  personal  solici 
tation  on  the  part  of  the  chief  Executive  wholly  unprece 
dented  in  character,  had  been  not  only  unrelenting  but 
successful  in  his  opposition.  The  President-General 
looked  upon  this  action  on  the  part  of  a  Senator  at 
the  head  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  as, 
during  war,  he  would  have  regarded  the  action  of  a 
department  commander  who,  refusing  to  cooperate  in 
the  plan  of  general  campaign  laid  down  from  head 
quarters,  should  exert  himself  to  cause  an  operation 
to  fail.  Such  a  subordinate  would  be  summarily  re 
lieved.  He  seems  actually  to  have  chafed  under  his 
inability  to  take  this  course  with  the  chairman  of  a 
Senate  committee  ;  and  so  he  primarily  relieved  his 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          169 

feelings  at  the  expense  of  the  friend  of  the  chairman, 
the  Minister  to  England.  He  was  within  his  power, 
and  him  he  incontinently  dismissed. 

This  distinctly  savored  of  Jackson  rather  than  of 
Washington.  The  White  House  had,  in  truth,  be 
come  a  military  headquarters.  But  the  President's 
personal  feelings,  as  well  as  the  General's  instinct  for 
discipline,  had  been  outraged,  and  he  was  intent  on 
the  real  offender,  —  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts. 
Hence  it  followed  that,  when  Secretary  Fish,  with  Mr. 
Sumner's  memorandum  in  his  hand,  went  to  the  White 
House  for  instructions,  the  President's  views  as  to  the 
independence,  and  subsequent  early  annexation,  of  the 
British  possessions  at  once  underwent  a  change.  As 
he  welcomed  an  issue  with  his  much-disliked  antago 
nist  upon  which  he  felt  assured  of  victory,  hemispheric 
flag-withdrawals  ceased  to  interest  him.  A  great  pos 
sible  obstruction  in  the  path  of  the  proposed  negoti 
ation  was  thus  suddenly  removed.  The  General-Pre 
sident  promptly  instructed  the  Secretary  to  go  to  Sir 
John  Rose,  and  advise  him  that  the  Administration 
was  prepared  to  accept  the  proposal  for  a  commission 
to  settle  all  questions  between  the  countries.  That 
was,  however,  a  preliminary  move  only.  By  it,  the 
Administration  was  committed  to  action  of  great 
import.  A  crucial  case  was  presented;  one  on  which 
no  unnecessary  risk  would  be  incurred.  The  next 
and  really  vital  step  remained  to  be  taken. 

When  the  first  Congress  of  Grant's  earlier  admin 
istration  met  in  its  final  session  at  the  usual  date  in 
December,  1870,  an  attempt  was  made  foreshadowing 
what  occurred  four  months  later.  A  partial  reorgan 
ization  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 


170  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

was  discussed,  with  a  view  to  the  introduction  into  that 
committee  of  some  element  less  under  its  chairman's 
influence,  and  holding  more  intimate  relations  with 
the  Executive.  A  place  was  to  be  found  for  Roscoe 
Conkling  of  New  York.  If  possible,  Mr.  Conkling 
was  to  be  substituted  for  Mr.  Sumner  ;  but  if  Mr. 
Sumner  was  found  too  firmly  fixed,  Mr.  Schurz  was 
to  be  replaced  as  a  member  of  the  committee ;  or,  as 
a  final  resort,  Mr.  Patterson  of  New  Hampshire,  if 
Mr.  Schurz  also  proved  immovable.  The  last  change 
was  finally  decided  upon  ;  but,  when  the  committee  as 
thus  altered  was  reported  in  caucus,  Sumner  objected. 
Senatorial  courtesy  then  prevailing,  the  scheme  was 
for  the  time  being  abandoned.1  Charles  Sumner  was, 
however,  yet  to  learn  that,  in  civil  as  in  military  life, 
Ulysses  S.  Grant  was  a  very  persistent  man. 

Two  weeks  later  Mr.  Sumner  did  what  he  had 
hitherto  refrained  from  doing.  Up  to  this  time  he 
had  expressed  himself  with  characteristic  freedom, 
denouncing  the  President  in  conversation  and  in 
letter,2  but  he  had  not  opposed  him  in  debate.  He 
now  openly  broke  ground  against  him  in  a  carefully 
prepared  speech  on  the  Dominican  question.  In  the 
position  he  took,  he  was  probably  right.  He  would 
certainly  be  deemed  so  in  the  light  of  the  views  then 
generally  taken  of  the  world-mission  of  the  United 
States  ;  but  that  was  during  the  country's  earlier 
period,  and  before  the  universality  of  its  mission 
was  so  plainly  disclosed  as  it  now  is.  Whether  cor 
rect,  however,  in  his  position  or  not,  his  manner  and 

language  were  characteristic,  and  unfortunate.     The 

» 

1  Pierce  :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  p.  456. 

2  Ib.,  pp.  448,  454;  Forum,  vol.  xxiv.  p.  406. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          171 

question  on  both  sides  had  become  personal ;  the  feel 
ing  uncontrollable :  and,  throughout  his  career,  — 
early  and  late,  —  Mr.  Sumner  did  not  appreciate  the 
significance  of  words.  He  failed  to  appreciate  them 
in  the  speech  now  made,  entitled  by  him  "  Naboth's 
Vineyard,"  wherein  he  accused  the  President  of  seek 
ing  surreptitiously  to  commit  the  country  to  a  "  dance 
of  blood."  On  the  9th  of  January,  less  than  three 
weeks  after  this  outbreak,  the  papers  relating  to  the 
recall  of  Mr.  Motley  were,  by  order  of  the  President, 
sent  to  the  Senate.  This  was  on  a  Monday ;  and 
it  was  on  the  following  Sunday  morning  that  Mr. 
Fish  called  on  Mr.  Sumner  by  arrangement,  with 
the  Sir  John  Rose  memorandum.  The  climax  was 
then  at  hand.  Among  the  papers  relating  to  the 
removal  of  Mr.  Motley  was  one  in  which  the  Secre 
tary  had  referred  to  some  unnamed  party  as  being 
"  bitterly,  personally,  and  vindictively  hostile  "  to  the 
President ;  while,  in  another  passage,  he  had  spoken 
of  the  President  as  a  man  than  whom  none  "  would 
look  with  more  scorn  and  contempt  upon  one  who 
uses  the  words  and  the  assurances  of  friendship  to 
cover  a  secret  and.  determined  purpose  of  hostility." 

The  allusion  was  unmistakably  to  Sumner.  It  was 
so  accepted  by  him.  There  is  nothing  in  the  record 
which  justifies  it ;  and,  while  it  indicates  a  deep  per 
sonal  feeling  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Fish,  it  was  unneces 
sarily  offensive.  Mr.  Sumner  had  a  right  to  take 
offence  at  it ;  nor,  indeed,  could  he  well  help  so  doing. 
On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Fish  was  not  improbably 
equally  incensed  at  some  denunciatory  remarks  of 
Mr.  Sumner's  brought  to  his  ears  by  White  House 
intermediaries,  then  abnormally  active.  However  this 


172  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

may  be,  and  the  record  is  silent  on  the  point,  the 
Motley  papers  were  laid  before  the  Senate  011  the 
very  Monday  upon  which  Sir  John  Rose  reached 
Washington.  A  week  from  Tuesday,  the  eighth  day 
after  the  transmission  of  those  papers,  the  memoran 
dum  of  Mr.  Sumner  of  January  17  reached  the  Secre 
tary.  The  break  between  the  two  officials  was  com 
plete  ;  they  were  no  longer  on  speaking  terms. 

January  was  now  more  than  half  over,  and,  in  six 
weeks'  time,  the  Forty-first  Congress  was  to  pass  out 
of  existence.  When,  on  the  4th  of  March,  the  new 
Congress  came  into  being,  the  committees  of  the  Sen 
ate  would  have  to  be  reappointed,  and,  of  necessity, 
largely  remodelled,  nineteen  newly  elected  members  of 
the  body  replacing  a  similar  number  whose  terms  had 
expired.  Mr.  Sumner's  deposition  from  the  chairman 
ship  he  would  then  have  filled  through  five  successive 
Congresses  had  meanwhile  become  a  fixed  idea  in  the 
presidential  mind ; 1  and  Secretary  Fish  shaped  his 
course  accordingly.  On  the  24th  of  January  he  again 
met  Sir  John  Rose.  A  week  had  intervened  since 
the  receipt  of  Mr.  Sumner 's  memorandum,  and  dur 
ing  that  week  the  Secretary  had  been  holding  consul 
tations  with  Mr.  Sumner 's  senatorial  colleagues  ;  of 
course,  absolutely  ignoring  that  gentleman.  While 
so  doing,  he  had  carefully  informed  himself  as  to  the 
attitude  of  the  Democratic  minority  in  the  chamber, 

1  Mr.  Davis  says  (Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  67)  :  —  "  Mr. 
Fish  and  the  President  thought  it  unwise  to  make  the  change. 
When,  however,  this  ultimatum  [the  Rose  memorandum  of  Janu 
ary  17]  was  received  from  Mr.  Sumner,  Mr.  Fish,  with  the  assent  of 
the  President,  \vithdrewallopposition."  But,  elsewhere  (Ib.,  p.  139), 
Mr.  Davis  says,  "  No  Senator  has  ever  told  me  what  induced  the  Sen 
ate  to  make  the  change." 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  173 

now  increased  to  seventeen  in  a  body  numbering  in 
all  seventy-four.  Mr.  Bayard  and  Mr.  Thurman  were 
the  recognized  leaders  of  the  opposition  ;  and,  from 
both,  he  received  assurances  of  support.  Upon  the 
other  side  of  the  chamber,  the  administration  Sen 
ators  could,  of  course,  be  counted  on  ;  and  through 
their  leaders,  Messrs.  Conkling  and  Edmunds,  it  was 
well  known  that  they  were  rijfe  for  revolt  against  the 
Sumner  committee-regime.  The  personal  relations  of 
Mr.  Sumner  with  General  Grant  and  Mr.  Fish,  or 
rather  the  absence  of  all  personal  relations  between 
the  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  and  the  President  and  Secretary  of  State, 
was  matter  of  common  knowledge.  The  several  Sen 
ators  consulted  were  also  informed  as  to  Mr.  Sum- 
ner's  attitude  towards  the  proposed  negotiations,  and 
a  carefully  drawn  memorandum  in  relation  thereto 
was  submitted  to  them  by  the  Secretary.  No  pre 
caution  was  neglected.1 

Charles  Sumner  was  a  man  with  whom  it  is  difficult 
to  deal  historically.  His  is  a  large  figure ;  senatorially 
viewed,  perhaps  none  is  larger.  He  projects  himself 
from  the  canvas.  In  referring  also  to  any  considera 
ble  public  character,  it  is  not  easy  to  call  attention  to 
his  foibles  and  limitations,  as  affecting  results,  without 
appearing  to  lay  undue  emphasis  upon  them.  It  is 
especially  so  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Sumner ;  for  he  was  a 
man  of  intense  individuality,  and,  as  he  grew  in  years, 
his  foibles  were  always  more  in  evidence.  In  the  mat 
ters  now  under  consideration,  also,  they  seem  to  have 
affected  his  public  conduct  and  his  relations  with  others 
to  a  peculiar  extent  ;  and  this  was,  perhaps,  to  be  in  a 

1  Moore :  International  Arbitrations,  vol.  i.  pp.  525,  529. 


174  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

degree  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  he  had  then  re 
cently  passed  through  a  most  trying  domestic  experi 
ence,  well  calculated  to  disturb  a  temperament  never 
disposed  to  placidity.1  Though  highly  respected.  Mr. 
Sumner  was  not  a  favorite  among  his  colleagues.  In 
many  respects  a  man  of  engaging  personality,  kind, 
sympathetic,  and  considerate,  essentially  refined  and 
easy  of  approach,  he  could  not  brook  sustained  opposi 
tion  on  any  question  which  to  his  mind  involved  the 
moral  issue.  Eecognizing  superiority  in  no  one,  he  then 
became  restive  in  presence  of  any  assertion  of  equality. 
The  savor  of  incense  was  sweet  in  his  nostrils ;  while  he 
did  not  exact  deference,  habitual  deference  was  in  later 
life  essential  to  his  good-will.  Among  his  colleagues, 
especially  those  not  politically  opposed  but  more  or  less 
lacking  in  sympathy,  his  unconsciously  overbearing 
habit  when  what  was  ever  present  to  his  mind  as  "  the 
cause  "  was  involved  almost  necessarily  made  him  ene 
mies.  In  those  days,  also,  "  the  cause  "  was  never  quies 
cent  ;  and,  when  intent  upon  it,  Mr.  Sumner 's  language 
became  rhetorically  intemperate  and  his  temper  impla 
cable.  These  terms  seem  strong ;  and  yet  they  are  not 
so  strong  as  those  used  of  him  at  the  time  by  men  of  his 
own  age,  and  friends  of  years'  standing.  One  instance 
will  suffice.  "  Sumner,"  wrote  R.  H.  Dana  not  long 
before,  "  has  been  acting  like  a  madman  ...  in  the 
positions  he  took,  the  arguments  he  advanced,  and  the 
language  he  used  to  the  twenty  out  of  twenty-five  Re 
publican  Senators  who  differed  from  him.  If  I  could 
hear  that  he  was  out  of  his  head  from  opium  or  even 
New  England  rum,  not  indicating  a  habit,  I  should  be 

1  See  on  this  point  the  suggestive  incident  mentioned  by  Mr.  Davis : 
Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  55. 


THE  TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON          175 

relieved.  Mason,  Davis,  and  Slidell  were  never  so  in 
solent  and  overbearing  as  he  was,  and  his  arguments, 
his  answers  of  questions,  were  boyish  or  crazy,  I  don't 
know  which."  Again,  in  June,  1861,  the  same  excel 
lent  authority  describes,  in  the  familiarity  of  private 
correspondence,  the  Senator  as  coming  from  Washing 
ton  "full  of  denunciation  of  Mr.  Seward.  .  .  .  He 
gave  me  some  anxiety,  as  I  listened  to  him,  lest  he 
was  in  a  heated  state  of  brain.1  He  cannot  talk  five 
minutes  without  bringing  in  Mr.  Seward,  and  always 
in  bitter  terms  of  denunciation.  .  .  .  His  mission  is 
to  expose  and  denounce  Mr.  Seward,  and  into  that 
mission  he  puts  all  his  usual  intellectual  and  moral 
energy."  Two  years  later  Mr.  Dana  was  in  Wash 
ington.  In  the  interim  he,  an  old  personal  as  well  as 
political  friend,  had  ventured  to  question  the  Senator's 
policy.  He  now,  as  was  his  wont,  at  once  called  on 
Mr.  Sumner,  leaving  his  card.  The  call  was  not  re 
turned,  nor  did  Mr.  Dana  hear  anything  from  Mr. 
Sumner  during  the  succeeding  twenty  days  while  in 
Washington,  or  see  him,  except  once  when,  by  chance, 
they  encountered  each  other  at  a  friend's  house.  All 
this  was  characteristic  of  the  man.  To  any  question 
in  which  he  was  deeply  concerned,  there  was  but  one 
side.2  As  it  was  his  mission  to  denounce  Seward  in 

1  Mr.  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis,  under  similar  circumstances,  records  the 
same  impression.     "  Mr.  Sumner  seemed  to  be  in  a  state  of  great  ex 
citement.     His  tremulous  manner  and  loud  voice  made  upon  me  the 
impression  that  his  mind  was  affected."     (Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama 
Claims,  p.  32.) 

2  "  Once,  in  later  days,  when  I  argued  with  him  that  opponents 
might  be  sincere,  and  that  there  was  some  reason  on  the  other  side, 
he  thundered  in  reply,  '  Upon  such  a  question  there  is  no  other  side.'  " 
(Eulogy  of  George  William  Curtis,  Massachusetts  Memorial  of  Charles 
Sumner,  p.  148.)    "  But  at  the  time  of  [the  San  Domingo  affair],  all  he 


176  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

1861,  ten  years  later  it  was  his  mission  to  denounce 
Grant ;  and  lie  fulfilled  it.  As  he  "  gave  the  cold 
shoulder"  to  Dana  in  1863,  so  he  gave  it  to  Fish  in 
1871.1  Consequently,  in  1871,  more  than  half  the 
body  of  which  he  was  in  consecutive  service  the  senior 
member  were  watching  for  a  chance  to  humiliate  him. 
As  Mr.  Fish  looked  at  it,  Mr.  Sumner  had  now 
taken  his  position  squarely  across  the  path  the  Admin 
istration  proposed  to  pursue  on  a  momentous  question 
of  foreign  policy,  —  a  government  measure.  He 
understood,  or  thought  he  understood,  Mr.  Sumner's 
mental  processes,  and  his  methods  of  parliamentary 
action.  Assuredly,  he  was  not  without  recent  experi 
ence  of  them.  He  shaped  his  course  accordingly  ;  de 
ciding  to  give,  in  the  first  place,  to  those  now  possibly 
being  invited  to  another  diplomatic  humiliation,  frank 
and  full  notice  of  the  difficulties  they  must  expect  to 
encounter,  and  the  danger  they  would  incur.  There 
was  to  be  no  ground  on  which  to  rest  against  him  a 
future  charge  of  deception,  or  even  of  suppression  of 
facts.  So,  at  his  next  meeting  with  Sir  John  Rose  on 
the  24th  of  January,  —  a  meeting  which  took  place  at 
the  Secretary's  house,  and  not  at  the  State  Depart 
ment,  —  Mr.  Fish  began  by  quietly,  but  in  confidence, 
handing  Sir  John  the  Sumner  hemispheric  flag-with 
drawal  memorandum.  Sir  John  read  it  ;  and,  having 


said  was  so  deeply  grounded  in  his  feeling  and  conscience,  that  it 
was  for  him  difficult  to  understand  how  others  could  form  different 
conclusions.  ...  It  was  difficult  for  him  to  look  at  a  question  or 
problem  from  more  than  one  point  of  view,  and  to  comprehend  its 
different  bearings,  its  complex  relations  with  other  questions  or  pro 
blems  ;  and  to  that  one  point  of  view  he  was  apt  to  subject  all  other 
considerations."  (Eulogy  of  Carl  Schurz,  Ib.,  pp.  241,  255.) 

1  Pierce :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  p.  468 ;  Adams  :  R.  H.  Dana,  vol.  ii.  p.  265. 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  177 

done  so,  returned  it,  apparently  without  comment. 
Mr.  Fish  then  informed  him  that,  after  full  consid 
eration,  the  government  had  determined  to  enter  on 
the  proposed  negotiation  ;  and,  should  Great  Britain 
decide  to  send  out  special  envoys  to  treat  on  the  basis 
agreed  upon,  the  Administration  would  spare  no  effort 
"  to  secure  a  favorable  result,  even  if  it  involved  a  con 
flict  with  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  in  the  Senate."1 

The  die  was  cast.  So  far  as  the  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  was  concerned, 
the  man  of  Donelson,  of  Vicksburg,  and  of  Appomattox 
now  had  his  eye  coldly  fixed  upon  him.  As  to  the 
settlement  with  Great  Britain,  it  was  to  be  effected 
on  business  principles,  and  according  to  precedent ; 
"  national "  claims  and  hemispheric  flag-withdrawals 
were  at  this  point  summarily  dismissed  from  consid 
eration. 

The  purport  of  the  last  interview  between  Mr.  Fish 
and  Sir  John  Rose  was  immediately  cabled  by  the 
latter  to  London ;  and,  during  the  week  that  ensued, 
the  submarine  wires  were  busy.  The  Gladstone  Min 
istry,  thoroughly  educated  by  fast-passing  continental 
events,  —  France  prostrate  and  Germany  defiant,  — 
was  now,  heart  and  soul,  intent  on  extricating  Great 
Britain  from  the  position  in  which  it  had,  ten  years 
before,  put  itself  under  a  previous  administration  of 
which  Mr.  Gladstone  had  been  a  prominent,  as  well 
as  an  acti'/e  and  an  influential,  member.  Before  the 
seven  days  had  expired  an  agreement  was  reached ; 
and,  on  the  1st  of  February,  Sir  Edward  Thornton 
notified  Secretary  Fish  of  the  readiness  of  his  gov 
ernment  to  send  a  special  mission  to  Washington 
1  Moore  :  International  Arbitrations,  vol.  i.  pp.  528-530. 


178  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

empowered  to  treat  on  all  questions  at  issue  between 
the  two  countries.  The  papers  were  duly  submitted 
to  Congress,  and,  on  the  9th  of  February,  President 
Grant  sent  to  the  Senate  the  names  of  five  persons, 
>  designated  as  commissioners  to  represent  the  United 
States  in  the  proposed  negotiation.  The  nominations 
were  promptly  confirmed.  The  question  was  now  a 
practical  one :  —  Would  Great  Britain  humble  its  pride 
so  far  as  to  avail  itself  of  the  chance  of  extrica 
tion  thus  opened  ?  —  and,  if  it  did  humble  its  pride 
to  that  extent,  could  the  administration  of  President 
Grant  so  shape  the  negotiation  as  to  get  the  United 
States  out  of  the  position  in  which  Mr.  Sumner  had 
partially  succeeded  in  putting  it?  His  more  than 
possible  opposition  to  any  settlement  at  that  time  had 
to  be  reckoned  with ;  if  necessary,  overborne. 

For  present  purposes,  it  is  needless  to  enter  into  the 
details  of  the  negotiation  which  ensued.  If  not  fa 
miliar  history,  I  certainly  have  no  new  light  to  throw  on 
it.  Under  the  skilful  business  guidance  of  Mr.  Fish, 
the  settlement  moved  quietly  and  rapidly  to  its  fore 
ordained  conclusion.  It  is,  however,  still  curious  to 
study,  between  the  lines  of  the  record,  the  extent  to 
which  the  Sumner  memorandum  influenced  results, 
and  how  it  in  the  end  only  just  failed  to  accomplish 
its  author's  purpose.  It  rested  among  Mr.  Fish's 
private  papers,  a  bit  of  diplomatic  dynamite,  the  ex 
istence  of  which  was  known  to  few,  and  mentioned  by 
no  one.  Not  a  single  allusion  is  to  be  found  to  it  in 
the  debates,  the  controversies,  or  the  correspondence 
of  the  time.  Mr.  Pierce,  in  his  life  of  Sumner,  ear 
nestly  combats l  Mr.  Bancroft  Da  vis's  statement  2  that 

1  Pierce:  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  p.  481. 

2  Davis  :  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  137. 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  179 

certain  Senators  were  fully,  if  confidentially,  advised 
of  the  existence  of  the  memorandum  and  of  the  atti 
tude  of  Mr.  Sumner.  In  this  he  is  clearly  in  error.1 
At  least  four  Senators  knew  of  both,  but,  not  without 
reason,  seem  to  have  been  afraid  of  the  former.  The 
danger,  of  course,  lay  in  the  direct  and  forcible  appeal 
to  Fenianism  contained  in  the  memorandum ;  for  the 
Irish-Americans  then  constituted  a  much  more  for 
midable  political  factor  than  now,  and  they  were  in  a 
highly  inflammatory  condition.  The  echoes  of  the 
last  raid  on  the  Dominion  had  hardly  died  away  in  the 
press,2  and  it  would  not  have  been  a  difficult  task,  es 
pecially  for  Mr.  Sumner,  to  have  excited  an  outburst 
of  Irish- American  feeling  which  would  have  so  affected 
a  minority  at  least  of  the  Senate  as  effectually  to  seal 
the  fate  of  any  treaty.  In  view  of  this  fact,  George 
F.  Edmunds  of  Vermont,  then  serving  in  his  second 
senatorial  term,  and  one  of  those  in  Mr.  Fish's  confi 
dence  and  on  whom  he  most  depended,  had  good  cause 
subsequently  to  allude  in  a  somewhat  mysterious  way 
to  the  Sumner  propositions  as  "  most  astonishing  and 
extravagant,  .  .  .  the  mere  statement  of  [which] 
would  have  put  an  end  to  all  negotiations  at  once."  3 
As  a  rule,  United  States  Senators  have  not  been  re 
garded  as,  among  mortals,  exceptionally  discreet  or 
secretive.  In  this  case,  however,  they  proved  so. 
The  references  to  Fenianism  and  hemispheric  flag  with 
drawals  were  few,  and,  confined  to  the  press  and  street 

1  Moore  :  International  Arbitrations,  vol.  i.  p.  529. 

2  Papers  Relating  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington  (1872),  vol.  ii.  p.  258. 
The  last  Fenian  move  on  the  Dominion,  calling  for  action  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  government,  occurred  as  late  as  October,  1871. 

3  Memorial  Address  before  the  Legislature  of  New  York,  April  5, 
1894,  p.  47. 


180  THE   TREATY   OF  WASHINGTON 

gossip,  elicited  no  response  from  the  Senate.  Yet 
when  it  came  to  the  preparation  of  what  is  known  as 
"  the  American  case  "  for  the  Geneva  Arbitration,  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  the  knowledge  of  Mr.  Sum- 
ner's  attitude,  and  the  desire  to  forestall  the  effect  of 
any  possible  later  appeal  to  the  Irish- American  element, 
contributed  sensibly  to  that  extreme  presentation  of 
national  injuries,  indirect  claims,  and  consequential 
damages  which,  in  the  following  autumn,  startled 
Great  Britain  from  its  propriety,  and  brought  the 
treaty  to  the  verge  of  rejection.  Had  it  led  to  that 
result,  the  possible  consequences  might  now,  did  space 
permit,  be  interesting  to  consider ;  but  such  a  result, 
whether  an  advantage  or  otherwise  to  the  world  at 
large,  would  have  been  a  singular  tribute  to  the  influ 
ence  of  Charles  Sumner.  In  all  human  probability, 
also,  a  calamity  to  Great  Britain. 

But  to  return  to  the  narrative.  General  Grant  was 
now  handling  a  campaign.  He  did  it  in  character 
istic  fashion.  His  opponent  and  his  objective  were 
to  him  clear,  and  he  shaped  his  plan  of  operations 
accordingly.  So  rapidly  did  events  move,  so  ready 
ripe  for  action  were  all  concerned,  that  the  Joint  High 
Commission,  as  it  was  called,  organized  in  Washington 
on  the  27th  of  February,  exactly  seven  weeks  from 
the  arrival  there  of  Sir  John  Rose.  On  the  8th  of 
the  following  May,  the  treaty  was  signed ;  and,  on  the 
10th,  the  President  sent  it  to  the  Senate.  It  was  at 
once  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 
Mr.  Surnner  was,  however,  no  longer  chairman  of  that 
committee.  On  the  8th  of  March,  —  two  months  be 
fore,  —  the  negotiators  were  struggling  with  the  vexed 
question  of  indirect  claims,  Mr.  Simmer's  special  sen- 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          181 

atorial  thunder ;  and,  on  the  day  following,  at  a  Sen 
ate  Republican  caucus  then  held,  he  was  deposed.  As 
the  story  has  been  told  in  all  possible  detail,  it  is  need 
less  here  to  describe  what  then  occurred.  The  step 
taken,  like  the  situation  because  of  which  it  was  taken, 
was  one  almost  without  precedent,  and  there  is  reason 
to  conclude  that  it  had  been  decided  upon  in  the  coun 
cils  of  the  Administration  Senators,  acting  in  har 
mony  with  inspiration  from  the  White  House,  quite 
irrespective  of  the  fate  of  any  possible  treaty  which 
might  result  from  negotiations  then  in  progress.  How 
ever  that  may  be,  its  complete  justification  can  be 
found  in  facts  now  known  in  connection  with  that 
negotiation.  Upon  certain  points  there  is  no  longer 
room  for  controversy.  As  already  pointed  out,  in  the 
conduct  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  country,  the  chair 
man  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
was,  and  is,  virtually,  and  in  everything  but  name,  a 
part  of  the  Administration.  He  is,  or  should  be,  its 
confidential  mouthpiece,  both  in  dealing  with  the  com 
mittee,  and  upon  the  floor  of  the  Senate  sitting  in 
executive  session.  He  should  accordingly  be  wholly 
and  intimately  in  the  confidence  of  the  State  Depart 
ment  on  all  questions  of  foreign  policy.  No  other 
chairman  of  any  congressional  committee  is  similarly 
placed ;  for,  as  respects  the  treaty -making  power,  the 
Senate  is  not  a  legislative  body,  it  is  the  council  of 
the  Executive.  In  March,  1871,  a  settlement  with 
Great  Britain  had  become  a  cardinal  feature,  —  it 
might  be  said  the  cardinal  feature  in  the  President's 
foreign  policy,  as  represented  by  his  official  organ,  the 
State  Department.  With  the  head  of  that  department 
the  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 


182  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

Eelations  was  no  longer  on  speaking  terms ;  while,  in 
private,  his  denunciation  of  both  Secretary  and  Presi 
dent  was  unsparing.  Mr.  Sumner  had,  moreover,  been 
consulted  in  advance  as  to  the  negotiations ;  and,  in 
reply  to  an  official  demand  therefor,  had  expressed  it  as 
his  fixed  opinion  that  "  the  withdrawal  of  the  British 
flag  "  from  Canada  at  least,  if  not  from  the  hemisphere 
altogether,  could  not  "  be  abandoned  as  a  condition,  or 
preliminary,"  of  a  settlement  such  as  was  now  pro 
posed.  The  conclusion  thus  reached  had  then  been 
communicated  to  the  head  of  the  State  Department  in 
an  informal,  but  a  written,  memorandum.  The  fate  of 
the  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention  was  still  fresh  in 
memory.  Solemnly  executed  in  London  by  the  fully 
accredited  representative  of  the  United  States,  it  had 
with  short  shrift,  and  by  a  vote  practically  unanimous, 
been  set  contemptuously  aside  by  the  Senate.  In  view 
of  this  experience,  Mr.  Fish  privately  communicated  the 
memorandum  of  the  chairman  of  the  Senate  committee 
to  the  confidential  agent  of  the  British  government. 
Under  the  circumstances,  this  was  manifestly  the  only 
course  open  to  him  to  pursue.  Its  recent  experience 
had  been  mortifying ;  and,  in  view  of  it,  the  British 
government  of  right  ought  to  be,  —  in  ordinary  good 
faith  had  to  be,  advised  of  this  danger,  known  only  to 
the  Secretary,  before  being  invited  to  enter  upon  a 
fresh  negotiation,  which,  not  improbably,  might  result 
in  another  rebuff.  When  so  advising  him,  the  Secre 
tary  had  also  intimated  to  its  agent  that,  should  Great 
Britain  still  decide  to  proceed  with  the  negotiation, 
the  Administration  would  spare  no  effort  to  secure  a 
favorable  result,  "even  if  it  involved  a  conflict"  with 
Mr.  Sumner.  To  any  one  who  knew  the  President 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          183 

and  his  methods,  mental  and  military,  such  a  committal 
admitted  of  no  misconstruction.  Unquestionably,  the 
contents  of  Mr.  Simmer's  memorandum  were  well 
known  to  every  one  of  the  British  plenipotentiaries, 
as  also  was  the  pledge  of  the  Administration  in  con 
nection  therewith.  This  premised,  the  course  now 
pursued  was  more  than  justifiable  ;  it  was  necessary, 
as  well  as  right.1  For  the  Administration,  in  face  of 
the  notice  thus  given,  to  have  permitted  the  continu 
ance  of  Mr.  Sumner  in  his  chairmanship,  if  to  prevent 
was  in  its  power,  would  have  been  worse  than  child 
ish;  it  would  have  distinctly  savored  of  bad  faith  with 
the  British  negotiators:  and  neither  General  Grant 
nor  Mr.  Fish  was  ever  chargeable  with  bad  faith,  any 
more  than  the  record  of  the  former  was  indicative  of 
a  proneness  to  indecisive  or  childish  courses  of  pro 
cedure. 

On  the  9th  of  March,  therefore,  in  accordance  with 
the  understood  wishes  of  the  President,  Mr.  Sumner 
was  deposed  by  his  senatorial  colleagues  from  the  chair 
manship  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions.  But  when,  some  two  months  later,  the  treaty  was 
reported  back  to  the  Senate  by  the  committee  as  now 
organized,  with  a  favorable  recommendation,  the  ques 
tion  of  interest  was  as  to  the  course  Mr.  Sumner  would 
pursue.  Would  he  acquiesce  ?  It  was  well  under 
stood  that  on  all  matters  of  foreign  policy  the  Senate, 
if  only  from  long  habit,  gave  a  more  than  attentive  ear 
to  his  utterances.  Almost  daily,  after  the  treaty  was 
transmitted  to  the  Senate  and  until  it  was  reported 
back  from  committee,  intimations  from  this  person  and 
from  that  —  callers  on  Mr.  Sumner,  or  guests  at  his 

1  See  Appendix  F,  infra,  pp.  225-244. 


184  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

table  —  reached  the  Department  of  State,  indicating 
what  the  deposed  chairman  proposed  to  do,  or  not  to 
do.  One  day  Judge  Hoar,  now  serving  as  one  of  the 
Joint  High  Commissioners,  would  announce  that  Mr. 
Sumner  had  declared  himself  the  evening  before  in 
favor  of  the  treaty,  and  was  preparing  a  speech  ac 
cordingly  ;  on  the  evening  of  the  very  day  of  this 
reassuring  announcement  another  gentleman  would 
come  to  Mr.  Fish  directly  from  Mr.  Simmer's  table 
to  say  that  his  host  had  just  been  criticising  the 
treaty,  and  proposed  to  urge  amendments.  The  Brit 
ish  commissioners  were  especially  solicitous.  They 
even  went  so  far  as  to  ignore  their  instructions  to 
leave  Washington  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  treaty 
was  signed.  The  Administration  wished  them  to  re 
main  there,  as  one  of  the  Englishmen  wrote,  on  the 
ground  that  they  might  be  able  to  influence  "par 
ticular  Senators,  such  as  the  Democrats  and  (still 
more)  Sumner,  over  whom  [the  Administration  has] 
no  party  control."  Sir  Stafford  Northcote  then  goes 
on  to  say  of  Mr.  Sumner,  —  "  We  have  paid  him  a 
great  deal  of  attention  since  he  has  been  deposed,  and 
I  think  he  is  much  pleased  at  being  still  recognized 
as  a  power."  l  Sir  Stafford  might  well  say  that  they 
had  paid  him  a  great  deal  of  attention.  Mr.  Sumner's 
egotism  and  love  of  flattery  were  tolerably  well  under 
stood  ;  and  the  Englishmen,  realizing  that  he  was 
"very  anxious  to  stand  well  with  England,"  humored 
him  to  the  top  of  his  bent.  Lord  de  Grey,  for  instance, 

1  Sir  Stafford  Northcote  added,  —  "He  certainly  is  [a  power],  for 
though  I  think  the  Government  could  beat  him  in  the  Senate,  he  could 
stir  up  a  great  deal  of  bad  feeling  in  the  country,  if  he  were  so 
minded."  (Lang  :  Narthcote,  vol.  ii.  p.  23.) 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          185 

presently  to  be  made  Marquis  of  Ripon,  the  head  of 
the  British  side  of  the  commission,  went  out  of  his 
way  to  inform  the  deposed  chairman  that,  without  his 
speech  on  the  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention,  "the 
treaty  could  not  have  been  made,  and  that  he  [Lord 
de  Grey]  worked  by  it  as  a  chart."  Nor  were  the 
American  commissioners  less  solicitous,  though  they 
went  about  it  in  a  more  quiet  way.  For,  hardly  was 
the  ink  of  the  signatures  to  the  treaty  dry  before  Judge 
Hoar  called  at  Mr.  Sumner's  door  with  a  copy,  which 
he  commended  to  the  Senator's  favorable  consideration 
"  as  meeting  on  all  substantial  points  the  objections 
he  had  so  well  urged  against  the  Johnson-Clarendon 
Convention." 

That  Mr.  Sumner,  had  he,  on  consideration,  con 
cluded  that  it  was  his  duty  to  oppose  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty,  could,  placed  as  he  now  was,  have  secured 
its  rejection,  is  not  probable.  As  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  it  would  almost  un 
questionably  have  been  in  his  power  so  to  do ;  not 
directly,  perhaps,  but  through  the  adoption  of  plausi 
ble  amendments,  —  that  practice  of  "  customary  disfig 
urement,"  according  to  President  Cleveland,  which 
treaties  undergo  "  at  the  hands  of  the  United  States 
Senate."  l  This  course  Mr.  Fish  apprehended.  On 
the  18th  of  May,  Mr.  Trumbull,  then  Senator  from 
Illinois,  and  deservedly  influential,  called  at  the  De 
partment  to  inquire  whether  an  amendment  would 
jeopardize  the  treaty.  In  reply  he  was  assured  that 
any  amendment,  however  trivial,  would,  in  all  prob 
ability,  destroy  the  treaty,  as  it  would  enable  Great 

1  See  paper  of  A.  M.  Low,  "  The  Oligarchy  of  the  Senate,"  North 
American  Review  (February,  1902),  vol.  174,  p.  242. 


186  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

Britain  either  to  withdraw  entirely,  or,  in  any  event, 
to  propose  counter-amendments.  In  point  of  fact,  Mr. 
Sumner,  while  advocating  approval,  did  offer  amend 
ments  ; 1  but,  no  longer  chairman  of  the  committee,  he 
was  shorn  of  his  strength.  Up  to  the  very  time  of  vot 
ing,  he  was  enigmatical.  He  would  intimate  a  sense  of 
great  responsibility,  inasmuch  as  he  realized  the  extent 
to  which  the  country  was  looking  to  him  for  guidance  ; 
and  he  would  then  suggest  doubts.  His  mind  was  not 
clear,  etc.,  etc.  On  the  direct  issue  of  approval  the 
solid  phalanx  of  administration  Senators  would  un 
questionably  have  been  arrayed  against  him  ;  and,  on 
the  Democratic  side  of  the  chamber,  he  was  far  from 
popular.  None  the  less,  had  he  even  remotely  re 
sembled  his  contemporary  then  in  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  Benjamin  F.  Butler,2  it  would  have  been  in 
his  power,  playing  on  the  Hibernian  element,  and  the 
anti-English  feeling  then  very  rife,  to  have  made  much 
trouble.  The  treaty  bears  distinct  marks  of  having  been 
framed  with  this  in  view.  In  its  provisions,  not  only 
did  Mr.  Sumner  find  the  ground  in  great  degree  cut 
away  from  under  him,  but  he  could  not  help  realizing 
that,  in  view  of  his  speech  on  the  Johnson-Clarendon 
Convention,  he  stood  to  a  certain  extent  committed. 
It  was  not  open  for  him  to  take  the  hemispheric  flag- 
withdrawal  attitude.  So  doing  was  impossible.  He 
had  not  taken  it  before ;  and,  though  his  reasons  for 
not  taking  it  then  were  obvious,  to  take  it  now  would, 
under  the  circumstances,  inevitably  expose  him  to  ridi 
cule.  He  was  thus  fairly  and  plainly  circumvented. 

1  Pierce :   Sumner,  vol.  iv.  pp.  489,  490. 

2  General  Butler  subsequently  made  two  public  speeches  in  opposi 
tion  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington. 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  187 

But,  more  and  most  of  all,  Charles  Sumner  was,  be 
It  ever  said,  no  demagogue.  Somewhat  of  a  doctri 
naire  and  more  of  an  agitator,  he  was  still  in  his  way 
an  enlightened  statesman,  with  aspirations  for  America 
and  mankind  not  less  generous  than  perfervid.  His 
egoism  was  apparent  ;  nor  has  his  rhetoric  stood  the 
test  of  time.  A  hearty  hater,  and  unsparing  of  de 
nunciation,  he  hated  and  denounced  on  public  grounds 
only ;  but  his  standards  were  invariably  high,  and  he 
was  ever  actuated  by  a  strong  sense  of  obligation. 
His  course  now  was  creditable.  In  his  belief,  an  un 
surpassed  opportunity  had  been  lost.  A  rejection  of 
the  proposed  adjustment,  manifestly  fair  so  far  as  it 
went,  could,  however,  result  only  in  keeping  alive  a 
source  of  acute  irritation  between  two  great  nations. 
That  involved  a  heavy  responsibility  :  a  responsibility 
not  in  Mr.  Sumner's  nature  to  assume.  Accordingly, 
he  accepted  the  inevitable  ;  and  he  accepted  it  not 
ungracefully.  General  Grant  numbered  him  with 
Buckner,  Pemberton,  Johnston,  Bragg,  and  Lee,  — 
among  his  vanquished  opponents.  As  to  Mr.  Fish, 
the  two  were  never  afterwards  reconciled  ;  but  the 
Secretary  now  had  his  way.1 

Into  the  subsequent  difficulties  encountered  by  Sec 
retary  Fish  in  his  work  of  saving  Great  Britain  in 
spite  of  Great  Britain's  self,  it  is  needless  to  enter. 
Suffice  it  to  say  they  can  all  be  traced  back  to  the 
positions  assumed  by  Mr.  Sumner  in  April,  1869. 
As  already  pointed  out,  it  was  obviously  from  an 
over-desire  to  forestall  Mr.  Sumner  that  Secretary 
Fish's  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Bancroft 
Davis,  a  little  later  jeopardized  the  whole  treaty  by  the 
1  See  Appendix  G,  pp.  245-255. 


188  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

extreme  grounds  taken  on  the  subject  of  national  in 
juries,  indirect  claims,  and  consequential  damages,  and 
the  somewhat  intemperate  way  in  which  the  same  were 
urged.  It  is  wholly  unnecessary  here  to  enter  into 
the  question  of  responsibility  for  this  portion  of  what 
was  known  as  "  The  Case  of  the  United  States."  In. 
preparing  it,  Mr.  Davis  unquestionably  acted  under 
instructions  from  Secretary  Fish,  and  in  cooperation 
with  the  very  able  counsel  who  had  the  matter  in 
charge.  Whatever  was  done  by  him  was  done  subject 
to  approval ;  and  was,  undoubtedly,  fully  considered 
before  being  approved.  Those  thus  responsible  for 
the  presentation  of  the  case  naturally  felt  that,  with 
Mr.  Sumner's  historic  indictment  of  the  Johnson-Clar 
endon  Convention  fresh  in  memory,  the  full  record  of 
grievance  had  to  be  set  forth,  or  the  American  people 
might  resent  a  tacit  abandonment  of  what  they  had 
been  taught  to  regard  as  their  just  demands.  With 
an  eye  to  this  possibility,  —  Sumner  always  in  mind, 
-  Mr.  Fish  had  at  an  early  stage  of  the  negotiations 
significantly  intimated  to  his  colleagues  that  "  he  sup 
posed  it  was  pretty  well  agreed  that  there  were  some 
claims  which  would  not  be  allowed  by  the  arbitrators, 
but  he  thought  it  best  to  have  them  passed  upon."  l 
So,  in  avoiding  the  senatorial  Scylla,  the  counsel  of  the 
United  States  subsequently  brought  the  ark  of  settle 
ment  squarely  up  against  the  British  Charybdis.  Six 
years  later,  when  both  Mr.  Sumner  and  Mr.  Motley 
were  dead,2  General  Grant  made  contemptuous  refer- 

1  Davis  :  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims,  p.  77. 

2  In  the  interview  at  Edinburgh,  published  in  the  New  York  Her 
ald  of  September  25,  1877.     Another  conversation  with  Grant  on  this 
topic  is  given  by  Young  in  his  Around  the  World  with  Grant  (vol.  ii.  p. 
279).     It  illustrates  the  utter  worthlessness  of  unverified  recollections 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  189 

ence  to  the  "  indirect  damage  humbug,"  as  he  then 
phrased  it ;  and,  as  set  forth  in  the  American  "  case  " 
presented  at  Geneva,  it  was  a  "  humbug,"  -  —  a  by  no 
means  creditable  "  humbug."  As  such  it  had  by  some 

as  a  basis  for  the  statement  of  historic  details.  He  was  at  the  time 
of  this  interview  on  a  steamship  in  Asiatic  waters,  far  from  books, 
records,  and  memoranda.  He  is  reported  as  then  saying  :  —  "  When 
Mr.  Fish  prepared  our  case  against  England,  and  brought  it  to  me  for 
approval,  I  objected  to  the  indirect  claim  feature.  Mr.  Fish  said  he 
entirely  agreed  with  me,  but  it  was  necessary  to  consider  Mr.  Sum- 
ner.  Mr.  Sumner  was  at  the  head  of  the  committee  in  the  Senate 
that  had  charge  of  foreign  affairs.  He  was  not  cordial  to  the  treaty. 
.  .  .  Mr.  Sumner  had  also  laid  great  stress  upon  indirect  claims. 
Not  to  consider  them  in  our  case,  therefore,  would  offend  him.  .  .  . 
The  argument  of  Mr.  Fish  convinced  me,  but  somewhat  against  my 
will.  I  suppose  I  consented  because  I  was  sincerely  anxious  to  be 
on  terms  with  Sumner."  It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  anything  much 
more  mistaken  than  these  utterances.  Grant  had  quarrelled  with 
Sumner,  and  ceased  to  be  on  speaking  terms  with  him,  a  year  before 
the  negotiations,  which  preceded  the  treaty,  were  initiated.  When 
the  case  for  the  Board  of  Arbitration  under  the  treaty  was  prepared, 
Mr.  Sumner  had  ceased  to  be  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations.  He  had  spoken  and  voted  for  the  treaty  ;  and, 
while  the  treaty  was  no  longer  at  issue,  neither  President  nor  Secre 
tary  cared  to  conciliate  him.  The  indirect  claims  were  inserted  in 
the  case  by  direction  of  Fish,  and  for  reasons  which  he  put  on  record, 
wholly  at  variance  with  those  attributed  to  him  by  Grant.  Finally, 
Grant,  as  President,  never  objected  to  the  claims,  and,  subsequently, 
was  wholly  unwilling  that  they  should  be  withdrawn  from  the  con 
sideration  of  the  Geneva  tribunal.  Indeed,  in  February,  1872,  when 
it  seemed  probable  that  Great  Britain  would,  because  of  our  insist 
ence  on  those  claims,  refuse  to  go  on  at  Geneva,  he  actually  wanted 
Secretary  Fish  to  instruct  Mr.  Adams  to  remain  at  Geneva,  and  to 
sign  the  award  alone  should  all  the  other  arbitrators  withdraw.  It 
was  necessary  for  Mr.  Fish  to  call  his  attention  to  the  fact  that,  under 
the  terms  of  the  treaty,  the  award  had  to  be  signed  by  a  majority  of 
the  arbitrators.  The  suggestion  of  Mr.  Adams  remaining  behind, 
after  all  the  others  were  gone,  and  then  proceeding  to  mulct  Great 
Britain  in  satisfactory  damages  was  again  suggestive  of  ope"ra  bouffe 
performances  and  Gerolstein  methods.  There  can,  however,  be  no 
doubt  that  Grant  was,  in  1879,  giving  a  perfectly  truthful  statement 
of  his  recollection  of  the  events  of  1871.  Merely,  his  recollection 
deceived  him  as  to  every  particular. 


190  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

means  to  be  got  rid  of ;  and  at  Geneva  it  was,  with 
general  acceptance,  so  got  rid  of.1     Be  it  always,  how- 

1  There  is,  however,  another  side  to  the  question  of  indirect  claims 
as  presented  in  the  "  case  "  at  Geneva.  It  is  well  put  in  the  follow 
ing1  extracts  of  a  despatch  from  Secretary  Fish  to  Minister  Schenck, 
of  April  23,  1872  (Papers  relating  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington  (1872), 
vol.  ii.  pp.  475,  476) : —  "  Neither  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
nor,  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  any  considerable  number  of  the  American 
people,  have  ever  attached  much  importance  to  the  so-called  'indirect 
claims,'  or  have  ever  expected  or  desired  any  award  of  damages  on 
their  account.  .  .  .  You  will  not  fail  to  have  noticed  that  through  the 
whole  of  my  correspondence  we  ask  no  damages  on  their  account ;  we 
only  desire  a  judgment  which  will  remove  them  for  all  future  time  as 
a  cause  of  difference  between  the  two  Governments.  In  our  opinion 
they  have  not  been  disposed  of,  and,  unless  disposed  of,  in  some  way, 
they  will  remain  to  be  brought  up  at  some  future  time  to  the  disturb 
ance  of  the  harmony  of  the  two  Governments.  ...  In  the  correspond 
ence,  I  have  gone  as  far  as  prudence  will  allow  in  intimating  that  we 
neither  desired  nor  expected  any  pecuniary  award,  and  that  we  should 
be  content  with  an  award  that  a  State  is  not  liable  in  pecuniary 
damages  for  the  indirect  results  of  a  failure  to  observe  its  neutral 
obligations.  It  is  not  the  interest  of  a  country  situate  as  are  the 
United  States,  with  their  large  extent  of  sea-coast,  a  small  Navy,  and 
smaller  internal  police,  to  have  it  established  that  a  nation  is  liable  in 
damages  for  the  indirect,  remote,  or  consequential  results  of  a  failure 
to  observe  its  neutral  duties.  This  government  expects  to  be  in  the 
future,  as  it  has  been  in  the  past,  a  neutral  much  more  of  the  time 
than  a  belligerent.  It  is  strange  that  the  British  Government  does 
not  see  that  the  interests  of  this  government  do  not  lead  them  to 
expect  or  to  desire  a  judgment  on  the  '  indirect  claims  ;  '  and  that  they 
fail  to  do  justice  to  the  sincerity  of  purpose,  in  the  interests  of  the 
future  harmony  of  the  two  nations,  which  has  led  the  United  States 
to  lay  those  claims  before  the  tribunal  at  Geneva." 

The  above  contains  a  sufficient  defence  of  the  presentation  of  the 
"  claims."  The  defect  in  the  American  "  case  "  was  rather  one  of 
taste.  Its  contentions  were  advanced  with  an  aggressiveness  of  tone, 
and  attorney-like  smartness,  more  appropriate  to  the  wranglings  of  a 
quarter-sessions  court  than  to  pleadings  before  a  grave  international 
tribunal.  In  this  respect  they  do  not  compare  favorably  with  the 
British  papers.  As  Sir  Roundell  Palmer  truly  says,  in  these  last 
' '  no  pains  were  spared  to  avoid  the  use  of  any  language  which  could 
wound  the  susceptibilities,  or  offend  the  high  spirit  of  a  generous 
nation.  ...  In  all  these  respects,  the  American  '  Case  '  was  in  the 
most  marked  contrast  with  our  own.  .  .  .  Its  tone  was  acrimonious, 


THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  191 

ever,  remembered,  the  vulgarized  bill  then  presented 
was  not  the  sublimated  balance-sheet  Charles  Sumner 
had  in  mind.  His  was  no  debit-and-credit  account, 
reduced  to  dollars  and  cents,  and  so  entered  in  an 
itemized  judgment ;  nor  was  this  better  understood 
by  any  one  than  by  President  Grant.  It  is  but  fair 
to  assume  that,  in  the  rapid  passage  of  events  between 
1870  and  1877,  the  facts  now  disclosed  had  been  by 
him  forgotten. 

In  Wemyss  Reid's  "  Life  of  William  E.  Forster  " 
is  a  chapter  devoted  to  this  subject.  I  think  it  may 
not  unfairly  be  said  that  Mr.  Forster  now  saved  the 
treaty.  In  the  first  outburst  of  indignation  over  the 
resurrection  in  the  American  "  case  "  of  Sumner's  self- 
evolved  equities  and  incalculable  claims,  a  special 
meeting  of  the  British  cabinet  was  summoned,  at 
which  a  portion  of  the  members  were  for  withdrawing 
forthwith  from  the  arbitration.  Though  he  himself, 
unadvised  as  to  the  real  motive  for  so  emphasizing  the 
demand  on  account  of  national  injuries,  held  the  whole 
thing  to  be  a  case  of  "  sharp  practice,"  yet  Mr.  Fors 
ter  counselled  a  moderate  and  prudent  course,  —  as 
he  put  it,  "  a  cool  head  and  a  cool  temper  wanted  ;  " 
adding,  "  I  never  felt  any  matter  so  serious."  He 
then  drew  up  a  special  memorandum  for  the  use  of 
his  colleagues,  looking  to  such  action  as  would  be  most 
likely  to  leave  open  the  way  to  an  understanding. 
Upon  this  all  the  ministers,  save  four,  were  against 
him.  Mr.  Forster  next  met  Mr.  Adams,  then  pass 
ing  through  London  on  his  way  home  from  the  pre- 

totally  wanting1  in  international  courtesy."  (Memorials  Personal  and 
Political,  1865-95  ;  vol.  i.  p.  229.)  The  truth,  as  well  as  the  con 
tained  force,  of  this  censure  cannot  be  gainsaid. 


192  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

liminary  meeting  of  the  tribunal  of  arbitration  at 
Geneva,  he  being  a  member  of  it ;  and  Mr.  Adams 
fairly  told  him  that,  for  Great  Britain,  it  was  a  case 
of  now  or  never.  If,  Mr.  Adams  said,  Great  Britain 
insisted  on  the  absolute  exclusion  of  the  indirect 
claims,  America  must  withdraw ;  and,  if  it  did,  "  the 
arbitration  was  at  an  end,  and  America  would  never 
make  another  treaty." 

During  those  anxious  weeks  the  British  cabinet 
was  the  scene  of  more  than  one  heated  discussion  ; 
and,  so  severe  was  the  tension,  the  very  existence  of 
the  Ministry  was  threatened.  On  the  afternoon  of 
April  24,  Forster  intimated  to  General  Schenck,  the 
American  Minister,  that,  unless  something  was  done, 
he  and  the  Marquis  of  Ripon  "  could  not  keep  the 
treaty  alive."  Mr.  Adams  was  now  once  more  in 
London  on  his  way  to  Geneva,  and  Mr.  Forster  again 
saw  him,  receiving  the  assurance  that  "  Fish  and  the 
President  had  the  Senate  well  in  hand ;  "  yet,  this 
notwithstanding,  when  an  article  supplemental  to  the 
treaty,  obviating  the  cause  of  trouble,  was  agreed  on 
and  submitted  to  the  Senate,  that  body  so  amended 
it  before  ratification  that  the  English  government 
professed  itself  unable  to  concur.  It  seemed  as  if 
the  last  chance  of  a  pacific  settlement  was  about  to 
vanish. 

On  the  15th  of  June,  the  Court  of  Arbitration  met 
at  Geneva,  pursuant  to  adjournment.  Everything  was 
in  the  air.  At  Geneva,  however,  the  policy  of  the 
State  Department  was  understood ;  and,  intrusted  to 
experienced  hands,  it  was,  at  the  proper  time,  skil 
fully  forwarded.  A  way  out  of  the  last  and  most 
serious  of  all  the  dangers  which  imperilled  the  settle- 


THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON  193 

merit  was  thus  devised,  and  the  arbitration  moved 
on  thenceforth  upon  common-sense  business  lines  to  a 
practical  result. 

Times  change,  and  with  them  the  estimate  in  which 
nations  hold  issues.  Recollecting  the  levity,  at  times 
marked  by  more  than  a  trace  of  sarcasm  and  petulance, 
with  which  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  had  received 
our  earliest  reclamations  because  of  injuries  inflicted 
on  our  mercantile  marine  by  British  built  commerce- 
destroyers,  I  cannot  refrain,  before  closing,  from  a 
few  words  descriptive  of  the  very  different  mood  in 
which  the  Ministry  then  in  power  awaited  tidings  of 
the  final  results  reached  at  Geneva.  It  was  the  15th 
of  June,  1872.  The  treaty  was  in  question.  The 
Court  of  Arbitration  met  at  Geneva  at  noon  ;  in  Lon 
don,  at  the  same  hour,  a  meeting  of  the  cabinet  was 
in  session,  —  a  meeting  almost  unique  in  character. 
The  members  waited  anxiously  for  tidings.  For  two 
hours  they  attended  listlessly  to  routine  parliamentary 
work ;  and  then  took  a  recess.  When,  at  3  o'clock, 
the  time  for  reassembling  came,  no  advices  had  been 
received.  Thereupon,  a  further  adjournment  was 
taken  until  5.30.  Still  no  telegram.  All  subjects 
of  conversation  being  now  exhausted,  the  members 
sat  about,  or  faced  each  other  in  silence.  It  was  a 
curious  situation  for  a  ministry.  Had  England  hu 
miliated  herself  by  an  expression  of  fruitless  regret  ? 
Those  present  contemplated  the  situation  in  the  true 
parliamentary  spirit.  "  The  opposition  would  snigger 
if  they  saw  us,"  remarked  one  ;  and  the  speaker  soon 
after  sent  for  a  chess-board,  and  he  and  Mr.  Forster 
took  chairs  out  on  the  terrace  in  front  of  the  cabinet- 


194  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

room,  and  there  sat  down  to  a  game,  using  one  of  the 
chairs  as  a  table.  Three  games  were  played ;  but 
still  no  tidings.  So  the  company  dispersed  for  din 
ner.  As  the  tribunal  adjourned  over  until  Monday, 
no  tidings  came  that  night ;  the  method  of  procedure 
had,  however,  been  arranged,  and  Mr.  Fish  communi 
cated  with.  His  assent  to  what  was  proposed  came 
immediately ;  and  meanwhile  Mr.  Forster  was  bestir 
ring  himself  in  London  to  "  urge  help  to  Adams,"  and 
a  "short,  helpful  telegram"  was  forwarded.  "After 
all,"  wrote  Mr.  Forster  that  night,  "  this  treaty,  which 
has  as  many  lives  as  a  cat,  will  live."  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  fourth  subsequent  day,  this  staunch 
friend  of  America  and  of  peace  scribbled,  from  his 
seat  in  the  ministerial  benches  of  the  House  of  Com 
mons,  this  note  to  his  wife  :  "  Hip,  hip,  hip,  hooray  !  the 
final  settlement  of  the  indirect  claims  came  during 
questions  to-day,  and  Gladstone  announced  it  amid 
great  cheers  on  our  side  and  the  disgust  of  the  Tories. 
This  is  a  good  year  now,  whatever  happens."  It  was 
the  20th  of  June,  1872,  —  one  month  over  eleven 
years  since  the  issuance  of  the  famous  proclamation. 
A  heavy  shadow  was  lifted  from  off  the  future  of  the 
British  Empire.  That  it  was  thus  lifted  must  in  all 
historic  truth  be  ascribed  to  Hamilton  Fish. 

In  discussing  the  developments  of  history,  it  is 
almost  never  worth  while  to  waste  time  and  ingenuity 
in  philosophizing  over  what  might  have  been.  The 
course  of  past  events  was  —  as  it  was !  What  the 
course  of  subsequent  events  would  or  might  have 
been,  had  things  at  some  crucial  juncture  gone  other 
wise  than  as  they  actually  did  go,  no  one  can  more 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          195 

than  guess.  Historical  consequences  are  not  less 
strange  than  remote.  For  instance,  the  lessons  of 
our  own  War  of  Independence,  closed  six-score  years 
ago,  are  to-day  manifestly  influencing  the  attitude 
and  action  of  Great  Britain  throughout  her  system 
of  dependencies.  Should  the  system  ever,  as  now 
proposed,  assume  a  true  federated  form,  that  result, 
it  may  safely  be  asserted,  will  be  largely  due  to  the 
experience  gained  a  century  and  a  quarter  ago  on  the 
North  American  continent,  supplemented  by  that  now 
being  gained  in  South  Africa.  In  view  of  the  enor 
mous  strides  made  by  science  during  the  last  third  of 
a  century,  it  cannot  be  assumed  that,  as  respects  war 
fare  on  land  or  on  sea,  what  was  possible  in  1863 
would  be  possible  now.  The  entire  globe  was  not 
then  interlaced  with  electric  wires,  and  it  may  well  be 
that  another  Alabama  is  as  much  out  of  the  range  of 
future  probabilities  as  a  ship  flying  the  black  flag, 
with  its  skull  and  crossed  bones,  was  outside  of  those 
of  1861.  This,  however,  aside,  it  is  instructive,  as 
well  as  interesting,  to  summarize  the  record  which  has 
now  been  recalled,  and  to  consider  the  position  in 
which  Great  Britain  would  to-day  find  itself  but  for 
the  settlement  effected  and  principles  established  by 
means  of  the  Treaty  of  Washington. 

So  far  as  the  international  situation  is  concerned, 
the  analogy  is  perfect.  Every  rule  of  guidance  appli 
cable  in  our  Civil  War  of  1861-65  is  a  fortiori 
applicable  in  the  South  African  war  of  1899—1902. 
The  contention  of  Great  Britain  from  1861  to  1865 
was  that  every  neutral  nation  is  the  final  judge  of 
its  own  international  obligations ;  and  that,  in  her 
own  case,  no  liability,  moral  or  material,  because  of  a 


196  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

violation  of  those  obligations  was  incurred,  no  matter 
how  scandalous  the  evasions  might  subsequently  prove 
to  have  been,  unless  the  legal  advisers  of  the  gov 
ernment  pronounced  the  ascertainable  evidence  of 
an  intention  to  violate  the  law  sufficient  to  sustain  a 
criminal  indictment.  In  view  of  the  "  lucrative " 
character  of  British  shipbuilding,  it  was  further  main 
tained  that  any  closer  supervision  of  that  industry, 
and  the  exercise  of  "  due  diligence  "  in  restraint  of 
the  construction  of  commerce-destroyers,  would  impose 
on  neutrals  a  "  most  burdensome,  and,  indeed,  most 
dangerous  "  liability.  Finally,  under  the  official  con 
struction  of  British  municipal  law,  —  a  law  pro 
nounced  by  Her  Majesty's  government  adequate  to 
any  emergency,  —  there  was  "  no  necessity  that  a  naval 
belligerent  should  have  a  port,  or  even  a  seashore." 
The  South  African  republics,  for  instance,  "might 
unite  together,  and  become  a  great  naval  power," 
using  the  ports  of  the  United  States  as  a  base  for  their 
maritime  operations.  "  Money  only  was  required  for 
the  purpose."  Then  came  the  admission  of  Sir  Ed 
ward  Thornton  that,  in  case  Great  Britain  were  en 
gaged  in  war,  retaliations  in  kind  for  the  Alabama  and 
the  Florida  would  naturally  be  in  order ;  commerce- 
destroyers  would  be  fitted  out  on  the  Pacific  coast  as 
well  as  the  Atlantic,  in  spite  of  all  the  United  States 
government  might,  or  could,  do  to  prevent  them ;  and, 
with  them,  the  high  seas  would  swarm.  War  must 
follow  ;  and  then  Canada  was  "  a  source  of  weakness." 
On  land  and  on  sea,  Great  Britain  was  equally  vul 
nerable. 

From  such  a  slough  of  despond  was  Great  Britain 
extricated  by  the  Treaty  of  Washington.     That  much 


THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON          197 

is  plain  ;  all  else  is  conjecture.  But  it  is  still  curious 
to  consider  what  might  well  have  now  resulted  had 
the  United  States,  between  1869  and  1871,  definitely 
for  its  guidance  adopted  the  policy  contemplated  by 
Charles  Sumner  instead  of  that  devised  by  Hamilton 
Fish,  and  had  then  persistently  adhered  to  it.  In  the 
hands  and  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Sumner,  the 
method  he  proposed  to  pursue  to  the  end  he  had  in 
mind  might  have  proved  both  effective  and,  in  the 
close,  beneficent.  So  long  as  all  things  are  possible  — 
Who  can  say  ?  But  Mr.  Sumner  died  in  1874  ;  and 
with  him  must  have  died  the  policy  he  proposed 
to  inaugurate.  Characteristically  visionary,  he  was 
wrong  in  his  estimate  of  conditions.  He  in  no  wise 

O 

foresaw  that  backward  swing  of  opinion's  pendulum, 
from  the  "  wretched  colonies  "  estimate  of  1870  to  the 
Imperium  et  Libertas  conceptions  of  1900.  Mr.  Fish, 
on  the  other  hand,  less  imaginative,  was  more  nearly 
right.  He  effected  a  practical  settlement ;  and,  in  so 
doing,  he  accomplished  a  large  result.  For  to-day  it 
is  apparent  to  all  who  carefully  observe  that,  as  the 
direct  outcome  of  the  American  Civil  War,  the  world 
made  a  long  stride  in  advance.  It  is  a  great  mistake 
to  speak  of  the  Florida,  the  Alabama,  and  the  Shen- 
andoah  as  "  privateers."  They  were  not.  No  "  pri 
vateer,"  in  the  proper  acceptation  of  the  word,  ever 
sailed  the  ocean  under  the  Confederate  flag  ;  the  com 
merce-destroyers  of  that  conflict,  whether  fitted  out  on 
the  Mersey  and  Clyde,  or  in  home  ports,  were,  one  and 
all,  government  ships-of-war,  owned  and  regularly  com 
missioned  by  the  belligerent  whose  flag  they  flew,  and 
commanded  by  its  officers.  Their  single  mission  was, 
none  the  less,  to  burn,  sink,  and  destroy  private  prop- 


198  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

erty  on  the  high  seas.  They  were  engaged  in  no  legiti 
mate  —  no  recognized  operation  of  modern  warfare ; 
unless  it  be  legitimate  for  an  invading  army  wholly  to 
devastate  a  hostile  country,  leaving  behind  it  a  smok 
ing  desert  only.  On  the  ocean,  the  archaic  principle 
still  obtains  that  the  immunity  of  private  property 
from  capture  or  destruction  is  confined  to  times  of 
peace ;  and,  when  war  intervenes,  mankind  reverts  to 
piracy,  as  the  natural  condition  of  maritime  life.  So 
the  commerce-destroyers  were  not  pirates,  —  common 
enemies  of  mankind  ;  but,  as  a  result  of  the  Treaty  of 
Washington,  a  new  and  broad  principle  will  inevitably, 
in  some  now  not  remote  hereafter,  replace  this  relic- 
of  barbarism,  —  the  principle  that  private  property, 
not  contraband  of  war,  is  as  much  entitled  to  immunity 
from  destruction  or  capture  on  water  as  on  land.  It 
is,  accordingly,  not  unsafe  even  now  to  predict  that  the 
Florida,  the  Alabama,  and  the  Shcnandoah  will  go 
down  in  history,  not  as  themselves  pirates,  but  as  the 
last  lineal  survivals  of  the  black-flagged  banditti  of  the 
olden  time.  If  this  so  prove,  it  will  in  the  close  be 
apparent  that  the  Treaty  of  Washington  supplemented 
the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation,  rounding  out  and 
completing  the  work  of  our  Civil  War.  The  verdict  of 
history  on  that  great  conflict  must  then  be  that  the  blood 
and  treasure  so  freely  poured  out  by  us  between  Sum- 
ter  and  Appomattox  were  not  expended  in  vain  ;  for, 
through  it  and  because  of  it,  the  last  vestiges  of  piracy 
vanished  from  the  ocean,  as  slavery  had  before  disap 
peared  from  the  land. 


APPENDIX  A1 

THE  grounds  on  which  the  British  government 
proceeded  in  May,  1861,  when  it  issued  the  proclama 
tion  of  belligerency,  were  clearly  set  forth  by  Lord 
Palmerston  in  the  course  of  a  debate  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  exactly  four  years  later  ;  when,  the  Civil 
War  having  been  brought  to  a  close,  the  proclama 
tion  was  withdrawn.  Throughout  that  period  Lord 
Palmerston  was  Premier ;  and,  on  the  15th  of  May, 
1865,  —  the  proclamation  having  been  issued  on  May 
13,  1861, — he  said,  in  answer  to  a  question  in  the 
House,  —  "  The  President  of  the  United  States  issued 
a  proclamation  declaring  a  blockade  of  all  the  coasts 
and  certain  ports  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  in 
accordance,  as  he  said,  with  the  law  of  nations.  Now 
a  blockade,  according  to  the  law  of  nations,  is  a  bel 
ligerent  right,  which  can  only  accrue  to  a  State  which 
is  at  war ;  and  I  need  not  say  that  if  there  is  one  bel 
ligerent  there  must  be  two  at  least,  and  therefore  the 
fact  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  declaring 
that  he  established  a  blockade  in  accordance  with  the 
law  of  nations  gave  him  all  those  rights  which  belong 
to  a  belligerent  in  declaring  a  blockade  —  the  right  of 
capture,  and  condemnation,  and  the  right  of  search 
in  regard  to  neutral  vessels.  The  British  government 
had  only  one  of  two  courses  to  pursue ;  the  first,  to 
refuse  to  submit  on  the  part  of  British  vessels  to 

1  See  supra,  p.  98. 


200  THE   TREATY   OF   WASHINGTON 

those  belligerent  rights,  on  the  ground  that  there  was 
no  formal  belligerent  on  the  other  side.  That  was 
not  a  course  which  was  at  all  expedient  to  pursue,  and 
therefore  the  only  course  left  us  was  to  acknowledge 
and  submit  to  those  belligerent  rights ;  and  that  neces 
sarily  involved  the  recognition  that  the  other  party 
was  also  a  belligerent."  .  .  . 

Looking  at  the  facts  in  the  case  through  a  vista  of 
forty  years,  and  in  connection  with  all  accepted  prin 
ciples  of  international  law,  it  must  now  be  acknow 
ledged  that  there  was  much  truth,  as  well  as  sound 
legal  sense,  in  the  dictum  on  this  point  of  Chief  Jus 
tice  Cockburn,  in  his  extremely  unconventional  "  opin 
ion  "  filed  in  connection  with  the  Geneva  award:  — 
"  The  pretension  that  the  Federal  Government  could 
treat  the  contest  as  a  war,  so  as  to  declare  a  blockade, 
and  thereby  exclude  neutral  nations  from  access  to 
the  blockaded  ports  for  the  purpose  of  trade,  while 
neutral  governments,  on  the  other  hand,  were  not 
entitled  to  treat  the  war  as  one  going  on  between  two 
belligerent  powers,  is  a  proposition  which  is,  I  say  it 
with  all  respect  for  Mr.  Adams,  really  preposterous." 
But  to  appreciate  the  full  audacity  of  the  positions  on 
this  point  assumed  by  Secretary  Seward,  —  the  cor 
rectness  of  which,  largely  through  the  utterances  of 
Senator  Sumner,  yet  has  vogue  as  a  species  of  Amer 
ican  article  of  historic  faith,  —  it  is  necessary  to  bear 
certain  facts  and  dates  distinctly  in  mind.  The  Rebel- 

1  Papers  relating  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington  (1872),  vol.  iv.  p.  321. 
On  this  point,  see  also  a  forcible  exposition  of  the  correct  principles 
of  international  law  in  the  letter  of  Earl  Russell  to  Mr.  Adams  of 
May  4,  1865.  Geneva  Arbitration  :  Correspondence,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  295. 
The  whole  subject  is  thoroughly  discussed  by  Lord  Cockburn,  in  his 
"  opinion."  Papers,  etc.,  pp.  313-326. 


APPENDIX  A  201 

lion  assumed  the  shape  of  a  fully  developed  civil  war 
on  April  12,  1861,  when  the  Confederates  opened 
fire  011  Fort  Suniter.  April  19,  seven  days  later,  the 
President  issued  his  proclamation,  announcing  the 
blockade  of  some  2700  miles  of  sea-coast,  "in  pursu 
ance  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  law 
of  nations  in  such  case  provided."  l  The  appeal  was 
thus  made  to  "  the  law  of  nations,"  and  the  step  was 
not  taken  as  a  matter  of  mere  municipal  regulation. 
At  the  same  time,  Secretary  Seward  informed  for 
eign  ministers  to  this  country,  and  instructed  our  own 
representatives  abroad,  that  the  blockade  would  "  be 
strictly  enforced  upon  the  principles  recognized  by  the 
law  of  nations  ;  "  and,  further,  provided  for  the  treat 
ment  of  the  "  armed  vessels  of  neutral  states."2  The 
Queen's  proclamation  of  May  13  was  published  four 
teen  days  after  the  receipt  in  London  of  the  news 
of  the  surrender  of  Suihter,  and  of  information  that 
the  Confederate  government  had  taken  steps  looking 
to  the  issue  of  letters  of  marque  ;  twelve  days  after 
receipt  of  intelligence  of  President  Lincoln's  procla 
mation  of  blockade ;  and  three  days  after  the  official 
communication  of  the  fact  by  Mr.  Dallas,  the  American 
Minister  in  London,  to  Lord  John  Russell,  Secretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs.3  One  of  the  most  considerable 
branches  of  British  commerce  —  that  to  and  from  the 
American  cotton  ports  —  was  thus,  at  a  moment's  no 
tice,  not  only  interfered  with,  but  broken  up  ;  British 
»  vessels  were,  under  the  law  of  nations,  subjected  to 
search,  and  liable  to  capture ;  the  law  of  contraband 

1  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  vi.  p.  14. 

2  Papers  relating  to  Treaty  of  Washington  (1872),  vol.  i.  p.  213. 

3  Ib.,  p.  218. 


202  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

and  prize  applied,  and  was  enforced.  Almost  at  once 
the  struggle  involved  armaments,  by  sea  and  land,  of 
the  first  magnitude,  and  conflicts  marked  by  an  almost 
unparalleled  loss  of  life.  Yet  Secretary  Seward  per 
sistently  maintained  that  this  struggle  —  well-nigh  the 
fiercest  on  record  —  in  no  way  concerned  foreign  na 
tions,  and  that  they  had  no  right  to  even  recognize  it 
as  existing.  So  far  as  the  world  at  large  was  con 
cerned,  —  though  its  commerce  was  broken  up,  its 
vessels  searched,  seized  and  condemned,  and  its  pro 
perty  confiscated  as  contraband,  —  the  disturbance  was 
merely  local  and  insignificant  in  character,  concerning 
no  one  but  ourselves.  Most  assuredly,  official  effront 
ery  could  go  no  further. 

That  the  recognition  by  the  British  government  of 
a  state  of  belligerency,  of  necessity  involving  two  par 
ties,  should,  if  possible,  have  been  in  courtesy  deferred 
until  the  arrival  of  the  newly  appointed  American 
Minister,  known  to  be  on  his  way,  is  indisputable. 
Most  fortunately  for  the  United  States,  it  was  not  so 
deferred.  On  the  other  hand,  every  hour  of  delay  in 
the  recognition  of  the  blockade  by  neutral  governments 
involved  the  possibility  of  unauthorized  search,  and 
consequent  seizures,  due  to  hostilities,  the  existence 
of  which  was  stoutly  denied  by  the  United  States,  and, 
therefore,  not  notified  to  those  concerned  by  neutral 
governments.  The  situation  was,  in  the  language  of 
Lord  Cockburn,  "  preposterous,"  and  could  only  con 
tinue  for  a  brief  period,  and  that  at  great  risk,  through 
the  exercise  of  extreme  comity  on  the  part  of  neutrals. 

And  yet,  so  strong  is  tradition,  the  question  is  still 
asked,  —  how  could  that  proclamation  have  been  con 
sidered  by  Mr.  Forster,  or  any  one  else,  as  a  point 


APPENDIX  A  203 

gained  for  the  United  States  ?  The  answer  seems 
obvious.  It  was  given  by  Lord  Palmerstoii  in  the 
speech  above  quoted.  The  United  States  declared  an 
extensive  blockade,  under  and  by  virtue  of  interna 
tional  law  and  usage.  By  the  Queen's  proclamation, 
that  blockade  was  recognized.  This  was  of  vital  im 
portance  to  the  United  States,  and  an  important 
concession  on  the  part  of  foreign  powers.  A  re 
cognition  of  the  blockade,  with  all  that  recognition 
implied,  was,  therefore,  in  May,  1861,  the  point  gained 
for  the  cause  of  the  Union  "  in  accordance  with  the 
earnest  wishes  of  [William  E.  Forster]  and  other 
friends  of  the  North."  As  to  Secretary  Seward's  con 
tention  that  our  Civil  War  was  no  affair  of  any  nation 
but  the  United  States,  it  will  not,  in  the  light  of  his 
tory  and  of  international  law,  bear  an  instant's  exam 
ination.  The  British  proclamation  of  belligerency  of 
May  13, 1861,  was  the  logical  and  legal  sequence  of 
the  President's  proclamation  of  blockade  of  the  19th 
of  the  previous  month.  By  the  nations  whose  com 
merce  was  affected  by  it,  the  blockade  had  either  to 
be  recognized  or  disallowed ;  and  its  recognition  was 
essential  to  the  Union  cause. 

The  difficulty  with  Secretary  Seward  was  one  not  at 
all  uncommon  among  men,  whether  in  public  station 
or  private  life.  He  claimed  for  the  side  he  repre 
sented  all  and  every  right  known  to  the  code ;  he  then 
vehemently  protested  against  the  application  to  him 
self,  by  those  affected  by  his  action,  of  its  logical  and 
necessary  consequences  under  that  code.  His  conten 
tions  may  have  been  wise,  as  well  as  bold,  under  the 
circumstances  and  at  the  time ;  but  American  histo 
rians  and  publicists  cannot  afford  to  profess  responsi 
bility  for  them  now.  They  are  quite  untenable. 


APPENDIX  BI 

THIS  assertion  seems  to  have  been  a  favorite  one 
with  Secretary  Seward ;  and  he  repeated  it  so  often, 
in  terms  only  slightly  varied,  that  he  evidently  per 
suaded  himself  of  its  truth.  He  thus  wrote  to  Mr. 
Pike,  the  Minister  at  the  Hague,  —  "  This  domestic 
war  .  .  .  would  come  to  an  end  to-morrow  if  the  Euro 
pean  States  should  clearly  announce  that  expectations 
of  favor  from  them  must  be  renounced."2  To  the  same 
effect  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Sanford,  at  Brussels,  May  23, 
1862,  —  "Europe  has  thus  put  this  beneficent  gov 
ernment  upon  an  ordeal  more  solemn  and  fearful," 3 
etc.  On  the  19th  of  February,  1862,  he  wrote  to 
Mr.  Dayton,  at  Paris,  — "  Let  the  European  States 
.  .  .  concede  now  to  the  Union  half  as  much  toleration 
as  they  have  practically,  though  unintentionally,  shown 
to  disunion,  and  the  Civil  War  will  come  to  an  end 
at  once."  4  Even  a  year  later,  after  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Adams,  —  "  The  insur 
rection  .  .  .  has  now  descended  so  low  that  mani 
festly  it  would  perish  at  once,  if  it  were  left  like  the 
late  insurrection  in  India,  like  the  insurrection  which 
a  few  years  ago  occurred  in  Canada  ...  to  stand  by 
means  of  its  own  strength,  not  as  a  recognized  bellig 
erent."5  The  Sepoy  mutiny  of  1857  was  undoubtedly 
a  fierce  struggle  for  supremacy ;  but  it  now  seems  in- 

1  Supra,  p.  101. 

2  Dip.  Cor.  1862,  p.  597-    See,  also,  pp.  597,  612. 
8  Ib.,  p.  656. 

4  Ib.,  p.  317  ;  see,  also,  pp.  320,  327,  332,  337,  338. 
6  Dip.  Cor.  1863,  p.  328. 


APPENDIX  B  205 

credible  that  an  American  Secretary  of  State  could, 
in  the  summer  of  1863,  with  Grant's  Wilderness 
campaign  and  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea  in  the  womb 
of  the  immediate  future,  have  gravely  put  our  Civil 
War  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  Canada  "  six-county 
insurrection"  of  1837,  effectually  suppressed  by  mili 
tia  and  one  regiment  of  infantry,  after  a  single  repulse 
of  a  fourth  of  a  regiment  from  a  brewery  extemporized 
into  a  stronghold.  But  the  same  lack  of  any  correct 
sense  of  proportion  is  apparent  in  all  the  discussions 
of  the  Rebellion  period,  and  of  the  period  immediately 
succeeding  the  Rebellion,  whether  diplomatic  and  par 
liamentary,  or  legal  and  historical.  It  permeates  the 
United  States  "  Case,"  prepared  for  submission  to  the 
Geneva  tribunal.  Seward  and  Sumner,  Motley  and 
Davis,  seemed  all  affected  by  it,  the  difference  being 
only  one  of  degree  and  temperament.  It  was  a  psy 
chological  phenomenon.  America  still  hung  on  the 
lips  of  Europe,  as  the  old  colonial,  dependency  spirit, 
continually  asserting  itself,  died  slowly  out.  In  the 
case  of  Secretary  Seward,  it  must  be  said  that,  though 
he  overdid  the  thing  grossly,  he  yet  wrote  and  talked 
largely  for  effect ;  but  there  is  no  reason  to  think  Mr. 
Sumner  did  not  fully  and  actually  believe  what  he  said, 
when,  in  April,  1869,  he  asserted  in  the  Senate  that 
a  certain  paper  manifesto,  recognizing  a  fact  of  com 
mon  knowledge,  put  forth  in  London  in  May,  1861, 
and  followed  by  no  act,  added  "  not  weeks  or  months, 
but  years  to  our  war."  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the 
genuine,  innate,  provincial  spirit  could  have  gone 
further.  The  moment  "  Her  Majesty's  Proclamation  " 
entered  into  account,  the  nascent  rebellion,  no  longer 
a  Palladian  giant,  was  suddenly  transformed  into  a 
puny,  workhouse  British  bastard. 


APPENDIX  C1 

WRITING  privately  to  his  friend,  S.  B.  Ruggles  of 
New  York,  on  May  18,  1869,  —  just  five  weeks  after 
the  delivery  of  Mr.  Sumner's  National  Claims  speech, 
-  Mr.  Fish  thus  explains  himself,  covering  the  whole 
situation,  and  indicating,  on  his  part  at  least,  a  clear 
comprehension  of  the  law  governing  it :  — 

"Public  law  recognizes  the  right  of  a  sovereign 
power,  when  a  civil  conflict  has  broken  out  in  another 
country,  to  determine  when  that  conflict  has  attained 
sufficient  complexity,  magnitude,  and  completeness, 
to  require  (not  merely  to  excuse)  for  the  protection  of 
its  own  interests  and  peace,  and  of  the  interests  and 
relations  and  duties  of  its  own  citizens  or  subjects, 
a  definition  of  its  relations,  and  of  the  relations  of 
its  citizens  or  subjects  to  those  of  the  parties  to  the 
conflict. 

"  In  the  exercise  of  this  right,  the  foreign  power  is 
responsible  to  the  general  obligations  of  right,  and  must 
be  guided  by  facts,  not  by  prejudice  for  or  against 
the  parent  country,  or  the  insurgents  —  least  of  all 
against  the  parent  country,  when  well  established,  and 
a  friendly  power. 

"  Having  defined  its  relations  to  the  parties  in  the 
civil  conflict  as  one  of  neutrality,  it  must  enforce  its 
neutral  position,  and  allow  no  infraction  thereof :  give 
no  favor. 

1  See  supra,  p.  112. 


APPENDIX  C  20T 

"  England  professes  to  have  exercised  only  what  is 
a  recognized  right  of  a  sovereign  foreign  power. 

"  We  have  held  she  was  precipitate ;  much  may 
well  be  said  on  this  side  —  she  had  promised  to 
await  Mr.  Adams's  arrival,  but  anticipated  it,  and  of 
course  any  information  or  explanation  he  might  make. 
Still  England  says  —  the  United  States  had  declared 
a  blockade  —  which  is  '  war  '  -  —  the  Confederates  had 
announced  '  letters  of  marque '  and  '  prize  courts '  which 
mean  4  war  '  -  -  both  sides  had  levied  large  armies  ; 
forts  had  been  seized,  etc.,  etc. 

"  This  would  seem  to  give  some  justification  to  her 
concession  of  belligerency,  and  disprove  the  complaint 
of  this  act  [of  concession]  of  some  of  its  force.  Then, 
again,  France  and  other  powers  were  contemporaneous 
with  England  in  the  same  concession.  The  United 
States  make  no  claim  against  them,  and  it  is  impor 
tant  to  separate  them  from  any  intent  to  unite  with 
England  in  resisting  the  claim. 

"  The  complaint  against  England  is,  that  she  sub 
sequently  allowed  acts  inconsistent  with  neutrality, 
and  these  acts  (to  a  certain  extent)  reflect  back  upon 
the  act  of  concession  of  belligerency,  and  to  this  extent 
alone  should  the  complaint  be  limited  of  the  procla 
mation  of  neutrality.  No  other  nation  which  conceded 
belligerency  (even  at  or  about  the  same  time  with 
England)  was  guilty  of  such  subsequent  causes  of 
injury. 

"  The  British  proclamation  of  neutrality  is,  there 
fore,  subject  of  complaint,  only  as  leading  to,  as  char, 
acterized  by,  and  authorizing  in  its  execution  and 
enforcement  the  fitting  out  of  the  Alabama,  etc.,  etc., 
the  acts  of  hospitality,  etc.,  given  in  their  colonial 


208  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

ports,  to  those  piratical  cruisers,  and  as  leading  to  the 
moral  support  given  in  England  to  the  Eebel  cause. 

"  Mr.  Sumner  makes  the  act  of  concession  per  se, 
a  grievance ;  he  draws  a  distinction  not  recognized  by 
publicists,  between  belligerency  on  land  and  what  he 
terms  4  ocean  belligerency.'  Belligerency  is  war,  and 
whether  on  land  or  on  the  ocean,  or  on  both,  is  a  fact, 
and  not  susceptible  of  division  —  certainly  not,  when 
the  parties  to  the  conflict  each  have  seaboard,  and 
ports  and  commerce. 

"  This  is  (perhaps)  the  main  point  in  his  argument, 
and  is  one  which  it  will  be  difficult  to  maintain  — 
difficult,  at  least,  to   establish  now,  as  applicable  to 
Prize  Courts. 

"  Pray  let  me  hear  from  you.  The  newspapers  seem 
shy  of  dissent  from  what  seems  to  be  the  controlling 
argument  in  bringing  the  Senate  to  its  vote. 

"But  the  fact  is,  many  Senators  dissented  from  the 
argument  while  agreeing  in  the  conclusion." 

As  to  the  influence  of  Mr.  Sumner's  position  and 
legal  contentions  as  contributing  to  the  defeat  of  the 
Johnson -Clarendon  Convention,  Mr.  Fish  at  the  same 
time  (May  17)  wrote  to  Senator  W.  P.  Fessenden, 
then  at  his  home  in  Portland,  Maine,  where  he  died 
early  in  the  following  September.  Mr.  Fessenden,  on 
May  25,  replied  as  follows  :  — 

"  As  to  Sumner's  speech,  I  can  only  say  that  it 
would  not,  in  my  judgment,  be  safe  to  look  at  it  in 
the  light  of  an  ultimatum.  Such  an  idea  would  be 
simply  preposterous. 

"  When  delivered,  I  considered  it  as  intended  for  a 


APPENDIX  C  209 

statement  of  our  grievances,  not  of  our  claims.  I  per 
ceive  that  the  language  is  stronger  than  I  had  supposed 
and  in  some  particulars  unguarded  and  exceptionable, 
and  calculated  to  give  a  wrong  impression.  I  was 
pleased  with  the  tone  of  the  speech,  and  so  said  ;  though 
it  would  have  been  vastly  better  to  have  made  none  at 
all,  and  trusted  to  the  effect  of  such  a  vote.  But  it 
was  not  possible  for  Sumner  to  omit  availing  himself 
of  such  an  occasion.  On  the  whole,  I  think  no  great 
harm  will  be  done  by  it. 

"  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  the  offence  of  recog 
nizing  belligerency  can  be  atoned  for  by  the  payment 
of  money.  Still,  under  the  circumstances,  it  was  a 
grievous  wrong,  and  coupled  with  subsequent  avowals 
and  conduct  would  have  justified  a  declaration  of  war. 
The  occasion  for  that,  however,  has  gone  by.  Yet  we 
are  entitled  to  something  in  the  nature  of  a  plaster 
for  the  sore  —  a  little  of  '  Mrs.  Winslow's  Soothing 
Syrup  '  at  least.  The  fault  of  the  treaty  was  that  it 
offered  absolutely  nothing,  and  might  have  left  mat 
ters  in  a  worse  condition  than  they  now  are." 

Mr.  Carl  Schurz,  then  in  the  Senate,  writing  con 
fidentially  from  St.  Louis,  said  to  Secretary  Fish  :  — 

"  We  shall  then  endeavor  to  find  a  form  of  settle 
ment  as  regardful  of  the  national  pride  of  England, 
and  of  her  material  interests,  as  possible.  (Distant 
hint  at  Canada.)  In  the  mean  time  we  prefer  not  to 
indulge  in  possibly  exciting  discussions,  but,  for  the 
present,  we  are  content  to  leave  the  question  open, 
giving  the  British  Government  a  fair  chance  for  quiet 
consideration. 


210  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

"  Mr.  Motley  might  furthermore  be  instructed, 
when  by  Lord  Clarendon  a  point  of  international  law 
is  urged  upon  him,  never  to  reply  promptly,  to  refer 
the  matter  to  his  Government  whenever  there  is  a 
chance  for  it,  and,  when  he  cannot  avoid  giving  an 
answer,  to  be  very  short.  He  ought  to  produce  the 
impression  that  we  are  rather  inclined  to  take  the 
matter  very  easy  and  are  in  no  haste  whatever.  He 
might,  when  very  hard  pressed,  occasionally  ask  the 
question,  whether  England  would  be  content  to  have 
us  follow  the  precedent  set  by  her  ?  In  private  con 
versation  he  might  freely  speak  of  the  annexation  of 
the  North  American  provinces  as  being  the  decided 
wish  of  the  American  people  in  settlement  of  the 
claims,  leaving  the  Government  uncommitted.  It  is 
our  interest  to  familiarize  them  gradually  with  the 
idea." 

George  F.  Edmunds  of  Vermont  was,  at  the  time 
of  the  rejection  of  the  Johnson-Clarendon  Conven 
tion,  a  member  of  the  Senate.  In  a  private  letter, 
written  thirty-three  years  later,  he  thus  gave  his  re 
collections  of  the  effect  of  Mr.  Simmer's  speech  on 
the  minds  of  his  colleagues :  — 

"lam  confident  that  the  Johnson-Clarendon  treaty 
was  not  rejected  by  reason  of  its  failure  to  embrace 
the  stupendous  claims  of  Mr.  Sumner  based  upon 
Great  Britain's  recognition  of  belligerency.  I  do  not 
believe  there  were  more  than  ten  Senators,  if  as  many, 
who  stood  upon  any  such  ground.  I  am  sure  the 
majority  of  the  Senate  acted  upon  the  ground  that  the 
making  of  such  a  treaty,  and  in  such  a  form,  would 
not  only  be  a  very  small  piecemeal  toward  the  restora 
tion  of  good  relations,  but  would  be  a  kind  of  recog- 


APPENDIX  C  211 

nition  of  the  fact  that  we  had  nothing  more  to  com 
plain  of  than  the  ordinary  and  accidental  wrongs  that 
the  government  of  one  country  continually  commits 
or  permits  against  the  citizens  of  another.  Nobody 
who  possessed  even  a  moderate  knowledge  of  the 
principles  of  international  law,  and  their  practice, 
would,  unless  laboring  under  some  great  emotion, 
maintain  for  a  moment  that  Great  Britain  had  vio 
lated  international  law,  or  had  done  an  act  in  that 
sense  hostile  to  the  United  States.  It  was  only  valu 
able  and  important  as  throwing  light  upon  the  later 
conduct  of  that  Government  in  permitting  the  building 
and  departure  of  Confederate  vessels  and  munitions  of 
war  from  her  ports." 


APPENDIX  D1 

THE  following  is  the  speech  referred  to  in  the  text, 
so  far  as  it  related  to  the  United  States.  It  was 
delivered  at  the  Lord  Mayor's  banquet,  November  9, 
1869.  and  printed  in  the  London  Times,  of  the  follow 
ing  day. 

"  Without  arrogating  influence,  I  think  we  are 
bound  on  every  occasion  that  may  offer  to  make  every 
effort  towards  composing  those  differences  and  allay 
ing  those  disturbances  which  may  arise  in  different 
portions  of  the  world  ;  and  I  rejoice  to  think  that,  on 
more  than  one  occasion  since  his  return  to  office,  my 
noble  friend  who  holds  the  seals  of  the  Foreign-office 
has  had  the  satisfaction  of  receiving  the  liberal  and 
handsome  acknowledgments  of  foreign  Governments 
for  the  useful  contributions  he  has  made  towards  the 
accommodation  of  their  relations.  One  exception,  per 
haps  —  one  partial  exception  —  I  ought  to  name.  It 
is  an  exception  of  the  deepest  interest.  I  refer  to  our 
relations  with  the  United  States.  But  there  is  no 
occasion,  my  Lord  Mayor,  that  I  should  refer  to  those 
relations  in  any  terms  except  those  of  peace  and  con 
cord.  (Cheers.)  Were  I  tempted  to  depart  from  that 
friendly  strain  I  should,  indeed,  be  admonished  to 
judge  more  correctly  and  to  speak  more  wisely  by  an 
event  which  has  happened  in  the  city  in  the  course  of 
the  last  few  days.  Your  quick  associations  will  out- 

1  See  supra,  p.  128. 


APPENDIX  D  213 

run  my  allusions.  You  will  know  that  I  refer  to  the 
death  of  Mr.  Peabody,  a  man  whose  splendid  benefac 
tions  —  which,  indeed,  secure  the  immortality  of  his 
name  in  that  which  he  regarded  as  his  old  mother 
country,  but  which,  likewise,  in  a  broader  view,  is 
applicable  to  all  humanity  —  taught  us  in  this  com 
mercial  age,  which  has  witnessed  the  construction  of 
so  many  colossal  fortunes,  at  once  the  noblest  and 
most  needful  of  all  lessons  —  namely,  he  has  shown  us 
how  a  man  can  be  the  master  of  his  wealth  instead  of 
being  its  slave.  (Cheers.)  And,  my  Lord  Mayor, 
most  touching  it  is  to  know,  as  I  have  learnt,  that 
while,  perhaps,  some  might  think  he  had  been  unhappy 
in  dying  in  a  foreign  land,  yet,  so  were  his  affections 
divided  between  the  land  of  his  birth  and  the  home  of 
his  early  ancestors,  that  that  which  had  been  his  fond 
wish  has,  indeed,  been  realized  —  that  he  might  be 
buried  in  America,  but  that  it  might  please  God  to 
ordain  that  he  should  die  in  England.  (Cheers.)  My 
Lord  Mayor,  with  the  country  of  Mr.  Peabody  we  are 
not  likely  to  quarrel.  (Loud  cheers.)  It  is  true, 
indeed,  that  the  care  and  skill  of  diplomacy,  animated 
by  the  purest  and  most  upright  feelings,  though  they 
have  not  imperilled,  yet  have  failed  to  lead  to  a  final 
issue  at  this  moment  the  tangled  questions  of  law  that 
have  been  in  discussion  between  the  two  countries  ;  but 
the  very  delay  that  has  taken  place,  instead  of  being 
a  delay  tending  to  anger,  has  been  a  delay  promoted 
by  kindred  good-will  and  by  the  belief  that  the  inter 
vention  of  a  limited  time  may  be  likely  to  obviate  any 
remaining  difficulty.  (Cheers.)  My  Lord  Mayor,  I 
speak  with  confidence  in  anticipating  that  that  which 
the  whole  world  would  view  with  horror  and  amaze- 


214  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

ment,  namely,  a  parricidal  strife  between  England  and 
America,  —  is  above  all  things  the  most  unlikely  to 
grow  out  of  this  state  of  affairs.  My  confidence  is,  in 
the  first  place,  in  the  sentiment  which  I  know  ani 
mates  the  Government  of  the  United  States  as  well  as 
our  own,  it  is  in  the  sentiment  which  we  believe  to 
pervade  the  mind  of  the  people  of  these  two  great 
countries ;  and,  permit  me  to  add,  I  have  yet  another 
source  of  confidence,  connected  with  some  of  those 
changes  which  we  are  witnessing  in  the  age  in  which 
we  live.  I  mean  this  change  in  particular,  that  as  in 
every  country  there  has  long  been,  and  especially  in 
the  best  governed  countries,  not  only  a  force  of  law, 
but  also  of  opinion  that  has  tended  to  restrain  it,  so 
with  the  augmenting  intercourse  of  nations  there  is 
now  growing  up  what  I  may  term  an  international 
opinion,  a  standard  of  international  conduct  higher 
than  the  standard  which  a  particular  nation  sets  up 
for  itself,  and  to  which  it  becomes  more  and  more  from 
year  to  year  as  we  live  necessary  that  each  country 
should  conform  consistently  with  the  rights  and  duties 
of  the  whole  mass  of  the  civilized  community  of  the 
world." 


APPENDIX  E1 

THE  condition  of  affairs  in  Cuba  became  matter  of 
discussion  again  in  1896.  Senator  Sherman  then 
stated,  in  the  course  of  a  Senate  debate,  that,  in  1870, 
there  had  been  a  conflict  of  opinion  between  President 
Grant  and  Secretary  Fish.  Mr.  Hamilton  Fish,  son 
of  the  Secretary,  who  had  died  three  years  before,  was, 
in  1896,  Speaker  of  the  New  York  House  of  Assembly, 
and  lie  permitted  the  publication  of  an  Associated 
Press  despatch,  dated  Albany,  March  15,  which  threw 
much  light  on  this  question,  —  a  question  always  of 
interest,  inasmuch  as  Cuban  complications  gave  its 
shape  to  the  whole  foreign  policy  of  the  government 
during  General  Grant's  first  administration,  includ 
ing  the  country's  attitude  towards  Great  Britain,  after 
the  rejection  of  the  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention. 

The  younger  Hamilton  Fish  then  said,  —  "  During 
his  eight  years'  service  in  the  State  Department  Mr. 
Fish  kept,  chiefly  as  a  reference  record  for  his  own 
use,  a  diary  in  his  own  handwriting,  containing  a  min 
ute  of  important  transactions  and  of  his  conversations 
with  the  President,  members  of  the  Cabinet,  Senators, 
and  other  leading  public  men  in  regard  to  the  more 
prominent  of  the  foreign  questions  with  which  he  had 
to  deal.  From  May  31  to  June  13,  1870,  the  date 
of  President  Grant's  special  message  to  Congress  on 
Cuban  belligerency,  the  entries  in  the  diary  are  many, 
1  Supra,  p.  119. 


216  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

and  very  full,  in  regard  to  the  origin,  preparation, 
discussions  in  the  Cabinet,  and  final  completion  of  the 
special  message." 

The  following  passages  from  the  diary  were  then 
given  to  the  correspondent  of  the  Associated  Press, 
his  despatch  appearing,  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  many 
journals  of  the  following  day  (March  16,  1896)  :  — 

February  19,  1870.  "  Called  this  morning,  by  ap 
pointment,  to  see  Senator  John  Sherman  on  subject 
of  the  unit  of  coinage.  After  conversing  on  that 
question,  I  referred  to  his  resolution  introduced  in  the 
Senate,  and  his  speech  in  favor  of  recognizing  the 
belligerency  of  Cuba,  and  asked  if  he  had  recently 
examined  the  treaty  with  Spain  of  1795.  He  said  he 
had  not ;  was  not  aware  of  the  existence  of  such  a 
treaty.  I  referred  to  its  provisions,  and  to  the  prob 
able  consequences  of  the  exercise  by  Spain  of  the  right 
of  visit  (or  of  search)  ;  thought  our  people  would  not 
submit  to  it,  and  that  the  consequences  would  soon 
develop  in  war ;  said  that  fighting  was  not  belliger 
ency  ;  there  is  fighting,  but  no  belligerency  in  Cuba ; 
there  is  no  government  of  the  insurrectionary  party, 
no  political  organization,  etc.  He  admitted  that  he 
had  not  examined  the  subject  closely,  but  said  there 
is  a  good  deal  of  excitement  in  the  country  on  the 
subject.  I  advised  him,  in  connection  with  the  passing 
of  his  resolution  of  belligerency,  to  prepare  bills  for 
the  increase  of  the  public  debt,  and  to  meet  the  in 
creased  appropriation  which  will  be  necessary  for  the 
army,  navy,  etc." 

June  10,  1870.  "Judge  Orth  and  General  Butler 
called  in  the  evening  to  urge  the  sending  of  a  message 
by  the  President  on  the  question  of  Cuban  belliger- 


APPENDIX  E  217 

ency.  Orth  says  the  vote  will  be  close.  Banks  will 
make  the  closing  speech,  but  there  are  some  twenty 
or  thirty  quiet  members  who  may  be  decided  by  his 
speech,  but  would  not  go  against  the  President's 
views." 

June  12,  1870.  "  Stay  at  home  and  prepare  a  mes 
sage  on  the  Cuban  belligerency  question,  to  be  sub 
mitted  for  the  President's  consideration,  in  case  he 
agreed  to  send  one.  He  has  not  yet  returned  from 
his  fishing  excursion." 

June  13,  1870.  "It  was  generally  admitted  that  if 
war  is  to  be  resorted  to  it  should  be  by  a  direct  decla 
ration,  and  not  by  embarrassing  Spain  by  a  declara 
tion  of  belligerency;  agrees  unanimously  that  no  con 
dition  of  facts  exists  to  justify  belligerency.  Finally 
the  President  amends  his  sentences  by  referring  in 
general  terms  to  seizures  on  the  high  seas,  embargoes 
of  property,  and  personal  outrages.  Robeson  adds 
the  concluding  sentences,  claiming  that  the  question 
of  belligerency  is  distinct  from  those  questions  of 
wrongs  which  are  being  pressed  for  indemnification, 
and,  if  not  satisfied,  they  will  be  made  the  subject  of 
a  future  message.  And  thus  it  is  agreed  that  the 
message  shall  be  sent  in." 

In  view  of  the  close  bearing  of  the  policy  at  this 
time  pursued  towards  Spain  on  the  policy  pursued 
towards  Great  Britain,  I  asked  the  representatives  of 
Mr.  Fish  for  any  further  entries  from  the  diary  made 
at  that  time  on  this  topic.  In  compliance  with  my 
request,  the  following  were  furnished. 

A  cabinet  meeting  was  held  on  the  day  following 
that  of  the  last  passage  from  the  diary  quoted  in  the 
Associated  Press  despatch  above  referred  to :  - 


218  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

June  14,  1870.  "Also  read  Clinton  J.  Trues' 
(Consul  at  St.  Thomas)  despatch,  not  numbered, 
dated  April  16.  .  .  .  President  thinks  he  may  be 
removed,  and  wishes  to  give  the  place  to  a  nominee 
of  Governor  Morton.  He  has  wished  to  give  almost 
every  place,  for  some  weeks  past,  to  some  friend  of 
Morton.  He  then  speaks  of  the  San  Domingo  treaty  ; 
his  desire  for  its  ratification  ;  that  he  wishes  all  the 
members  of  his  Cabinet,  and  all  his  friends,  to  use  all 
proper  efforts  to  aid  him ;  that  he  will  not  consider 
those  who  oppose  his  policy  as  entitled  to  influence 
in  obtaining  positions  under  him:  that  he  will  not 
let  those  who  oppose  him  '  name  Ministers  to  Lon 
don,'  etc.,  etc.  ;  refers  warmly  and  affectionately  to 
Babcock,  whose  innocence  of  the  charges  against  him 
he  confidently  believes ;  speaks  very  strongly  against 
Perry,  against  whom  he  says  grave  charges  were  made 
while  in  the  army.  .  .  . 

"  A  general  approval  is  expressed  by  the  members 
of  the  Cabinet,  on  the  announcement  of  his  determi 
nation  to  hold  members  of  the  party  to  the  support 
of  the  policy  of  the  Administration.  (I  did  not  say 
so,  but  hope  it  may  mean  something  more  than  San 
Domingo.)  I  did  say  that  I  was  glad  to  hear  this  (it 
is  what  I  had  recommended  some  months  ago  when  the 
President  said  he  would  remove  men  from  New  York 
Custom  House  and  Post  Office,  who  had  been  appointed 
on  recommendation  of  Evarts  and  others  connected 
with  the  New  York  Sun;  but  Boutwell  interposed 
and  prevented  the  carrying  out  of  this  determination), 
and  hoped  it  would  be  applied  to  the  general  policy  of 
the  Administration,  and  referred  to  the  paper  read  a 
short  time  before  from  D.  C.  Forney,  and  said  that 


APPENDIX  E  219 

while   J.    W.    Forney  supported  the  Cuban  policy, 
etc." 

June  17,  1870.  "  Not  an  allusion  was  made  at  the 
Cabinet  to  Judge  Hoar's  resignation,  or  to  the  pro 
ceedings  in  the  House  on  the  4  Cuba '  message  ;  after 
the  meeting  (Hoar,  Cox,  Robeson  and  I,  on  the  por 
tico)  Hoar  and  Cox  congratulated  me  most  cordially, 
saying  it  was  '  the  greatest  triumph  the  Administra 
tion  had  yet  achieved.'  Robeson  said,  '  Yes  —  the 
first  triumph.'  All  concur  in  the  opinion  that  the 
movement  was  wise,  and  beneficial  in  its  results,  that 
it  has  served  to  concentrate  and  consolidate  the  party, 
and  to  exhibit  a  policy,  and  the  capacity  of  rallying 
the  party.  This  in  truth  has  been  the  great  want  of 
the  party  ;  the  presentation  of  some  issue  on  which 
they  should  be  required,  as  party  men,  to  say  '  yes ' 
or  4  nay  '  distinctly  upon  some  issue  presented  by  the 
Administration ;  we  have  not  done  it  before.  Each 
man  has  been  allowed  to  follow  his  own  peculiar  views. 
Consequently  all  the  measures  presented  by  the  Ad 
ministration  thus  far  have  failed.  I  felt  that  the 
4  Cuban  '  question  was  the  one  on  which  perhaps 
more  than  on  any  other,  the  sensational  emotions  of 
the  party  and  of  the  country  might  be  arrayed  in 
opposition  to  what  is  honest  and  right.  Believing,  as 
I  do,  that  the  public  sentiment,  however  much  influ 
enced  by  questions  of  sentiment,  and  of  supposed 
popular  impulse,  is  sure  eventually  to  be  just  and 
correct,  I  have  pressed  this  question  in  the  way  I 
have  done,  and  first  tried  the  proposed  message  sub 
mitted  a  short  time  since  ;  finding  the  President  would 
not  adopt  it,  I  tried  the  latter  message,  and  he  was 
induced  with  great  hesitation,  and  with  much  reluc- 


220  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

tance,  to  sign  it,  and  after  it  was  sent  in  he  told  me 
that  he  feared  he  had  made  a  mistake.  I  never 
doubted  the  propriety  of  it,  nor  the  4  policy '  of  it, 
in  the  mere  sense  of  ordinary  politics.  It  evoked  a 
fierce  debate,  and  much  denunciation,  but  it  evoked 
also  much  good  sense,  in  the  speeches  of  those  who 
sustained  it ;  an  expression  of  good,  sound  interna 
tional  law,  and  of  honesty  of  purpose,  and  it  brought 
the  gravity  of  the  case  to  the  consideration  of  Con 
gress  ;  and  the  Administration,  after  the  severest 
debate  on  a  question  of  Foreign  Policy  which  has 
occurred  for  years,  was  triumphantly  sustained.  In 
the  mere  and  the  low  sense,  of  a  political  or  partisan 
question,  it  has  consolidated  the  party,  and  those  who 
are  the  demagogues  and  the  disorganizes,  —  the  men 
who  follow  a  party  so  long  as  they  can  control  it.  In 
a  higher  view,  it  has  shown  that  the  representatives 
of  the  country  can  rise  above  the  temporary  and  fer 
vent  appeals  of  a  momentary  excitement  of  popular 
sympathy  in  support  of  the  obligations  of  national 
duties,  and  in  the  line  and  direction  of  honesty  and  of 
right,  even  when  opposed  by  clamor,  and  by  appeals 
to  passion.  Most  sincerely  am  I  thankful  for  the 
result,  and  that  I  have  been  a  very  humble  instrument 
in  bringing  it  to  its  conclusion.  I  have  been  most 
grossly  maligned  and  assailed.  At  times  I  have  been 
inclined  to  retire  and  abandon  the  cause,  but  I  have 
felt  it  a  duty  to  stand  or  fall  with  what  I  felt  to  be  a 
principle.  The  office  I  hold  has  no  attractions  for 
me ;  it  is  attended  with  immense  labor,  with  great 
sacrifices  of  comfort,  and  of  personal  and  family  asso 
ciations,  with  privations  of  pursuits  with  which  I  had 
surrounded  myself,  and  which  were  congenial  to  my 


APPENDIX  E  221 

tastes  and  my  years.  .  .  .  Most  gladly  would  I  be 
relieved  of  its  honors,  and  its  labors,  its  responsi 
bilities,  and  the  constant  criticisms  and  misrepresen 
tations  to  which  its  incumbent  is  exposed.  If  I  could, 
now,  to-day,  when  the  vote  of  Congress  has  emphatic 
ally  sustained  me,  with  a  consciousness  of  duty,  resign, 
I  would  follow  Hoar's  example,  and  send  a  written 
note,  declaring  myself  once  more  free  from  official 
duties  and  responsibilities.  I  do  not  quite  yet  see  the 
road  clear.  I  hope  to  do  so  soon.  I  certainly  shall 
find  it  open  before  long. 

"  While  at  dinner  Judge  Hoar  called.  He  goes 
home  this  evening,  to  return,  and  remain  in  office  until 
the  end  of  July. 

"  The  public  announcement  of  his  resignation,  he 
tells  me,  was  '  owing  to  one  of  the  leaks  at  the  White 
House  —  that  the  President  had  given  his  reply  to 
one  of  the  confidential  clerks  to  be  copied,  and  thus 
it  had  gotten  out ;  '  hearing  it  had  been  telegraphed 
to  the  public  prints  in  New  York,  and  thus  given  to 
the  world,  he  had  advised  the  immediate  nomination 
of  his  successor,  to  relieve  the  President  from  the 
importunity  which  would  otherwise  follow.  He  said 
that  he  called  for  the  purpose  of  urging  me  '  under 
all  circumstances  to  hold  fast,'  and  added  most  kindly 
and  flatteringly,  that  I  was  '  the  bulwark  now  stand 
ing  between  the  Country  and  its  destruction.' 

"  This  may  be  very  complimentary,  but  while  I  am 
trying  to  do  my  duty,  I  can  by  no  means  accept  either 
the  compliment  or  the  responsibility  —  (I  mean  before 
very  long  to  retire  from  the  Cabinet,  and  from  all 
public  position) .  I  told  the  Judge  that  I  did  not  feel 
that  I  could  much  longer  stand  the  labor,  and  the 


222  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

annoyance  and  abuse  of  official  position.  With  great 
apparent  (and  I  doubt  not  sincere)  earnestness  he 
urged  me  not  to  think  of  leaving.  But  there  is  a 
time  in  a  man's  life  when  he  must  leave  public  ser 
vice,  and  there  is  a  time  when  he  ought  to  leave  it, 
and  a  time  when  he  is  entitled  to  leave  it.  I  con 
scientiously  think  that  one  of  the  two  latter  has  very 
nearly,  if  not  quite,  arrived  in  my  case.  If  there  be 
no  other  ground  for  this  opinion,  I  may  honestly  say 
4  the  wish  is  Father  to  the  thought.'  I  should  be 
infinitely  happier  out  of  office. 

"  In  the  evening  the  President  came  to  see  me.  .  .  . 
Again  referring  to  the  difference  of  views  with  regard 
to  '  San  Domingo,'  he  expressed  regret  that  Boutwell 
had  not  been  present  on  Tuesday  when  he  spoke  of 
his  expected  assistance  from  the  Members  of  his  Cabi 
net  ;  said  I  had  always  given  him  aid  with  regard 
to  it.  (I  have  certainly  been  loyal  to  a  measure  of 
policy  which  he  inaugurated,  and  after  it  was  entered 
upon  have  done  what  I  could  to  sustain  it.  I  might 
have  paused  before  entering  upon  it,  and  think  it  has 
been  embarrassed  unnecessarily  by  the  interference  of 
those  who  were  not  properly  charged  with  the  manage 
ment  of  such  negotiations,  and  by  the  intervention  of 
some  persons  whose  standing  had  not  increased  public 
confidence.)  He  also  said  that  Belknap,  Robeson  and 
Cresswell  had  sustained  it.  That  there  was  no  man 
whom  he  loved  more  than  Governor  Cox,  but  regretted 
he  had  not  given  the  Treaty  his  support.  He  referred 
to  the  newspaper  rumors  of  further  changes  in  the 
Cabinet,  and  that  reporters  had  called  upon  him 
yesterday  to  inquire  as  to  them  ;  said  he  had  given 
Mr.  Gobright  (Agent  of  the  Associated  Press)  the 


APPENDIX  E  223 

correct  statement,  and  asked  if  I  had  read  it ;  the  New 
York  Times  of  this  morning  was  lying  on  my  table, 
and  I  read  Gobright's  article,  and  the  correspondence 
between  Hoar  and  him ;  he  says  Gobright's  article  is 
substantially  correct.  Taking  up  the  subject  of  news 
paper  rumors,  and  newspaper  reporters,  I  say  that  I 
had  observed  the  rumors  with  respect  to  myself,  and 
had  been  visited  last  evening  by  many  reporters,  and 
I  now  desired  again  to  repeat  what  I  had  more  than 
once  before  said  to  him,  that  I  should  be  glad  to 
withdraw  from  the  Cabinet,  and  would  do  so  at  any 
moment  when  he  would  accept  my  resignation.  He 
replied,  '  I  will  tell  you  when  I  want  to  do  so  —  don't 
speak  of  it  until  then.'  I  answered  that  it  was  a 
laborious  position,  full  of  responsibilities,  and  without 
thanks,  exposing  one  to  great  abuse  and  misrepresen 
tation,  and  I  could  not  stand  it  much  longer.  He  said 
that  he  was  aware  of  the  thanklessness  of  the  position, 
and  could  understand  that  nothing,  but  a  sense  of 
duty,  would  retain  a  man  in  the  position  of  a  Cabinet 
Minister.  He  would  not,  however,  listen  to  my  wish 
to  withdraw.  .  .  . 

"  I  referred  to  the  recent  debate  and  vote  in  the 
House  on  the  Cuban  question,  and  remarked  in  con 
nection  therewith,  '  I  hope  that  you  have  no  reason  to 
regret  sending  the  Message.'  He  replied,  c  I  like  the 
vote  very  much  —  the  debate  was  violent,  and  denun 
ciatory  ;  it  is  strange  that  men  cannot  allow  others  to 
differ  with  them,  without  charging  corruption  as  the 
cause  of  the  difference  ; '  pressing  the  question  again 
as  to  the  Message^  he  said,  4  No  —  I  think  it  has  done 
good  ; '  he  continued  in  deprecation  of  the  personalities 
and  abuse  heaped  upon  public  men ;  said  he  had  been 


224  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

the  subject  of  investigation  (referring  to  the  Davis- 
Hatch  inquiry,  now  in  progress),  and  alluded  to  the 
4  Gold  Speculation '  investigation  of  some  months 
back,  with  a  good  deal  of  feeling,  and  said,  4  There  is 
little  inducement  other  than  a  sense  of  duty  in  hold 
ing  public  position  in  this  country  —  but  for  that  I 
do  not  know  what  there  is  to  induce  a  man  to  take 
either  the  place  I  hold,  or  one  in  the  Cabinet,  and 
were  it  not  for  that  I  would  resign  immediately.' 
He  seemed  very  well  satisfied  with  the  result  of  the 
Cuban  discussion,  and  said  that  he  observed  that  Gen 
eral  Butler  had  thought  proper  to  disclaim  the  author 
ship  of  the  message  for  Gushing.  I  said  that  the 
papers,  especially  the  New  York  Sun,  ascribe  every 
paper  officially  written  to  Gushing,  but  that  as  to  the 
message  on  Cuban  belligerency,  no  person  whatever 
had  seen  a  word  of  it,  until  I  had  read  it  to  him  on 
Monday  morning,  except  the  Attorney-General,  that  I 
wrote  it  every  word  with  my  own  hand  on  Sunday, 
and  went  in  the  afternoon  to  Judge  Hoar's ;  read  it 
to  him,  and  he  suggested  the  change  of  some  three  or 
four  words,  only,  which  change  was  made." 


APPENDIX   FI 

THE  expression  used  in  the  text  that  "  this  pre 
mised,  the  course  now  pursued  in  the  deposition  of 
Mr.  Sumner  from  the  chairmanship  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations  was  more  than  justifi 
able;  it  was  necessary,  as  well  as  right,"  has,  since  the 
publication  of  this  address,  been  criticised.  Friends 
and  admirers  of  Mr.  Sumner,  of  whom  there  are 
many,  especially  in  New  England,  have  taken  issue  on 
this  point,  contending  that,  under  all  the  circumstances 
even  yet  disclosed,  the  removal  was  unprecedented, 
and  an  arbitrary  exercise  of  power  by  a  partisan  ma 
jority  of  Republican  Senators,  acting  in  obedience  to 
what  was,  practically,  an  executive  demand. 

By  the  word  "  right "  in  the  text,  it  was  meant  that 
the  action  taken  in  this  matter  was  taken  for  good 
and  sufficient  reasons,  and  with  due  regard  to  those 
public  interests  which  should  always  be  the  dominat 
ing  consideration  in  the  minds  of  legislators,  whether 
members  of  the  United  States  Senate  or  any  other 
parliamentary  body.  This  conclusion  was  reached 
after  a  careful  examination  of  the  record  and  the 
principles  involved  ;  nor  have  I  seen  any  reason  why 
it  should  be  withdrawn,  or  in  any  way  modified.  In 
reviewing  the  subject,  some  repetition  of  statements 
made  in  the  text  is  unavoidable. 

The  contention  on  the  part  of  the  adherents  of  Mr. 
1  See  supra,  p.  183. 


226  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

Sumner  appears  to  be  based  upon  erroneous  premises, 
leading  to  conclusions  which  would  render  parlia 
mentary  government  in  the  United  States  practically 
impossible.  Some  confusion  of  thought,  as  well  as 
misapprehension  of  facts,  seems  also  to  pervade  many 
of  the  criticisms.  It  is,  in  the  first  place,  tacitly, 
perhaps  unconsciously,  assumed  that  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States  is,  in  some  inscrutable  way,  a 
judicial  rather  than  a  legislative  body,  and  that  the 
chairmen  of  Senate  committees  are,  by  usage  and  pre 
scription,  amounting  to  an  unwritten  law,  entitled  to 
retain  their  positions,  in  any  event,  until  the  political 
complexion  of  the  body  is  so  changed  that  one  party 
supplants  the  other  as  the  dominating  power.  This 
subject  will  be  discussed  presently ;  here  it  is  only 
necessary  to  say  that  no  ground  whatever  exists  on 
which  to  rest  any  such  assumption.  The  United 
States  has  a  system  of  parliamentary  government ; 
and  that  term  implies  a  government  by  party,  the 
executive  and  the  legislative  being  independent  of 
each  other  in  theory,  but,  in  practice,  expected  to 
cooperate  and  work  in  party  harmony.  As  a  rule,  and 
under  normal  conditions,  it  is  essential  to  the  proper 
management  of  public  business  that  one  political  party 
should  control  both  departments  of  government  —  the 
legislative  as  well  as  the  executive.  If  a  policy  is  to 
be  carried  out,  the  two  cannot  be  continually  at  cross- 
purposes. 

In  1871,  a  large  majority  of  those  composing  both 
branches  of  Congress  were  friendly  to  the  administra 
tion  of  General  Grant.  They  were  what  are  known, 
and  properly  known,  as  Administration  men,  occupying, 
in  parliamentary  language,  the  government  benches. 


o     ,-., 

APPENDIX  F  227 

In  every  legislative  body,  it  is  well  understood  that  the 
committees  should,  for  the  proper  transaction  of  busi 
ness,  reflect  the  feelings  and  sympathies  of  the  whole 
body,  the  majority  being  dominant  in  them.  If  they 
fail  so  to  do,  they  are,  and  should  be,  remodelled  so 
as  to  bring  the  desired  result  about.  This  is  essen 
tial  to  any  successful  government  by  party.  While 
the  Executive  may  not  interfere  in  any  improper 
way  in  the  appointment  of  legislative  committees,  the 
Chief  Executive  has  a  perfect  right,  and,  indeed,  it  is 
his  duty,  to  cause  members  of  Congress,  whether  in 
the  Senate  or  the  House,  to  be  fully  informed  as  to 
the  policy  of  the  Administration  ;  and  it  has  been  the 
practice  that  the  machinery  of  each  body  is  so  ar 
ranged  as  to  work  in  harmony  with  that  policy,  and 
not  in  opposition  to  it.  Such  has  always  been  the 
practice.  All  this  is  elementary. 

This  being  so,  it  is  now  contended  that  Mr.  Sum- 
ner  was  deposed  from  the  chairmanship  of  his  com 
mittee,  which  he  held  through  usage  and  under  pre 
scriptive  right,  by  executive  action.  In  other  words, 
that  President  Grant  brought  his  influence  to  bear 
upon  a  subservient,  not  to  say  servile,  majority  of 
the  Senate,  causing  a  gross  injustice  to  be  done  to 
an  eminent  leader  of  his  own  party.  There  is  no 
evidence  on  which  to  base  such  a  contention.  This 
is  apparent  from  a  careful  review  of  the  facts  as  here 
tofore  disclosed,  and  it  is  improbable  that  any  new  or 
additional  facts  will  come  to  light. 

It  was  asserted  at  the  time,  and  is  still  asserted, 
that  the  removal  of  Mr.  Sumner  was  due  entirely  to 
his  course  in  regard  to  the  San  Domingo  treaty.  Of 
this,  again,  there  is  no  evidence.  On  the  contrary,  in 


228  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

voting  against  the  ratification  of  the  San  Domingo 
treaty  Mr.  Sumner  acted  in  unison  with  a  majority 
of  the  Senate,  and  reflected  the  views  of  a  majority. 
That  the  San  Domingo  treaty  was  the  remote  cause 
of  Mr.  Simmer's  displacement  is  true.  It  is  not  true 
that  it  was  the  approximate,  or  moving,  cause.  The 
quarrel  —  for  in  the  end  it  became  a  personal  quar 
rel,  and  not  a  political  difference  over  a  specific  mea 
sure  —  between  Mr.  Sumner,  General  Grant  and  Mr. 
Fish  —  did,  it  is  true,  originate  on  the  San  Domingo 
question ;  but,  so  far  as  that  issue  went,  it  was  an 
ordinary  political  difference.  Subsequently,  in  his 
strong  desire  to  secure  the  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
President  Grant  took  the  very  unusual  course  of  call 
ing  upon  Mr.  Sumner  personally  at  his  house  on  an 
evening  in  January,  1871,  under  the  circumstances 
fully  described  by  Mr.  Pierce,  and  in  this  paper.  What 
followed  grew  out  of  a  difference  of  recollection  be 
tween  himself  and  Mr.  Sumner  as  to  what  then  took 
place,  aggravated  by  a  constitutional  incompatibility 
in  the  tempers  of  the  two  men.  President  Grant 
always  insisted  that  Mr.  Sumner  then  promised  to 
throw  his  influence  in  aid  of  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty.  There  is  no  question  that  General  Grant  was 
here  in  error.  Mr.  Sumner,  taken  by  surprise,  natu 
rally  spoke  in  a  guarded  manner  ;  and  the  President 
misconstrued  his  words.  Afterwards,  the  tale-bearers 
and  gossip-mongers,  especially  of  the  White  House 
military  staff,  carried  to  General  Grant's  ears  exag 
gerated  reports  of  indiscreet  remarks  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Sumner,  for  which,  there  is  no  question,  there 
was  more  or  less  basis.  Subsequently,  Mr.  Sumner 
did  not  go  to  the  President,  and  frankly  explain  his 


APPENDIX  F  229 

position,  —  a  failure  on  his  part  for  which  he  after 
wards  more  than  once  expressed  regret.  The  breach  be 
tween  the  two  then  rapidly  widened,  and  soon  involved 
Mi*.  Fish  ;  for  Secretary  Fish,  acting  in  loyalty  to 
the  head  of  the  Administration,  endeavored  to  influ 
ence  Mr.  Sunnier.  This  attempt  Mr.  Sumner  met  in 
a  characteristic  way ;  that  is,  by  charging  the  Secre 
tary  with  a  change  of  front,  and  insisting  upon  it 
that,  under  the  circumstances,  the  proper  course  for 
him  to  pursue  was  to  resign.  This  he  did  in  a  way 
which  deeply  offended  Mr.  Fish  ;  and  Mr.  Fish  had 
not  a  forgiving  disposition.  The  quarrel  thus  begun 
culminated  over  the  papers  relating  to  the  dismissal 
of  Mr.  Motley,  ending  in  an  open  affront  put  upon 
the  Secretary  of  State  by  the  Senator  from  Massa 
chusetts,  at  a  dinner  given  by  General  Schenck,  in 
January,  1871.  At  that  very  time  the  negotiations 
leading  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington  were  actively 
going  on. 

Such  was  the  position  of  affairs  in  January,  1871. 
The  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions  of  the  Senate,  as  it  was  then  constituted,  was 
not  on  speaking  terms  with  either  the  President  or 
the  Secretary  of  State.  Meanwhile,  as  stated  in  the 
text,  the  position  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate  then  was,  as  it 
now  is,  different  from  that  of  any  other  member 
of  the  whole  legislative  body.  The  Senate  partici 
pates  in  executive  functions  so  far  as  treaties  are  con 
cerned  ;  hence  it  is  obviously  necessary  to  the  proper 
conduct  of  any  foreign  policy  that  friendly,  and  even 
intimate,  relations  should  exist  between  the  executive 
department  and  the  chairman  of  that  committee ;  for 


230  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

he  of  necessity  is  the  spokesman  of  the  Executive  on 
the  floor  of  the  Senate,  the  Senate  alone  of  the  legis 
lative  department  having  any  immediate  connection 
with  foreign  policy.  All  business  relating  to  treaties, 
nominations,  etc.,  is  thus  put  in  the  hands  of  the 
chairman  of  the  committee.  He  shapes  it,  brings  it 
before  his  committee,  and  subsequently  has  charge  of 
it  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate.  Under  these  circum 
stances,  it  would  seem  to  be  so  obvious  as  to  call  for 
no  argument  that  matters  relating  to  the  foreign  policy 
of  the  government  cannot  be  properly  handled  if  the 
chairman  of  the  Senate  committee  having  them  in 
charge  and  the  two  chiefs  of  the  executive  depart 
ment  do  not  act  in  harmony.  When  the  friends  of 
the  Administration,  therefore,  control  the  Senate,  it  is 
eminently  desirable,  if  the  party  to  which  the  Admin 
istration  and  they  belong  is  to  be  responsible  for 
a  foreign  policy,  that  the  Senate  Committee  on  For 
eign  Relations  should  be  so  composed  as  to  act  in  per 
fect  accord  with  the  Executive.  The  friends  of  Mr. 
Sunnier  contend,  however,  that,  in  his  case,  this  was 
unnecessary ;  that  the  business  of  the  country  could 
have  been  conducted  without  public  detriment  by  a 
chairman  who  was  in  open  and  avowed  hostility  to 
the  Executive,  and  that,  in  such  case,  the  Executive 
had  no  good  ground  of  complaint,  and,  certainly, 
would  not  be  justified  in  urging  its  friends  in  the 
Senate  to  readjust  the  committee  so  as  to  give  the 
Administration  a  fair  chance  both  to  have  a  policy,, 
and  to  carry  it  into  effect.  This  proposition  I  do  not 
care  to  argue.  To  my  mind  it  is  plainly  untenable. 
That  the  public  business,  under  such  circumstances, 
would  go  on  after  a  fashion,  is  probable ;  that  it 


APPENDIX  F  231 

would  go  on  as  it  should  go  on,  is  out  of  the  ques 
tion. 

Such  being  the  facts,  a  change  of  assignments  hav 
ing  become  expedient,  for  the  proper  conduct  of  pub 
lic  affairs,  it  would  seem  unreasonable  to  expect  the 
President  to  dismiss  from  the  executive  councils  the 
Secretary  of  State,  and  then  to  resign  himself,  in 
order  to  make  way  for  others  less  personally  objec 
tionable  to  the  chairman  of  a  Senate  committee.  A 
reorganization  of  the  committee,  and  the  transfer  of 
its  chairman  to  some  other  field  of  influence  and 
usefulness,  would  seem  to  offer  a  more  practicable 
solution  of  the  trouble.  This  obvious  fact  could 
hardly  fail  to  suggest  itself  to  the  average  senatorial 
mind.  It  implied  no  indisputable,  or  even  pronounced, 
tendency  to  subserviency.  It  is  a  conclusion,  on  the 
contrary,  which  any  self-respecting  man  might  so 
discipline  himself  as,  in  time,  to  reach. 

It  is  obvious  that,  in  the  early  days  of  January, 
1871,  the  Executive  had  not  become  fully  satisfied 
that  a  rearrangement  of  the  Senate  committee  was 
indispensable.  Had  such  a  conclusion  been  reached, 
the  Secretary  of  State  would  not,  as  he  did,  have 
called  on  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  to  get  his  views  on  the  subject  of  the  pro 
posed  negotiation  with  Great  Britain,  and,  if  possi 
ble,  to  gain  his  support  thereto.  That  proposed  ne 
gotiation,  it  must  further  be  borne  in  mind,  was  the 
cardinal  feature  in  the  policy  of  the  Administration  at 
that  time.  As  such  it  took  precedence.  On  it  the 
Administration  largely  rested  its  claim  for  the  support 
of  the  country  in  a  presidential  election  then  nearly 
impending.  For  the  Secretary  of  State  thus  to  seek 


232  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

the  opinion  of  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  was  unprecedented.  Nevertheless, 
he  did  it.  Greater  deference  could  not  have  been 
paid. 

The  result  of  the  interview  that  followed  is  set  forth 
in  the  text.  But  it  is  maintained  by  the  friends  of 
Mr.  Sumner  that,  when  he  said,  as,  in  his  memoran 
dum  to  Mr.  Fish  he  did  say,  that  the  "  withdrawal  of 
the  British  flag  cannot  be  abandoned  as  a  condition 
or  preliminary  "  to  the  proposed  negotiation,  he  should 
not  have  been  considered  as  having  proposed  an  ulti 
matum,  as  it  is  called ;  and  it  indicated  almost  a 
degree  of  moral  turpitude  on  the  part  of  the  Secre 
tary  to  suppose  that  he  really  meant  any  such  thing. 
The  Secretary,  it  is  contended,  should  have  assumed 
that  this  utterance  was  on  his  part  a  mere  diplomatic 
pretence,  and  that  subsequently  he  would  prove  amen 
able  to  reason,  or,  at  the  proper  time,  change  his 
mind. 

Such  a  process  of  convenient  and  surely  foreseeable 
change  is  scarcely  in  accordance  with  the  general 
understanding  of  Mr.  Sumner' s  public  record  and 
mental  attributes.  He  had  no  sense  of  humor  ;  and, 
therefore,  it  was  improbable  that  he  could  have  in 
tended  his  memorandum  as  a  pleasantry.  What  he 
wrote  was  written  after  two  days  of  careful  considera 
tion,  in  the  full  light  of  a  prolonged  oral  discussion 
with  the  Secretary.  The  whole  ground  had  been 
gone  over.  As  the  result  of  much  meditation,  and 
acting  unquestionably  under  a  grave  sense  of  public 
responsibility,  he  then  penned  his  memorandum,  than 
which  it  would  seem  nothing  could  be  more  explicit. 
The  Secretary  certainly  was  justified  in  assuming  that 


APPENDIX  F  233 

the  Senator  meant  what  he  wrote.  Mr.  Fish  then 
found  himself  in  a  difficult  position.  Mr.  Sumner 
had  also  said  in  the  memorandum,  in  a  clause  not 
quoted  in  the  text,  that  "  no  proposition  [looking  to 
renewed  negotiations]  can  be  accepted  unless  the 
terms  of  submission  are  such  as  to  leave  no  reason 
able  doubt  of  a  favorable  result.  There  must  not  be 
another  failure."  In  that  opinion  the  Secretary  fully 
coincided.  Mr.  Fish,  therefore,  found  himself  con 
fronted  with  this  proposition :  —  He  was  to  begin  a 
negotiation,  —  which,  on  no  account,  should  fail  of 
success,  —  in  the  face  of  an  explicit  statement  of  the 
chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions  that  the  negotiation  in  question  should  be 
entered  upon  only  upon  a  condition,  or  preliminary, 
which,  if  stated,  would  bring  it  at  once  to  a  close. 
The  dilemma  was  obvious ;  there  was  but  one  course 
for  the  Secretary  to  pursue.  If  he  proposed  to  deal 
honestly  by  the  British  government,  making  no  attempt 
to  inveigle  it  into  a  false  position,  he  must  explain  the 
situation  to  its  representatives  fairly  and  openly,  and, 
if  they  then  expressed  a  willingness  to  proceed,  it  only 
remained  for  him  to  pledge  the  Administration  to 
carry  it  to  a  satisfactory  result,  if  it  could,  over  any 
opposition  which  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  might  have  it  in  his  power  to  offer. 
To  those  who  knew  Mr.  Sumner,  it  needs  no  argu 
ment  to  prove  that,  under  the  circumstances,  it  would 
have  been  altogether  unjustifiable  for  the  Secretary 
to  enter  into  a  negotiation,  leaving  Mr.  Sumner  as  an 
unknown  quantity  in  position  to  control  the  result. 
He  had  to  be  eliminated.  At  least,  that  was  a  rea 
sonable  view  to  take  of  the  situation ;  the  only  view, 


234  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

unquestionably,  which  would  commend  itself  to  the 
military  mind  of  General  Grant.  He  could  never  have 
been  disposed  to  leave  a  formidable  enemy  intrenched 
in  his  rear. 

The  rest  followed,  naturally  and  inevitably.  After 
careful  deliberation,  Secretary  Fish  sent  for  four 
leaders  of  the  Senate,  two  of  each  party,  —  Messrs. 
Thurman  and  Bayard  on  the  part  of  the  Opposition, 
and  Messrs.  Conkling  and  Edmunds  representing  the 
friends  of  the  Administration.  With  them  he  con 
sulted  freely,  making  plain  the  situation.  They  ad 
vised  together  as  to  the  course  best  to  pursue. 

All  apparently  agreed.  Naturally,  being  experi 
enced  men,  skilful  in  handling  a  parliamentary  body, 
the  question  at  once  arose,  how  the  issue  could  best 
be  presented.  Mr.  Sumner's  displacement  from  his 
stronghold,  the  chairmanship  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  was  the  result  to  be  brought  about. 
The  fact  that  he  was  not  friendly  to  the  proposed 
negotiation  could  not  well  be  put  forward,  in  view 
of  the  grounds  upon  which  he  rested  his  opposition. 
This  was  obvious.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
parliamentary  leaders  naturally  fell  back  upon  the 
very  sufficient  difficulty  apparent  in  the  attempt  pro 
perly  to  conduct  a  foreign  policy  under  a  condition 
of  affairs  so  wholly  unexampled  as  that  then  exist 
ing.  It  is  said  that  the  removal  of  Mr.  Sumner  was 
unprecedented.  So  also,  it  will  be  agreed,  was  the 
situation.  An  unprecedented  situation  can  only 
apparently  be  dealt  with  through  exceptional  mea 
sures  of  correction. 

Under  the  rules  of  that  body,  and  the  practice  of 
the  government  from  the  beginning,  it  is  customary  to 


APPENDIX  F  235 

revise  the  committees  of  the  Senate  every  two  years, 
the  terms  of  one  third  of  the  Senators  then  coming  to 
a  close,  and  the  places  of  that  third  being  filled,  either 
by  reelection  or  by  change  of  occupant.  This  peri 
odical  rearrangement  was  to  be  made  in  March,  1871, 
after  the  Forty-first  Congress  expired.  The  matter 
was  considered  in  a  caucus  of  Republican  Senators,  and 
the  necessity  of  reorganizing  the  Committee  on  For 
eign  Relations  was  discussed,  upon  the  grounds  stated. 
Undoubtedly,  the  Executive  had  intimated  to  its 
friends  in  the  Senate  that  such  a  change  was  in  its 
judgment  necessary  to  the  development  of  a  policy,  and 
the  proper  conduct  of  public  affairs.  Those  affairs 
would  sustain  detriment  by  a  continuance  of  existing 
conditions.  It  was  also  right  and  proper  that  this 
argument  in  favor  of  a  change  should  be  advanced. 
Furthermore,  it  was  right  and  proper  that  Senators 
should  give  due  consideration  to  it.  To  the  majority 
the  argument  seemed  good ;  and  the  change  was  made. 
This  is  believed  to  be  a  fair  statement  of  the  case ; 
and,  in  the  light  of  such  statement,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  any  allegation  of  improper  interference  of 
the  Executive  in  legislative  action  can  be  sustained. 
It  is  futile  to  argue  that  the  Senate  is  a  quasi-judi 
cial  body,  and  that  the  Executive  has  consequently 
no  more  right  to  try  to  influence  its  members  than  it 
would  have  to  seek  to  affect  the  decision  of  a  court  of 
law  by  representations  made  to  judges  out  of  court. 
The  two  cases  are  in  no  respect  analogous.  The  is 
sues  before  the  Senate  are  political ;  the  issues  before 
the  court  of  law  are  legal.  On  political  issues  — 
questions  of  policy —  it  is  the  business  and  duty  of 
the  Executive  to  try  by  all  legitimate  means  to  bring 


236  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

about  harmonious  action.  The  legislative  department 
should  understand  thoroughly  the  purpose  and  policy 
of  the  Executive.  In  March,  1871,  it  was  notorious 
that  Mr.  Sumner  had  broken  with  the  Administra 
tion.  A  year  later  the  break  was  avowed.  He  then 
went  over  to  the  Opposition.  In  1871  his  proper  seat 
was,  so  to  speak,  below  the  gangway  ;  in  1872  it  was 
on  the  opposition  side  of  the  chamber.  Under  such 
circumstances  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  his  displace 
ment  by  the  act  of  a  majority  with  whom  he  was  no 
longer  in  sympathy,  and  whose  views  he  had  ceased  to 
represent,  can  be  characterized  as  "  among  the  most 
unwarrantable,  grossly  unjust,  and  inexcusable  acts  in 
our  political  history."  1  Stronger  language  could  not 
have  been  used  had  Mr.  Sumner  held  his  position  by 
vested  right,  or  judicial  tenure.  The  logical  result  of 
such  a  contention  would  be  to  insist  that  the  so-called 
"  courtesy  of  the  Senate  "  is  one  of  the  precious  muni 
ments  of  the  Constitution,  having  no  limits  and  ad 
mitting  of  no  exceptions.  The  displacement  of  Mr. 
Sumner  was  in  disregard  of  "  the  courtesy  of  the 
Senate  ;  "  it  was,  therefore,  equivalent  to  a  wilful 
infraction  of  the  fundamental  law. 

That  the  contrary  view  here  taken  is  sustained  by 
men  of  experience  in  public  life,  and  after  years  of 
reflection  on  the  facts  of  this  particular  case,  admits 

1  D.  H.  Chamberlain,  in  the  Boston  Herald  and  the  Springfield 
Republican,  of  Sunday,  February  23,  1902.  The  paper  here  referred 
to,  afterwards  published  in  pamphlet  form  under  the  title  of  "  Charles 
Sumner  and  the  Treaty  of  Washington,"  is  by  far  the  most  elaborate 
and  carefully  argued  discussion  of  the  displacement  of  Mr.  Sumner 
from  his  committee  chairmanship  which  has  yet  appeared.  It  is  un 
necessary  to  say  that  the  conclusions  reached  by  Governor  Chamberlain 
are  diametrically  opposed  to  those  set  forth  in  this  paper. 


APPENDIX  F  237 

of  proof.  George  S.  Boutwell,  for  instance,  was  at  the 
time  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Though  a  member 
of  Grant's  Cabinet,  Mr.  Boutwell  sympathized  with 
Mr.  Sunnier  on  the  Dominican  issue.  He  has  recently 
expressed  himself  thus  as  regards  the  displacement  of 
Mr.  Sunnier  from  his  chairmanship  :  — 

"  Mr.  Simmer's  course  in  regard  to  the  acquisition 
of  San  Domingo  contributed  to  the  separation  between 
the  President  and  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  but  opposition  without  personality 
would  not  have  produced  alienation  on  the  part  of  the 
President.  Other  Senators  were  opposed  to  the  acqui 
sition  of  San  Domingo,  and  there  were  members  of  his 
Cabinet  who  did  not  sympathize  with  his  policy,  as  the 
President  well  knew  ;  but  those  facts  in  themselves 
did  not  tend  in  the  least  to  alienation.  ...  As  far  as 
I  have  knowledge,  you  have  stated  with  accuracy  the 
conditions  and  circumstances  which  led  to  and  required 
the  removal  of  Mr.  Sumner  from  the  head  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations.  The  time  had  come  when 
Mr.  Sumner  limited  his  conversation  with  the  Secre 
tary  of  State  to  official  matters.  Such  are  the  require 
ments  of  administration  that  it  is  not  possible  for  the 
head  of  a  department  to  conduct  the  business  of  his 
department,  unless  he  can  have  full  and  free  conversa 
tion  with  the  members  of  committees,  not  even  exclud 
ing  those  who  represent  a  party  in  Opposition.  Inas 
much  as  the  hostility  which  Mr.  Sumner  entertained 
for  the  Secretary  of  State  extended  to  the  President, 
it  was  not  possible  that  any  change  of  intercourse  be 
tween  the  department  and  the  head  of  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  could  be  effected  by  the  removal 
of  the  Secretary.  Hence  a  change  in  the  chairmanship 


238  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  became  a  public 
necessity,  essential  to  the  administration  of  the  govern 
ment." 

George  F.  Edmunds  was,  as  stated  in  the  text,  then 
a  Senator  from  Vermont.  After  thirty-one  years  of 
reflection,  Mr.  Edmunds  has  recently  expressed  himself 
as  follows.  In  reading  what  he  says,  it  is  only  neces 
sary  to  bear  in  mind  that  many  Senators  who  were 
satisfied  of  the  propriety  of  the  act  on  grounds  of  public 
policy  were  opposed  to  it  for  reasons  of  party  unity. 
They  felt  apprehensive  of  the  ill  feeling  it  would  neces 
sarily  generate.  Mr.  Edmunds  has  said  :  — 

"At  the  time  of  the  caucus  in  December,  1870,  it 
was  thought  by  a  majority  of  the  Republican  Senators 
that  the  relations  between  Mr.  Sumner  and  Mr.  Fish 
had  not  become  so  absolutely  broken  as  to  prevent  the 
necessary  communications  between  the  Secretary  of 
State  and  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations.  When  the  new  Congress  came  into  being, 
and  the  Senate  committees  had  all  expired,  and  many 
changes  had  taken  place  in  the  personnel  of  the  Senate, 
and  the  relations  between  the  Secretary  of  State  arid 
Mr.  Sumner  had  become  entirely  severed,  it  was 
thought  that  the  public  interest  absolutely  demanded 
that  the  chairman  of  the  committee  should  be  on  terms 
of  personal  good-will  and  civility  with  the  Secretary 
of  State,  and  accordingly,  and  I  think  almost  unani 
mously,  the  Republican  caucus  determined  not  to  re- 
appoint  Mr.  Sumner,  and  this,  so  far  as  I  recollect, 
was  done  without  any  factional  or  other  inquiry  into 
whether  Mr.  Sumner  or  Mr.  Fish  were  in  the  wrong ; 
and  I  believe  that  at  least  three  fourths  if  not  nine 
tenths  of  the  gentlemen  concerned  both  respected,  and 


APPENDIX  F  239 

were  on  personally  friendly  terms,  with  Mr.  Sumner, 
as  I  was  myself.  The  rules  of  the  Senate  were  framed 
with  the  purpose  that  at  the  opening  of  a  new  Con 
gress  the  Senate  should  feel  perfectly  free  to  make  such 
changes  in  the  chairmanship  and  personnel  of  all  her 
committees  as  should  be  deemed  expedient,  without 
giving  any  gentleman  a  right  to  complain  that  he  had 
been  dismissed  from  office." 

John  Sherman  of  Ohio  was  then,  as  for  many 
years  afterwards,  a  leading  member  of  the  Senate. 
Few  were  more  influential  in  that  body.  Writing 
over  twenty  years  later,  Mr.  Sherman  said  :  —  "  Social 
relations  between  the  Secretary  of  State  and  Mr. 
Sumner  had  become  impossible  ;  and  —  considering 
human  passion,  prejudice  and  feeling  —  anything  like 
frank  and  confidential  communication  between  the 
President  and  Mr.  Sumner  was  out  of  the  question. 
A  majority  of  the  Republican  Senators  sided  with  the 
President.  .  .  .  When  we  met  in  March  it  was  known 
that  both  [the  San  Domingo  and  British  negotiations] 
would  necessarily  be  referred  to  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  and  that,  aside  from  the  hostile 
personal  relations  of  Mr.  Sumner  and  the  Secretary 
of  State,  he  did  not,  and  could  not,  and  would  not,  re 
present  the  views  of  a  majority  of  his  Republican  col 
leagues  in  the  Senate,  and  that  a  majority  of  his  com 
mittee  agreed  with  him.  Committees  are,  and  ought 
to  be,  organized  to  represent  the  body,  giving  a  major 
ity  of  members  to  the  prevailing  opinion,  but  fairly 
representing  the  views  of  the  minority.  It  has  been 
the  custom  in  the  Senate  to  allow  each  party  to  choose 
its  own  representatives  in  each  committee,  and  in  pro 
portion  to  its  numbers.  ...  In  deciding  Mr.  Sum- 


240  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

ner's  case,  in  view  of  the  facts  I  have  stated,  two  plans 
were  urged :  — 

"  First  —  To  place  him  at  the  head  of  the  new  and 
important  Committee  of  Privileges  and  Elections, 
leaving  the  rest  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Kela- 
tions  to  stand  in  the  precise  order  it  had  been,  with 
one  vacancy  to  be  filled  in  harmony  with  the  majority. 

"  Second  —  To  leave  Mr.  Sumner  to  stand  in  his 
old  place  as  chairman,  and  to  make  a  change  in  the 
body  of  the  committee  by  transferring  one  of  its  mem 
bers  to  another  committee,  and  fill  the  vacancy  by  a 
Senator  in  harmony  with  the  majority. 

"  My  own  opinion  was  that  the  latter  course  was  the 
most  polite  and  just ;  but  the  majority  decided,  after 
full  consideration  and  debate,  upon  the  first  alter 
native."  l 

Though  Mr.  Sherman  expressed  himself  in  the 
subsequent  debate  in  open  Senate  in  terms  of  strong 
opposition  to  the  course  pursued,  his  objection  was 
based  on  party  considerations.  In  his  judgment  the 
situation  called  for  remedial  action  ;  but  not  the  action 
proposed.  He  preferred  to  put  Mr.  Sumner  in  a 
minority,  and  under  guardianship,  in  the  committee  of 
which  he  was  to  remain  the  nominal  head.  If  he  still 
remained  chairman,  and,  as  such,  the  official  mouth 
piece  of  the  committee  and  its  intermediary  with  the 
Department  of  State,  this  position  would  certainly 
have  been  to  him  both  embarrassing  and  mortifying. 
He  would  scarcely  have  submitted  to  it.  It  would  seem 
more  kindly,  and  scarcely  less  courteous,  squarely  to 
reorganize  the  committee ;  which,  at  least,  had  the 
merit  of  accomplishing  the  result  in  view,  and  avoid- 
1  Recollections  of  Forty  Years,  vol.  i.  pp.  471,  472. 


APPENDIX  F  241 

ing  unseemly  conflicts  both  in  committee  and  on  the 
floor  of  the  Senate. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  editorial  pages  of 
the  New  York  Nation  —  then  very  critical  of  the 
course  pursued  by  the  Administration  —  give  a  con 
temporary  view  of  the  whole  matter,  and  of  the  per 
sonage  chiefly  concerned :  — 

"  It  seems  not  improbable  that  an  attempt  will  be 
made  in  the  Senate  to  make  the  settlement  of  the 
Alabama  case  depend  on  the  willingness  of  Great 
Britain  to  abandon  all  her  possessions  on  this  side  of 
the  ocean,  including  her  West  Indian  Islands.  The 
germ  of  this  idea  made  its  appearance  in  the  columns 
of  the  Tribune  about  two  years  ago,  in  the  shape  of  a 
hint  that  nothing  short  of  the  cession  of  Canada  would 
suffice  to  satisfy  the  American  public  for  the  wrongs 
it  had  suffered.  The  source  of  this  suggestion  could 
hardly  have  been  doubtful,  as  it  was  a  natural  enough 
deduction  from  Mr.  Sumner's  statement  of  the  measure 
of  damages  in  his  famous  speech.  Under  the  rule  he 
laid  down,  the  surrender  of  Canada  indeed  would  have 
only  been  a  moderate  atonement.  Since  then  the 
conception  has  grown  and  expanded  until  it  involves 
the  total  retirement  of  England  from  the  Western 
continent  and  the  adjacent  isles ;  and  Mr.  Sumner  is 
apparently  as  anxious  to  connect  his  name  with  the 
execution  of  this  great  scheme  as  the  President  is 
to  connect  his  with  the  settlement  of  the  affair  in  the 
ordinary  way  by  the  payment  of  pecuniary  damages. 
Of  course,  the  production  of  the  plan  by  the  American 
commissioners  is  not  at  all  likely,  as  they  are  all  ra 
tional  politicians  and  men  of  business ;  but  it  is  not 
at  all  unlikely  to  find  supporters  enough  in  the  Senate 


242  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

to  secure  the  rejection  of  any  treaty  the  commissioners 
may  agree  on."  (February  23,  1871.) 

"  The  main  business  of  the  chairman  of  the  Senate 
committee  is  not  to  negotiate  treaties,  but  to  discuss 
with  the  Executive  such  treaties  as  have  been  negoti 
ated,  and  to  receive  from  it  explanations  about  them. 
His  first  business,  therefore,  is  to  be  a  good  organ  of 
communication  on  this  particular  class  of  subjects  be 
tween  the  President  and  Senate,  and  nobody  can  be 
said  to  be  well  fitted  for  this  duty  whose  personal  rela 
tions  with  the  President  are  of  an  unpleasant  nature. 
In  fact,  we  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  a  proper  sense  of 
his  duty,  and  of  the  fitness  of  things,  and  a  proper 
appreciation  of  the  delicacy  of  the  machinery  of  such 
a  government  as  ours,  might  have  suggested  to  Mr. 
Sumner  the  expediency  of  resigning  the  chairmanship 
as  soon  as  he  found  himself  arrayed  in  open  and  bit 
ter  hostility  to  General  Grant.  It  must  be  remem 
bered  that  his  resigning  the  chairmanship  would  not 
deprive  the  Senate  of  the  benefit  of  his  counsels.  It 
would  enable  no  act  of  the  Administration  to  escape 
his  supervision.  .  .  . 

"We  allude  to  his  [Sumner's]  want  of  judgment 
and  want  of  sense  of  responsibility  in  the  use  of  lan 
guage.  He  talks  sometimes  in  the  wildest  way,  and 
apparently  without  being  fully  conscious  of  the  force 
or  bearing  of  what  he  says.  ...  It  would  not  be  un 
natural  that,  in  view  of  all  these  facts,  and  on  the  eve 
of  an  attempt  to  settle  a  most  important  controversy 
with  England,  in  which  he  has  taken  a  most  excited 
part,  and  has  given  utterance  to  most  extraordinary 
views  of  international  law  and  morality,  the  Adminis 
tration  should  wish  for  some  friendlier,  calmer,  and 


APPENDIX  F  243 

more  accurate  organ  of  communication  with  the  body 
which  is  to  ratify  any  treaty  it  may  enter  into." 
(March  16,  1871.) 

"  Some  fresh  light  has,  however,  been  thrown  on 
the  causes  of  the  great  Sumner-Fish  quarrel,  by  the 
new  Washington  paper,  the  Capital,  whose  account 
is  said  to  be  '  semi-official.'  It  appears  to  have  arisen 
out  of  an  ill-judged  attempt  of  the  foolish  Fish  to  get 
Sumner  to  take  the  English  mission  and  abandon  his 
opposition  to  the  San  Domingo  scheme.  Sumner,  of 
course,  refused  with  a  pitying  smile.  The  unhappy 
Fish  4  left  the  house  a  baffled  and  disappointed  man,' 
and  then  went  to  work  to  k  insult '  Mr.  Motley.  After 
the  appearance  of  his  letter  to  Moran,  however,  the 
poor  old  coward  did  not  dare  to  go  near  « the  Old  Bay 
State  Lion  '  for  some  time,  but  at  last  mustered  up 
courage  to  call  at  his  den  to  meet  Sir  John  Rose  on 
official  business.  The  evening  passed  quietly  enough, 
and,  we  are  glad  to  say,  '  intellectually  and  profita 
bly,'  and  the  Fish  doubtless  thought  he  was  forgiven 
and  restored  to  favor.  Far  from  it.  After  he  had 
gone,  Sumner  sat  down  4  after  midnight  in  the  quiet 
of  his  library,'  and  considered  his  case  afresh,  and 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  ought  still  further  to 
punish  him.  This  cruel  but  we  presume  just  decision 
reached,  the  house  of  Mr.  Schenck  was  chosen  for  the 
execution  of  the  sentence.  The  judge  and  culprit  met 
there  at  dinner,  and  in  the  course  of  the  meal  poor 
Fish,  little  knowing  what  was  in  store  for  him,  '  made 
a  frivolous  remark  about  duck  and  partridge '  across 
the  table  to  the  4  Numidian  Lion  '  -  —  for  as  such  it 
appears  Mr.  Sumner  figured  on  this  occasion,  doubt 
less  having  ascertained  that  an  c  Old  Bay  State  Lion  ' 


244  THE   TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

was,  to  say  the  least,  an  anomaly.  '  The  Lion  '  merely 
looked  at  him,  and  made  no  reply.  4  Fish's  weak 
nature/  says  the  chronicler,  '  felt  the  shock.'  Small 
blame  to  him,  say  we ;  whose  nature  would  n't  k  feel 
the  shock '  if  a  Numidian  Lion  looked  at  him  in 
silence  across  a  small  table  ?  The  effect  on  American 
securities  of  this  dreadful  business,  we  are  glad  to  say, 
has  not  yet  been  perceptible ;  but  mighty  agencies 
work  slowly."  (March  23,  1871.) 


APPENDIX   G1 

IT  is  curious,  as  well  as  historically  interesting,  to 
trace  in  the  correspondence  and  memoranda  of  Mr. 
Fish  the  gradual  change  of  his  tone  and  feeling 
towards  Mr.  Sumner.  Their  personal  as  well  as  social 
relations,  as  colleagues  in  the  Senate  from  1851  to 
1857,  have  already  been  referred  to.2  Though  tak 
ing  very  different  views,  politically  and  morally,  of 
the  issues  of  the  day,  they  were  intimate.3  Indeed, 
in  no  house  in  Washington  was  Mr.  Sumner  so  inti 
mate  or  so  welcome  as  in  that  of  Mr.  Fish.  The 
single  term  during  which  the  latter  served  expired 
in  March,  1857.  Twelve  years  later,  in  March, 
1869,  he  was  unexpectedly  called  into  Grant's  cab 
inet.  He  then  at  once  wrote  to  Mr.  Sumner,  ex 
pressing  the  earnest  hope  that  he  might  "  rely  upon 
your  friendship  and  your  experience  and  ability,  for 
your  support  and  aid  to  supply  my  manifold  deficien 
cies."  During  the  earlier  months  of  Secretary  Fish's 
tenure  of  office,  the  relations  between  the  two  were  of 
the  most  friendly  character,  —  official,  social  and  per 
sonal.  Indeed,  officially,  no  Senator  had  ever  been 
treated  by  the  head  of  the  State  Department  in  so  con 
fidential  a  way,  —  it  might  almost  be  said,  a  way  so 
deferential.  The  first  difference  arose  over  the  instruc 
tions  to  Mr.  Motley,  as  stated  already.  Mr.  Sumner 

1  See  supra,  p.  187.  2  Supra,  p.  106. 

3  Pierce  :  Sumner,  vol.  iv.  pp.  375-379. 


246  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

on  that  occasion  was,  in  his  peculiar  way,  distinctly 
overbearing ;  and  Mr.  Fish  did  not  conceal  his  sense 
of  the  fact.  It  was  on  the  15th  of  May,  and  at  the 
State  Department.  After  reading  the  draught  of  in 
structions,  Mr.  Sumner  walked  up  and  down  the  room, 
talking  in  a  most  excited  way,  and  declaring  that  he 
would  "  make  Motley  resign  ;  "  speaking  of  the  Min 
ister  to  Great  Britain  as  if  he  was  his  man,  or  agent. 
To  this  the  Secretary  replied,  —  "  Let  him  resign.  I 
will  put  a  better  man  in  his  place." 

Mr.  Bancroft  Davis  describes  another  characteristic 
scene  which  occurred  at  about  this  time.  Mr.  Sumner 
one  evening  had  called,  this  time  by  appointment,  at 
Mr.  Fish's  house,  to  discuss  the  instructions.  When 
his  visitor  rose  to  go,  Mr.  Fish  accompanied  him  to  the 
door.  "  It  was  one  of  those  mild  evenings  in  May 
which  in  Washington  make  the  doorsteps  so  attrac 
tive.  Standing  there,  Sumner  opened  his  case.  They 
talked  long.  Sumner 's  voice  at  last  became  so  loud, 
as  his  feelings  were  aroused,  that  Mr.  Fish  said, 
pleasantly :  '  Sumner,  you  roar  like  the  bull  of  Bashan. 
The  police  will  be  after  us.  I  think  we  had  better 
adjourn.'  Sumner  smiled,  and  bade  him  good-night." 
All  this  occurred  in  May,  nearly  eight  months  before 
that  after-dinner  call  on  Mr.  Sumner  at  which  the 
President  tried  to  secure  the  Senator's  approval  of  the 
Babcock  Dominican  treaty.  During  that  time  the 
friction  between  the  Secretary  and  the  Senator  had 
sensibly  increased.  Their  correspondence  was  marked 
by  occasional  exhibitions  of  feeling,  indicative  of  less 
cordiality.  From  January  to  June,  1870,  this  tend 
ency  to  a  separation  developed  apace,  until,  in  June, 
the  President  insisted  on  the  recall  of  Mr.  Motley. 


APPENDIX  G  247 

Grant  and  Sunnier  had  now  openly  quarrelled.  Each 
denounced  the  other.  E.  R.  Hoar,  up  to  that  time 
Attorney-General  in  Grant's  cabinet,  altogether  sym 
pathizing  with  Sumner  in  his  opposition  to  the 
West  Indian  expansion  policy,  yet  maintained  his 
friendly,  as  well  as  official,  relations  with  the  Presi 
dent.  Judge  Hoar  was  wont  in  after  years  to  describe 
with  much  humor  the  Washington  doorstep  interviews 
he  at  that  time  had  with  Mr.  Sumner.  Going  to  the 
house  of  that  gentleman  in  the  evening,  his  host 
would  accompany  him  to  the  door  as  he  went  away, 
and  there,  on  one  side  of  Lafayette  Square,  using  the 
Attorney-General  as  a  species  of  buffer  between  him 
and  the  President,  he  would,  gradually  and  uncon 
sciously,  raise  his  voice  until  he  roared,  as  Mr.  Fish 
expressed  it,  "like  a  bull  of  Bashan."  He  would 
then,  in  terms  equally  unmeasured  and  stentorian,  de 
nounce  the  man  in  the  White  House  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Square.  It  would  at  times  seem,  as  Judge 
Hoar  expressed  it,  as  if  all  Washington,  including 
Mrs.  Grant,  must  hear  him,  and  the  police  would  have 
to  interfere. 

On  the  issues  now  raised,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
after  much  hesitation,  sided  with  the  President.  He 
did  so  with  reluctance ;  but  he  was  a  member  of  the 
Cabinet,  and,  moreover,  as  he  wrote  to  a  friend  at  the 
time,  "  I  have  a  very  strong  affection  for  the  Presi 
dent  ;  he  is  a  very  true  man,  and  warm  friend,  — 
accustomed  to  deal  with  men  of  more  frankness  and 
sincerity,  and  loyalty  to  a  cause,  than  many  of  those 
whom  the  business  of  Washington  attracts  hither." 
He  then  went  on  in  the  same  letter  thus  to  refer  to 
Mr.  Sumner :  —  "  Congress  is  incapable,  —  suffering 


248  THE   TREATY   OF   WASHINGTON 

from  the  want  of  leadership,  and  cursed  with  incap 
able  aspirants  to  leadership.  Jealousies  and  disap 
pointments  develop  in  old  Senators,  who  exhibit 
arrogance,  the  attendant  perhaps  of  long  continuance 
in  senatorial  position.  Clay  and  Benton,  each  dom 
ineered  in  their  day,  but  they  were  men  capable  of 
position ;  the  aspirant  to  their  control,  in  the  present 
day,  knows  nothing  but  books,  and  not  over-much  of 
them."  This  was  written  on  the  23d  of  June,  1870, 
fifteen  months  after  Grant's  inauguration.  Within  the 
ten  days  preceding  or  following,  the  Dominican  treaty 
was  rejected  by  the  Senate,  and  the  resignation  of  the 
Attorney-General,  and  the  Minister  to  Great  Britain, 
called  for.  Though,  in  the  Dominican  matter,  Judge 
Hoar  had  not  seen  his  way  to  follow  the  same  course 
of  loyalty  to  the  head  of  the  administration  which  Mr. 
Fish  had  pursued,  he  recognized  the  fact  that  grounds 
might  exist  for  an  honest  difference  of  opinion,  and 
retained  a  warm  friendly  regard  for  Mr.  Fish  person 
ally  as  well  as  great  respect  for  his  character  and 
ability ;  a  respect  which  he  always  afterwards  felt, 
and  did  not  fail  freely  to  express.  The  evening  of 
the  second  day  after  that  upon  which  he  had,  in  re 
sponse  to  the  President's  somewhat  curt  request,  sent 
in  his  resignation,  Judge  Hoar,  as  elsewhere  appears,1 
called  on  Mr.  Fish  to  explain  the  reasons  thereof,  and 
to  urge  him  "  under  all  circumstances  to  hold  fast ;  " 
earnestly  adding  in  language  already  quoted  that  in 
his  judgment  the  Secretary  of  State  was  "the  bul 
wark  now  standing  between  the  Country  and  its 
destruction."  It  was  characteristic  of  the  two  men 
that  Mr.  Sumner  was  at  the  same  time  roughly  de- 
1  Supra,  p.  221. 


APPENDIX  G  249 

manding  of  Mr.  Fisli  why,  under  the  circumstances 
in  which  he  found  himself  placed,  he  did  not  forth 
with  resign. 

On  this  point,  Mr.  Fish,  fortunately,  hearkened  to 
the  appeal  of  Judge  Hoar,  disregarding  the  suggestion 
of  Mr.  Sumner.  But  the  breach  between  him  and 
the  latter  was  now  fast  widening.  Five  weeks  later, 
on  the  6th  of  August,  Mr.  Fish  thus  wrote  to  Senator 
Howe  of  Wisconsin  :  - 

"  Mr.  Sunnier,  I  fear,  is  implacable.  I  passed  an 
hour  in  his  study  the  evening  before  I  left  Washing 
ton.  His  general  tone  towards  me  was  very  friendly, 
and  my  farewell  was  cordial  and  kind  as  ever.  But 
he  was  very  severe  towards  the  President,  and  in  one 
or  two  outbursts  of  rhetorical  denunciation  he  included 
me  and  any  one  connected  with  the  Administration. 
I  am  quite  convinced  that  on  such  occasions,  he  is 
not  conscious  of  the  extent  and  violence  of  his  expres 
sions,  and  is  not  wholly  the  master  of  himself.  .  .  . 
With  large  ability,  high  culture,  extended  reading,  and 
remarkable  power  of  oratory,  he  lacks  knowledge  of 
men,  is  overborne  by  much  vanity  (much  of  it  quite 
justifiable),  is  arrogant  and  domineering,  and  these 
qualities  increase  with  years.  He  has  no  one  of  the 
peculiar  elements  essential  for  leadership,  to  which  he 
thinks  that  his  long  service,  and  his  admitted  abil 
ity,  entitle  him.  .  .  .  Under  the  name  of  Mr.  Perley 
Poore,  he  has  made  a  publication  neither  generous  nor 
frank.  I  should  have  been  quite  justified  in  noticing 
it  and  denouncing  it,  and  should  have  done  so  but  for 
my  desire  to  avoid  anything  to  confirm  him  in  his 
estrangement  or  his  antagonism  to  the  Administration, 
and  for  my  determination  to  avoid,  if  practicable, 


250  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

being  brought  personally  into  controversy  with  one 
with  whom  for  many  years  I  have  had  such  friendly 
relations,  and  who  has  so  many  very  fine  qualities. 
...  I  intend  not  to  lose  him  as  a  personal  friend. 
I  wish  not  to  lose  him  as  a  political  associate  and  co- 
worker." 

In  the  same  spirit  Mr.  Fish  some  three  weeks  later 
(August  25)  wrote  from  his  home  at  Garrison  to 
Senator  Morrill  of  Vermont :  - 

"  I  had  several  very  friendly  interviews  with  him 
[Sumner],  and  made  statements  to  the  very  limit  that 
the  confidence  of  niy  official  position  would  allow,  and 
which  ought  to  satisfy  any  sensible  man.  But  on  the 
subject  of  Mr.  Motley's  removal,  and  on  his  own  rela 
tions  with  the  President,  I  cannot  regard  Mr.  S.  as 
either  a  reasonable  or  a  reasoning  man.  He  fell  back 
always  from  the  facts  I  presented  to  a  severe  expression 
of  feeling,  and  some  rhetorical  phrase.  He  seemed  to 
me  determined  to  consider  himself  the  cause  and  the 
object  of  all  that  had  been,  or  might  be,  done.  ...  I 
am  not  insensible  of  his  arrogance  and  overbearing 
temper,  but  I  know,  too,  his  extended  literary  attain 
ments,  his  power  of  eloquence,  and  his  many  good 
qualities,  and  should  deeply  regret  on  his  own  ac 
count,  and  on  that  of  the  Eepublican  party,  that  at 
this  late  day  he  should  fall  from  the  faith." 

Finally,  on  the  6th  of  September  following,  he 
wrote  again,  still  to  Senator  Morrill :  — 

"  He  [Sumner]  is  of  great  value  and  importance  to 
us  ;  but,  unfortunately,  he  thinks  that  value  and  im 
portance  to  embrace  the  existence  of  the  party.  .  .  . 
He  nourishes  his  supposed  griefs,  and  seems  to  take 
comfort  in  imagining  everything  that  is  done  without 


APPENDIX  G  251 

him,  or  contrary  to  his  wishes,  as  a  personal  offence." 
This  letter  was  probably  received  by  Senator  Morrill 
on  the  7th  of  September.  While  it  was  lying  on  his 
table,  there  came  to  him  from  Mr.  Sumner  a  most 
characteristic  effusion,  dated  the  8th,  to  which,  two 
days  later,  he  referred,  in  reply,  as  follows  :  —  "  You 
characterize  [the  President's]  acts,  and  that  with 
severity  —  perhaps  with  greater  severity  than  you  are 
aware  of.  Your  words  must  leap  out  in  your  conver 
sation,  and  they  will  inevitably  reach  the  ears  of  the 
President.  'Brutality,'  'indignity,'  'offensive,'  '  utterly 
indefensible  conduct,'  '  excuses,  apologies,  and  reasons 
which  are  obviously  pretexts,  subterfuges,  and  after- 
y  thoughts,'  would  make  any  man's  ears  tingle.  It  may 
be  too  much  to  ask  you  to  forget  and  forgive :  but  I 
think  it  might  be  wise  to  let  the  subject  '  alone  se 
verely.'  "  i 

This  excellent  advice  Mr.  Sumner  could  not  fol 
low  ;  and,  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  weeks,  inci 
dents  of  personal  intercourse  apparently  occurred  which 
brought  matters  to  a  crisis.  Though  not  a  man  of 
aggressive  disposition,  Mr.  Fish  seems,  when  aroused,  to 
have  had  in  him  a  strong  infusion  of  that  stubbornness 
so  characteristic  of  the  Dutch  stock.  He  also  was 
resentful  of  what  he  regarded  as  affronts ;  and  of 
anything  of  the  nature  of  personal  insult,  he  was  un 
forgiving.  In  view  of  past  friendly  relations  he  bore 
much  from  Sumner,  as  being  Sumner's  way,  but, 
finally,  the  limit  seems  on  some  occasion  to  have  been 
passed.  Thereafter,  the  sense  of  personal  exaspera 
tion  on  the  part  of  the  Secretary  of  State  was  not  less 

1  "  Notable  Letters  from  my  Political  Friends,"  by  Justin  S.  Mor 
rill,  The  Forum,  vol.  xxiv.  p.  409  ;  December,  1897. 


252  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

than  that  felt  by  the  President ;  and  when  Mr.  Bout- 
well,  the  head  of  the  Treasury,  truthfully  as  well  as 
charitably,  suggested  that  Mr.  Sumner  was  apt  to  for 
get  what  he  said,  Mr.  Fish  sharply  replied,  —  "  Sum 
ner  is  crazy.  He  is  a  monomaniac  upon  all  matters 
relating  to  his  own  importance,  and  his  relations  to 
the  President."  Mr.  Sumner  and  Roscoe  Conkling, 
then  Senator  from  New  York,  were  naturally  antago 
nistic.  As  Rufus  Choate  would  have  phrased  it,  they 
disliked  each  other,  not  for  cause,  but  peremptorily. 
To  Conkling,  Mr.  Fish  now  said,  —  "  Sumner  is  par 
tially  crazy.  Upon  a  certain  class  of  questions,  and 
wherever  his  own  importance  or  influence  are  con 
cerned,  or  anything  relating  to  himself,  or  his  own 
views,  past  or  present,  or  his  ambition,  he  loses  the 
power  of  logical  reasoning,  and  becomes  contradictory, 
violent,  and  unreasoning.  That  is  mental  derange 
ment." 

This  evidence  of  such  contemporaries  as  Mr.  Dana 
and  Mr.  Fish,  both  during  long  periods  warm  per 
sonal  as  well  as  close  political  friends  of  Mr.  Sumner, 
is  highly  suggestive.  It  affords  indications  of  mental 
methods  and  characteristics  which,  explaining  much, 
would  in  no  wise  be  inferred  from  anything  to  be 
found  in  the  elaborate  biography  of  Mr.  Pierce.  Cer 
tainly,  neither  General  Grant  nor  Mr.  Fish  were 
considered  among  their  contemporaries  men  difficult 
to  get  on  with,  or  prone  to  take  offence.  They  were 
both,  at  the  outset,  most  solicitous  of  Simmer's  friend 
ship  and  support.  They  were  anxious  to  conciliate 
him.  Grant  and  Sumner  never  were  on  terms  of 
personal  intimacy.  They  had  little  in  common.  But 
the  same  is  hardly  less  true  of  Grant  and  Fish.  They 


APPENDIX  G  253 

saw  nothing  of  each  other  socially,  in  later  years,  when 
both  were  residents  of  the  same  city.  Simply,  they 
were  not  congenial  natures.  But,  in  the  early  months 
of  his  presidency,  Grant  was  sincerely  desirous  of  being 
on  good  terms  with  Sunnier.  Hence  the  appointment 
of  Motley ;  hence  the  unfortunate  after-dinner  visit  in 
January,  1870.  Yet,  all  this  being  unquestionably 
so  as  late  as  January,  1870,  in  January,  1871,— 
twelve  months  afterwards  only,  —  neither  President 
nor  Secretary  was  on  speaking  terms  with  the  Sena 
tor.  The  differences  had  become  personal  and  bitter. 
This  was  suggestive.  * 

The  simple  fact  was  that  Mr.  Fish,  instinctively 
and  unconsciously,  knew  how  to  deal  with  Grant,  and 
how  to  accomplish  results  which  depended  on  him. 
Mr.  Simmer  did  not.  He  was  essentially  aggressive  ; 
and  General  Grant  resented  aggressiveness.  His 
friends,  while  greatly  admiring  his  strong  and  brilliant 
qualities,  could  not  but  be  conscious  of  his  foibles  ;  they 
did  not,  however,  state  them  in  the  somewhat  direct 
language  used  by  Mr.  Fish.  On  the  contrary,  they 
indulged  in  much  circumlocution.  For  instance,  Sen 
ator  Hoar  of  Massachusetts,  almost  a  disciple  of  Mr. 
Sumner's,  once  said  of  him  :  —  "  It  has  always  seemed 
to  me  as  if  Mr.  Sumner  thought  the  Rebellion  was  put 
down  by  a  few  speeches  he  made  in  the  Senate,  and 
that  he  looked  upon  the  battles  fought  as  the  noise  of 
a  fire-engine  going  by  while  he  was  talking."  Mr. 
Schurz  furnishes  a  curious  illustration  of  this  idio 
syncrasy.  The  renomination  of  President  Grant  was, 
in  1872,  a  foregone  conclusion.  Mr.  Sumner  felt 
impelled  to  take  ground  against  it  in  a  speech.  Mr. 
Schurz  then  says  :  —  "  When,  shortly  before  the  Na- 


254  THE   TREATY  OF   WASHINGTON 

tional  Republican  Convention  of  1872,  he  had  deliv 
ered  in  the  Senate  that  fierce  philippic  for  which  he 
has  been  censured  so  much,  he  turned  to  me  with  the 
question,  whether  I  did  not  think  that  the  statement 
and  arguments  he  had  produced  would  certainly  exer 
cise  a  decisive  influence  on  the  action  of  that  conven 
tion.  I  replied  that  I  thought  it  would  not.  He  was 
greatly  astonished  —  not  as  if  he  indulged  in  the  delu 
sion  that  his  personal  word  would  have  such  authorita 
tive  weight,  but  it  seemed  impossible  to  him  that  opin 
ions  which  in  him  had  risen  to  the  full  strength  of 
overruling  convictions  .  .  .  should  fall  powerless  at 
the  feet  of  a  party  which  so  long  had  followed  inspira 
tions  kindred  to  his  own.  Such  was  the  ingenuousness 
of  his  nature." 

Yet  Mr.  Sumner  was  essentially  a  man  of  large, 
kindly  nature,  and  generous  impulses.  He  felt  slights 
keenly,  and  made  personal  issues;  but  he  did  not 
bear  malice,  nor  was  he  small  or  vindictive.  A  curi 
ous  illustration  of  this  occurred  in  the  experience  of 
George  F.  Edmunds  of  Vermont,  whose  first  full  term 
in  the  Senate  coincided  with  Sumner's  uncompleted 
last  term.  Mr.  Edmunds,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
one  of  those  in  the  confidence  of  Secretary  Fish  dur 
ing  the  incipient  negotiations  which  led  up  to  the 
Treaty  of  Washington.  Active  in  effecting  the  reor 
ganization  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  he 
had  taken  part  adversely  to  Mr.  Sumner  in  the  debate 
on  that  subject.  He  subsequently,  in  a  familiar  letter, 
thus  described  what  thereupon  occurred:  —  "It  is  true 
that  I  was  visited  with  Mr.  Sumner's  resentment  of 
my  connection  with  the  change,  for  he  absolutely  cut 
my  acquaintance  ;  which  was  not  renewed  until  some 


APPENDIX  G  255 

months  afterwards,  when,  in  vacation,  we  suddenly 
met  in  a  New  York  omnibus,  and  he  at  the  moment 
had  forgotten  my  wickedness,  and  we  cordially  shook 
hands  ;  and  were  on  the  friendliest  terms  for  the  rest 
of  his  life." 


Ill 

A  NATIONAL  CHANGE   OF  HEART  * 

A  TEKRIBLE  and  tragic  episode  in  our  national  life 
has  burned  itself  into  history  since  the  last  meeting 
of  the  Society,  —  the  assassination  of  President  Mc- 
Kinley.  Twice  before  have  we,  in  common  with 
the  whole  land,  been  shocked  by  like  occurrences.2 
At  the  time  of  both,  Mr.  Winthrop  occupied  this 
chair  ; 3  and,  on  each  occasion,  fitting  resolutions,  sub 
mitted  by  him  and  unanimously  adopted,  were  spread 
upon  our  records.  From  the  precedents  thus  estab 
lished  I  propose  to  deviate ;  not  that  I  have  failed  to 
sympathize  in  the  outburst  of  feeling  this  truly  terrible 
event  has  excited,  or  the  expressions  elicited  by  it ; 
but,  on  now  reading  the  resolutions  heretofore  passed 
on  similar  occasions,  they  seem  to  me,  though  drawn 
with  all  Mr.  Winthrop's  accustomed  felicity,  unequal 
to  the  occasion,  —  in  one  word,  almost  of  necessity, 
formal,  conventional,  perfunctory.  I  also  feel  that  I 
could  not  express  myself  more  adequately.  Of  Presi 
dent  McKinley  all  has  in  this  way  been  said  that  can 
be  said :  — 


1  A  paper  read  before  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  at  its 
monthly  meeting,  October  10,  1901. 

2  April  20,  1865,  following-  the  death  of  President  Lincoln  ;  and 
October  13,  1881,  following-  that  of  President  Garfield. 

3  Robert  C.  Winthrop  was  President  of  the  Massachusetts  Histori 
cal  Society  from  1855  to  1885. 


A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART         257 

"  Duncan  is  in  his  grave  ; 
After  life's  fitful  fever  he  sleeps  well ; 
Treason  has  done  his  worst ;  nor  steel,  nor  poison, 
Malice  domestic,  foreign  levy,  nothing, 
Can  touch  him  further." 

He  cannot  hear ;  and,  as  to  her  for  whom  the  latter 
years  of  the  dead  President's  life  were  one  long  record 
of  affectionate,  self-sacrificing  care,  no  formally  set 
down  words  of  mine  could  add  one  iota  to  the  expres 
sion  of  sympathy  —  deep  and  prolonged  as  sincere  — 
which  has  already  gone  forth.  This  being  so,  silence 
seems  best. 

Still,  to  one  aspect  of  this  awe-impelling  tragedy  I 
wish  to  call  attention,  for  that  aspect  has  to  my  mind 
an  historic  interest.  Perhaps,  already  discussed,  it  is  an 
old  story  ;  if  such  is  the  case  I  can  only  excuse  myself 
on  the  ground  that,  having  been  absent  from  the  coun 
try,  and  only  just  returned  to  it,  I  am  less  informed 
as  to  what  has  been  said  than  I  otherwise  might  have 
been.  But,  when  some  event  like  this  last  murder  of 
a  high  official  startles  and  shocks  the  whole  civilized 
world,  the  first  impulse  always  is  to  attribute  its  oc 
currence  to  present  conditions, — moral  or  material, — 
to  some  circumstance  or  teaching  or  appliance  peculiar 
to  the  day,  —  and  to  ask  in  awe-struck  tones,  —  To 
what  are  we  coming  ?  Whither  do  tendencies  lead  ? 
In  what  will  they  result?  So,  as  of  genuine  historical 
interest,  in  this  connection,  I  want  to  call  attention  to 
the  very  noticeable  fact  that  this  murder  of  President 
McKinley  by  the  wretched,  half-witted  Czolgosz  has 
no  significance  whatever,  as  respects  either  cause  or 
method,  in  connection  with  the  times  in  which  we  live, 
its  destructive  appliances,  or  its  moral  instruction. 
This,  somewhat  curiously,  is  true  not  only  of  President 


258         A   NATIONAL  CHANGE  OF  HEART 

McKinley's  assassination,  but  of  all  the  assassinations 
of  a  like  nature,  with  two  exceptions,  which  have  oc 
curred  within  the  last  half  century.  Of  such,  I  easily 
recall  eight :  (1)  The  Orsini  attempt  on  Napoleon  III. 
in  1858,  which  resulted  in  numerous  deaths,  though 
the  person  aimed  at  escaped  unharmed  ;  (2)  the  slay 
ing  of  President  Lincoln  in  1865  ;  (3)  that  of  the 
Czar  Alexander  II.  in  1881  ;  (4)  that  of  President 
Garfield  three  months  later  in  the  same  year  ;  (5)  that 
of  President  Carnot  in  1894  ;  (6)  that  of  the  Empress 
Elizabeth  of  Austria  in  1898  ;  and  (7,  8)  those  of 
King  Humbert  in  1900,  and,  more  recently,  of  Presi 
dent  McKinley. 

This  is  truly  enough  the  age  of  advance,  —  scientific 
and  intellectual.  Strange  doctrines  are  promulgated, 
and  widely  preached.  There  is  a  freedom  given  to 
utterances,  at  once  wild  and  subversive,  the  like  of 
which  the  world  has  not  known  before ;  we  do  not  be 
lieve  in  the  suppression  of  talk ;  the  press  disseminates 
incendiary  doctrines  broadcast  among  the  partially  ed 
ucated,  and  the  half,  where  not  wholly,  crazed.  Then, 
in  its  turn,  science  has  put  the  most  deadly  and  de 
structive  of  appliances  within  easy  reach  of  the  irra 
tional  or  reckless.  Yet,  of  all  the  attempts  I  have 
enumerated,  two  only  have  borne  an  earmark  of  this 
age.  The  Orsini  conspiracy  of  1858  and  the  death  of 
the  Czar  Alexander  in  1881  brought  into  play  imple 
ments  of  destruction  unknown  to  former  generations  ; 
the  other  six  cases  out  of  the  eight  had  no  features  in 
any  respect  different  from  similar  crimes  of  the  long 
past.  The  impulses,  the  methods,  and  the  weapons  of 
Booth  and  Guiteau,  in  1865  and  1881,  were  identical 
in  every  way  with  those  of  Gerard  and  Ravaillac  in 


A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART        259 

1584  and  1610,  three  centuries  before.  They  had  in 
them  nothing  epochal,  —  nothing  peculiar  to  the  dy 
namitic  age.  Consider,  in  the  first  place,  the  aim  of 
the  assassin,  the  object  of  his  animosity,  —  McKinley 
and  Garfield  were  neither  tyrants  nor  despots  ;  nor 
were  William  the  Silent  and  Henry  of  Navarre.  On 
the  contrary,  all  those  named  were  men  of  a  merciful, 
not  to  say  singularly  genial  disposition.  Beneficent 
as  rulers  and  magistrates,  they  were  in  the  popular 
mind  connected  with  no  severities  towards  individuals. 
In  not  one  of  these  cases  had  the  assassin,  directly  or 
indirectly,  immediately  or  remotely,  suffered  injury  at 
the  hands  of  his  victim.  It  was  the  same  with  Lincoln 
and  Carnot,  Humbert  and  Elizabeth.  In  ah1  these  in 
stances,  moreover,  the  weapons  used  in  killing,  if  not 
identical,  were  common  to  the  earlier  and  the  later 
period.  Henry  of  Navarre  in  1610,  President  Carnot 
in  1894,  and  Elizabeth  of  Austria  in  1898,  were  mur 
dered  by  thrusts  of  a  poniard ;  William  of  Orange  in 
1584,  King  Humbert  in  1900,  and  Presidents  Lincoln, 
Garfield  and  McKinley,  all  within  forty  years,  met 
their  deaths  from  pistol-shots.  In  no  one  of  these 
tragedies  did  the  modern  high  explosive  play  any  part. 
They  were  all  ordinary  shootings  or  stabbings  of  the 
old  style. 

Nor  was  it  otherwise  as  respects  motive.  The  more 
recent  instances  developed  nothing  peculiar  to  any 
age  or  doctrines,  except  that  in  the  earlier  cases  the 
crime  originated  in  a  morbid  fanaticism  born  of  reli 
gious  zeal ;  whereas,  in  the  later,  social  and  anarchis 
tic  teachings  had  taken  the  place  of  theological.  In 
the  process  of  human  development,  or  evolution  as  we 
call  it,  the  same  character  of  mind  was  set  in  action  to 


260         A  NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART 

a  like  end  by  a  common  diseased  impulse,  only  under 
another  name.  There  is  no  new  factor  at  work  ; 
merely  the  teaching  of  social  rights  now  operates,  in 
a  certain  order  of  brooding  minds,  as  the  teachings 
of  theology  once  did  on  minds  of  the  same  temper. 
So  far  as  these  recent  murders  are  concerned,  the 
world  and  human  nature  have,  therefore,  undergone 
no  change.  The  Czolgosz  of  1901  is  the  Gerard  of 
1584  reembodied,  but  actuated  by  the  same  impulse, 
and  armed  with  his  old  weapon !  Luccheni  is  Ravail- 
lac.  The  three  centuries  between  introduced  no  ele 
ment  of  novelty.  Indeed,  the  thought  this  recent 
murder  has  most  forced  on  me  has  been  one  of  sur 
prise,  on  the  whole,  that  such  things  so  rarely  happen. 
Here  in  America  are  now  seventy  millions  of  people, 
—  gentle  and  simple,  rich  and  poor,  sane  and  insane, 
healthy  and  morbid ;  of  those  seventy  millions  not  a 
few  are  men  who,  like  Macbeth' s  hired  assassin,  might 
truthfully  enough  declare  themselves  of  those 

"  Whom  the  vile  blows  and  buffets  of  the  world 
Have  so  incensed  that  I  am  reckless  what 
I  do  to  spite  the  world  ;  " 

and,  when  thus  thought  of,  it  seems  cause  for  genu 
ine  surprise  that  among  those  seventy  millions  there 
do  not  more  frequently  develop  single  individuals  — 
some  one  person  in  the  half  million  —  who,  seized  in 
his  brooding  moments  with  the  homicidal  mania, 
asserts  his  equality  and  his  hate  by  striking  at  the 
most  shining  mark.  To  my  mind,  contemplating 
mankind  as  an  infinitely  varied  and  well-nigh  count 
less  mass,  it  is  the  rarity  of  these  attempts  in  our  day, 
not  their  occasional  occurrence,  which  should  excite 
our  special  wonder. 


A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART         261 

At  the  time  of  the  assassination  of  the  President, 
I  chanced  to  be  in  England,  having  left  home  on 
the  10th  of  August.  It  was  a  vacation  trip  ;  and, 
in  the  course  of  it,  I  thus  had  some  opportunity  to 
witness  that  singular,  and  very  suggestive,  outburst 
of  sympathy  and  fellow-feeling  on  the  part  of  our  kin 
beyond  the  sea,  which  was  so  marked  a  feature  of 
that  unhappy  episode.  On  Thursday,  September  19, 
I  was  in  London,  and  present  at  the  memorial  ser 
vices  in  Westminster  Abbey.  Certainly,  they  were 
most  impressive.  Seated  in  the  choir,  I  was  not  in 
position  to  see  the  nave  of  the  Abbey,  except  in  part 
and  by  glimpses  ;  but,  throughout  the  solemn  obser 
vances  of  that  day  and  place,  an  atmosphere  of  genu 
ine  sympathy  and  deep  feeling  pervaded  the  great 
assembly.  Every  nook  and  corner  was  occupied ;  a 
sense  of  awe  was  apparent.  The  day  had  been  dull 
and  obscure,  —  a  September  noon  in  London,  —  but, 
towards  the  close  of  the  ceremonial,  as  the  solemn 
tones  of  the  great  organ,  intermingled  with  the  re 
sponses  of  the  choir,  rolled  up  through  the  arches  of 
the  vaulted  roof,  the  clouds  broke  away  without,  and 
the  sun  shone  down  through  the  windows  of  stained 
glass  on  the  vast  congregation  below.  It  was  Mil 
ton's  "  dim  religious  light ;  "  and  the  dusky  atmos 
phere  seemed  laden  with  the  smoke  of  incense,  as  the 
chant  of  the  choir  died  slowly  away. 

To  me  personally,  however,  this  outburst  of  English 
sentiment  towards  the  United  States  and  all  things 
American  —  the  demonstration  of  an  undemonstra 
tive  people  —  contained  within  itself  much  food  for 
thought.  I  freely  acknowledge  I  have  seen  nothing 
like  it.  And,  as  my  eyes  witnessed  the  Present, 


262         A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART 

memory  called  the  Past  to  mind.  What,  I  could  not 
but  ask  myself,  did  it  signify  ?  In  what  did  it  origi 
nate  ?  Was  it  merely  external  ?  Was  it  matter  of 
policy  ?  Or  did  it  indicate  a  true  change  of  heart  ? 
And  if  a  change  of  heart,  to  what  was  that  change 
due  ? 

My  thoughts  then  reverted  to  remote  days  and 
other  experiences,  now,  in  Great  Britain,  quite  for 
gotten,  —  memories  still  fresh  with  me,  though  a  gen 
eration  has  since  passed  on.  I  recalled  my  first 
experiences  in  England  far  back  in  the  "  sixties,"  - 
in  the  dark  and  trying  days  of  our  Civil  War ;  and 
again,  more  recently,  during  the  commercial  depres 
sion,  and  contest  over  the  free  coinage  of  silver,  in 
1896.  Then,  especially  in  the  earlier  period,  nothing 
was  too  opprobrious  —  nothing  too  bitter  and  sting 
ing  —  for  English  lips  to  utter  of  America,  and  men 
and  things  American.1  We  were,  as  the  Times,  echo 
ing  the  utterances  of  the  governing  class,  never  wea 
ried  of  telling  us,  a  "  dishonest  "  and  a  "  degenerate  " 
race,  —  our  only  worship  was  of  the  Almighty  Dollar. 
A  hearty  dislike  was  openly  expressed,  in  terms  of 
contempt  which  a  pretence  of  civility  hardly  feigned 
to  veil.  They  openly  exulted  in  our  reverses  ;  our 
civilization  was,  they  declared,  a  thin  veneer  ;  demo 
cracy,  a  bursted  bubble.  In  true  Pharisaic  spirit  they 
made  broad  their  phylacteries,  thanking  God  that 
they  were  not  as  we,  nor  we  as  they.  All  this  I  dis 
tinctly  recalled  ;  it  was  the  atmosphere  —  frigid,  con- 

1  See  supra,  pp.  74-79;  also  Life  of  C.  F.  Adams,  American 
Statesmen  Series,  pp.  291-305 ;  for  a  collection  of  parliamentary 
utterances  from  the  pages  of  Hansard,  see  Elaine  :  Twenty  Years  of 
Congress,  vol.  ii.  pp.  478-481. 


A  NATIONAL   CHANGE  OF  HEART        263 

temptuous,  condescending  —  in  which  I  had  first  lived 
and  moved  in  London.  And  now  what  a  change  !  - 
and  so  very  sudden  !  Nothing  was  too  good  or  too 
complimentary  to  say  of  America.  Our  representa 
tives  were  cheered  to  the  echo.  In  the  language  of 
Lord  Rosebery,  at  the  King  Alfred  millenary  celebra 
tion  at  Winchester,  on  the  day  following  the  Mc- 
Kinley  observances,  the  branches  of  the  great  Anglo- 
Saxon  stock  were  clasping  hands  across  the  centuries 
and  across  the  sea  ;  and  the  audience  applauded  him 
loudly  as  he  spoke.1 

The  heartiness  was  all  there.  That  at  least  admit 
ted  of  no  question.  But  what  did  it  mean  ?  Why  had 
this  people  so  suddenly  awakened  to  a  kinship,  in 
which  formerly  they  had  felt  something  in  no  way 
akin  to  pride  ?  It  was  over  this  I  pondered.  At  last 
I  evolved  an  explanation,  mistaken,  perhaps,  —  I  may 
say  probably  mistaken,  —  but  still  plausible,  and  to  me 
satisfactory.  At  the  risk,  perchance,  of  seeming  un 
gracious,  —  of  appearing  to  respond  somewhat  unfeel 
ingly  to  an  outburst  of  genuine  sympathy  on  the  part 

1  Mr.  E.  L.  Godkin,  formerly  editor  of  the  Nation,  called  atten 
tion  to  this  great  change  of  tone  in  the  very  last  published  communi 
cation  from  his  pen,  dated  Lyndhurst,  England,  July  31,  1901,  printed 
in  the  New  York  Evening  Post  of  the  10th  of  the  following  month. 
Mr.  Godkin  is  peculiarly  qualified  to  speak  on  this  point.  A  Briton 
by  birth,  he  has,  after  long  residence  in  this  country,  been  a  frequent 
visitor  in  England  during  recent  years,  returning  there  recently  in  fail 
ing  health.  "  The  American,"  he  wrote  in  the  letter  referred  to,  "  who 
in  any  profession  enjoys  ever  so  slight  a  distinction  at  home,  has  little 
idea  what  a  great  man  he  is  until  he  comes  to  England.  It  is,  how 
ever,  just  as  well  for  him  in  this  respect  that  he  comes  now  instead  of  . 
ten  years  earlier.  ...  At  the  present  time  American  fortunes,  and 
freedom  in  distributing  them,  and  wide  financial  operations  generally, 
have  so  captured  the  English  imagination  that  they  now  hasten  to 
embrace  indiscriminately  the  cousins  whom  they  snubbed  for  a  cen 
tury,  and  to  pronounce  them  and  their  works  good,  one  and  all." 


264        A  NATIONAL   CHANGE  OF  HEART 

of  a  kindred  people,  calling  on  us  to  forgive  and  for 
get  the  ill-considered  utterances  and  unwise  policy  of 
another  time,  I  purpose  here  to  put  my  much  pon 
dered  explanation  coldly  on  record. 

In  the  first  place  let  me  premise,  and,  in  so  doing, 
emphasize,  my  sense  of  the  little  worth  of  the  judg 
ment  of  an  individual,  and  that  individual  an  alien, 
on  what  may  be  the  feeling  of  any  community,  taken 
in  the  aggregate,  on  a  question  which  does  not  at  once 
absorb  and  concentrate  attention.  Even  in  our  own 
country,  except  when  deeply  stirred  by  some  outburst 
of  patriotism  or  sympathy, — a  common  impulse  sweep 
ing  over  the  land,  and  bending  minds  as  a  strong 
gust  inclines  one  way  a  field  of  ripening  grain,  —  ex 
cept  on  occasions  such  as  this,  we  know  how  little  real 
insight  the  average  man  has  into  what  is  passing  in 
the  minds  of  those  among  whom  he  has  from  his  birth 
lived  and  moved.  We  all  are  conscious  of  that  sense 
of  weariness  which  almost  daily  comes  over  us  when 
we  read,  in  editorial  parlance,  what  the  American  Peo 
ple  have  made  up  their  minds  to  do  or  not  to  do,  — 
to  have  or  not  to  have.  On  this  point  the  average 
journalist  is  always  fully  advised.  His  insight  is  in 
fallible.  To  his  conclusions,  knowing  by  long  expe 
rience  their  utter  worthlessness,  we  pay  no  attention. 
Yet  not  an  American  goes  to  Europe  for  a  vacation 
trip,  but  he  comes  home  fully  convinced  that  he  knows 
more  or  less  of  the  tendencies  of  foreign  thought. 
Yet  all  the  insight  he  has,  has  been  picked  up  from 
newspapers  and  conversations  in  the  railway  carriage 
or  the  smoking-room.  It  is  true  that,  in  the  case  of 
Great  Britain,  descended  from  one  parent  stock,  we 
speak  the  same  language.  None  the  less,  an  Ainer- 


A  NATIONAL   CHANGE  OF  HEART        265 

lean  in  Great  Britain  must  almost  of  necessity  draw 
his  inferences  as  to  Great  Britain  as  a  community 
from  casual  sources  and  a  narrow  range  of  observa 
tion.  He  may  read  the  Times  and  the  Saturday 
Review,  or  the  News  and  the  Spectator;  he  may 
have  an  introduction  into  English  domestic  and  social 
life,  passing  as  a  guest  from  one  great  house  to  an 
other  ;  he  may  mix  in  business  or  financial  circles,  and 
be  familiar  with  "  the  city ; "  he  may  belong  to  the 
church,  and  breathe  the  atmosphere  of  the  close  or 
the  university  ;  he  may  be  a  non-conformist,  and  so 
frequent  the  conventicle  :  —  and  yet,  when  all  is  said 
and  done,  he  is  still  a  stranger  in  a  strange  land.  In 
spite  of  himself,  except  it  be  as  the  result  of  a  long 
and  varied  sojourn,  he  necessarily  draws  his  conclu 
sions  largely  from  matters  of  accident,  —  chance  con 
versations  overheard  or  participated  in  at  hotels  and 
in  clubs,  in  waiting-rooms  and  in  railway  carriages,  — 
unsigned  communications  in  copies  of  papers  he  may 
pick  up,  —  or  even  from  talking  with  bagmen,  waiters, 
cab-drivers,  and  casual  travelling  companions.  In  this 
way  what  may  be  called  the  general  drift  of  public 
opinion,  so  far  as  it  reaches  him,  finds  its  expression. 
Much  undoubtedly  in  such  cases  depends,  also,  on  the 
individual ;  for,  though  every  one  is  apt  to  generalize 
from  his  individual  experience,  not  all  men  are  either 
sympathetic  or  approachable.  Yet,  allowing  for  all 
these  peculiarities  of  the  individual,  —  these  kaleido 
scopic  chances  of  travel,  —  certain  large  features  stand 
forth  and  impress  themselves ;  some  general  infer 
ences  may  at  times  not  unsafely  be  drawn. 

I  think  I  know  the  Englishman  fairly  well  ;  at  any 
rate,  I  have  known  him  through  personal  contact  for 


266         A  NATIONAL   CHANGE  OF  HEART 

over  thirty  years.  I  may  add  that  I  like  him ;  and, 
individually,  I  think  he  does  not  dislike  me.  We  cer 
tainly  get  on  fairly  well  together.  About  him  and 
her  there  is  a  downrightness,  sometimes,  it  is  true,  bor 
dering  on  brutality,  which  commands  my  respect.  He 
does  not  conceal  his  feelings.  He  is  not  good  at  play 
ing  policy.  But,  high  or  low,  gentle  or  simple,  rich 
or  poor,  the  Englishman  and  the  Englishwoman  re 
spect  and  admire  the  wealthy,  the  successful,  the  mas 
terful.  This  is  natural,  for  the  English  themselves 
are  essentially  masterful.  They  are  also  a  commercial 
people.  Of  late  years  the  struggle  for  life  in  Great 
Britain,  as  elsewhere,  has  become  more  intense,  —  the 
cost  of  living  higher,  —  the  social  scales  more  exact 
ing.  There,  as  in  America,  wealth,  and  the  possession 
of  wealth,  has  become  a  larger  and  larger  factor  in  the 
common  existence ;  and  the  newspaper,  with  its  elab 
orate  daily  accounts  of  what  is  taking  place  among 
the  rich  and  the  fashionable,  has  distorted  ideals.  Now, 
of  recent  years,  —  since,  we  will  say,  the  close  of  our 
Civil  War,  or  1870,  —  no  people  on  earth  have  been 
comparably  so  successful  as  the  Americans  in  the 
rapid  accumulation  of  wealth,  none  have  shown  them 
selves  more  masterful ;  and,  as  he  has  more  and  more 
so  shown  himself,  the  Englishman  has  undergone  a 
change  of  feeling  towards  him,  —  and  this  change  is, 
I  believe,  real.  Whether  real  or  not,  it  certainly  is 
sudden.  The  outward  expression  is  of  recent  date ; 
but  the  influences  which  have  gradually  brought  it 
about  have  been  a  good  while  at  work.  The  change, 
as  now  witnessed,  may,  I  think,  be  traced  to  one  re 
mote  and  several  immediate  causes.  I  will  enumerate 
some  of  the  more  prominent. 


A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART        267 

The  first  was  the  outcome  of  our  gigantic,  prolonged 
Civil  War.  At  one  stage  of  that  struggle,  America 
-  loyal  America,  I  mean  —  touched  its  lowest  estate 
in  the  estimation  of  those  called,  and  in  Great  Britain 
considered,  the  ruling  class,  —  the  aristocracy,  the 
men  of  business  and  finance,  the  army  and  navy,  the 
members  of  the  learned  professions.1  None  the  less, 
they  then  saw  us  accomplish  what  they  had  in  every 
conceivable  form  of  speech  pronounced  "  impossible." 
We  put  down  the  Rebellion  with  a  strong  hand  ;  and 
then,  peacefully  disbanding  our  victorious  army,  made 
good  our  every  promise  to  pay.  We  accomplished 
our  results  in  a  way  they  could  not  understand,  —  a 
way  for  which  experience  yielded  no  precedent.  None 
the  less,  the  dislike,  not  unalloyed  by  contempt,  was 
too  deep-rooted  to  disappear  at  once,  much  more  to 
be  immediately  transmuted  into  admiration  and  cor 
diality.  They  waited.  Then  several  striking  events 
occurred  in  rapid  succession,  —  all  within  ten  years. 

I  am  no  admirer  of  President  Cleveland's  Venezu 
ela  diplomacy.  I  do  not  like  brutality  in  public  any 
more  than  in  private  dealings.  Good  manners  and 
courtesy  can  always  be  observed,  even  when  firmness 
of  bearing  is  desirable.  None  the  less,  bad  for  us  as 
the  precedent  then  established  was,  and  yet  will  prove, 
there  can  be  no  question  that,  so  far  as  Great  Britain 
was  concerned,  the  tone  and  attitude  on  that  occasion 
adopted  were  productive  of  results  at  once  profound 
and,  in  some  ways,  beneficial.  The  average  English 
man  from  the  very  bottom  of  his  heart  respects  a  mail 
who  asserts  himself,  —  provided  always  he  has  the  will, 
as  well  as  the  power,  to  make  the  self-assertion  good. 
1  Supra,  pp.  62,  63. 


268         A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART 

This,  as  a  result  of  our  Civil  War,  they  felt  we  had. 
We  had  done  what  they  had  most  confidently  pro 
claimed  we  could  not  do,  and  what  they,  in  their 
hearts,  feel  they  have  failed  to  do.  Throughout  our 
Rebellion  they  had  insisted  that,  even  if  the  conquest 
of  the  Confederacy  was  possible, — which  they  de 
clared  it  manifestly  was  not,  —  the  pacification  of  the 
Confederates  was  out  of  the  question.  They  thought, 
also,  they  knew  what  they  were  talking  about.  Had 
they  not  for  centuries  had  Ireland  on  their  hands  ? 
Was  it  not  there  now  ?  Were  they  not  perpetually 
floundering  in  a  bottomless  bog  of  Hibernian  discon 
tent  ?  Would  not  our  experience  be  the  same,  except 
on  a  larger  scale  and  in  more  aggravated  form  ?  The 
result  worked  out  by  us  wholly  belied  their  predic 
tions.  Not  only  was  the  rebellion  suppressed,  but 
the  Confederates  were  quickly  conciliated.  The  Brit 
ish  could  not  understand  it ;  in  the  case  of  the  Trans 
vaal  they  do  not  understand  it  now.  They  merely  see 
that  we  actually  did  what  they  had  been  unable  to  do, 
and  are  still  trying  to  do.  The  Spanish  war  showed 
that  our  work  of  domestic  conciliation  was  as  com 
plete  as  had  been  that  of  conquest. 

Then  came  the  commercial  depression  of  1893,  and 
the  silver  issue.  Again  they  predicted  all  possible 
disaster.  I  was  in  London  in  the  summers  of  1896 
and  1897,  in  close  touch  with  financial  circles.  The 
tone  and  atmosphere  at  that  time  prevalent  reminded 
me  forcibly  of  the  dark  days  of  the  Rebellion.  Even 
as  recently  as  four  years  back,  nothing  was  too  bad 
for  the  Englishman  "  on  'Change  "  to  say  or  to  predict 
of  America,  or  "  Americans,"  as  our  securities  were 
called.  Suddenly,  and  in  our  own  way,  we  emerged 


A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART        269 

from  under  the  cloud,  and,  again  erect  and  defiant, 
challenged  British  commercial  supremacy.  That  they 
understood  ;  while  they  feared,  in  their  hearts  they 
admired.  Then  came  our  Spanish  war  ;  and  at 
Manila  and  Santiago  they  saw  us  crush  a  European 
navy,  such  as  it  was,  much  as  the  lion  they  have 
taken  for  their  emblem  might  crush  some  captive 
jackal  of  the  desert.  This  they  understood  best,  and 
most  admired.  The  rest  naturally  followed.  We 
were  unquestionably  rich,  unmistakably  powerful; 
that  we  too  were  a  masterful  race  was  evident ;  we 
fearlessly  challenged  supremacy  ;  we  had  a  way  of 
somehow  accomplishing  results  which  they  had  been 
at  much  pains  vociferously  to  pronounce  altogether 
out  of  the  question.  So  they  respected  and  feared 
us  ;  then  they  began,  in  a  way,  to  feel  proud  of  us. 
Were  we,  after  all,  not  flesh  of  their  flesh,  —  bone  of 
their  bone  ? 

Finally  came  their  own  war  in  the  Transvaal. 
Among  the  nations  of  Europe,  Great  Britain  found 
itself  in  a  state  of  extreme  isolation.  We  ourselves 
know  from  recent  experience  to  what  this  is  due. 
Under  some  law  of  development  as  yet  only  partially 
understood,  the  leading  nations  of  the  earth  have, 
especially  within  the  last  quarter  of  a  century,  been 
reaching  out  for  dominion  in  every  direction.  In  this 
process  Great  Britain,  for  reasons  plain  to  every  ob 
server,  took  the  lead.  In  so  doing,  she  had  a  century's 
start  ;  but,  none  the  less,  she  came  in  necessary  but 
sharp  contact  with  others,  all  bent  on  the  same  work. 
The  result  was  logical.  A  few  years  ago  we  suddenly 
entered  on  the  same  path,  —  Imperialism,  it  is  called. 
AVe  all  know  what  followed.  We  came  in  conflict 


270         A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART 

with  a  nation  belonging  to  Latin  Europe.  Immedi 
ately,  all  the  Latin  communities  were  in  sympathy 
with  Spain,  and  looked  loweringly  upon  us.  The 
English,  at  about  the  same  time,  came  in  conflict  with 
an  offshoot  of  the  Germanic  stock ;  and  instantly  all 
those  of  German  blood  scowled  upon  her.  France, 
she  had  offended  in  Africa ;  Russia  was  traditionally 
a  rival,  and  an  enemy  in  Asia.  It  so  chanced  that  a 
fellow  feeling  then  brought  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  together.  We  were  in  a  not  dissimi 
lar  situation.  As  Mr.  Richard  Cobden  observed  long 
ago  of  his  countrymen,  —  "  We  generally  sympathize 
with  everybody's  rebels  but  our  own."  1  This  is  not  a 
peculiarly  British  characteristic.  We,  in  America, 
were  inclined  to  sympathize  strongly  with  the  rebels 
of  South  Africa ;  but  we  now  have  rebels  of  our  own. 
Rebels,  therefore,  are  with  us  not  in  such  high  favor 
as  they  were,  —  temporarily,  of  course.  Thus,  in 
stinctively  and  insensibly,  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  each  being  to  a  degree  isolated,  drew 
together  in  face  of  the  Germanic  and  the  Latiij  races. 
Especially  was  this  so  with  Great  Britain  ;  for  her 
isolation  and  consequent  unpopularity  were  much  the 
more  pronounced  of  the  two.  It  thus  became,  to  a 
certain  extent,  those  of  the  English-speaking  race 
against  the  world.  Blood,  speech,  descent,  told  ;  and 
it  told  more  plainly  with  them  than  with  us. 

Thus,  as  I  more  and  more  reflected  upon  it,  I  be 
gan  to  realize  that  the  change  in  the  English  heart 
was  not  only  real,  but  altogether  human,  as  well  as 
eminently  characteristic.  I  saw,  also,  or  thought  I 
saw,  just  how  it  came  about.  The  mass  of  the  English 

1  Speeches,  vol.  ii.  p.  88. 


A   NATIONAL   CHANGE   OF  HEART        271 

people  —  the  great  wage-earning  class,  the  toiling  mil 
lions  —  never  had  shared  in  the  fear  and  dislike,  so 
long  and  loudly  proclaimed,  of  America  and  Demo 
cracy.  They,  on  the  contrary,  throughout  the  slave 
holders'  rebellion,  and  during  our  time  of  greatest 
stress,  as  a  whole,  sympathized  with  the  national  spirit 
and  the  Union  cause.  They  instinctively  felt  that 
we  somehow  were  fighting  their  battle  with  privilege 
and  aristocracy.  Their  hearts,  therefore,  were  true  ; 
in  them  no  change  had  to  take  place.  The  govern 
ing  or  influential  classes,  on  the  other  hand,  though 
prejudiced,  were  quick,  in  their  way,  to  learn.  They 
now  felt  British  isolation  ;  they  feared  for  their  trade  ; 
they  found  themselves  in  trouble  in  Ireland  and  in 
Africa.  So  their  hearts  turned  towards  their  kin 
beyond  the  sea ;  and  they  turned  in  good  earnest. 
The  new-born  sympathy  was  real ;  its  expression  gen 
uine.  They  themselves  did  not  analyze  the  motive. 
Perhaps  it  was  as  well  they  did  not,  for  that  adulation 
which  goes  forth  to  those  whom  success  has  crowned 
savors  of  the  Philistine,  rather  than  of  the  disciples  of 
sweetness  and  light.  None  the  less  it  is  human  ;  and, 
moreover,  there  is  much  to  urge  in  extenuation  of  it. 
But,  in  this  case,  the  worship  of  success  was  but  one 
of  the  factors  which  entered  into  the  situation.  We 
ourselves,  it  must  not  be  forgotten,  had,  in  the  years 
that  had  passed  and  the  bitter  experiences  through 
which  we  had  gone,  been  largely  transmuted.  More 
assured  of  our  position,  we  had  that  increased  confi 
dence  in  ourselves  which  relieved  us  in  a  degree  of 
self-consciousness.  We  had  a  record,  and  a  future. 
The  national  crudeness,  so  conspicuous  in  the  past, 
was  largely  of  the  past.  It  was  no  longer  necessary 


272         A   NATIONAL   CHANGE  OF  HEART 

to  assert  our  equality,  for  our  equality  was  no  longer 
challenged.  Thus  the  change  was  as  much  in  our 
selves  as  in  the  estimate  held  of  us  by  others. 

All  this  we  only  partially  appreciate.  In  my  own 
case,  remembering  the  situation  of  a  generation  back, 
while  I  saw  how  differently  they  regarded  us,  I  could 
but  be  to  some  extent  conscious  of  a  failure  to  realize 
how  different  we  had  ourselves  become.  In  reality  it 
was  much  as  if,  from  under  the  parental  roof,  a  father 
had  watched  some  rebellious,  self-assertive  youth,  who 
had  gone  forth  into  the  world  to  work  out  his  destiny 
in  his  own  way  and  on  his  own  account,  not  over  and 
above  respectful,  and  setting  all  precept  and  expe 
rience  at  defiance.  At  first,  and  for  a  good  while,  he 
would  be  looked  at  askance  ;  failure  would  be  pro 
nounced  his  predestined  fate.  Then,  by  degrees,  as, 
always  asserting  his  equality,  he  overcame  difficulties, 
—  as  he  acquired  wealth,  power,  fame,  —  the  father 
would  begin  to  look  with  pride  on  the  stalwart,  broad- 
shouldered,  big-boned  youth,  moving  on  from  success 
to  success,  achieving  victory  after  victory,  ever  accom 
plishing  results  before  pronounced  impossible,  by  pro 
cesses  peculiarly  his  own  working  out  a  great  destiny 
in  defiance  of  rule,  but  ever  changing,  developing, 
ripening  as  he  did  so.  And  gradually  that  father, 
however  set  in  his  ideas,  would  undergo  a  change  of 
heart,  not  the  less  real  because  unconfessed,  saying  to 
himself  :  "  This  is  my  offspring,  —  bone  of  my  bone, 
flesh  of  my  flesh !  And  what  an  extraordinary  fellow 
he  is,  —  and  enormously  rich  withal !  " 

And  this,  unless  I  greatly  err,  is  the  process  through 
which  Great  Britain  has  gone,  —  is  going ;  we  have 
gone,  and  are  going.  In  any  event,  I  now  submit  it 


A   NATIONAL   CHANGE  OF  HEART         273 

as  a  tentative  explanation  of  an  extremely  noticeable 
recent  something,  —  a  manifestation  no  less  unmis 
takable  than  suggestive.  As  a  change  of  demeanor, 
too,  it  was  not  otherwise  than  agreeable  to  some  of 
us,  as,  last  month,  we  sat  in  quiet  reminiscent  mood 
during  the  ringing  plaudits.  The  "  Old  Home  "  had 
not  always  welcomed  us  back  in  just  that  way  ;  we 
probably  were  other  than  we  had  been  ;  they  certainly 
looked  upon  us  with  more  kindly  eyes. 


IV 

AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION1 

"  History  is  past  Politics,  and  Politics  are  present  History."  —  ED 
WARD  A.  FREEMAN. 

"  Politics  are  vulgar  when  they  are  not  liberalized  by  history,  and 
history  fades  into  mere  literature  when  it  loses  sight  of  its  relation  to 
practical  politics."  —  SIR  JOHN  SEELEY. 

HERE  are  aphorisms  from  two  writers,  both  justly 
distinguished  in  the  field  of  modern  historical  research. 
Sententious  utterances,  they  would  probably,  like  most 
sententious  utterances,  go  to  pieces  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  under  the  test  of  severe  analysis.  They  will, 
however,  now  serve  me  sufficiently  well  as  texts. 

That  politics  should  find  no  place  at  its  meetings 
is,  I  believe,  the  unwritten  law  of  this  Association ; 
and,  by  politics,  I  refer  to  the  discussion  of  those  ques 
tions  of  public  conduct  and  policy  for  the  time  being 
uppermost  in  the  mind  of  the  community.  Taking 
into  consideration  the  character  and  purpose  of  our 
body,  and  the  broad  basis  on  which  its  somewhat  loose 
membership  rests,  the  rule  may  be  salutary.  But 
there  are  not  many  general  propositions  not  open  to 
debate ;  and  so  I  propose  on  this  occasion  to  call  this 

1  Address  as  President  of  the  American  Historical  Association,  de 
livered  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Association,  in  Washington, 
December  27,  1901.  Owing  to  its  length,  this  address  was  compressed 
in  delivery,  occupying  forty-five  minutes  only  ;  it  was  printed,  in 
part,  in  the  American  Historical  Review  for  January,  1902,  vol.  vii. 
pp.  203-232. 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  275 

unwritten  law  of  ours  in  question.  While  so  doing, 
moreover,  I  shall  distinctly  impinge  upon  it. 

Let  us  come  at  once  to  the  point.  May  it  not  be 
possible  that  the  unwritten  law,  —  perhaps  it  would 
be  better  to  speak  of  it  as  the  tacit  understanding,  —  I 
have  referred  to,  admits  of  limitations  and  exceptions 
both  useful  and  desirable  ?  Is  it,  after  all,  necessary, 
or  even,  from  a  point  of  large  view,  well  considered, 
thus  to  exclude  from  the  list  of  topics  to  be  discussed 
at  meetings  of  historical  associations,  and  especially  of 
this  Association,  the  problems  at  the  time  uppermost 
in  man's  thoughts  ?  Do  we  not,  indeed,  by  so  doing 
abdicate  a  useful  public  function,  —  surrender  an  edu 
cational  office ;  practically  admitting  by  our  act  that 
we  cannot  trust  ourselves  to  discuss  political  issues  in 
a  scholarly  and  historical  spirit?  In  one  word,  are 
not  those  composing  a  body  of  this  sort  under  a  species 
of  obligation,  in  a  community  like  ours,  to  contribute 
their  share,  from  the  point  of  view  they  occupy,  to 
the  better  understanding  of  the  questions  in  a,ctive 
political  debate  ?  This  proposition,  as  I  have  said,  I 
now  propose  to  discuss  ;  and,  in  so  doing,  I  shall,  for 
purposes  of  illustration,  draw  freely  on  present  prac 
tical  politics,  —  using  as  object  lessons  the  issues  now, 
or  very  recently,  agitating  the  minds  of  not  a  few  of 
those  composing  this  audience,  —  indeed,  I  hope,  of 
all. 

I  start  from  a  fundamental  proposition.  The  Amer 
ican  Historical  Association,  like  all  other  associations, 
whether  similar  in  character  or  not,  either  exists  for 
a  purpose,  or  it  had  better  cease  to  be.  That  purpose 
is,  presumably,  to  do  the  best  and  most  effective  work 
in  its  power  in  the  historical  field.  I  then  further, 


276  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

and  with  much  confidence,  submit  that  the  standard 
of  American  political  discussion  is  not  now  so  high  as 
not  to  admit  of  elevation.  On  the  contrary,  while, 
comparatively  speaking,  it  ranks  well  both  in  tone  and 
conduct,  yet  its  deficiencies  are  many  and  obvious. 
That,  taken  as  a  whole,  it  is  of  a  lower  grade  now 
than  formerly,  I  do  not  assert ;  though  I  do  assert, 
and  propose  presently  to  show,  that  in  recent  years  it 
has  been  markedly  lower  than  it  was  in  some  periods 
of  the  past,  and  periods  within  my  own  recollection. 
That,  however,  it  is  not  so  high  as  it  should  be,  — 
that  it  is  by  no  manner  of  means  ideal,  —  all  will,  I 
think,  admit.  If  so,  that  admission  suffices  for  present 
purposes. 

My  next  contention  is  perhaps  more  open  to  dis 
pute.  It  is  a  favorite  theory  now  with  a  certain  class 
of  philosophers,  somewhat  inclined  to  the  happy-go- 
lucky  school,  that  in  all  things  every  community  gets 
about  what  it  asks  for,  and  is  qualified  to  appreciate. 
In  political  discussion  —  as  in  railroad  or  hotel  ser 
vice,  and  in  literature  or  religion  —  the  supply,  as 
respects  both  quality  and  quantity,  responds  with  suf 
ficient  closeness  to  the  demand.  There  is,  however, 
good  reason  for  thinking  that,  with  the  American 
community  which  to-day  is,  or  at  least  with  some 
sections  and  elements  thereof,  this  at  best  specious 
theory  does  not  at  the  present  time  hold  true.  Our 
recent  political  debates  have,  I  submit,  been  conducted 
on  a  level  distinctly  below  the  intelligence  of  the 
constituency ;  the  participants  in  the  debate  have  not 
been  equal  to  the  occasion  offered  them.  Evidence 
of  this  is  found  in  the  absence  of  response.  I  think  I 
am  justified  in  the  assertion  that  no  recent  political 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  277 

utterance  has  produced  a  real  echo,  much  less  a  re 
verberation  ;  and  it  would  not  probably  be  rash  to 
challenge  an  immediate  reference  to  a  single  speech, 
or  pointed  expression  even,  which  during  the  last 
presidential  campaign,  for  instance,  impressed  itself 
on  the  public  memory.  That  campaign,  seen  through 
the  vista  of  a  twelve-month,  was,  on  the  contrary,  from 
beginning  to  end,  with  a  single  exception,  creditable 
neither  to  the  parties  conducting  it,  nor  to  the  audi 
ence  to  whose  level  it  was  presumably  gauged. 

Recall,  I  pray  you,  its  incidents;  already  almost 
forgotten,  they  come  back,  when  revived  by  an  effort 
of  memory,  with  a  remote,  far  away  echo,  as  of  mock 
ery.  In  the  first  place,  on  neither  side  were  the  issues 
of  1900  clearly  defined  or  well  presented;  indeed,  the 
long  indecision  as  to  what  should  be  accepted  as  the 
"paramount  issue"  was,  not  remotely,  suggestive  of 
a  certain  very  memorable  "  Hunting  of  the  Snark." 
Ignoring  the  personal  element  which  entered  so  largely 
into  it,  as  it  enters  into  all  canvasses,  the  favorite 
argument  with  one  set  of  orators  was  the  post  ergo 
propter,  as  illustrated  in  "  the  Full  Dinner  Pail ; " 
which  argument  those  of  the  other  side  met  by  fierce 
denunciation  of  "  Department  Stores,"  and  the  mani 
festly  pertinent  inquiry,  addressed  to  the  general  audi 
tory,  as  to  what  they  proposed  to  do  with  their  sons. 
The  fate  in  store  for  their  daughters,  it  was  gloomily 
intimated,  would  admit  of  little  question,  should  the 
opposing  candidate  be  chosen.  So  far  as  what  is 
known  as  "  Labor  "  is  concerned,  one  candidate  posed 
as  the  prescriptive  protector  of  American  Industry, 
while  the  other  warmly  declared  himself  in  favor  of 
"  The  Man  against  the  Dollar."  The  talk  from  the 


278  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

hustings  under  this  head  was  irresistibly  suggestive 
of  the  scene  in  Dickens's  Old  Curiosity  Shop,— 
the  adherents  of  both  candidates  stoutly  maintained 
that  Codlin  was  the  Workingman's  friend,  not  Short ; 
Short  might  be  very  well  as  far  as  he  went,  but  the 
real  friend  was  Codlin. 

But,  apart  from  this,  the  one  noticeable  feature, 
possibly  the  single  significant  feature  of  the  canvass, 
was  that  it  distinctly  deteriorated  as  it  progressed. 
It  was  opened  by  Mr.  Bryan,  on  the  8th  of  August, 
with  a  speech  at  Indianapolis  which  struck  a  lofty 
note,  promising  a  high  level  of  discussion.  That 
speech  fairly  startled  the  reflecting  portion  of  the 
community.  It  seemed  for  the  moment  as  if  the 
party  in  power  would  be  forced  to  reckon  seriously 
with  the  opposition  throughout  a  sustained  debate. 
How  completely  this  promise  failed  of  realization  is 
fresh  in  memory.  No  subsequent  utterance  on  either 
side  made  any  impression  on  the  public  mind.  Mr. 
Bryan,  using  his  audience  as  a  sounding-board,  seemed 
thereafter  to  bid  continually  down  ;  and,  finally,  the 
contest  degenerated  into  a  mere  trial  of  endurance 
between  himself  and  the  talking  candidate  of  the  other 
side,  the  telegraph  day  by  day  recording  the  number 
of  speeches  made  by  each.  A  less  inspiring  compe 
tition  could  hardly  be  imagined ;  and,  as  the  papers 
in  flaring,  modern-time  head-lines  declared  that  Mr. 
Roosevelt  had  the  previous  day  broken  all  records  by 
making  eighteen  speeches,  they  went  on  gravely  to  an 
nounce  that  Mr.  Bryan  had  arranged  a  programme  for 
the  morrow  under  which  he  would  "  see  "  his  opponent 
and  "  go  him  two  better,"  orating  to  a  square  score  of 
distinct  audiences  between  10  A.  M.  and  midnight. 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  279 

But  was  this  all  the  occasion  called  for  ?  Did  our 
much  vaunted  American  intelligence  demand  nothing 
better  ?  Credat  Judceus  !  Not  for  a  moment  do  I 
believe  it.  To  that  canvass,  then,  I  propose  presently 
to  return,  using  it  as  an  object  lesson.  I  shall  seek  to 
revive  the  memory  of  its  issues,  —  for  already  they 
are  far  advanced  on  the  road  to  oblivion, —  and  I  shall 
contrast  what  I  have  described  as  actually  occurring 
with  what  was  easily  possible,  had  that  same  debate 
been  actively  participated  in  by  organizations  such 
as  this  of  ours ;  organizations  whose  representative 
spokesmen  would  have  at  least  approached  the  dis 
cussion,  not  in  a  partisan,  but  in  a  scientific  spirit. 
For  even  active  political  issues,  I  contend,  freed  from 
the  deflection  always  incident  to  party  prejudice  and 
personal  feeling,  may  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  prin 
ciple,  precedent  and  experience. 

Perhaps,  however,  I  can  best  illustrate  what  I  have 
to  say,  —  enforce  the  lesson  I  would  fain  this  even 
ing  teach,  —  by  approaching  it  through  retrospect. 
So  doing,  also,  if  there  is  any  skill  in  my  treatment, 
cannot  well  be  otherwise  than  interesting,  for  I  shall 
deal  with  events  almost  all  within  the  recollection 
of  those  yet  in  middle  life.  But  while  those  events 
are  sufficiently  removed  from  us  to  admit  of  the  neces 
sary  perspective,  having  assumed  their  true  propor 
tions  to  what  preceded  and  has  followed,  they  have 
an  advantage  over  the  occurrences  of  a  year  ago ;  for 
the  controversial  embers  of  1900  may  still  be  glowing 
in  1901,  —  though,  I  must  say,  to  me  the  ashes  seem 
white  and  cold  and  dead  enough.  Still,  I  do  not 
propose  to  go  back  to  any  very  remote  period,  and  I 
shall  confine  myself  to  my  own  recollection,  speaking 


280  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

of  that  only  of  which  I  know,  and  in  which  I  took 
part.  My  review  will  begin  with  the  year  1856, 
—  the  year  of  my  graduation,  and  that  in  which  I 
cast  my  first  vote ;  also  one  in  which  a  President 
was  chosen,  James  Buchanan  being  the  successful  can 
didate. 

Under  the  provisions  of  our  Constitution,  a  great 
national  debate  is  preordained  for  every  fourth  year. 
The  whole  policy  of  the  government  is  thus  at  fixed 
periods  challenged  and  reviewed.  Whether,  as  the 
country  has  expanded  and  its  population  multiplied, 
while  the  questions  involved  in  material  interests  of 
ever  growing  volume  have  become  more  complex  and 
difficult  of  comprehension,  this  fixed  Olympic  period 
is  wise,  or,  if  wise,  that  assigned  is  not  too  short,  are 
open  questions.  I  think  the  period  at  any  rate  too 
short.  Large  bodies  proverbially  move  slowly,  and 
considerable  stages  of  fixity  are  necessary  to  adjust 
ment.  In  the  case  of  so  large  and  complex  a  body 
politic  as  the  United  States  has  now  become,  four 
years  are  manifestly  insufficient  for  that  purpose. 
Recent  experience  has  shown  such  to  be  the  case. 
But  this  is  not  now  to  be  discussed.  For  our  present 
purpose  we  must  take  things  as  they  are ;  and  the 
fundamental  law  imposes  on  us  a  national  political 
debate  every  fourth  year,  wholly  irrespective  of  cir 
cumstance.  As  1856  was  one  of  the  years  thus  in 
advance  assigned,  I  have  now  taken  part  in  no  less 
than  twelve  presidential  canvasses.  Approaching  them 
in  a  spirit  strictly  historical,  these  I  propose  briefly  to 
review. 

Yet  it  must  be  premised  that  each  election  does  not 
represent  a  debate,  —  not  infrequently  it  is  merely  a 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  281 

stage  in  a  debate.  It  was  so  in  1856  ;  it  has  been  so 
several  times  since.  Indeed,  since  1840,  —  the  famous 
"  Log  Cabin  and  Hard  Cider  "  campaign  of  "  Coon- 
Skin  Caps,"  and  "  Tippecanoe  and  Tyler,  too,"  — 
probably  the, most  humorous,  not  to  say  grotesque, 
episode  in  our  whole  national  history,  that  in  which 
the  plane  of  discussion  reached  its  lowest  recorded 
level,  —  since  1840  there  have  been  only  six  real  de 
bates  ;  the  average  period  of  a  debate  being,  there 
fore,  ten  years.  These  debates  were  (1)  that  over 
Slavery,  from  1844  to  1864  ;  (2)  that  over  Recon 
struction,  from  1868  to  1872;  (3)  Legal  Tenders,  or 
"  Fiat  Money,"  and  Resumption  of  Specie  Payments 
were  the  issues  in  1876  and  1880  ;  (4)  the  issue  of 
1888  and  1892  was  over  Protection  and  Free  Trade; 
(5)  the  debate  over  Bimetallism  and  the  Demoneti 
zation  of  Silver  occurred  in  1896  ;  and,  finally,  (6) 
Imperialism,  as  it  is  called,  came  to  the  front  in  1900. 
Since  1856,  therefore,  the  field  of  discussion  has  been 
wide  and  diversified,  —  presenting  several  issues  of 
great  moment.  Of  necessity,  also,  the  debates  have 
assumed  many  and  diverse  aspects,  —  ethical,  ethnolo 
gical,  legal,  military,  economical,  financial,  historical. 
The  last-named  aspect  is  that  which  interests  us. 

In  every  one  of  these  debates,  —  and  it  goes  almost 
without  saying,  —  the  historical  aspect  has  been  pro 
minent, —  it  is,  indeed,  the  one  aspect  which  is  all- 
pervasive.  And  this  must  be  the  case  just  so  long  as 
men,  yielding  respect  to  precedent,  seek  guidance  from 
the  experience  of  the  past.  My  purpose  is,  briefly 
passing  these  debates  in  review,  to  measure  the  degree 
to  which  the  trained  historical  element  in  the  American 
community  entered  into  them  as  an  influencing  factor, 


282  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

and  to  estimate  the  extent  to  which  such  an  element 
might  have  entered  into  them,  with  results  manifestly 
beneficial.  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  the  great  benefit, 
the  elevating  influence,  which  in  all  these  debates, 
though  far  more  in  some  than  in  others,  would  have 
been  derived  from  the  active  participation  therein  of 
such  an  organization  as  this,  —  an  organization  wholly 
free  from  party  lines,  but  divided  in  opinion,  which 
would  approach  the  questions  at  issue  from  a  point  of 
view  distinctly  scholarly  and  scientific.  In  doing  this, 
let  it  be  always  borne  in  mind  that,  in  scholarship 
and  in  science  also,  unanimity  is  not  to  be  expected, 
scarcely  to  be  desired.  In  the  study  of  history,  as 
in  religion  and  in  science,  schools  differ.  The  record 
is  voluminous  and  full  of  precedents  from  which  very 
contradictory  conclusions,  all  more  or  less  plausible, 
may  be  drawn.  In  this  field,  as  in  others,  the  great 
desideratum  is  to  have  every  side  fully  and  vigorously 
presented,  with  a  full  assurance  that  the  soundest  con 
clusions  will  survive  as  being,  here  also,  always  the 
most  fit. 

The  first  of  these  debates,  that  involving  the  slavery 
issue,  is  now  far  removed.  We  can  pass  upon  it  his 
torically  ;  for  the  young  man  who  threw  his  maiden 
vote  in  1860,  when  it  came  to  its  close,  is  now  near- 
ing  his  grand  climacteric.  Of  all  the  debates  in  our 
national  history  that  was  the  longest,  the  most  ele 
vated,  the  most  momentous  and  the  best  sustained. 
It  looms  up  in  memory  ;  it  projects  itself  from  history. 
As  a  whole,  it  was  immensely  creditable  to  the  people, 
—  the  community  at  large,  —  for  whose  instruction  it 
was  conducted.  It  has  left  a  literature  of  its  own,  — 
economical,  legal,  moral,  political,  imaginative.  In 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  283 

fiction  it  produced  Uncle  Tom''  s  Cabin,  still,  if  one 
can  judge  by  the  test  of  demand  at  the  desks  of  our 
public  libraries,  one  of  the  most  popular  books  in  the 
English  tongue.  In  the  law,  it  rose  to  the  height  of 
the  Dred  Scott  decision ;  and,  while  the  rulings  in 
that  case  laid  down  have  since  been  reversed,  it  will 
not  be  denied  that  the  discussion  of  constitutional 
principles  involved,  whether  at  the  bar,  in  the  halls 
of  legislatures,  in  the  columns  of  the  press  or  on  the 
rostrum,  was  intelligent,  of  an  order  extraordinarily 
high,  and  of  a  very  sustained  interest.  It  was  to  the 
utmost  degree  educational. 

So  far  as  the  historical  aspect  of  that  great  debate 
is  concerned,  two  things  are  to  be  specially  noted. 
In  the  first  place,  the  moral  and  economical  aspects 
predominated  ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  what  may  be 
called  the  historical  element  as  an  influencing  factor 
was  then  in  its  infancy.  Neither  in  this  country  nor 
in  Europe  had  that  factor  been  organized,  as  it  now  is. 
The  slavery  debate  was  so  long  and  intense  that  all 
the  forces  then  existing  were  drawn  into  it.  The  pul 
pit,  for  instance,  participated  actively.  The  physiolo 
gist  was  much  concerned  over  ethnological  problems, 
trying  to  decide  whether  the  African  was  a  human 
being  or  an  animal ;  and,  if  the  former,  was  he  of  the 
family  of  Cain.  Thus,  all  contributed  to  the  discus 
sion  ;  and  yet  I  am  unable  to  point  out  any  distinctly 
historical  contribution  of  a  high  order  ;  though,  on 
both  sides,  the  issue  was  discussed  historically  with 
intelligence  and  research.  Especially  was  this  the 
case  in  the  arguments  made  before  the  courts  and  in 
the  scriptural  dissertations ;  while,  on  the  political 
side,  the  speeches  of  Seward  and  Sumner,  of  Jefferson 


284  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

Davis  and  A.  H.  Stephens,  leave  little  to  be  desired. 
The  climax  was,  perhaps,  reached  in  the  memorable 
joint  debate  between  Lincoln  and  Douglas,  of  which 
it  is  not  too  much  to  say  the  country  was  the  auditory. 
The  whole  constituted  a  fit  prologue  to  the  great 
tragedy  which  ensued. 

Beginning,  in  its  closing  stage,  in  January,  1854, 
when  the  measure  repealing  the  Missouri  Compromise 
of  1820  was  introduced  into  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  and  closing  in  December,  1860,  with  the  pas 
sage  of  its  ordinance  of  secession  by  South  Carolina, 
this  debate  was  continuous  for  seven  years,  covering 
two  presidential  elections,  those  of  1856  and  1860. 
So  far  as  I  know,  it  was  sui  generis  ;  for  it  would,  I 
fancy,  be  useless  to  look  for  anything  with  which  to 
institute  a  comparison,  except  in  the  history  of  Great 
Britain.  Even  there,  the  discussion  which  preceded 
the  passage  of  the  Kef  or  m  Bill  of  1832,  or  that 
which  led  up  to  the  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  in  1846, 
or,  finally,  the  Irish  Home  Rule  agitation  between 
1871  and  1893,  —  one  and  all  sink  into  insignificance 
beside  it.  Of  the  great  slavery  debate  it  may  then  in 
fine  be  said  that,  while  the  study  of  history  and  the 
lessons  to  be  deduced  from  history  contributed  not 
much  to  it,  it  made  history,  and  on  history  has  left  a 
permanent  mark. 

Of  the  canvass  of  1864,  from  our  point  of  view 
little  need  be  said.  There  was  in  it  no  field  fruitful 
for  the  historical  investigator,  the  issue  then  presented 
to  the  people  being  of  a  character  altogether  excep 
tional.  The  result  depended  less  on  argument  than 
on  the  outcome  of  operations  in  the  field.  There  was, 
I  presume,  during  August  and  September  of  that 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  285 

year,  a  wordy  debate ;  but  the  people  were  too  intent 
on  Sherman  as  he  circumvented  Atlanta,  and  on 
Sheridan  as  he  sent  Early  whirling  up  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  to  give  much  ear  to  it.  Had  this  Asso 
ciation  then  been  in  existence,  and  devoted  all  its 
energies  to  elucidating  the  questions  at  issue,  I  can 
not  pretend  to  think  it  would  perceptibly  have  affected 
the  result. 

Nor  was  it  greatly  otherwise  in  the  canvass  of  1868. 
The  country  was  then  stirred  to  its  very  depths  over 
the  questions  growing  out  of  the  war.  The  shattered 
Union  was  to  be  reconstructed ;  the  slave  system  was 
to  be  eradicated.  These  were  great  political  pro 
blems  ;  problems  as  pressing  as  they  were  momentous. 
For  their  proper  solution  it  was  above  all  else  neces 
sary  that  they  should  be  approached  in  a  calm, 
scholarly  spirit,  observant  of  the  teachings  of  history. 
Never  was  there  a  greater  occasion ;  rarely  has  one 
been  so  completely  lost.  The  assassination  of  Lincoln 
silenced  reason  ;  and  to  reason,  and  to  reason  only, 
does  history  make  its  appeal.  The  unfortunate  per 
sonality  of  Andrew  Johnson  now  intruded  itself ;  and, 
almost  at  once,  what  should  have  been  a  calm  debate 
degenerated  into  a  furious  wrangle.  Looking  back 
over  the  canvass  of  1868,  and  excepting  General 
Grant's  singularly  felicitous  closing  of  his  brief  letter 
of  acceptance,  —  "  Let  us  have  peace  !  "  —  I  think  it 
would  be  difficult  for  any  one  to  recall  a  single  utter 
ance  of  that  campaign  which  produced  any  lasting 
impression.  The  name  even  of  the  candidate  nomi 
nated  in  opposition  to  Grant  is  not  readily  recalled. 
In  that  canvass,  as  in  the  preceding  one,  I  should  say 
there  was  no  room  for  the  economist,  the  philosopher, 


286  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

or  the  historian.  The  country  had,  for  the  time  being, 
cut  loose  from  both  principle  and  precedent. 

The  debate  over  Reconstruction,  begun  in  1865, 
did  not  wear  itself  out  until  1876.  In  no  respect  will 
it  bear  comparison  with  that  debate  over  slavery 
which  preceded  it.  Sufficiently  momentous,  it  was 
less  sustained,  less  thorough,  far  less  judicial.  To 
wards  its  close,  moreover,  as  the  country  wearied, 
it  was  gravely  complicated  by  a  new  issue  ;  for,  in 
1867,  began  that  currency  discussion,  destined  to  last 
in  its  various  phases  through  the  lifetime  of  a  genera 
tion.  It  thereafter  entered,  in  greater  or  less  degree, 
into  no  less  than  nine  consecutive  presidential  elec 
tions,  two  of  which,  those  of  1876  and  1896,  actually 
turned  upon  it. 

The  currency  debate  presented  three  distinct 
phases ;  first,  the  proposition,  broached  in  1867, 
known  as  the  Greenback  theory,  under  which  the 
interest-bearing  bonds  of  the  United  States,  issued 
during  the  Rebellion,  were  to  be  paid  at  maturity  in 
United  States  legal  tender  notes,  bearing  no  interest 
at  all.  This  somewhat  amazing  proposition  was 
speedily  disposed  of  ;  for,  early  in  1869,  an  act  was 
passed  declaring  the  bonds  payable  "  in  coin."  But, 
as  was  sure  to  be  the  case,  the  so-called  "  Fiat  Money  " 
delusion  had  obtained  a  firm  lodgment  in  the  minds 
of  a  large  part  of  the  community,  and  to  drive  it  out 
was  the  work  of  time.  It  assumed,  too,  all  sorts  of 
aspects.  Dispelled  in  one  form,  it  reappeared  in  an 
other.  When,  for  instance,  the  act  of  1869  settled 
the  question  as  respects  the  redemption  of  the  bonds, 
the  financial  crisis  of  1873  reopened  it  by  creating 
an  almost  irresistible  popular  demand  for  a  govern- 


AN   UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  287 

ment  paper  currency  as  a  permanent  substitute  for 
specie.  Finally,  when,  seven  years  later,  this  issue  was 
put  to  rest  by  a  return  to  specie  payments,  the  over 
production  of  silver,  as  compared  with  gold,  already 
foreshadowed  the  rise  of  one  of  the  most  serious  and 
far-reaching  questions  which  has  perplexed  modern 
times.  Thus,  as  the  ethical  and  legal  issues,  which 
were  the  staples  of  public  discussion  from  1844  to 
1872,  were  disposed  of,  or  by  degrees  settled  them 
selves,  a  series  of  monetary  questions  arose,  destined, 
even  if  at  times  in  a  somewhat  languid  way,  to  occupy 
public  attention  through  thirty  years. 

Yet  there  is,  in  connection  with  the  canvasses  of 
1876,  1880  and  1884,  a  suggestive  reflection,  which, 
if  laid  properly  to  heart,  ought  to  bear  fruit  in  future 
quadrennials.  It  is  not  now  easy  for  those  who  took 
part  —  perhaps  an  eager  and  interested  part  —  in 
those  elections,  to  name  off-hand  the  opposing  candi 
dates,  much  less  to  state  the  issues  upon  which  the 
country  then  divided.  It  is  very  suggestive  how 
much  less  momentous  the  average  presidential  choice 
becomes,  the  further  we  get  away  from  it.  Finally, 
we  come  to  realize  that,  in  world  development,  and 
even  in  national  life,  it  would  have  been  very  much 
the  same  whichever  candidate  was  chosen.  Perhaps, 
after  all,  this  lesson  is  that  of  not  least  historical 
value  to  be  deduced  from  the  study  of  well-nigh  for 
gotten  presidential  campaigns. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  what  the  dividing  issue  of 
1876  really  was.  The  country  was  then  slowly  re 
covering  from  the  business  prostration  which  followed 
the  collapse  of  1873.  The  issues  involved  in  recon 
struction,  if  not  disposed  of,  were  clearly  worn  out. 


288  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

The  country,  weary  of  them,  would  not  respond,  turn 
ing  impatiently  from  further  discussion.  Those  issues 
might  now  settle  themselves,  or  go  unsettled ;  and, 
though  that  conclusion  was  reached  thirty  years  ago, 
they  are  not  settled  yet.  The  living  debate  was  over 
material  questions,  —  the  cause  of  the  prolonged  busi 
ness  depression,  and  the  remedy  for  it.  The  favorite 
specific  was,  at  first,  a  recourse  to  paper  money  :  the 
government  printing-press  was  to  set  it  in  motion  ; 
and.  even  hard-money  Democrats  of  the  Jackson ian 
school  united  with  radical  Republicans  of  the  Recon 
struction  period  in  guaranteeing  a  resultant  prosper 
ity.  Again,  the  teachings  of  history  were  ignored. 
What,  it  was  contemptuously  exclaimed  in  the  Senate, 
do  we  care  for  "  abroad  "  ?  From  this  calamity  the 
v  country  had  been  saved  by  the  veto  of  President 
Grant  in  1874  ;  and,  the  following  year,  an  act  was 
passed  looking  to  the  resumption  of  specie  payments 
on  the  1st  of  January,  1879.  Seventeen  years  of 
suspension  were  then  to  close.  Over  this  measure, 
the  parties  nominally  joined  issue  in  1876.  The 
Republicans,  nominating  Governor  Hayes  of  Ohio, 
demanded  the  fulfilment  of  the  promise  ;  the  Demo 
crats,  nominating  Governor  Tilden  of  New  York, 
insisted  on  the  repeal  of  the  law.  Yet  it  was  well 
understood  that  the  candidate  of  the  Democracy 
favored  the  policy  of  which  the  law  in  debate  was  the 
concrete  expression.  The  contest  was  thus  in  reality 
one  between  the  "  ins "  and  the  "  outs."  We  all 
remember  how  it  resulted,  and  the  terrible  strain  to 
which  our  machinery  of  government  was  in  conse 
quence  subjected.  In  the  wrangle  which  ensued,  the 
material  and  business  interests  of  the  country  recuper- 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  289 

ated  in  a  natural  way,  just  as  had  repeatedly  been  the 
case  before,  and  more  than  once  since  ;  and  the  United 
States  then  entered  on  a  new  era  of  increased  pros 
perity.  This  brought  the  paper  money  debate  to  a 
close.  The  issues  presented  had,  in  the  course  of 
events,  settled  themselves. 

But,  not  the  less  for  that,  in  the  canvass  of  1876  a 
field  of  great  political  usefulness  was  opened  up  to  the 
historical  investigator ;  a  field  which,  I  submit,  he 
failed  adequately  to  develop.  A  public  duty  was  left 
unperformed.  It  was  in  connection  with  what  John 
Stuart  Mill  has  in  one  of  his  Dissertations  and  Discus 
sions  happily  denominated  "  The  Currency  Juggle." 
From  time  immemorial,  to  tamper  with  the  established 
measures  of  value  has  been  the  constant  practice  of 
men  of  restless  and  unstable  mind,  honest  or  dishonest, 
whether  rulers  or  aspirants  to  rule.  History  is  replete 
with  instances.  To  cite  them  was  the  function  of  the 
historical  investigator ;  to  marshal  them,  and  bring 
them  to  bear  on  the  sophistries  of  the  day,  was  the 
business  of  the  politician.  A  professorial  discussion 
in  a  meeting  of  such  an  organization  as  this  would 
then  have  been  much  to  the  point ;  and  yet,  curiously 
enough,  a  new  historical  precedent  was  about  to  be 
worked  out.  That  was  then  to  be  done  which  had 
never  been  done  before,  —  a  country  which  had  gone 
to  the  length  the  United  States  had  gone  in  the  direc 
tion  of  "  fiat  money "  -  two  thirds  of  the  way  to 
repudiation  —  was  actually  to  retrace  its  steps,  and 
resume  payments  in  specie  at  the  former  standards  of 
value.  History  would  have  been  searched  in  vain  for 
a  parallel  experience. 

The  administration  of  President  Hayes  was  curi- 


290  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

ously  epochal.  During  it  the  so-called  "  carpet-bag 
governments  "  disappeared  from  the  southern  states ; 
the  country  resumed  payments  in  specie  ;  and,  on  the 
28th  of  February,  1878,  Congress  passed,  over  the 
veto  of  the  President,  an  act  renewing  the  coinage  of 
silver  dollars,  the  stoppage  of  which,  five  years  before, 
constituted  what  was  destined  thereafter  to  be  referred 
to  as  "the  crime  of  1873."  This  issue,  however, 
matured  slowly.  Public  men,  having  recourse  to  pal 
liatives,  temporized  with  it ;  and,  through  four  presi 
dential  elections  it  lay  dormant,  except  in  so  far  as 
parties  pledged  themselves  to  action  calculated,  in  the 
well-nigh  idiotic  formula  of  politicians,  to  "  do  some 
thing  for  silver."  The  canvasses  of  1880  and  1884 
are,  therefore,  devoid  of  historical  interest.  The 
first  turned  largely  on  the  tariff  ;  and  yet,  curiously 
enough,  the  single  utterance  in  that  debate  which  has 
left  a  mark  on  the  public  memory  was  the  wonderful 
dictum  of  General  Hancock,  the  candidate  of  the 
defeated  opposition,  that  the  tariff  was  a  local  issue, 
which,  a  number  of  years  before,  had  excited  a  good 
deal  of  interest  in  his  native  state  of  Pennsylvania. 
The  gallant  and  picturesque  soldier,  metamorphosed 
into  a  political  leader  pro  Jiac  vice,  simply  harked 
back  to  the  "  Log  Cabin  "  and  "  Coon-Skin  "  cam 
paign  of  1840,  when,  a  youth  of  sixteen,  he  was  on 
his  way  to  West  Point. 

Nor  is  the  recollection  of  the  debate  of  1884  much 
more  inspiring.  It  was  a  lively  contest  enough,  under 
Grover  Cleveland  and  James  G.  Blaine  as  opposing 
candidates  ;  —  a  struggle  between  the  "  outs  "  to  get 
in,  and  the  "  ins  "  not  to  go  out.  But  a  single  for 
mula  connected  with  it  comes  echoing  down  the  corri- 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  291 

dors  of  time,  the  alliterative  "Rum,  Romanism,  and 
Rebellion  "  of  the  unfortunate  Burchard.  An  inter 
lude  in  the  succession  of  great  national  debates,  the 
canvass  of  1884  called  for  no  application  of  the  les 
sons  of  history. 

That  of  1888,  presenting  at  last  an  issue,  rose  to  the 
dignity  of  debate.  In  his  annual  message  of  the  pre 
vious  December,  the  President,  in  disregard  of  all 
precedent,  had  confined  his  attention  not  only  to  the 
tariff,  but  to  a  single  feature  in  the  tariff,  the  duty 
on  wool.  In  so  doing  he  had,  as  the  well-understood 
candidate  of  his  party  for  reelection,  flung  down  the 
gauntlet  ;  for,  only  three  years  before,  the  Republi 
can  party,  in  its  quadrennial  declaration  of  articles  of 
cardinal  political  faith,  had  laid  heavy  emphasis  on 
"the  importance  of  sheep  industry,"  and  "  the  danger 
threatening  its  future  prosperity."  The  opposition 
had  thus  pledged  itself  to  "  do  something  "  for  wool, 
as  well  as  for  silver  ;  and  the  President  now  struck 
at  wool  as  "  the  Tariff-arch  Keystone."  But,  while  in 
this  debate  the  economist  came  to  the  front,  there  was 
no  pronounced  call  and,  indeed,  small  opportunity  for 
the  historian.  The  silver  issue  was  in  abeyance  ;  the 
pension  list  and  civil  service  were  not  calculated  to 
incite  to  investigation  ;  nor  had  history  much  to  say 
on  either  topic.  As  to  the  "  sheep  industry,"  now  so 
much  in  evidence,  the  British  woolsack  might  afford 
a  text  suggestive  of  curious  learning  in  connection  with 
England's  once  greatest  staple,  —  how,  for  instance, 
as  a  protective  measure,  it  was  by  one  Parliament 
solemnly  ordained  that  the  dead  should  be  buried  in 
woollens  ;  but  it  will  readily  be  admitted  that  the  his 
toric  spirit  does  not  kindle  over  tariff  schedules.  The 


292  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

lessons  of  experience  to  be  drawn  from  revenue  tables 
appeal  rather  to  the  school  of  Adam  Smith  than  to 
the  disciples  of  Gibbon. 

Returning  to  the  review  of  our  national  debates,  in 
that  of  1892  the  shadow  of  coming  events  was  plainly 
perceptible.  The  tariff  issue  had  now  lost  its  old  sig 
nificance  ;  for  the  infant  industries  had  developed  into 
trade  and  legislation-compelling  trusts.  These  were 
suggestive  of  new  and,  as  yet,  inchoate  problems ;  but 
to  them  the  constituency  was  not  yet  prepared  intelli 
gently  to  address  itself.  Populism  was  rife,  with  its 
crude  and  restless  theories  ;  a  crisis  in  the  history  of 
the  precious  metals  was  clearly  impending,  with  the 
outcome  in  doubt ;  indiscriminate  and  unprecedented 
pension-giving  had  reduced  an  overflowing  exchequer 
to  the  verge  of  bankruptcy.  The  debate  of  1892  ac 
cordingly  dropped  back  to  the  politician's  level,  —  that 
of  1876,  1880  and  1884.  In  it  there  was  nothing  of 
any  educational  value  ;  nothing  that  history  will  dwell 
upon.  The  "  ins  "  pointed  with  pride  ;  the  "  outs  " 
sternly  arraigned  the  "  ins ; "  while  the  student, 
whether  of  economics  or  history,  there  found  small 
place  and  a  listless  audience.  The  memory  of  the  can 
vass  which  resulted  in  the  second  administration  of 
Cleveland  is  quite  obliterated  by  the  issues,  altogether 
unexpected,  which  the  ensuing  years  precipitated. 

Of  quite  another  character  were  the  two  canvasses 
of  1896  and  1900.  Still  fresh  in  memory,  the  echoes 
of  these  have  indeed  not  yet  ceased  to  reverberate  ;  — 
and  I  assert  without  hesitation  that,  not  since  1856 
and  1860,  has  this  people  passed  through  two  such 
wholesome  and  educational  experiences.  In  1896  and 
in  1900,  as  in  the  debates  of  forty  years  previous,  there 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  293 

was  a  place,  and  a  large  place,  for  the  student,  whether 
investigator  or  philosopher.  Great  problems,  —  pro 
blems  of  law,  of  economics  and  ethics,  problems  involv 
ing  peace  and  war,  and  the  course  of  development  in 
the  oldest  as  in  the  newest  civilizations,  —  had  to  be 
discussed,  on  the  way  to  a  solution.  That  the  pro 
longed  debate  running  through  those  eight  years  was 
at  all  equal  to  the  occasion,  I  do  not  think  can  be 
claimed.  Even  his  most  ardent  admirers  will  hardly 
claim  that  Mr.  Bryan  in  1896  and  1900  rose  to  the 
level  reached  by  Lincoln  forty  years  before ;  nor  do 
the  utterances  of  Mr.  Roosevelt,  Mr.  Depew,  or  Mr. 
Hanna  bear  well  a  comparison  with  those  of  Seward, 
Trumbull  and  Sumner.  And  that  this  momentous, 
many-sided  debate  failed  to  rise  to  the  proper  height 
was  due,  I  now  unhesitatingly  submit,  to  the  predomi 
nance  in  it  of  the  political  u  Boss,"  and  the  absence 
from  it  of  the  scholar.  In  it,  those  belonging  to  this 
association,  and  to  other  associations  similar  in  char 
acter  to  this,  did  not  play  their  proper  part,  —  they 
proved  themselves  unequal  to  the  occasion.  Indeed, 
in  the  whole  wordy  canvass  of  1896,  I  now  recall  but 
two  instances  of  the  professor  or  philosopher  distinc 
tively  taking  the  floor ;  but  both  of  those  were  mem 
orable.  They  imparted  an  elevation  of  tone  to  discus 
sion,  immediately  and  distinctly  perceptible,  in  the 
press  and  on  the  platform.  I  refer  to  the  single  utter 
ance  of  Carl  Schurz,  before  a  small  audience  at  Chi 
cago,  on  the  5th  of  September,  and  to  the  subsequent 
publications  of  President  Andrew  D.  White,  in  which, 
from  his  library  at  Ithaca,  he  drew  freely  on  the  stores 
of  historical  experience  in  crushing  refutation  of  dem 
agogical  campaign  sophistry.  Amid  the  petulant  chat- 


294  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

tering  of  the  political  magpies,  it  was  refreshing  to 
hear  those  clear-cut,  incisive  utterances,  — calm, 
thoughtful,  well-reasoned.  I  have  been  told  that  in 
its  various  forms  of  republication,  no  less  than  five 
millions,  and  some  authorities  say  ten  millions,  of  copies 
of  that  Chicago  speech  of  Mr.  Schurz  were  then  put 
in  circulation.  It  was  indeed  a  masterly  production, 
—  a  production  in  which  a  high  keynote  was  struck, 
and  sustained.  But  the  suggestive  and  extremely  en 
couraging  fact  in  connection  with  it  was  the  response 
it  elicited.  Delivering  himself  at  the  highest  level  to 
which  he  could  attain,  Mr.  Schurz  was  only  on  a  level 
with  his  audience.  To  the  political  optimist  that  fact 
spoke  volumes  ;  it  revealed  infinite  possibilities. 

Twelve  presidential  canvasses  and  six  great  national 
debates  have  thus  been  passed  in  rapid  review.  It  is 
as  if,  in  the  earlier  history  of  the  country,  we  had  run 
the  gamut  from  Washington  to  Van  Bur  en.  Taken  as 
a  whole,  —  viewed  in  gross  and  perspective,  the  retro 
spect  leaves  much  to  be  desired.  That  the  debates 
held  in  Ireland  and  France  during  the  same  time  have 
been  on  a  distinctly  lower  level,  I  at  once  concede. 
Those  held  in  Great  Britain  and  Germany  have  not 
been  on  a  higher.  Yet  ours  have  at  best  been  only  rela 
tively  educational ;  as  a  rule  extremely  partisan,  they 
have  been  personal,  often  scurrilous,  and  more  fre 
quently  still,  I  regret  greatly  to  find  myself  compelled 
to  say,  intentionally  deceptive.  A  singular  feature 
in  them  has  been  the  noticeable  fact  that  where, 
from  time  to  time,  the  clergy  have  intervened,  their 
so  doing  has  not  tended  to  elevate.  They  have  been 
conspicuous  neither  for  moderation  nor  for  charity, 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  295 

while  they  actually  seemed  to  revel  in  their  igno 
rance  of  the  teachings  of  the  past.  One  fact  in  the 
review  is,  however,  salient.  With  the  exception  of 
the  first,  —  that  of  1856-60,  —  not  one  of  the  de 
bates  reviewed  has  left  an  utterance  which,  were  it 
to  die  from  human  memory,  would  by  posterity  be 
accounted  a  loss.  This,  I  am  aware,  is  a  sweeping 
allegation  ;  in  itself  almost  an  indictment.  Yet,  with 
some  confidence,  I  challenge  a  denial.  Those  here  are 
not,  as  a  rule,  in  their  first  youth,  and  they  have  all 
of  them  been  more  or  less  students  of  history.  Let 
each  pass  in  rapid  mental  review  the  presidential  can 
vasses  in  which  he  has  in  any  degree  participated,  and 
endeavor  to  recall  a  single  utterance  which  has  stood 
the  test  of  time,  as  marking  a  distinct  addition  to  man 
kind's  intellectual  belongings,  —  the  classics  of  the 
race.  It  has  been  at  best  a  babel  of  the  commonplace. 
I  do  not  believe  one  utterance  can  be  named  for  which 
a  life  of  ten  years  will  be  predicted.  Such  a  record 
undeniably  admits  of  improvement.  Two  questions, 
then,  naturally  suggest  themselves  :  —  To  what  has 
this  shortcoming  been  due  ?  -  -  Wherein  lies  the 
remedy  for  it  ? 

The  shortcoming,  I  submit,  is  in  greatest  part  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  work  of  discussion  has  been  left 
almost  wholly  to  the  journalist  and  the  politician,  — 
the  professional  journalist  and  the  professional  poli 
tician.  And  in  the  case  of  both,  there  has  in  this 
country,  during  the  last  forty  years,  been,  so  far  as 
grasp  of  principle  is  concerned,  a  marked  tendency  to 
deterioration.  Nor,  I  fancy,  is  the  cause  of  this  far  to 
seek.  It  is  found  in  the  growth,  increased  complexity, 
and  irresistible  power  of  organization  as  opposed  to 


296  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

individuality,  —  in  the  parlance  of  the  day,  it  is  the 
all-potency  of   the   machine   over   the  man ;    equally 
noticeable  whether  by  that  word,  "  machine,"  we  refer 
to  the  political  organization  or  to  the  newspaper. 
Let  the  last  be  considered  first.     The  daily  journal 

-  the  newspaper  —  is  indisputably  the  one  far-reach 
ing  organ  of  popular  political  education.     Through  its 
columns,  as  a  medium,  the  teachings  of  those  who  think 
on  all  subjects  —  educational,  religious,  moral,  political 

-  percolate  slowly,  and,  as  a  rule,  in  a  very  diluted 
form,  finding  thus  at  last  lodgment  and  acceptance  in 
the  public  thought.    They  are  slowly  assimilated.    But 
the  newspaper  of  to-day  is  altogether  the  product  of 
the  last  century  —  almost  of  the  last  half  of  the  cen 
tury.     Practically  brought  into  being  by  James  Gordon 
Bennett  and  Horace  Greeley  during  "  the  forties,"  it 
then,  and  for  nearly  thirty  years  after,  represented  an 
editorial  individuality,  of  which  Greeley  was  the  highest 
type.     From  1841  to  1872,  Horace  Greeley  was  the 
New  York  Tribune  ;  and  the  New  York  Tribune  dur 
ing  those  years  was  the  greatest  educational  factor  — 
economically    and   morally  —  this    country    has    ever 
known.     The  protective  tariff  is  its  monument,  cere 
perennius.    The  Tribune  still  exists ;  but  the  Tribune 
of  to-day  is  no  longer  the  organ  of  one  man.     A  news 
medium,  owned  by  a  syndicate,  its  utterances  shaped 
by  a  business  management  —  an  editorial  Aulic  Coun 
cil —  are  turned  out  by  the  yard  by  salaried  ready 
writers,  —  quill-drivers  of  fortune,  —  whose  necessary 
fate  it  is  always  to  strive  to  reduce  superficiality  to  a 
system.     "By  journalism,"  a  modern  writer  of  much 
acumen  says,  "  is  to  be  understood,  I  suppose,  writing 
for    pay  on    matters  of   which  you  are   ignorant ; "  1 

1  Leslie  Stephen,  Letters  of  John  Richard  Green,  p.  66. 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  297 

and,  as  an  evolution,  the  modern  newspaper  is  the 
necessary  outcome  of  existing  conditions.  A  financial 
combination  controls  a  most  intricate,  costly  and  in 
fluential  machine.  Since  1872  the  intense,  widely 
pervasive  personality  of  Horace  Greeley  has  given 
place  to  the  ordered  and  stereotyped  utterances  of  the 
Tribune's  editorial  staff. 

Mutatis  mutandis,  it  is  the  same  in  politics.     As 
Tennyson  wrote  two  generations  ago :  — 

"  The  individual  withers,  and  the  world  is  more  and  more." 

The  intricacy  of  modern  political  life,  the  magnitude 
of  interests  and  expenditure,  the  cohesive  power  of 
plunder,  the  number  of  those  who  make  of  political 
life  a  bread  winning  trade,  the  size  of  the  constituency, 

—  all  these  concurring  conditions  have  resulted  in  a 
state  of  affairs  in  which  "  the  machine,"  of  necessity, 
predominates.     Among  the  qualities  which  go  to  con 
stitute  that  natural  aptitude  calculated  to  win  success 
in  public  life,  —  to  secure  office  and  retention  in  office, 

—  grasp  of  principle,  or  a  philosophical  or  statesman 
like  turn  of  mind,  no  longer  find  a  place.     What  is 
needed  is  the  faculty  of  managing  men,  combining 
interests,  or  conforming  to   tendencies.     In    a  word, 
what  is  vulgarly  but  most  expressively  known  as  the 
"  Boss  "  is,  in  our  American  public  life,  the  logical  out 
come  of  the  syndicate  and  machine  principle  applied 
to  existing  political  conditions.     The  "  Boss  "  is,  in 
fact,  to  America  what  the  Imperator  was  to  Rome. 
It  is  the  master  mechanic  with  his  hand  on  the  lever ; 
but,  as  the  machine  responds  to  his  touch,  the  indi 
vidual  is  eliminated. 

This  tendency  of  the  day,  few,  I  think,  deny.     In 
deed,  all  must  recognize  the  growth  of  combination. 


298  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

It  can  be  studied  everywhere,  save  in  the  highest  forms 
of  art  and  thought.  Syndicates  cannot  turn  out  great 
poems,  or  noble  statues,  or  attain  to  a  deep  insight. 
In  letters,  their  power  is  confined  to  the  profuse  manu 
facture  of  printed  matter,  —  dictionaries,  blue-books, 
cooperative  histories,  and  the  like.  But  we  have  now 
to  do  only  with  the  political  life,  and  the  higher  educa 
tional  forces  there  in  action,  or  possible  to  bring  into 
action  in  any  emergency ;  and  the  increased  power 
of  the  machine  in  that  field,  I  take  to  be  one  of  the 
indications  of  the  time,  not  less  unmistakable  than 
significant.  Machine  work  always  has  a  degenerating 
tendency.  The  more  powerful  the  machine,  the  more 
it  inclines  to  self-aggrandization  and  the  perpetuation 
of  abuse.  A  perfect  machine  is  as  nearly  soulless  as 
may  be.  Such  a  machine  was  the  Church  of  Rome 
in  the  days  of  Voltaire  and  the  Galas  tragedy ;  such 
a  machine  is  the  French  army  now,  as  exemplified  in 
the  Dreyfus  affair,  and  the  experience  therein  of  Zola. 
The  tendency  from  the  individual  towards  the  machine, 
in  American  journalism  and  public  life,  cannot  be 
denied.  It  distinctly  does  not  promote  a  loftier,  a  more 
liberal  and  scholarly  tone  of  discussion ;  on  the  con 
trary,  it  works  always  in  the  opposite  way. 

This  being  so,  in  what  direction  may  we  look  for 
the  corrective  agency  ?  In  a  body  politic,  so  full  of 
vitality,  so  instinct  with  life,  as  that  of  ours,  each  evil 
works  its  own  cure.  The  remedial  action  is  apt  to 
reveal  itself  in  unexpected  quarters,  and  in  shapes  not 
at  once  recognized  ;  but,  unless  the  body  politic  is 
decadent,  it  is  as  sure  to  assert  itself  as  it  is  in  the  case 
of  disease  in  a  physical  organization  not  moribund. 

That  those  who  philosophize  and  prescribe  in  this 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  299 

and  kindred  cases  generally  reach  wrong  conclusions 
is  quite  indisputable ;  it  is  safe,  indeed,  to  say  that 
they  do  so  in  more  than  nine  cases  out  of  ten.  As 
Mr.  Disraeli  long  since  sagely  observed,  "  It  is  the 
unexpected  which  is  apt  to  occur."  In  the  present 
case  I  wish,  therefore,  in  advance,  to  acknowledge  that 
I  am  probably  quite  wide  of  the  mark  in  both  my 
diagnosis  of  the  disease  and  my  forecast  of  the  remedy. 
That  remedy,  moreover,  when  it  comes,  will,  I  am 
confident,  not  be  in  the  nature  of  some  ingenious  dis 
covery,  —  an  invention  which  might  admit  of  letters 
patent.  On  the  contrary,  it  will  be  an  evolution,  —  the 
natural  development  of  internal  healing  force  asserting 
itself  to  meet  a  pathological  condition.  Not  posing 
here,  therefore,  as  a  physician  prescribing  a  sure  cure 
of  his  own  devising,  but  as  an  observer  of  conditions 
and  symptoms,  I  propose  to  point  out,  so  far  as  my 
observation  and  insight  enable  me  so  to  do,  the  indica 
tions  of  a  self -curative  process  already  asserting  itself. 
The  source  of  trouble  being  located  in  the  tendency 
to  excessive  organization,  it  would  seem  natural  that 
the  counteracting  agency  should  be  looked  for  in  an 
exactly  opposite  direction ;  that  is,  in  the  increased 
efficacy  of  individualism.  Of  this,  I  submit,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  go  far  in  search  of  indications.  Take,  for 
instance,  the  examples  already  referred  to,  of  Mr. 
Schurz  and  President  White,  in  the  canvass  of  1896  ; 
and  suppose,  for  a  moment,  efforts  such  as  theirs  then 
were,  made  more  effective  as  resulting  from  the  organ 
ized  action  of  an  association  like  this.  Our  platform 
at  once  becomes  a  rostrum,  —  and  a  rostrum  from 
which  a  speaker  of  reputation  and  character  is  insured 
a  wide  hearing.  His  audience,  too,  is  present  to  listen 


300  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

and  repeat.  From  such  a  rostrum,  the  observer,  the 
professor,  the  student  —  be  it  of  economy,  of  history, 
or  of  philosophy  —  might  readily  be  brought  into 
immediate  contact  with  the  issues  of  the  day.  So 
bringing  him  is  but  a  step.  He  would  appear,  also,  in 
his  proper  character  and  place,  —  the  scholar  having 
his  say  in  politics ;  but  always  as  a  scholar,  not  as  an 
office-holder,  nor  an  aspirant  for  office.  His  appeal 
would  be  to  intelligence  and  judgment,  not  to  passion 
or  self-interest,  or  even  to  patriotism.  The  elements 
are  all  there ;  the  question  is  only  as  to  a  method  of 
effective  concentration.  It  must,  I  submit,  be  sought 
for  here  on  the  floor  of  the  academy,  and  not  in  the 
confusion  of  the  caucus. 

A  due  sense  of  political  proportion  might  then 
become  possible.  Heretofore,  the  view  customarily 
taken  has  been  too  narrow  and  too  close.  The  con 
tinuity  of  movement  has  been  ignored,  and  the  true 
relation  of  things  intentionally  distorted.  The  effort 
has  uniformly  been  to  give  each  contest,  in  so  far  as 
possible,  a  crucial  aspect.  All  has  been  made  to 
depend  on  that  particular  cast  of  the  dice.  The  future 
of  the  race,  one  would  suppose,  rests  on  the  outcome 
of  some  struggle,  in  which,  in  fact,  those  immediately 
participating  are  alone  concerned.  The  retrospect  I 
have  just  invited  you  to  tells  a  very  different  story. 
Sixteen  presidential  elections,  and  only  six  national 
debates  in  sixty  years !  The  issues,  moreover,  involved 
in  those  debates  have  in  most  cases  been  settled,  not 
on  the  hustings  or  in  Congress,  but  by  the  course  of 
events,  —  the  logic  of  the  philosopher,  the  scientist,  or 
the  economist.  Illustrations  of  this,  also,  are  not  far 
to  seek.  In  the  journal  of  the  day  on  which  I  am 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  301 

writing  these  words,  I  find,  for  instance,  a  confession 
of  faith  by  a  United  States  Senator,  in  which  he 
indulges  in  this,  for  a  politician,  refreshing  form  of 
speech,  —  "  In  1896  we  had  a  campaign  on  the  money 
question.  Everything  was  depressed,  —  idleness,  dis 
content,  distrust  and  misery,  everywhere.  We  were 
told  that  the  salvation  of  the  country  depended  upon 
the  free  coinage  of  silver.  I  believed  then,  and  I 
believe  now,  that  theoretically  we  were  right ;  but 
new  and  unforeseen  forces  came  into  play,  and  I  have 
enough  sense  to  recognize  the  fact  that  the  restoration 
of  confidence  about  which  Mr.  Cleveland  talked,  and 
about  which  I  did  not  know  enough  at  the  time  to 
understand,  the  discovery  of  gold  in  the  Klondike, 
the  influx  of  money  seeking  investment  from  abroad, 
and  the  increase  of  banking  facilities,  have,  for  the 
time  being  at  least,  settled  the  money  question,  and 
nobody  but  a  fool  would  make  a  4  free  silver '  speech 
now."  What  did  the  politicians  have  to  do  with  the 
restoration  of  confidence  ?  It  was  the  work  of  time,  and 
of  the  producing  and  business  community.  What  did 
they  have  to  do  with  the  discoveries  in  the  Klondike  ? 
or  with  the  cyanide  treatment  of  refractory  ores? 
or  with  the  increase  of  capital,  seeking  employment 
itself  and  giving  employment  to  labor?  Through 
out  that  long  and  momentous  debate,  I  submit,  so  far 
as  the  result  was  concerned  and  the  record  shows,  our 
statesmen  and  journalists  remind  us  only  of  Burke's 
famous  metaphor  of  the  dozen  grasshoppers  making 
the  field  ring  with  their  importunate  chink,  while 
thousands  of  great  cattle,  chewing  the  cud,  silently 
repose  under  the  shadow  of  the  British  oak.  I/ooking 
back  over  the  whole  period  that  is  gone  since  that 


302  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

April  day  thirty-six  years  ago,  when  Grant  and  Lee, 
at  Appomattox,  brought  the  conflict  in  the  field  to  a 
close,  and  speaking  in  perfect  moderation,  I  cannot 
point  to  one  single  beneficial  result  of  a  positive  char 
acter  which  can  properly  be  classed  as  political.  As 
a  species  of  safety-valve,  political  debate  has,  I  admit, 
been  of  infinite  service.  Unending,  and  mostly  idle 
in  character,  it  has  prevented  ill-considered  and  pre 
cipitate  action,  and  given  natural  influences  time  in 
which  to  work  out  their  results.  Beyond  this,  what 
can  be  put  to  its  credit  ?  Take  the  debates  in  their 
order.  The  political  Congressional  reconstruction  of 
the  slaveholding  and  rebellious  South  has  certainly 
failed  to  bear  the  test  of  time.  What  was  then  done 
has  since  been  undone,  and  the  section  concerned  is 
even  now  groping  its  way,  painfully,  and  with  no 
excess  of  intelligence  and  humanity,  towards  a  more 
practical  and  better-considered  solution.  Thanks  to 
a  providential  veto,  the  great  currency  debate  ended 
in  an  absolutely  do-nothing  policy.  Of  the  tariff 
debate  I  will  not  speak.  Stretching  through  a  whole 
century,  it  once  brought  the  country  to  the  verge  of 
civil  war,  and  its  history  is  read  in  a  vast  literature 
of  its  own,  —  a  veritable  Serbonian  bog  of  sophistry, 
saturated  with  bad  rhetoric.  The  practical  outcome, 
as  studied  in  our  last  general  tariff  revision,  has  not 
been  deemed  specially  creditable  to  American  political 
disinterestedness  or  scientific  fiscal  thought.  Our 
pension  list  is,  indeed,  a  monument,  but  scarcely  of 
public  liberality  judiciously  exercised.  Finally,  the 
advocates  of  free-silver  coinage,  having  erased  from 
the  statute-book  that  "  Sherman-bill "  which  they 
themselves  had  inscribed  there,  confess  that  "  a  fool " 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  303 

only  would  be  guilty  of  "  a  silver  speech  "  now.  Con 
gress  has  all  along  been  but  a  clumsy  recording  ma 
chine  of  conclusions  worked  out  in  the  laboratory  and 
machine-shop ;  and  yet  the  idea  is  still  deeply  seated 
in  the  minds  of  men,  otherwise  intelligent,  that,  to 
effect  political  results,  it  is  necessary  to  hold  office,  or 
at  least  to  be  a  politician,  and  to  be  heard  from  the 
hustings.  Is  not  the  exact  reverse  more  truly  the 
case  ?  The  situation  may  not  be,  indeed  it  certainly 
is  not,  as  it  should  be  ;  it  may  be,  I  hold  that  it  is, 
unfortunate  that  the  scholar  and  investigator  are  find 
ing  themselves  more  and  more  excluded  from  public 
life  by  the  professional  with  an  aptitude  for  the 
machine :  but  the  result  is  none  the  less  patent.  On 
all  issues  of  real  moment,  —  issues  affecting  anything 
more  than  a  division  of  the  spoils,  or  the  concession 
of  some  privilege  of  exaction  from  the  community,  — 
it  is  the  student,  the  man  of  affairs  and  the  scientist 
who,  to-day,  in  last  resort,  closes  debate  and  shapes 
public  policy.  His,  the  last  word.  How  to  organize 
and  develop  his  means  of  influence  is  the  question. 

"  Here  's  what  should  strike,  could  one  handle  it  cunningly : 
Help  the  axe,  give  it  a  helve  !  " 

So  far  as  the  historian  is  concerned,  this  association 
is,  I  submit,  the  helve  to  the  axe. 

Of  this  the  presidential  election  which  closed  just 
a  year  ago  affords  an  apt  illustration,  ready  at  hand. 
No  better  could  be  asked  for.  What  might  then  well 
have  been  ?  The  American  Historical  Association,  as 
I  have  already  said,  is  composed  of  those  who  have 
felt  a  call  for  the  investigation  and  treatment  of  his 
torical  problems.  Its  members  —  largely  instructors 


304  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

in  our  advanced  education  —  feel  that  keen  interest  in 
the  issues  of  the  day,  natural  and  proper  in  all  good 
citizens,  irrespective  of  calling.  They  want  to  con 
tribute  their  share  to  discussion ;  and,  in  that  way,  to 
influence  results,  so  far  as  in  them  lies.  From  every 
conceivable  point  of  view  it  is  most  desirable  that  they 
should  have  facilities  for  so  doing.  I  hold,  therefore, 
that,  in  the  last  presidential  canvass,  a  special  meeting 
of  this  association,  called  to  discuss  the  issues  then 
pending,  might  well  have  tended  to  the  better  general 
and  popular  comprehension  of  those  issues,  and  to  the 
elevation  of  that  debate.  Conducted  on  academic 
principles,  and  looking  to  no  formal  expression  of 
results  in  any  enunciated  platform  of  principles,  such 
a  gathering  would  have  exercised  an  influence,  as 
perceptible  as  beneficial,  in  lifting  the  discussion  up 
into  the  domain  of  philosophy  and  research.  It  would 
have  brought  to  bear  the  lessons  of  the  past  on  the 
questions  of  the  day.  In  any  event,  it  would  certainly 
not  have  descended  to  that  contemptible  post  ergo 
propter  formula,  which,  on  the  one  side  or  the  other, 
has  in  every  presidential  canvass  been  the  main  staple 
of  argument. 

What  were  the  issues  of  the  last  presidential  can 
vass  ?  —  on  what  questions  did  its  debate  turn  ?  Three 
in  number,  they  were,  I  think,  singularly  inviting  to 
those  historically  minded.  To  the  reflecting  man  the 
matter  first  in  importance  was  what  is  known  as  "  Im 
perialism,"  -  —  the  problem  forced  upon  our  considera 
tion  by  the  outcome  of  the  war  with  Spain.  Next  I 
should  place  the  questions  of  public  policy  involved 
in  the  rapid  agglomerations  of  capital,  popularly  de 
nominated  "  Trusts."  Finally,  the  silver  issue  still 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  305 

lingered  at  the  front,  a  legacy  from  the  canvass  of 
four  years  previous.  The  debate  of  1900  is  a  thing 
of  the  past.  Each  of  those  issues  can  now  be  dis 
cussed,  as  it  might  well  then  have  been  discussed,  in 
the  pure  historical  spirit.  Let  us  take  them  up  in 
their  inverse  order. 

Historically  speaking,  I  hold  there  were  two  dis 
tinct  sides  to  the  silver  question  ;  and,  moreover,  on 
the  face  of  the  record,  the  advocates  of  bimetallism, 
as  it  was  called,  had  in  1896  the  weight  of  the  argu 
ment  wholly  in  their  favor.  In  his  very  suggestive 
work  entitled  Democracy  and  Liberty,  Mr.  Lecky 
referred  to  the  discovery  of  America  as  producing, 
among  other  far-reaching  effects,  one  which  he  con 
siders  most  momentous  of  all.  To  quote  his  words  :  — 
"  The  produce  of  the  American  mines  created,  in  the 
most  extreme  form  ever  known  in  Europe,  the  change 
which  beyond  all  others  affects  most  deeply  and 
universally  the  material  well-being  of  man :  it  revolu 
tionized  the  value  of  the  precious  metals,  and,  in 
consequence,  the  price  of  all  articles,  the  effects  of  all 
contracts,  the  burden  of  all  debts."  This  was  during 
the  sixteenth  century,  —  the  years  following  the  great 
event  of  1492.  Again,  the  world  went  through  a  simi 
lar  experience  within  our  own  memories,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  California  and  Australia  gold-finds,  be 
tween  1848  and  1852.  These  revolutions  were  due 
to  natural  causes,  and  came  about  gradually.  They 
were  also  of  a  stimulating  character.  From  the  be 
ginning  of  modern  commercial  times,  however,  to  the 
close  of  the  last  century,  the  exchanges  of  all  civilized 
communities  had  been  based  on  the  precious  metals ; 
and  silver  had  been  quite  as  much  as  gold  a  precious 


306  AN   UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

metal  for  monetary  purposes.  Shortly  after  1870  the 
policy  of  demonetizing  silver  was  entered  upon  ;  and, 
in  1873,  the  United  States  gave  in  its  adhesion  to 
that  policy.  Thereafter,  in  the  great  system  of  inter 
national  exchanges,  silver  ceased  to  be  counted  a  part 
of  that  specie  reserve  on  which  draughts  were  made. 
Thenceforth,  the  drain,  as  among  the  financial  centres, 
was  to  be  on  gold  alone.  In  the  whole  history  of  man, 
no  precedent  for  such  a  step  was  to  be  found.  So  far 
as  the  United  States  was  concerned,  the  basis  on  which 
its  complex  and  delicate  financial  fabric  rested  was 
weakened  by  one  half  ;  and  the  cheaper  and  more 
accessible  metal,  that  to  which  the  debtor  would 
naturally  have  recourse  in  discharge  of  his  obligations, 
was  made  unavailable.  It  could  further  be  demon 
strated  that,  without  a  complete  readjustment  of  cur 
rencies  and  values,  the  world's  accumulated  stock  and 
annual  production  of  gold  could  not,  as  a  monetary 
basis,  be  made  to  suffice  for  its  needs.  A  continually 
recurring  contest  for  gold  among  the  great  financial 
centres  was  inevitable.  A  change  which,  in  the 
language  of  Lecky,  "  beyond  all  others  affects  most 
deeply  and  universally  the  material  well-being  of 
man,''  had  been  unwittingly  challenged.  The  only 
question  was,  —  Would  the  unexpected  occur  ?  — 
Then,  if  it  did  occur,  what  might  be  anticipated? 
Such  was  the  silver  issue,  as  it  presented  itself  in 
1896.  On  the  facts,  the  weight  of  argument  was 
clearly  with  the  advocates  of  the  continued  use  of 
silver. 

Four  years  later,  in  1900,  the  unexpected  had 
occurred.  As  then  resumed,  the  debate  was  replete 
with  interest.  The  lessons  of  1492  and  1848  had  a 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  307 

direct  bearing  on  the  present,  and,  in  the  light  by 
them  shed,  the  outcome  could  be  forecast  almost  with 
certainty  ;  but  it  was  a  world-question.  Japan,  China, 
Hindostan  entered  into  the  problem,  in  which  also 
both  Americas  were  factors.  It  was  a  theme  to  in 
spire  Burke,  stretching  back,  as  it  did,  from  this 
latter  day  light  to  the  middle  age  darkness,  and  in 
volving  the  whole  circling  globe.  Rarely  has  any 
subject  called  for  more  intelligent  and  comprehen 
sive  investigation  ;  rarely  has  one  been  more  confused 
and  befogged  by  a  denser  misinformation.  The  dis 
coverer  and  scientist,  moving  hand  in  hand,  had,  dur 
ing  the  remission  of  the  debate,  been  getting  in  their 
work,  and,  under  the  magic  touch  of  their  silent  influ 
ence,  the  world's  gold  production  rose  by  leaps  and 
bounds.  Less  than  ten  millions  of  ounces  in  1896,  in 
1899  it  had  nearly  touched  fifteen  millions ;  and,  in 
money  value,  it  alone  then  exceeded  the  combined 
value  of  the  gold  and  silver  production  of  the  earlier 
period.  What  did  this  signify  ?  —  History  was  only 
repeating  itself.  The  experiences  of  the  first  half  of 
the  sixteenth  century  and  the  middle  decennaries  of 
the  nineteenth  century  were  to  be  emphasized  on  the 
threshold  of  the  twentieth. 

So  much  for  the  silver  question  and  its  possible 
treatment.  In  the  discussion  of  1900,  the  last  word 
in  the  debate  of  1896  remained  to  be  uttered.  A 
page  in  history,  both  memorable  and  instructive,  was 
to  be  turned.  Next  trusts,  —  those  vast  aggregations 
of  capital  in  the  hands  of  private  combinations,  con 
stituting  practical  monopolies  of  whole  branches  of 
industry,  and  of  commodities  necessary  to  man.  Was 
the  world  to  be  subject  to  taxation  at  the  will  of  a 


308  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

moneyed  syndicate  ?  The  debate  of  a  year  ago  over 
this  issue,  if  debate  it  may  be  called,  is  still  very 
recent.  In  it  the  lessons  of  history  were  effectually 
ignored  ;  and  yet,  if  applied,  they  would  have  been 
sufficiently  suggestive.  The  historian  was  as  conspic 
uous  for  his  absence  as  the  demagogue  was  in  evi 
dence. 

The  cry  was  against  monopoly  and  the  monopolist, 
—  a  cry  which,  as  it  has  been  ringing  through  all 
recorded  times,  suggests  for  the  historical  investigator 
a  wide  and  fruitful  field.  Curiously  enough,  the  first 
lesson  to  be  derived  from  labor  in  that  field  is  a  para 
dox.  Practically,  so  far  as  extortion  is  concerned, 
there  is  almost  nothing  in  common  between  the  old- 
time  monopoly  and  the  modern  trust.  Of  examples 
of  the  first,  the  record  is  monotonously  full.  Mere 
agents  of  the  government,  sometimes  the  favorites  of 
the  Crown,  the  whole  machinery  of  the  state  has  time 
out  of  mind  been  put  at  the  service  of  monopolists  to 
enable  them  to  exact  tribute  from  all.  To  the  stu 
dent  of  English  history  the  names  and  misdeeds  of  Sir 
Francis  Michell  and  Sir  Giles  Mompesson  at  once 
suggest  themselves ;  while  others,  more  familiar  with 
the  drama,  recall  Sir  Giles  Overreach,  or  that  power 
ful  scene  in  Ruy  Bias  in  which  the  Spanish  courtiers 
wrangle  together,  coming  almost  to  blows,  over  a  par 
tition  among  themselves  of  the  right  to  extort.  The 
old  system  still  survives.  For  example,  in  France 
to-day  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  salt  is  a  govern 
ment  monopoly.  A  prime  necessity  of  life,  no  person 
not  specially  authorized  may  engage  in  the  production 
of  salt,  or  import  it  into  France.  If  a  peasant 
woman,  living  on  the  sea-coast  of  Brittany  or  Nor- 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  309 

mandy,  endeavors  to  procure  salt  for  her  family  by 
the  slow  process  of  evaporating  a  pailful  of  sea-water 
in  the  sun,  she  is  engaged  in  an  illicit  trade,  and 
becomes  amenable  to  law.  Her  salt  will  certainly,  if 
found,  be  confiscate.  So  of  improved  pocket  matches. 
In  France,  their  manufacture  is  a  government  revenue 
monopoly.  They  are  notoriously  bad.  Those  made 
and  sold  in  Great  Britain  are,  on  the  contrary,  noted 
for  excellence.  If,  however,  passing  from  England  to 
France,  a  box  of  British  matches  is  found  in  the 
pocket  of  a  traveller,  it  is  taken  from  him  and  the 
contents  are  destroyed  at  once  ;  indeed,  he  is  fortunate 
if  he  escapes  the  payment  of  a  fine.  This  is  mono 
poly  ;  the  whole  strength  of  a  government  being  put 
forth  to  exact  an  artificial  profit  on  the  sale  of  a  com 
modity  in  general  use.  There  is  a  historical  literature 
pertaining  to  the  subject,  —  a  lamentation,  and  an 
ancient  tale  of  wrong. 

Into  that  literature  I  do  not  propose  to  enter.  It 
is  familiar  ;  and  fully  explains  the  deadly  effect  of  the 
word  "  Monopoly  "  to-day,  or  of  the  opprobrious  term 
"  Monopolist,"  when  flung  as  a  missile  from  the  hus 
tings.  It  is  an  epithet  suggestive  of  a  branding-iron, 
and  of  the  scars  of  burns,  the  recollection  of  which  is 
imbedded  in  the  popular  mind. 

The  curious  feature  in  the  present  discussion  — 
that  which  in  the  thought  of  the  student  of  things 
as  opposed  to  words  imparts  a  special  interest  to  it  — 
is  that,  while  the  trust,  or  vast  aggregation  of  capi 
tal  and  machinery  of  production  in  the  hands  of  indi 
viduals  designed  to  the  end  that  competition  may  be 
brought  under  control,  is  in  fact  the  modern  form  of 
monopoly,  it  is  in  its  methods  and  results  the  direct 


310  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

opposite  of  the  old-time  monopoly  ;  for,  whereas  the 
purpose  and  practice  of  that  was  to  extort  from  all 
purchasers  an  artificial  price  for  an  inferior  article 
through  the  suppression  of  competitors,  the  first  law 
of  its  existence  for  the  modern  trust  is,  through  econ 
omies  and  magnitude  of  production,  to  supply  to  all 
buyers  a  better  article  at  a  price  so  low  that  other 
producers  are  driven  from  the  market.  The  ground 
of  popular  complaint  against  the  trust  is,  not  that  it 
exacts  an  inordinate  profit  on  what  it  sells,  but  that 
it  sells  so  low  that  the  small  manufacturer  or  mer 
chant  is  deprived  of  his  trade.  This  distinction,  with 
a  difference,  explains  at  once  the  wholly  futile  charac 
ter  of  the  politician's  outcry  against  trusts.  It  is  easy, 
for  instance,  to  denounce  from  the  platform  the  mag 
nates  of  the  Sugar  Trust  to  a  sympathizing  audience ; 
and  yet  not  one  human  being  in  that  audience,  his 
sympathies  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  will  the 
next  morning  pay  a  fraction  of  a  cent  more  per  pound 
for  his  sugar,  that,  by  so  doing,  he  may  help  to  keep 
alive  some  struggling  manufacturer,  who  advertises 
that  his  product  does  not  bear  the  trust  stamp. 

As  to  the  outcome  of  conflicts  of  this  character,  his 
tory  is  a  monotony.  They  can  have  but  one  result, 
—  an  industrial  readjustment.  A  single  familiar 
illustration  will  suffice.  Any  one  who  chooses  to 
turn  back  to  it  can  read  the  story  of  the  long  con 
flict  between  the  spinning-wheel  and  the  loom.  For 
merly,  and  not  so  very  far  back,  the  distaff  and  spin 
ning-wheel  were  to  be  seen  in  every  house  ;  homespun 
was  the  common  wear.  To-day,  the  average  man  or 
woman  has  never  seen  a  distaff,  nor  heard  the  hum 
of  a  spinning-wheel.  Ceasing  long  since  to  be  a  com- 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  311 

modity,  homespun  would  be  sought  for  in  vain.  Yet 
the  struggle  between  the  loom  of  the  manufacturing 
trust  and  the  old  dame's  spinning-wheel  was,  liter 
ally,  for  the  latter,  a  fight  to  the  death ;  for,  in  that 
case,  the  livelihood  of  the  operator  was  at  stake. 
Her  time  was  worth  absolutely  nothing,  except  at 
the  wheel.  She  must  needs  work  for  any  wage  ;  on  it 
depended  her  bread.  A  vast  domestic,  industrial  re 
adjustment  was  involved  ;  one  implying  untold  human 
suffering.  The  result  was,  however,  never  for  an  in 
stant  in  doubt.  The  trust  of  that  day  was  left  in  un 
disputed  control  of  the  field  ;  and  it  always  must,  and 
always  will  be,  just  so  long  as  it  supplies  purchasers 
with  a  better  article,  at  a  lower  price  than  they  had 
to  pay  before.  The  process  does  not  vary ;  the  only 
difference  is  that  each  succeeding  readjustment  is  on 
a  larger  scale,  and  more  far-reaching  in  its  effects. 

Such,  stripped  of  its  verbiage  and  appeals  to  sym 
pathy,  is  the  trust  proposition.  But  the  popular  ap 
prehension  always  has  been,  as  it  now  is,  that  this 
supply  of  the  better  article  at  a  lower  price  will  con 
tinue  only  until  the  producer  —  the  monopolist — has 
secured  a  complete  mastery  of  the  situation.  Capital, 
it  is  argued,  is  selfish  and  greedy;  corporations  are 
proverbially  soulless  and  insatiable  ;  and,  as  soon  as 
competition  is  eliminated,  nature  will  assert  itself. 
Prices  will  then  be  raised  so  as  to  assure  inordinate 
gains  ;  and  when,  in  consequence  of  such  profits,  fresh 
competitors  enter  the  field,  they  will  either  be  crushed 
out  of  existence  by  a  temporary  reduction  in  price,  or 
absorbed  in  the  trust. 

All  this  has  a  plausible  sound  ;  and  of  it,  as  a 
theory  of  practical  outcome,  the  politician  can  be  re- 


312  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

lied  upon  to  make  the  most.  On  this  head,  however, 
what  has  the  historical  investigator  to  say?  His  will 
be  the  last  word  in  that  debate  also  ;  his,  the  verdict 
which  will  be  final.  The  lessons  bearing  on  this  con 
tention  to  be  drawn  from  the  record  cover  a  wide  field 
of  both  time  and  space ;  they  also  silence  discussion. 
They  tend  indisputably  to  show  that  the  dangers  de 
picted  are  imaginary.  The  subject  must,  of  course, 
be  approached  in  an  unprejudiced  spirit,  and  studied 
in  a  large,  comprehensive  way.  Permanent  tendencies 
are  to  be  dealt  with ;  and  exceptional  cases  must  be  in 
stanced,  classified,  and  allowed  for.  Attempts,  more 
or  less  successful,  at  extortion,  in  a  confidence  of  mas 
tery,  can  unquestionably  be  pointed  out ;  but,  in  the 
history  of  economical  development,  it  is  no  less  un 
questionable  that,  on  the  large  scale  and  in  the  long 
run,  every  new  concentration  has  been  followed  by  a 
permanent  reduction  of  price  in  the  commodity  af 
fected  thereby.  The  world's  needs  are  continually 
supplied  at  a  lower  cost  to  the  world.  Again,  the 
larger  the  concentration,  the  cheaper  the  product ; 
until  now  a  new  truth  of  the  market-place  has  become 
established  and  obtained  general  acceptance,  —  a  truth 
of  the  most  far-reaching  consequence,  —  the  truth  that 
the  largest  returns  are  found  in  quick  sales  at  small 
profits.  To  manage  successfully  one  of  those  great 
and  complex  industrial  combinations  calls  for  excep 
tional  administrative  capacity  in  individuals,  —  for 
men  of  quick  perception,  and  masterful  tempers. 
These  men  must  be  able  correctly  to  read  the  lessons 
of  experience,  and,  accepting  the  facts  of  the  situation, 
they  must  find  out  how  most  exactly  to  adapt  them 
selves  to  those  facts.  No  theorist,  be  he  politician  or 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  313 

philosopher,  appreciates  so  clearly  as  does  the  success 
ful  trust  executive  the  fundamental  laws  of  being  of  the 
interests  he  has  in  charge.  Such  have  good  cause  to 
know  that,  under  conditions  now  prevailing,  compe 
tition  is  the  sure  corollary  of  the  attempted  abuse  of 
control ;  and,  moreover,  that  the  largest  ultimate  re 
turns  on  capital,  as  well  as  the  only  real  security  from 
competition,  are  found,  not  in  the  disposal  of  a  small 
product  at  a  large  profit,  but  in  a  large  output  at 
prices  wrhich  encourage  consumption.  Throwing  ex 
ceptional  cases  and  temporary  conditions  out  of  con 
sideration,  as  not  affecting  final  results,  the  historical 
investigator  will  probably  on  this  subject  find  himself 
much  at  variance  with  the  political  canvasser.  That 
the  last  will  get  worsted  in  the  argument  hardly  need 
be  said. 

Does  history  furnish  any  instance  of  a  financial,  an 
industrial,  or  a  commercial  enterprise  —  a  bank,  a 
factory,  or  an  importing  company  —  ever  having  been 
powerful  enough  long  to  regulate  the  price  of  any 
commodity  regardless  of  competition,  except  when  act 
ing  in  harmony  with  and  supported  by  governmental 
power  ?  Is  not  the  monopolist  practically  impotent, 
unless  he  has  the  constable  at  his  call  ?  To  answer 
this  question  absolutely  would  be  to  deduce  a  law  of 
the  first  importance  from  the  general  experience  of 
mankind.  So  doing  would  call  for  a  far  more  care 
ful  examination  than  is  now  in  my  power  to  make, 
were  it  even  within  the  scope  of  my  ability  ;  but,  if 
my  supposition  prove  correct,  the  corollary  to  be 
drawn  therefrom  is  to  us  as  a  body  politic,  and  at 
just  this  juncture,  one  of  the  first  and  most  far-reach 
ing  import.  In  such  case,  the  modern  American  trust, 


314        AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

also,  so  far  as  it  enjoys  any  power  as  a  monopoly, 
or  admits  of  abuse  as  such,  must  depend  for  that 
power,  and  the  opportunity  of  abuse,  solely  on  govern 
mental  support  and  cooperation.  Its  citadel  is  then 
the  custom-house.  The  moment  the  aid  of  the  United 
States  revenue  officer  is  withheld,  the  American  mono 
polist  would  cease  to  monopolize  except  in  so  far  as 
he  could  defy  competition  by  always  supplying  a  bet 
ter  article  at  a  price  lower  than  any  other  producer 
in  the  whole  world.  And  here,  having  deduced  and 
formulated  this  law,  the  purely  historical  investigator 
would  find  himself  trenching  on  the  province  of  the 
economist.  The  so-called  protective  system  would 
now  be  in  question.  Thus  again,  as  so  often  before, 
the  tariff  would  become  the  paramount  issue.  But  the 
tariff  would  no  longer  stand  in  the  popular  mind  as 
the  beneficent  protector  of  domestic  enterprise ;  it 
would  on  the  contrary  be  there  closely  associated  with 
the  idea  of  monopoly,  it  would  be  assailed  as  the 
stronghold  of  the  trust.  From  the  historical  and 
economical  point  of  view,  however,  the  debate  would 
not  because  of  that  undergo  any  diminution  of  interest. 
Whatever  the  politician  might  in  the  course  of  that 
debate  assert,  or  the  opportunist  incorporate  into 
legislation,  we  may  rest  assured  that  this  issue  will 
ultimately  settle  itself  in  accordance  with  those  irre 
sistible  underlying  influences  which  result  in  what  we 
know  as  natural  evolution.  History  is  but  the  record 
of  the  adjustment  of  mankind  in  the  past  to  the  out 
come  of  those  influences  ;  and,  in  this  respect,  when 
all  is  said  and  done,  it  is  tolerably  safe  to  predict  that 
the  future  will  present  no  features  of  novelty.  If, 
then,  we  can  measure  correctly  the  nature  of  the  in- 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  315 

fluences  at  work,  the  character,  as  well  as  the  extent, 
of  the  impending  readjustment  may  be  surmised.  For 
such  a  diagnosis  the  historian  and  economist  must  fur 
nish  the  data. 

It  remains  to  pass  on  to  the  third  and  last  of  the 
matters  in  debate  during  1900  —  that  known  as  Im 
perialism.  This  was  the  really  great  issue  before  the 
American  people  then,  and,  I  submit,  it  is  the  really 
great  issue  before  them  now.  That  issue,  moreover, 
I  with  confidence  submit,  can  be  intelligently  consid 
ered  only  from  the  historical  standpoint.  Indeed, 
unless  approached  through  the  avenues  of  human 
experience,  it  is  not  even  at  once  apparent  how  the 
question,  as  it  now  confronts  us,  arose,  and  injected 
itself  into  our  political  action ;  and,  accordingly,  it  is 
in  some  quarters  even  currently  assumed  that  it  is 
there  only  fortuitously,  —  a  feature  in  the  great  chap 
ter  of  accidents,  —  a  passing  incident,  which  may  well 
disappear  as  mysteriously  and  as  suddenly  as  it  came. 
Studied  historically,  I  do  not  think  this  view  of  the 
situation  will  bear  examination.  On  the  contrary,  I 
fancy  even  the  most  superficial  investigator,  if  actu 
ated  in  his  inquiry  by  the  true  historical  spirit,  would 
soon  reach  the  conclusion  that  the  issue  so  recently 
forced  upon  us  had  been  long  in  preparation,  was 
logical  and  inevitable,  and,  for  our  good  or  our  evil, 
must  be  decided,  rightly  or  wrongly,  on  a  large  view 
of  great  and  complex  conditions.  In  other  words, 
there  may  be  reason  to  conclude  that  an  inscrutable 
law  of  nature,  at  last  involving  us,  has  long  been,  and 
now  is,  evolving  results.  It  is  one  more  phase  of  nat 
ural  evolution,  working  itself  out,  as  in  the  case  of 
Rome  twenty-five  centuries  ago,  through  the  survival 
and  supremacy  of  the  fittest. 


316  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

I  need  hardly  say,  I  feel  myself  now  venturing  on 
a  dangerous  generalization  ;  and  yet  I  do  not  see  how 
the  American  investigator,  who  endeavors  to  draw  his 
conclusions  from  history,  can  recoil  from  the  venture. 
His  deductions  will  probably  be  erroneous,  —  indeed, 
they  are  sure  to  be  so  to  some  extent ;  —  and,  in  making 
them,  he  is  more  than  likely  to  make  a  not  inconsider 
able  display  of  superficial  knowledge.  None  the  less, 
even  if  it  be  of  small  value,  he  is  bound  to  offer  what 
he  has.  If  the  seed  that  sower  sows  bears  no  fruit,  it 
can  do  small  harm. 

Mr.  Leslie  Stephen,  in  one  of  his  essays,  truly 
enough  says,  "  The  Catholic  and  the  Protestant,  the 
Conservative  and  the  Radical,  the  Individualist  and 
the  Socialist,  have  equal  facility  in  proving  their  own 
doctrines  with  arguments,  which  habitually  begin, 
4  All  history  shows.'  Printers  should  be  instructed 
always  to  strike  out  that  phrase  as  an  erratum;  and 
to  substitute,  '  I  choose  to  take  for  granted.' "  And 
elsewhere  the  same  writer  lays  it  down  as  a  general 
proposition  that  "  Arguments  beginning  « All  his 
tory  shows '  are  always  sophistical."  1  What  is  by 
some  known  as  the  doctrine  of  Manifest  Destiny  is, 
I  take  it,  identical  with  what  others,  more  piously 
minded,  refer  to  as  the  Will,  or  Call,  of  God.  The 
Mohammedan  and  the  modern  Christian  gospel-mon 
ger  say,  u  God  clearly  calls  us  "  to  this  or  that  work  ; 
and  with  a  conscience  perfectly  clear,  they  then  pro 
ceed  to  rob,  oppress  and  slay.  In  like  manner,  the 
political  buccaneer  and  land-pirate  proclaims  that  the 
possession  of  his  neighbor's  territory  is  rightfully  his 

1  Social  Eights  and  Duties,  vol.  i.  p.  129 ;  An  Agnostic's  Apo 
logy,  p.  260. 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  317 

by  Manifest  Destiny.  The  philosophical  politician 
next  drugs  the  conscience  of  his  fellow  men  by  de 
claring'  solemnly  that  "  all  history  shows  "  that  might 
is  right  ;  and  with  time,  the  court  of  last  appeal,  it 
must  be  admitted  possession  is  nine  points  in  the  law's 
ten.  It  cannot  be  denied,  also,  that  quite  as  many 
crimes  have  been  perpetrated  in  the  name  of  God  and 
of  Manifest  Destiny  as  in  that  of  Liberty  ;  and  that, 
at  least,  "  all  history  shows  ;  "  but,  all  the  same,  just 
as  Liberty  is  a  good  and  desirable  thing,  so  God  does 
live,  and  there  is  something  in  Manifest  Destiny. 
As  applied  to  the  development  of  the  races  inhabiting 
the  earth,  it  is,  I  take  it,  merely  an  unscientific  form  of 
speech,  —  the  word  now  in  vogue  is  evolution,  —  the 
phrase  "  survival  of  the  fittest."  When  all  is  said 
and  done,  that  unreasoning  instinct  of  a  people  which 
carries  it  forward  in  spite  of  and  over  theories  to  its 
Manifest  Destiny,  amid  the  despairing  outcries  and 
long-drawn  protestations  of  theorists  and  ethical  phi 
losophers,  is  a  very  considerable  factor  in  making  his 
tory  ;  and,  consequently,  one  to  be  reckoned  with. 

In  plain  words,  then,  and  Mr.  Stephen  to  the  con 
trary  notwithstanding,  "  all  history  shows  "  that  every 
great,  aggressive  and  masterful  race  tends  at  times 
irresistibly  towards  the  practical  assertion  of  its 
supremacy,  usually  at  the  cost  of  those  not  so  well 
adapted  to  existing  conditions.  In  his  great  work, 
Mommsen  formulates  the  law  with  a  brutal  directness 
distinctly  Germanic.  "  By  virtue  of  the  law,  that  a 
people  which  has  grown  into  a  state  absorbs  its  neigh 
bors  who  are  in  political  nonage,  and  a  civilized  people 
absorbs  its  neighbors  who  are  in  intellectual  nonage, 
-  by  virtue  of  this  law,  which  is  as  universally  valid 


318  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

and  as  much  a  law  of  nature  as  the  law  of  gravity,  — 
the  Italian  nation  (the  only  one  in  antiquity  which  was 
able  to  combine  a  superior  political  development  and 
a  superior  civilization,  though  it  presented  the  latter 
only  in  an  imperfect  and  external  manner)  was  en 
titled  to  reduce  to  subjection  the  Greek  states  of  the 
East  which  were  ripe  for  destruction,  and  to  dispossess 
the  peoples  of  lower  grades  of  culture  in  the  West  — 
Libyans,  Iberians,  Celts,  Germans  —  by  means  of  its 
settlers  ;  just  as  England,  with  equal  right,  has  in  Asia 
reduced  to  subjection  a  civilization  of  rival  standing, 
but  politically  impotent,  and  in  America  and  Austra 
lia  has  marked  and  ennobled,  and  still  continues  to 
mark  and  ennoble,  extensive  barbarian  countries  with 
the  impress  of  its  nationality."  1  Professor  von  Hoist 
again  states  a  corollary  from  the  law  thus  laid  down 
in  terms  scarcely  less  explicit,  in  connection  with  a 
well-known  and  much  discussed  act  of  foreign  spolia 
tion  in  our  own  comparatively  recent  history.  "It  is 
as  easy  to  bid  a  ball  that  has  flown  from  the  mouth  of 
the  gun  to  stop  in  its  flight,  and  return  on  its  path,  as 
to  terminate  a  successful  war  of  conquest  by  a  volun 
tary  surrender  of  all  conquests,  because  it  has  been 
found  out  that  the  spoil  will  be  a  source  of  dissension 
at  home."  2  And  then  von  Hoist  quotes  a  very  signifi 
cant  as  well  as  philosophical  utterance  of  William  H. 
Seward's,  which  a  portion  of  our  earnest  protestants  of 
to-day  would  do  well  to  ponder.  "  I  abhor  war,  as  I 
detest  slavery.  I  would  not  give  one  human  life  for 
all  the  continent  that  remains  to  be  annexed.  But  I 
cannot  exclude  the  conviction  that  the  popular  passion 

1  History  of  Rome,  Book  v.  chap.  7. 

2  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  iii.  p.  304. 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  319 

for  territorial  aggrandizement  is  irresistible.  Pru 
dence,  justice,  cowardice,  may  check  it  for  a  season, 
but  it  will  gain  strength  by  its  subjugation.  ...  It 
behooves  us  then  to  qualify  ourselves  for  our  mission. 
We  must  dare  our  destiny."  l  One  more,  and  I  have 
done  with  quotations.  The  last  I  just  now  commended 
to  the  thoughtful  consideration  of  those  classified  in 
the  political  nomenclature  of  the  day  as  Anti-Imperial 
ists.  A  most  conscientious  and  high-minded  class,  — 
possessed  with  the  full  courage  of  their  convictions, 
—  the  efforts  of  the  Anti-Imperialists  will  not  fail, 
we  and  they  may  rest  assured,  to  make  themselves  felt 
as  they  enter  into  the  grand  result.  Nevertheless,  for 
them  also  there  is  food  for  thought,  perhaps  for  con 
solation,  in  this  other  general  law,  laid  down  in  1862 
by  Richard  Cobden,  than  whose,  in  my  judgment,  the 
utterances  of  no  English-speaking  man  in  the  nine 
teenth  century  were  more  replete  with  shrewd  sense 
expressed  in  plain,  terse  English  :  "  From  the  moment 
the  first  shot  is  fired,  or  the  first  blow  is  struck,  in 
a  dispute,  then  farewell  to  all  reason  and  argument ; 
you  might  as  well  attempt  to  reason  with  mad  dogs  as 
with  men  when  they  have  begun  to  spill  each  other's 
blood  in  mortal  combat.  I  was  so  convinced  of  the 
fact  during  the  Crimean  war,  which,  you  know,  I  op 
posed,  —  I  was  so  convinced  of  the  utter  uselessness 
of  raising  one's  voice  in  opposition  to  war  when  it  has 
once  begun,  that  I  made  up  my  mind  that  as  long  as 
I  was  in  political  life,  should  a  war  again  break  out 
between  England  and  a  great  Power,  I  would  never 
open  my  mouth  upon  the  subject  from  the  time  the 
first  gun  was  fired  until  the  peace  was  made,  because, 
1  Works,  vol.  iii.  p.  409. 


320  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

when  a  war  is  once  commenced,  it  will  only  be  by 
the  exhaustion  of  one  party  that  a  termination  will  be 
arrived  at.  If  you  look  back  at  our  history,  what 
did  eloquence,  in  the  persons  of  Chatham  or  Burke,  do 
to  prevent  a  war  with  our  first  American  colonies? 
What  did  eloquence,  in  the  persons  of  Fox  and  his 
friends,  do  to  prevent  the  French  Revolution,  or  bring 
it  to  a  close  ?  And  there  was  a  man  who,  at  the  com 
mencement  of  the  Crimean  war,  in  terms  of  eloquence, 
in  power,  and  pathos,  and  argument  equal  —  in  terms, 
I  believe,  fit  to  compare  with  anything  that  fell  from 
the  lips  of  Chatham  and  Burke  —  I  mean  your  distin 
guished  townsman,  my  friend  Mr.  Bright  —  and  what 
was  his  success  ?  Why,  they  burnt  Ijim  in  effigy  for 
his  pains."  l 

Turning  from  the  authorities,  and  the  lessons  by 
them  deduced  from  the  record  called  History,  let  us 
now  consider  the  problem  precipitated  on  the  Ameri 
can  people  by  the  Spanish  war  of  1898.  There  has 
of  late  been  much  talk  of  the  sudden  development  of 
the  United  States  as  a  "  World  Power,"  and  of  the 
new  and  prominent  part  it  henceforth  has  to  play,  — 
talk,  as  I  hold  it,  empty,  idle  and  wearisome,  —  closely 
bordering  on  cant.  The  United  States  without  ques 
tion  is  a  world  power ;  but,  that  it  has  been  such  a 
power  hard  upon  a  century,  I  hold  not  more  open  to 
denial.  The  United  States  became  a  world  power  in 
the  eyes  of  all  nations  between  five  minutes  after  6 
o'clock  P.  M.  of  the  19th  of  August,  1812,  and  the 
following  half  hour ;  the  frigate  Constitution,  within 
those  twenty-five  minutes,  having  by  her  broadsides 
put  the  frigate  Guerriere  in  such  a  position  that  the 
1  Speeches,  vol.  ii.  p.  314. 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  321 

British  flag  had  to  come  down.  Since  the  hands  of 
the  Constitution's  chronometer  marked  the  half  hour 
after  6  o'clock  of  that  eventful  afternoon,  there  has 
been,  I  hold,  no  room  for  debate  as  to  the  United 
States  as  a  world  power. 

For  more  than  eighty  years  afterwards,  the  efforts 
of  that  power  at  supremacy  were,  in  obedience  to  the 
law  of  its  being  and  subject  to  the  conditions  of  its 
environment,  confined  to  filling  up  the  waste  spaces 
in  its  immediate  neighborhood  or  to  aggressive  atti 
tude,  sometimes  resulting  in  action,  towards  the  less 
well  adapted  who  chanced  to  find  themselves  in  its 
path.  But,  as  the  world's  solidarity  increased,  and 
trade  and  intercourse,  assuming  new  forms,  forced 
their  way  into  fresh  fields,  it  became  inevitable,  as 
the  prescriptive  barriers,  one  by  one,  gave  way,  that  a 
new  and  larger  policy  would  evolve  itself  for  the 
United  States  also.  That  policy,  moreover,  would  not 
fail  to  find  expression  soon  or  late  in  some  assertion 
of  supremacy.  It  was  only  a  question  of  place,  time 
and  degree. 

We  all  know  how  it  came  about.  It  is  needless  for 
me  here  and  now  to  refer  in  detail  to  the  war  with 
Spain,  and  the  fight  in  Manila  Bay.  Suffice  it  to 
say  that,  if  human  experience  goes  for  anything  in 
such  cases,  what  has  since  resulted  was  in  its  larger 
scope  inevitable,  —  in  the  nature  of  a  logical  outcome. 
Nor  in  thus  stating  a  conclusion  do  I  imply  a  spirit 
of  fatalism,  or  say  anything  calculated  to  disparage 
opposition  at  the  beginning,  or  discourage  discussion 
now.  On  the  contrary,  "  all  history  shows  "  —  and 
this  time,  I  submit,  shows  indisputably  and  conclu 
sively —  that  final  results  are  the  outcome,  not  of 


322  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

some  of  the  antecedent  influences,  or  even  of  those 
among  them  most  preponderating,  but  of  all  of  them, 
combined  and  forever  interacting.  Every  ingredient 
goes  into  the  grand  total,  there  making  its  presence 
felt.  This  being  premised,  it  must  next  be  admitted 
that  there  are  few  things  which,  when  they  first  con 
front  perplexed  mankind,  call  more  emphatically  for 
challenge  than  the  apparitions  of  manifest  destiny. 
Such  invariably  come  in  questionable  shapes.  As  our 
own  experience  teaches,  —  "  as  all  history  shows," 
not  one  time  in  ten  that  manifest  destiny  is  heralded 
does  the  thing  so  confidently  pronounced  as  destined 
come  to  pass.  How  many  times  within  our  own  mem 
ories  it  has  been  appealed  to,  and  in  behalf  of  what 
causes,  —  Ostend  manifestoes,  Fenian  raids,  servile 
insurrections,  "Naboth's  vineyard,"  miscegenation, 
and  the  like,  —  the  record  indicates.  It  cannot,  there 
fore,  and  should  not  even  for  an  instant  be  assumed 
that  the  appeal  to  God's  Will,  or  Manifest  Destiny, 
is  entitled  to  consideration  until  it  has  so  proved  itself 
by  actually  overcoming  the  most  strenuous  opposition. 
That  puts  its  reality  to  the  test.  Nor,  when,  in  the 
matter  of  so-called  expansion,  the  given  manifestation 
has  in  the  outcome  proved  itself  genuine,  and  remains 
an  established  fact,  —  as,  citing  our  own  experience, 
in  the  cases  of  Texas,  California,  Alaska,  Porto  Rico 
and  Hawaii,  —  a  condition,  and  no  longer  a  theory, 
—  not  then  even  is  the  struggle  necessarily  over. 
The  details  remain  to  be  settled ;  and  the  details,  in 
cluding  all  questions  of  form,  involve  the  whole  final 
character  of  the  development.  It  is  then  to  be  decided 
whether  the  inevitable  is  to  assume  shape  in  harmony 
with  our  traditions,  or  in  defiance  of  them.  This  is 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  323 

the  final  outcome  of  conflicting  views  and  opposing 
forces.  In  the  case  now  under  discussion,  therefore, 
while  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay  and  the  Treaty  of 
Paris  did,  as  is  now  apparent,  settle  the  main  issue, 
and  finally  committed  the  United  States  to  a  new 
phase  and  sphere  of  expansion,  —  a  peopled,  trans- 
Pacific  acquisition,  —  to  that  expansion  a  shape  was, 
and  is  yet  to  be  given.  It  was  in  debate  during  the 
last  presidential  canvass  ;  it  is  in  debate  now. 

That  question  —  the  burning  political  issue  of  the 
hour  —  I  propose  here  and  now  to  discuss.  I  propose 
to  discuss  it,  however,  from  the  purely  historical  stand 
point,  and  not  at  all  in  its  moral  or  economical  aspects. 
So  far,  then,  as  this  question  is  concerned,  the  last  pre 
sidential  vote  —  that  of  1900  —  settled  nothing,  except 
that  the  policy  which  had  assumed  a  certain  degree  of 
form  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris  should  not  be  reversed. 
All  else  was  left  for  debate  and  ulterior  settlement. 
Certain  lessons,  calculated  greatly  to  influence  the 
character  of  that  settlement,  can,  I  submit,  now  be 
most  advantageously  drawn  from  history.  At  formu 
lating  those  lessons,  I  propose  here  to  try  my  hand. 

The  first  and  most  important  lesson  is  one  which, 
in  theory  at  least,  is  undisputed ;  though  to  live  up 
to  it  practically  calls  for  a  courage  of  conviction  not 
yet  in  evidence.  That  a  dependency  is  not  merely  a 
possession,  but  a  trust  —  a  trust  for  the  future,  for 
itself  and  for  humanity  —  is  accepted;  —  accordingly 
it  is  in  no  wise  to  be  exploited  for  the  general  benefit 
of  the  alien  owner,  or  that  of  individual  components 
of  that  owner,  but  it  is  to  be  dealt  with  in  a  large 
and  altruistic  spirit,  with  an  unselfish  view  to  its  own 
utmost  development,  materially,  morally,  and  politi- 


324  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

cally.  And,  through  a  process  of  negatives,  "  all  his 
tory  shows "  that  only  when  this  course  is  hereafter 
wisely  and  consecutively  pursued  —  should  that  blessed 
consummation  ever  be  attained  —  will  the  dominating 
power  itself  derive  the  largest  and  truest  benefit  from 
its  possession. 

As  yet  no  American  of  any  character,  much  less  of 
authority,  has  come  forward  to  controvert  this  propo 
sition.  That  it  will  be  controverted,  and  attempts 
made  by  interested  parties  to  sophisticate  it  away 
through  the  cunningly  arranged  display  of  exceptional 
circumstances,  can  with  safety  be  predicted.  In  this 
respect,  to  use  a  cant  phrase,  "  we  know  how  it  is  our 
selves."  We  all  remember,  for  instance,  the  unspeak 
able  code  of  factitious  morals  and  deceptive  philosophy 
manufactured  to  order  in  these  United  States  as  a 
"  Gospel  of  Niggerdom  "  less  than  half  a  century  ago. 
Coming  down  to  more  recent  times,  we  can,  none  of 
us,  yet  have  forgotten  the  wretched  sophistry  igno- 
rantly  resurrected  from  French  Revolution  and  assignat 
days  in  glorification  of  "  Fiat  Money,"  and  a  business 
world  emancipated  at  last  from  any  heretofore  accepted 
measures  of  value.  The  leopard,  rest  assured,  has  not 
changed  its  spots  since  either  1860  or  1876.  The 
New  Gospel  phase  of  the  debate  now  on  is,  however, 
yet  to  develop  itself.  But,  assuming  the  correctness 
of  the  proposition  I  have  just  formulated,  a  corollary 
follows  from  it.  A  formidable  proposition,  I  state  it 
without  limitations,  meaning  to  challenge  contradic 
tion.  I  submit  that  there  is  not  an  instance  in  all 
recorded  history,  from  the  earliest  precedent  to  that 
now  making,  where  a  so-called  inferior  race  or  com 
munity  has  been  elevated  in  its  character,  or  made 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  325 

self-sustaining  and  self-governing,  —  or  even  put  011 
the  way  to  that  result,  —  through  a  condition  of 
dependency  or  tutelage.  I  say  "  inferior  race  ;  "  but, 
I  fancy,  I  might  state  the  proposition  even  more 
broadly.  I  might,  without  much  danger,  assert  that 
the  condition  of  dependency,  even  for  communities  of 
the  same  race  and  blood,  always  exercises  an  emascu 
lating  and  deteriorating  influence.  I  would  undertake, 
if  called  upon,  to  show  also  that  the  rule  is  invariable, 
—  that,  from  the  inherent  and  fundamental  conditions 
of  human  nature  it  has  known,  and  can  know,  no 
exceptions.  Of  this  history  affords  well-nigh  innum 
erable  examples,  —  ourselves  among  them.  In  our 
case,  it  required  a  century  to  do  away  in  our  minds 
and  hearts  with  our  colonial  traditions.  The  Civil 
War,  and  not  what  we  call  the  Revolution,  was  our 
real  war  of  Independence.  And  yet  in  our  depend 
ency  days  you  will  remember  we  were  not  emasculated 
into  a  resigned  and  even  cheerful  self -incapacity  as 
the  natural  result  of  a  kindly,  paternal  and  protec 
tive  policy ;  but,  as  Burke,  with  profound  insight, 
expressed  it,  with  us  the  spirit  of  independence  and 
self-support  was  fostered  "  through  a  wise  and  salutary 
neglect."  But,  for  present  purposes,  all  this  is  unne 
cessary,  and  could  lead  but  to  a  poor  display  of  common 
place  learning.  The  problem  to-day  engaging  the 
attention  of  the  American  people  is  more  limited.  It 
relates  solely  to  what  are  called  "  inferior  races ; " 
those  of  the  same  race,  or  of  cognate  races,  we  as  yet 
do  not  propose  to  hold  in  a  condition  of  permanent 
dependency ;  those  we  absorb,  or  assimilate.  Only 
those  of  "  inferior  race  "  —  the  less  developed  or  deca 
dent  —  do  we  propose  to  hold  in  subjection,  —  dealing 


326  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

with  them,  in  theory  at  least,  as  a  guardian  deals  with 
a  family  of  wards. 

My  proposition  then  broadens.  If  history  teaches 
anything  in  this  regard,  it  is  that  race  elevation,  the 
capacity  in  a  word  of  political  self-support,  cannot  be 
imparted  through  tutelage.  Moreover,  the  milder, 
the  more  paternal,  kindly  and  protective  the  guardian 
ship,  the  more  emasculating  it  will  prove.  A  "  wise 
and  salutary  neglect "  is  in  the  end  the  more  benefi 
cent  policy ;  for,  with  races  as  with  individuals,  a 
state  of  dependency  breeds  the  spirit  of  dependency. 
Take  Great  Britain,  for  instance.  That  people,— 
working  at  it  now  consecutively  through  three  whole 
centuries,  —  after  well-nigh  innumerable  experiences 
and  as  many  costly  blunders,  —  Great  Britain  has,  I 
say,  developed  a  genius  for  dealing  with  dependencies, 
—  for  the  government  of  "  inferior  races  ;  "  —  a  genius 
far  in  advance  of  anything  the  world  has  seen  before. 
Yet  my  contention  is  that,  to-day,  after  three  rounded 
centuries  of  British  rule,  the  Hindostanese, — the 
natives  of  India,  —  in  spite  of  all  material,  industrial 
and  educational  improvements,  —  roads,  schools,  jus 
tice  and  peace,  —  are  in  1900  less  capable  of  inde 
pendent  and  ordered  self-government  than  they  were 
in  the  year  1600,  —  the  year  when  the  East  India 
Company  was  incorporated  under  a  patent  of  Eliza 
beth.  The  native  Indian  dynasties  —  those  natural 
to  the  Hindoos  —  have  disappeared ;  accustomed  to 
foreign  rule,  the  people  have  no  rulers  of  their  own, 
nor  could  they  rule  themselves.  The  rule  of  aliens 
has  with  Hindostan  thus  become  a  domestic  necessity. 
Remove  it,  —  and  the  highest  and  most  recent  authori 
ties  declare  it  surely  will  some  day  be  removed,  — 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  327 

chaos  would  inevitably  ensue.  What  is  true  of  India 
is  true  of  Egypt.  That,  under  British  rule,  Egypt  is 
to-day  in  better  material  and  political  case  than  ever 
before  in  its  history  —  modern,  biblical,  hieroglyphic 
or  legendary  —  scarcely  admits  of  dispute.  Schools, 
roads,  irrigation,  law  and  order,  and  protection  from 
attack,  she  has  them  all ;  — 

"  But  what  avail  the  plough  or  sail, 
Or  land  or  life,  if  freedom  fail  ?  " 

The  capacity  for  self-government  is  not  acquired  in 
that  school. 

This  fact  is  to-day  more  than  ever  before  forcing 
itself  on  the  attention  and  engaging  the  an§ious  thought 
of  those  Englishmen  most  familiar  with  the  imperial 
system.  "  As  yet  there  is  no  sign  that  the  British  are 
accomplishing  [in  Hindostaii]  more  than  the  Romans 
accomplished  in  Britain,  that  they  will  spread  any 
permanently  successful  ideas,  or  that  they  will  found 
anything  whatever.  It  is  still  true  that  if  they  de 
parted,  or  were  driven  out,  they  would  leave  behind 
them,  as  the  Romans  did  in  Britain,  splendid  roads, 
many  useless  buildings,  an  increased  weakness  in  the 
subject  people,  and  a  memory  which  in  a  century  of 
new  events  would  be  extinct.  ...  So  far  as  one  can 
see,  not  a  European  idea,  not  a  European  habit,  not 
a  distinctively  European  branch  of  knowledge,  ever 
penetrated  into  Asia.  .  .  .  We  are  told  every  day  how 
Europe  has  influenced  Japan,  and  forget  that  the 
change  in  those  islands  was  entirely  self-generated, 
that  Europeans  did  not  teach  Japan,  but  that  Japan  of 
herself  chose  to  learn  from  Europe  methods  of  organi 
zation,  civil  and  military,  which  have  so  far  proved 
successful."  l 

1  Meredith  Townsend  :  Asia  and  Europe,  pp.  25,  27,  28. 


328  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

Such  is  the  recent  testimony  of  one  closely  observing 
Englishman,  the  larger  portion  of  whose  life  has  been 
passed  in  Asia.  Another  says,  to  the  same  effect, 
"  The  very  peace  and  security  which  a  great  Empire 
establishes  may  prove  a  deadening  influence.  ...  In 
India  peace  reigns  to-day,  and  order,  but  there  is  cer 
tainly  less  scope  for  the  Eastern  patriotism  of  race 
and  class,  less  romance  and  food  for  poetry,  less 
motive  for  heroic  self-sacrifice,  less  to  stir  the  heart 
and  imagination  of  Rajput  and  Sikh,  of  Mahratta  and 
Pathan,  than  there  was  in  those  years  of  glorious 
turbulence  in  the  breaking  up  of  the  Mogul  empire. 
British  rule  tends  to  destroy  native  originality,  vigor 
and  initiative.  How  to  replace  that  which  our  rule 
takes  away  is  the  great  Indian  problem."  l  Evidence 
on  this  head  might  be  accumulated  to  any  desired 
extent ;  and  yet  to-day  a  vague  idea,  almost  an  aspi 
ration,  is  floating  through  our  American  popular  mind 
that  a  single  generation  of  our  beneficent  rule  will 
suffice  to  convert  Malays  into  self-governing  commu 
nities  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  type. 

But  England,  in  its  own  two  thousand  years  of  his 
tory,  furnishes  an  example  of  what  I  have  been  assert 
ing,  —  an  example  well-nigh  forgotten.  In  funda 
mentals  human  nature  is  much  the  same  now  as  twenty 
centuries  back.  During  the  first  century  of  the  pre 
sent  era,  the  Romans,  acting  in  obedience  to  the  law 
laid  down  by  Mommsen,  —  the  law  quoted  by  me  in 
full,  and  of  which  Thomas  Carlyle  is  the  latest  and 
most  eloquent  exponent,  —  the  law  known  as  the 
Divine  Right  of  the  most  Masterful,  —  acting  in  obe 
dience  to  that  law,  the  Romans  in  the  year  of  Grace 

1  Bernard  Holland  :  Imperium  et  Libertas,  p.  12. 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION*  329 

43  crossed  the  British  Channel,  overthrew  the  Celts 
and  Gauls  gathered  in  defence  of  what  they  mistakenly 
deemed  their  own,  and,  after  reducing  them  to  sub 
jection,  permanently  occupied  the  land.  They  remained 
there  four  centuries  —  a  hundred  years  longer  than 
the  English  have  been  in  Calcutta.  During  that 
period  they  introduced  civilization,  established  Chris 
tianity,  constructed  roads,  dwellings  and  fortifications. 
Materially,  the  condition  of  the  country  vastly  im 
proved.  The  Romans  protected  the  inhabitants  against 
their  enemies  ;  also  against  themselves.  During  four 
hundred  years  they  benevolently  assimilated  them. 
Doubtless,  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber,  the  inhabitants 
of  what  is  now  England  were  deemed  incapable  of 
self-government.  Probably  they  were ;  unquestionably 
they  became  so.  When  the  legions  were  at  last  with 
drawn,  the  results  of  a  kindly  paternalism,  secure 
protection  and  intelligent  tutelage  became  apparent. 
The  race  was  wholly  emasculate.  It  cursed  its  inde 
pendence;  it  deplored  its  lost  dependency.  As  the 
English  historian  now  records  the  result,  "  crushing  all 
local  independence,  crushed  all  local  vigor.  Men  for 
got  how  to  fight  for  their  country  when  they  forgot 
how  to  govern  it."  1 

There  is  a  familiar  saying  to  the  effect  that,  while 
Man  is  always  in  a  hurry,  God  never  is.  Certainly, 
Nature  works  with  a  discouraging  indifference  to  time. 
Each  passing  generation  of  reformers  does  love  to 
witness  some  results  of  its  efforts ;  but,  in  the  case  of 
England,  in  consequence  of  the  emasculation  incident 
to  tutelage,  and  dependency  on  a  powerful,  a  bene 
volent  and  beneficent  foreign  rule,  after  that  rule 

1  Green :  Short  History  of  the  English  People,  vol.  i.  p.  9. 


330  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

ended,  —  as  soon  or  late  such  rule  always  must  end, 

—  throughout  the  lives  of  eighteen  successive  genera 
tions    emasculated    England  was  overrun.     At    last, 
with   some  half  dozen  intermediate  rulers,  the   Nor 
mans  succeeded  the  Romans.     They  were  conquering 
masters;    but    they  domesticated  themselves    in   the 
British  Islands,  and  in  time  assimilated  the  inhabit 
ants    thereof,  —  Britons,   Picts    and    Celts,  --  bene 
volently,  or  otherwise.     But,  as  nearly  as  the  historian 
can  fix  it,  it  required  eight  centuries  of  direst  tribu 
lation  to  educate  the  people  of  England  out  of  that 
spirit  of  self-distrust  and  dependency  into  which  they 
had  been  reduced   by  four  centuries   of  paternalism, 
at  once  Roman  and  temporarily  beneficent.     Twelve 
centuries  is  certainly  a  discouraging  term  to  which  to 
look  forward.     But   steam  and  electricity  have  since 
then  been  developed  to  a  manifest  quickening  of  re 
sults.     Even   the  pace  of   Nature  was  in    the  nine 
teenth  century  vastly  accelerated. 

Briefly  stated,  then,  the  historical  deduction  would 
seem  to  be  somewhat  as  follows  :  Where  a  race  has 
in  itself,  whether  implanted  there  by  nature  or  as  the 
result  of  education,  the  elevating  instinct  and  energy, 
-  the  capacity  of  mastership,  —  a  state  of  dependency 
will  tend  to  educate  that  capacity  out  of  existence ; 
and  the  more  beneficent,  paternal  and  protecting  the 
guardian  power  is,  the  more  pernicious  its  influence 
becomes.  In  such  cases,  the  course  most  beneficial 
in  the  end  to  the  dependency,  now  as  a  century  ago, 
would  be  that  characterized  by  "  a  .wise  and  salu 
tary  neglect."  Where,  however,  a  race  is  for  any 
cause  not  possessed  of  the  self-innate  saving  capacity, 

—  being  stationary  or  decadent,  —  a  state  of  depend- 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  331 

ency,  while  it  may  improve  material  conditions,  tends 
yet  further  to  deteriorate  the  spirit  and  to  diminish 
the  capacity  of  self-government :  if  severe,  it  brutal 
izes  ;  if  kindly,  it  enervates.  History  records  no  in 
stance  in  which  it  develops  and  strengthens. 

Following  yet  further  the  teachings  of  experience, 
we  are  thus  brought  to  a  parting  of  the  ways,  — 
a  parting  distinct,  unmistakable.  Heretofore  the  pol 
icy  of  the  United  States,  as  a  nationality,  has,  so  far 
as  the  so-called  inferior  races  are  concerned,  been 
confined  in  its  operation  to  the  North  American  con 
tinent  ;  but,  as  a  whole  and  in  its  large  aspects,  it  has 
been  well  defined  and  consistent.  We  have  proceeded 
on  the  theory  that  all  government  should  in  the  end 
rest  on  the  consent  of  the  governed ;  that  any  given 
people  is  competent  to  govern  itself  in  some  fashion  ; 
and  that,  in  the  long  run,  any  fashion  of  self-imposed 
government  works  better  results  than  will  probably 
be  worked  by  a  government  imposed  from  without. 
In  other  words,  the  American  theory  has  been  that, 
in  the  process  of  Nature  and  looking  to  ultimate,  per 
haps  remote,  conditions,  any  given  people,  not  admit 
ting  of  assimilation,  will  best  work  out  its  destiny 
when  left  free  to  work  it  out  in  its  own  way.  More 
over,  so  far  as  outside  influence  is  concerned,  it  could, 
in  the  grand  result,  be  more  effectively  exercised 
through  example  than  by  means  of  active  interven 
tion.  Where  we  have  not  therefore  forcibly  absorbed 
into  our  system  foreign  and  inferior  races  alien  in 
character  and  more  or  less  completely  assimilated 
them,  we  have,  up  to  very  recently,  adopted  and  ap 
plied  what  may  perhaps  in  homely  speech  best  be  de 
scribed  as  a  "  Hands- off  and  Walk-alone  "  doctrine, 


332  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

relying  in  our  policy  toward  others  on  the  theory 
practised  at  our  private  firesides,  —  the  theory  that 
self-government  results  from  example,  and  is  self- 
taught. 

I  have  already  quoted  Richard  Cobden  in  this  con 
nection  ;  I  will  quote  him  again.  Referring,  in  1864, 
to  the  British  foreign  policy,  then  by  him  as  by  us 
denounced,  though  by  us  now  imitated,  Cobden  said, 
—  "  I  maintain  that  a  man  is  best  doing  his  duty  at 
home  in  striving  to  extend  the  sphere  of  liberty  — 
commercial,  literary,  political,  religious,  and  in  all 
directions ;  for  if  he  is  working  for  liberty  at  home, 
he  is  working  for  the  advancement  of  the  principles  of 
liberty  all  over  the  world."  : 

Mexico  and  Hayti  afford  striking  illustrations  of  a 
long  and  rigid  adherence  to  this  policy  on  our  part, 
and  of  the  results  of  that  adherence.  Conquering  and 
dismembering  Mexico  in  1847,  we,  in  1848,  left  it 
to  its  own  devices.  So  completely  had  the  work  of 
subjugation  been  done  that  our  representatives  had 
actually  to  call  into  being  a  Mexican  government  with 
which  to  arrange  terms  of  peace.  With  that  simula 
crum  of  a  national  authority  we  made  a  solemn  treaty, 
and,  after  so  doing,  left  the  Aztec  land  to  work  out 
its  destiny,  if  it  could,  as  it  could.2  In  spite  of  numer 
ous  domestic  convulsions  and  much  internal  anarchy, 
from  that  day  to  this  we  have  neither  ourselves  inter 
vened  in  the  internal  affairs  of  our  southern  conti 
nental  neighbor,  nor  long  permitted  such  interference 
by  others.  To  Mexico,  we  have  said,  "  Walk  alone ;  " 

1  Speeches,  vol.  ii.  p.  353. 

2  See  the  very  suggestive  paper  entitled  "  The  Proposed  Absorp 
tion  of  Mexico  in  1847-1848,"  by  Professor  E.  G.  Bourne :  Essays  in 
Historical  Criticism,  pp.  227-242. 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  333 

to  France,  "  Hands  off."  The  result  we  all  know.  It 
has  gone  far  to  justify  our  theory  of  the  true  path  of 
human  advancement.  Forty  years  is,  in  matters  of 
race  development,  a  short  time.  A  period  much  too 
short  to  admit  of  drawing  positive,  or  final,  infer 
ences.  Dr.  Holmes  was  once  asked  by  an  anxious 
mother  when  the  education  of  a  child  should  begin ; 
his  prompt,  if  perhaps  unexpected,  reply  was,  —  "  Not 
less  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  years  before  it  is 
born."  To-day,  and  under  existing  conditions,  Mexico, 
though  republican  in  name  and  form  only,  is  self-gov 
erning  in  reality.  It  is  manifestly  working  its  pro 
blem  out  in  its  own  way.  The  statement  carries  with 
it  implications  hardly  consistent  with  the  Might-is- 
Right,  latter-day  dispensation  voiced  by  Mommsen 
and  Carlyle.  • 

Hayti  presents  another  case  in  point,  with  results 
far  more  trying  to  our  theory.  We  have  toward 
Hayti  pursued  exactly  the  policy  pursued  by  us  with 
Mexico.  Not  interfering  ourselves  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  island,  we  have  not  permitted  interfer 
ence  by  others.  Occupied  by  an  inferior  race,  appar 
ently  lapsing  steadily  toward  barbarism,  for  the  con 
dition  of  affairs  prevailing  in  Hayti  the  United  States 
is  morally  responsible.  Acting  on  the  law  laid  down 
in  the  extract  I  have  given  from  the  pages  of  Momrn- 
sen,  we  might  at  any  time  during  the  last  quarter  of 
a  century  have  intervened  in  the  name  of  humanity, 
and  to  the  great  temporary  advantage  of  the  inhabit 
ants  of  the  one  region  "  Where  Black  rules  White." 
The  United  States,  in  pursuance  of  its  theories,  has 
abstained  from  so  doing.  It  has  abstained  in  the  be 
lief  that,  in  the  long  run  and  grand  result,  the  inhabit- 


334  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

ants  of  Hayti  will  best  work  out  their  problem,  if  left 
to  work  it  out  themselves.  In  any  event,  however, 
exceptional  cases  are  the  rocks  on  which  sound  prin 
ciples  come  to  wreck ;  and,  so  far  as  the  race  of  man 
on  earth  is  concerned,  it  is  better  that  Hayti  should 
suffer  self-caused  misfortune  for  centuries,  as  did  Eng 
land  before,  than  that  a  precedent  should  be  created 
for  the  frequent  violation  of  a  great  principle  of  nat 
ural  development.  Yet  the  case  of  Hayti  is  crucial. 
Persistently  to  apply  our  policy  there  evinces,  it  must 
be  admitted,  a  robust  faith  in  the  wisdom  of  its  uni 
versal  application.  The  logical  inference,  so  far  as 
the  Philippine  Islands  are  concerned,  is  obvious. 

The  rule  guiding,  or  that  should  guide,  the  United 
States  in  its  dealings  with  alien  races,  probably  in 
ferior,  as  being  either  as  yet  undeveloped  or  else  in  a 
state  of  arrested  development,  is  simple.  The  capacity 
for  self-government,  and,  consequently,  the  consent  of 
the  governed,  should  be  assumed,  until,  as  the  result 
of  experience,  a  negative  is  proved ;  the  interference 
should  then  be  the  least  necessary  to  arrest  decay  or 
secure  stability.  The  assumption  should  ever  be  in 
favor  of  a  tendency  to  progressive  self -development. 
The  British  rule  is  the  reverse.  Incapacity  is  assumed, 
until  capacity  is  proved. 

Historically  speaking,  those  now  referred  to  are  the 
only  two  theories  of  a  national  policy  to  be  pursued  in 
dealing  with  practical  dependencies,  which  challenge 
consideration,  —  the  American  and  the  British.  The 
others,  whether  ancient  and  abandoned,  or  modern 
and  in  use,  —  Phoenician,  Roman,  Spanish,  French, 
Dutch,  German,  or  Russian,  —  may  be  dismissed  from 
the  discussion.  They  none  of  them  ever  did,  nor  do 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  335 

any  of  them  now,  look  to  an  altruistic  result.  In  all, 
the  dependency  is  confessedly  exploited  on  business 
principles,  with  an  eye  to  the  trade  development  of 
the  alien  proprietor.  Setting  these  aside,  there  re 
main  only  the  American,  or  "  Walk-alone  and  Hands- 
on0  "  theory  ;  and  the  British,  or  "  Ward-in-Chancery  " 
theory.  The  first  is  exemplified  in  Mexico  and  Hayti ; 
the  last  in  Hindostan  and  Egypt.  The  question  now 
in  debate  for  the  United  States  may,  therefore,  be 
concisely  stated,  thus :  Taking  the  Philippine  Islands 
as  a  subject  for  treatment,  and  the  ultimate  elevation 
of  the  inhabitants  of  those  islands  to  self-government 
as  the  end  in  view,  which  is  the  policy  best  calculated 
to  lead  to  the  result  desired,  —  the  traditional  and 
distinctively  American  system,  as  exemplified  in 
the  cases  of  Mexico  and  Hayti,  or  the  modern  and 
improved  British  system,  to  be  studied  in  Hindostan 
and  Egypt? 


Subject  to  limitations  of  time  and  space  I  have  now 
passed  in  review  the  great  political  debates  which  have 
occupied  the  attention  of  the  American  public  during 
the  last  half  century.  I  have  endeavored  to  call  at 
tention  to  the  plane  on  which  those  debates  have  been 
conducted,  and  to  the  noticeable  absence  from  them 
of  a  scholarly  spirit.  The  judicial  temper  and  the 
patience  necessary  to  any  thorough  investigation  have 
in  them,  I  submit,  been  conspicuously  lacking.  Then, 
starting  from  the  point  of  view  peculiar  to  this  Asso 
ciation,  I  have  examined  the.  issues  presented  to  the 
country  in  the  last  presidential  canvass,  and,  for  pur 
poses  of  illustration,  I  have  discussed  them,  always  in 
a  purely  historical  temper. 


336  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

While  the  result  of  my  experiment  is  for  others  to 
pass  upon,  my  own  judgment  is  clear  and  decided.  I 
hold  that  the  time  has  now  come  when  organizations 
such  as  this  of  ours,  instead  of,  as  heretofore,  scrupu 
lously  standing  aloof  from  the  political  debate,  are 
under  obligation  to  participate  in  it.  As  citizens,  we 
most  assuredly  should,  in  so  far  as  we  may  properly 
so  do,  contribute  to  results,  whether  immediate,  or 
more  or  less  remote.  As  scholars  and  students,  the 
conclusions  we  have  to  present  should  be  deserving  of 
thoughtful  consideration.  The  historical  point  of  view, 
moreover,  is,  politically,  an  important  point  of  view ; 
for  only  when  approached  historically  —  by  one  look 
ing  before,  as  well  as  after  —  can  any  issue  be  under 
stood  in  its  manifold  relations  with  a  complex  civili 
zation.  Indeed,  the  moral  point  of  view  can  in  its 
importance  alone  compare  with  the  historical.  The 
economical,  vital  as  it  unquestionably  often  is,  comes 
much  lower  in  the  scale ;  for,  while  an  approach 
through  both  these  avenues  is  not  infrequently  neces 
sary  to  the  intelligent  comprehension  of  questions  of 
a  certain  class,  —  such,  for  instance,  as  the  tariff  or 
currency,  —  it  is  very  noticeable  that,  though  many 
issues  present  themselves,  —  slavery  or  imperialism, 
for  example,  —  into  which  economical  considerations 
do  not  enter  as  controlling  factors,  there  is  scarcely 
any  matter  of  political  debate  which  does  not  to  some 
extent  at  least  have  to  be  discussed  historically.  Still, 
though  our  retrospect  has  proven  this  to  be  the  case, 
the  scarcely  less  significant  fact  also  appears  that  not 
more  than  one  presidential  canvass  in  two  involves 
any  real  issue  at  all,  —  moral  or  economical.  Of  the 
last  twelve  elections,  covering  the  half  century,  —  six 


AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION  337 

were  mere  struggles  for  political  control ;  and  so  far  as 
can  now  be  seen,  the  course  of  subsequent  events  would 
have  been  in  no  material  respect  other  than  it  was, 
whichever  party  prevailed.  Judging  by  experience, 
therefore,  in  only  one  future  canvass  out  of  two  will 
any  occasion  arise  for  a  careful  historical  presentation 
of  facts.  The  investigator  will  not  be  called  upon ; 
and,  if  he  rises  to  take  part  in  the  discussion,  he  will 
do  no  harm,  for  the  excellent  reason  that  no  one  will 
listen  to  him.  In  the  other  of  each  two  canvasses  it 
is  not  so.  There  is  then  apt  to  be  a  real  debate  over 
a  paramount  issue ;  and,  in  all  such,  the  strong  search 
light  of  experience  should  be  thrown,  clearly  and  fully, 
over  the  road  we  are  called  upon  to  traverse.  In 
every  such  case,  the  presentation,  provided  always  it 
be  made  in  the  true  historical  spirit,  should  by  no 
means  be  of  one  side  only.  On  the  contrary,  every 
phase  of  the  record  should  have  its  advocate ;  every 
plausible  lesson  should  be  drawn.  The  facts  are 
many,  complicated  and  open  to  a  varied  construction ; 
and  it  is  only  through  the  clash  of  opposing  views  that 
they  can  be  reduced  to  comparative  system,  and  com 
pelled  to  yield  their  lessons  for  guidance. 

As  I  have  also,  more  than  once  already,  observed, 
this  Association  is  largely  made  up  of  those  occupying 
the  chairs  of  instruction  in  our  seminaries  of  the 
higher  education.  From  their  lecture-rooms  the  dis 
cussion  of  current  political  issues  is  of  necessity  ex 
cluded.  There  it  is  manifestly  out  of  place.  Others 
here  are  scholars,  for  whom  no  place  exists  on  the 
political  platform.  Still  others  are  historical  inves 
tigators  and  writers,  interested  only  incidentally  in 
political  discussion.  Finally,  some  are  merely  public- 


338  AN  UNDEVELOPED  FUNCTION 

spirited  citizens,  on  whom  the  oratory  of  the  stump 
palls.  They  crave  discussion  of  another  order.  They 
are  the  men  whose  faces  are  seen  only  at  those  gather 
ings  which  some  one  eminent  for  thought  or  in  char 
acter  is  invited  to  address.  To  all  these,  the  suggestion 
I  now  make  cannot  but  be  grateful.  It  is  that,  in 
future,  this  Association,  as  such,  shall  so  arrange  its 
meetings  that  one  at  least  shall  be  held  in  the  month 
of  July  preceding  each  presidential  election.  The 
issues  of  that  election  will  then  have  been  presented, 
and  the  opposing  candidates  named.  It  should  be 
understood  that  the  meeting  is  held  for  the  purpose  of 
discussing  those  issues  from  the  historical  point  of 
view,  and  in  their  historical  connection.  Absolute 
freedom  of  debate  should  be  insisted  on,  and  the  par 
ticipation  of  those  best  qualified  to  deal  with  the 
particular  class  of  problems  under  discussion  should 
be  solicited.  Such  authorities,  speaking  from  so  lofty 
a  rostrum  to  a  select  audience  of  appreciative  men  and 
women,  could,  I  confidently  submit,  hardly  fail  to 
elevate  the  standard  of  discussion,  bringing  the  calm 
lessons  of  history  to  bear  on  the  angry  wrangles  and 
distorted  presentations  of  those  whose  chief,  if  not 
only,  aim  is  a  mere  party  supremacy. 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY1 

I  AM  to  contribute  to  this  occasion  a  paper  under 
the  title  of  "  A  Plea  for  Military  History."  To  this 
subject  I  have  already  —  more  than  six  months  ago  — 
elsewhere  alluded,  —  in  the  course  of  an  address  to  the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  on  taking  for  the 
fifth  time  the  chair  as  its  president. 

"  It  is  scarcely  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  there 
are  not  many  considerable  branches  of  human  know 
ledge  concerning  which  the  historian  of  the  future  must 
not  in  some  degree  inform  himself.  Somewhere  and 
somehow  his  researches  will  touch  upon  them,  remotely, 
perhaps,  but  still  as  factors  in  his  problem.  .  .  . 
Formerly  all  necessary  information,  it  was  supposed, 
could  be  acquired  from  books  ;  manuscripts  were  bet 
ter  yet,  for  those  were,  without  any  question,  what  are 
termed  '  original  sources.'  But  the  old-fashioned  his 
torian,  rarely,  if  ever,  hesitating,  flies  boldly  at  every 
kind  of  game  —  all  are  fish  that  come  to  his  net.  For 
instance,  history  is  largely  made  up  of  accounts  of 
operations  and  battles  on  land  and  on  sea.  Weary 
of  threading  his  way  through  a  long  period  of  most 
impicturesque  peace,  trying  to  make  that  interesting 

1  A  paper  read,  in  part,  at  the  Annual  Meeting1  of  the  American 
Historical  Association,  held  in  Boston,  December  28,  1899.  Printed 
in  the  Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association  for  1900, 
vol.  i.  pp.  193-218.  Revised  and  corrected. 


340         A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

which  was  at  best  commonplace,  the  historian  draws  a 
breath  of  relief  when  at  length  he  comes  to  a  tumult 
of  war.     Here  are  pride,  pomp,  and  circumstance,  — 
a  chance  for  descriptive  power. 

"  The  historian  of  the  future  seems  now  likely  to 
pursue  a  different  method.  Recognizing  the  fact  that 
he  probably  is  not  at  once  a  litterateur,  a  soldier,  a 
statesman,  a  lawyer,  a  theologian,  a  physician,  and  a 
biologist ;  that  he  certainly  will  not  live  forever  ;  that 
he  has  not  the  cosmogony  at  his  fingers'  ends,  and 
that  to  ransack  every  repository  of  information  on  all 
possible  subjects  transcends  the  powers  of  even  the 
most  industrious  ;  recognizing  in  this  degree  the  limits 
of  possibility,  he  will  be  content  to  avail  himself  of 
the  labors  of  others,  better  advised  on  many  subjects 
than  himself,  and,  becoming  the  student  of  mono 
graphs,  derive  the  great  body  of  his  information,  not, 
as  the  expression  now  goes,  from  '  original  sources,'  or 
even  from  personal  observation,  but,  as  we  all  in  the 
end  must,  at  secondhand.  His  insight  will  be  largely 
into  the  knowledge  and  judgment  of  others,  and  the 
degree  of  reliance  to  be  placed  in  them. 

"  I  know  of  but  one  writer  who  has  described  mili 
tary  operations  and  battles,  —  those  intricate  move 
ments  of  human  pawns  on  a  chessboard  of  much  topo 
graphical  uncertainty,  and  those  scientific  melees  in 
which  skill,  luck,  preparation,  superiority  of  weapons, 
human  endurance,  and  racial  characteristics  decide  the 
question  of  mastery  as  between  two  marshalled  mobs, 
—  I  know,  I  was  saying,  of  but  one  writer  who  has 
described  battles  and  military  operations  in  that  real 
istic  way  which  impresses  me  with  a  sense  of  both 
personal  experience  and  literary  skill.  That  one  is 


A   PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         341 

Tolstoi,  the  Russian  philosopher  and  novelist.  His 
Austerlitz  and  Russian  campaigns  of  Napoleon  and 
his  Sebastopol  are  masterpieces.  A  man  of  imagina 
tion  and  consummate  literary  capacity,  he  had  him 
self  served  ;  and,  curiously  enough,  in  the  same  way, 
his  compatriot,  Verestchagin,  has  put  upon  canvas  the 
sickening  realism  of  war  with  a  degree  of  force  which 
could  come  only  from  familiarity  with  the  cumbered 
field,  and  could  by  no  possibility  be  worked  up  in  the 
studio  through  the  study  of  photographs,  no  matter 
how  numerous,  or  the  perusal  of  the  accounts  '  from 
our  special  correspondent,'  no  matter  how  graphic  and 
detailed. 

"  I  once,  in  a  very  subordinate  capacity,  though  for 
a  considerable  period  of  time,  was  brought  into  close 
contact  with  warfare  and  saw  much  of  military  opera 
tions  from  within,  or,  as  I  may  say,  on  the  seamy 
side.  Since  then  I  have  read  in  books  of  history,  and 
other  works  more  avowedly  of  fiction,  many  accounts 
of  campaigns  and  battles  ;  and  in  so  doing  I  have 
been  most  deeply  impressed  with  the  audacity,  not  of 
soldiers,  but  of  authors.  Usually,  bookish  men  who 
had  passed  their  lives  in  libraries,  often  clergymen  — 
knowing  absolutely  nothing  of  the  principles  of  strategy 
or  of  the  details  of  camp  life  and  military  organiza 
tion,  never  having  seen  a  column  on  the  march,  or  a 
regiment  in  line,  or  heard  a  hostile  shot,  —  not  taking 
the  trouble  even  to  visit  the  scene  of  operations  or  to 
study  its  topography,  wholly  unacquainted  with  the 
national  characteristics  of  the  combatants,  —  these 
4  bookish  theoricks '  substitute  their  imaginings  for 
realities,  and  in  the  result  display  much  the  same  real 
acquaintance  with  the  subject  which  would  be  expected 


342         A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

from  a  physician  or  an  artist  who  undertook  to  treat 
of  difficult  problems  in  astronomy  or  mechanics.  They 
are  strongly  suggestive  of  the  good  Dr.  Goldsmith 
and  his  c  Animated  Nature.'  Once  or  twice  I  have 
had  occasion  to  follow  these  authorities,  —  authors  of 
standard  historical  works,  —  and  in  so  doing  have 
familiarized  myself  with  the  topography  of  the  scenes 
they  described,  and  worked  down,  as  best  I  could,  into 
the  characters  of  those  in  command,  and  what  are 
known  as  the  '  original  sources '  of  information  as  to 
their  plans  and  the  course  of  operations.  The  result 
has  uniformly  been  a  distinct  accession  of  historical 
scepticism."  1 

I  come  now  to  the  true  occasion  of  my  being  here 
to-day.  Having  a  year  ago  passed  this  general  cen 
sure  upon  "  bookish  theoricks,"  I  happily  bethought 
me  of  a  friend  of  a  lifetime  to  whom  it  was  possible 
what  I  had  said  might  be  assumed  to  apply.  I  refer 
to  the  late  John  Codman  Ropes.  I  therefore  added 
this  qualifying  sentence,  and  I  now  greatly  rejoice 
that  it  occurred  to  me  so  to  do ;  for  Mr.  Ropes  was 
present  when  I  spoke  the  words  I  have  quoted,  having 
done  me  the  compliment  that  day  to  leave  his  office 
that  he  might  listen  to  me.  The  qualifying  sentence 
was  as  follows  :  — 

"  That  among  men  of  the  closet  and  the  historical 
laboratory  are  to  be  found  military  students  of  pro 
found,  detailed  knowledge  and  great  critical  acumen, 
no  one  would  dispute  ;  least  of  all  we,  with  at  least 
one  brilliant  and  recognized  exemplar  in  our  own 

1  "  Historians  and  Historical  Societies,"  Proceedings  of  the  Massa 
chusetts  Historical  Society  (April,  1899),  Second  Series,  vol.  xiii.  pp. 
81-119. 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY        343 

ranks,  —  a  man  who  never  saw  an  army  in  movement 
or  a  stricken  field,  and  yet  whom  I  once  heard  referred 
to  by  one  who  had  borne  a  part  in  fifty  fights,  the 
general  then  commanding  our  army,  as  the  first  among 
living  military  critics." 

The  hearty  applause  with  which  the  audience  re 
ceived  these  words  showed  that  the  allusion  was  under 
stood,  and  Mr.  Kopes  did  not  fail,  later  on,  to  express 
the  gratification  the  incident  afforded  him.  Not  yet 
a  month  ago,  at  midnight  on  the  29th-30th  of  No 
vember  last,  he  died.  As  I  have  already  said,  the 
friendship  which  existed  between  us  was  almost  life 
long.  Nearly  fifty  years  ago  we  were  students  to 
gether  at  Harvard,  though  not  classmates,  and  my 
intimacy  with  him  and  my  feeling  of  high  regard  for 
him  had  increased  with  each  passing  year.  In  my 
existence  his  death  has  left  a  void  not  to  be  filled. 
That  is  a  small  matter  and  personal  only ;  but, 
so  far  as  the  study  of  military  history  is  concerned, 
especially  in  connection  with  our  Civil  War,  the  loss 
occasioned  by  his  death  is  scarcely  less  great.  The 
work  Mr.  Ropes  was  engaged  on  must  remain  un 
finished  ;  for  the  second  of  his  four  volumes  was  pub 
lished  less  than  a  year  ago,  and  of  the  third  volume 
the  beginning  only  had  been  prepared.  He  had 
brought  down  his  narrative  to  the  battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg  on  one  side  and  that  of  Murfreesboro  on  the 
other,  following,  as  he  did,  the  large  strategic  lines  of 
the  conflict  only,  and  paying  little  attention  to  those 
minor  operations,  almost  innumerable,  which  did  not 
greatly  affect  the  grand  result.  It  was  General  Scho- 
field,  then  commanding  the  armies  of  the  United 
States,  who,  in  a  conversation  I  had  with  him  more 


344         A   PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

than  ten  years  ago,  referred  to  Mr.  Kopes  in  the  Ian- 
guage  I  have  quoted,  as  the  first  of  living  military 
critics.  And  now,  standing  here  among  historical 
writers,  scholars  and  investigators,  speaking  over  the 
scarcely  closed  grave  of  the  man,  the  student  and  the 
friend,  I  bear  such  witness  as  I  may  to  the  fact  that 
in  my  judgment  General  Schofield  in  this  remark  was 
not  guilty  of  exaggeration.  And  further  let  me  add 
that,  in  my  judgment  also,  so  far  as  the  history  of  the 
great  struggle  hereafter  to  be  known  as  the  American 
Confederate  Rebellion  is  concerned,  the  death  of  Mr. 
Ropes,  leaving  his  work  unfinished,  is  to  the  highest 
class  of  historical  research  an  irreparable  loss.  As  a 
student  of  military  historical  problems  he  was,  so  far 
as  my  knowledge  of  such  goes,  almost  unique.  Com 
bined  with  a  sufficient  literary  skill,  he  had  a  grasp  of 
the  great  principles  of  strategy  which  could  hardly  be 
bettered.  His  knowledge  of  tactics,  and  of  the  details 
of  the  march  and  of  the  battlefield,  was  of  course 
defective.  He,  too,  had  never  seen  a  column  on  the 
road  or  a  battery  in  action.  Accordingly,  when  it 
came  to  this  portion  of  his  subject  he  could  not  speak 
as  a  man  can  speak  who  has  himself  shared  in  the 
prolonged  weariness  of  the  march  or  the  sharp  stress 
of  conflict.  He  knew  as  little  of  campaign  variety  as 
he  did  of  camp  tedium.  As  respects  all  these  elements 
of  warfare  —  and  they  have  much  to  do  with  the  evo 
lution  of  military  results ;  far  more  than  most  writers 
are  apt  to  realize  —  he  was  obliged  to  have  recourse 
to  his  imagination  ;  and,  while  imagination  is  in  good 
historical  writing  a  most  important  factor,  yet  when 
imagination  deals  with  topics  of  which  the  writer  has 
had  no  practical  experience,  it  is  a  dangerous  guide. 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         345 

Nevertheless,  allowing  for  these  limitations  under 
which  Mr.  Ropes  necessarily  labored,  I  am  free  to 
say  that,  in  my  estimation,  he  has  contributed  more 
than  any  other  one  writer  has  done,  or  any  other  one 
writer  is  likely  to  do,  to  a  correct  historical  under 
standing  of  the  great  military  operations  and  strategic 
results  of  the  first  two  years  of  the  Rebellion.  I  felt, 
therefore,  that  it  would  not  have  been  well  had  this 
meeting  of  the  American  Historical  Association  gone 
by,  the  first  held  since  his  death,  without  bearing  in 
its  record  something  indicative  of  the  high  appreciation 
in  which  he  and  his  work  are  by  us  held.  But  for 
that  feeling  I  should  not  trespass  on  your  patience  to 
day.  I  am  well  aware  that  our  president  has  already 
fittingly  forestalled  me  in  this  grateful  task,  and  that 
mine  is  but  a  concurrent  testimony  on  a  subject  con 
cerning  which  little  new  remains  to  be  said.  That 
little,  however,  is  very  appropriate  to  my  theme,  for  it 
would  not  be  possible  on  this  occasion  to  enter  "  A 
Plea  for  Military  History,"  and  not  to  feel  that  in 
doing  so  the  name  and  thought  of  our  best  exponent 
of  "  military  history  "  —  he  who,  in  fact,  had  with  us 
identified  himself  with  it  —  at  once  suggested  them 
selves.  In  all  that  our  president  has  said  of  Mr.  Ropes 
I  concur,  and  to  it  I  have  sought  to  add  what  I  might. 
Having  thus  rendered  my  tribute,  I  recur  to  my 
allotted  theme,  and  I  propose  to  illustrate  the  criti 
cism  I  last  spring  ventured  upon  by  references  to  a  few 
of  the  great  military  operations  which  have  left  dis 
tinct  marks  upon  American  history ;  and,  in  so  doing, 
I  shall  endeavor  to  point  out  how  inadequately  they 
have  been  treated,  having,  as  a  rule,  been  treated  by 
investigators  who  failed  to  combine  technical  know- 


346         A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

ledge  and  a  professional  experience  with  literary  skill. 
Indeed,  among  writers  who  have  undertaken  to  deal 
with  problems  of  this  class  we  number  in  the  whole 
record  of  the  United  States,  so  far  as  I  know,  but 
one  striking  instance  to  whom  this  criticism  plainly 
fails  to  apply,  and  that  exceptional  instance  is  outside 
the  field  of  military  operations.  Captain  Mahan  has 
recently  shown  us  what  naval  history  becomes  when 
handled  by  one  who  had  himself  sailed  the  ocean  and 
had  thoroughly  familiarized  himself  with  maritime 
conditions.  In  this  I  think  all  will  agree.  His  work 
constitutes,  indeed,  a  veritable  addition  to  naval  his 
torical  lore.  It  marks  a  new  departure  ;  and  it  does 
so  for  the  simple  reason  that  he  did  combine  the  two 
qualities  I  have  referred  to,  —  literary  skill  with  pro 
fessional  knowledge.  I  think  it  hardly  less  safe  to 
say  that,  so  far  as  strictly  military  operations  are  con 
cerned,  no  similar  American  writer  has  yet  come  for 
ward.  These  operations,  past  and  present,  recent  and 
remote,  have  been  very  copiously  described  and  almost 
lovingly,  as  altogether  too  patriotically,  dwelt  upon  ; 
they  have  been  analyzed  on  paper,  and  fought  over  in 
print  more  than  enough,  but  it  has  been  either  by 
military  men  who  failed  to  possess  Captain  Mahan's 
literary  gift,  or  by  literary  men  who  had  not  shared  in 
his  professional  work.  The  result,  except  in  the  case 
of  Mr.  Kopes,  has  been  an  inadequate  and  more  or 
less  unsatisfactory  treatment,  and  even  his  conclusions 
are  to  a  degree  affected  by  his  lack  of  that  persona] 
observation  and  familiarity  bred  of  contact  which  was 
an  essential  element  in  the  success  of  Captain  Mahan. 
As  Gibbon,  referring  to  his  own  experience,  observed 
in  a  well-remembered  passage  of  his  autobiography, 


A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY        347 

"  The  captain  of  the  Hampshire  Grenadiers  has  not 
been  useless  to  the  historian  of  the  Roman  Empire." 

Coming  to  my  first  illustration,  I  propose  to  sub 
mit  a  few  words  concerning  what  was  the  most  memo 
rable  incident  in  American  military  annals  prior  to 
the  struggle  we  know  as  the  Revolution,  more  pro 
perly  called  the  War  of  American  Independence.  I 
refer,  of  course,  to  Wolfe's  capture  of  Quebec.  It  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  the  fall  of  Quebec  led  to 
results  which  have  affected  the  whole  subsequent 
history  of  the  American  continent  and  of  civilization. 
Though  not  included  in  his  selection  by  Professor 
Creasey,  the  short  struggle  on  the  Plains  of  Abraham 
must,  therefore,  unquestionably  be  classed  among  the 
decisive  battles  of  the  world. 

In  common  with  every  boy  who  was  taught  in  an 
American  school  during  the  first  half  of  the  century, 
the  story  of  Wolfe's  victory  and  death  had  been 
familiar  to  me  from  childhood.  None  the  less,  though 
I  believe  I  have  been  in  every  other  considerable  city 
on  the  North  American  continent,  with  the  exception, 
possibly,  of  Vera  Cruz,  Quebec  had  until  last  summer 
unaccountably  escaped  me.  Putting  a  copy  of  Park- 
man's  Montcalm  and  Wolfe  in  my  bag,  I  went 
there  in  September  last ;  and,  while  there,  of  course 
examined  with  no  little  interest  the  scene  of  the  great 
exploit  in  that  work  described.  The  defects  in  Park- 
man's  narrative,  when  studied  on  the  spot,  became  at 
once  apparent.  Written  by  a  scholar  who  spared  no 
pains  in  preparation,  the  result  yet  showed  on  its 
face  that  it  was  the  work  of  one  who  had  never  him 
self  participated  in  military  operations.  It  was  defi 
cient  in  precision ;  inferences  were  not  drawn ;  tech- 


348         A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

nical   expressions    were    incorrectly  used;    it   lacked 
firmness  of  touch. 

I  was,  in  the  first  place,  much  surprised  on  examin 
ing  the  ground  over  which  Wolfe's  force  reached  the 
Plains  of  Abraham.  All  my  preconceptions,  derived 
from  tradition  and  confirmed  by  Parkman's  narrative, 
were  at  variance  with  the  actual  topography.  From 
the  descriptions,  I  had  assumed  that  the  path  by  which 
Wolfe's  forces  made  their  ascent  was  narrow  and  very 
steep,  winding  along  the  face  of  the  cliff,  and  one  by 
which  men  could  go  up  only  in  single  file,  or  at  most 
by  twos ;  or,  as  I  have  seen  it  described  within  a  few 
days  in  the  report  of  a  discourse  delivered  here  in 
Boston,  it  was  an  "  ascent  up  precipitous  cliffs,  by 
means  of  overhanging  boughs  and  projecting  crags."  1 
On  examination,  I  found  it  quite  another  thing.  In 
1759  the  legendary  "narrow  path"  must  have  been, 

1  "  He  [Wolfe]  was  the  first  to  leap  on  shore  and  to  scale  the  narrow 
path  where  no  two  men  could  go  abreast.  His  men  followed,  pulling 
themselves  to  the  top  by  the  help  of  bushes  and  the  crags."  (Green : 
A  Short  History  of  the  English  People,  vol.  iii.  p.  1655.)  There  has 
been  no  more  careful  and  contained  British  historian  than  J.  R.  Green. 
His  name  can  never  be  mentioned  otherwise  than  with  respect.  But 
Green  had  no  military  experience,  and  this  quotation  from  his  work 
illustrates  the  difficulties  under  which  merely  bookish  men  write. 
There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Wolfe  "  was  the  first  to  leap 
ashore."  In  practical  warfare,  the  General  in  command  does  not  act 
as  a  boatman  holding  a  painter,  or  fending  off  with  an  oar.  He  was 
not  the  first  "to  scale  the  narrow  path."  There  was  no  "narrow 
path,"  and  he,  very  properly  and  in  accordance  with  the  necessities 
of  actual  field  service,  immediately  sent  a  reconnoitring  party  up  the 
gorge  to  secure  the  outlet  at  its  summit.  He  followed,  in  his  proper 
place,  with  the  main  command.  The  men  of  the  main  command  did 
not  "  pull  themselves  to  the  top  by  the  help  of  bushes  and  the  crags," 
but  tramped  up  in  tolerably  solid  column,  and  deployed  in  the  regu 
lar  way  when  they  debouched  at  the  summit.  The  accounts  given  by 
Lord  Mahon  and  in  Knight's  Popular  History  of  England  are  open  to 
similar  criticisms. 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         349 

as  it  now  is,  up  an  acclivity,  steep,  it  is  true,  but 
not  difficult,  and  nowhere  narrow.  A  somewhat  pre 
cipitous  gorge,  it  then  was,  as  it  still  is,  wide  and  well 
wooded,  —  a  bit  of  rough  hillside  breaking  a  palisade, 
up  which  any  group  of  athletic  young  men  could  in 
ten  minutes  easily  clamber.  Especially  would  this  be 
true  of  Scotch  Highlanders,  of  whom  Wolfe's  command 
was  largely  made  up. 

It  is  here,  and  in  connection  with  this  legendary 
scaling  of  the  heights,  that  the  technical  deficiencies 
of  Parkman's  narrative  become  apparent.  Though  he 
had  himself,  unquestionably,  time  and  again  gone  over 
the  ground,  yet  his  account  fails,  as  that  of  no  trained 
military  historian  would  have  failed,  to  give  the  exact 
time  of  the  ascent.  His  narrative  is  indeed  on  this 
important  point  exasperatingly  vague.  He  says: 
"  Towards  two  o'clock  the  boats  cast  off  and  fell  down 
with  the  current."  He  then  adds  that  "  for  full  two 
hours  the  procession  of  boats  steered  silently  down  the 
St.  Lawrence."  It  must,  therefore,  have  been  four 
o'clock  in  the  morning  when  the  landing  was  effected, 
and  a  small  scaling  party  climbed  the  heights,  "  closely 
followed  by  a  much  larger  party."  Meeting  with  no 
resistance,  those  in  the  advance,  the  escaladers,  sur 
prised,  and  captured  or  routed,  a  small  French  out 
post  at  the  head  of  the  ravine.  Its  commanding 
officer  was  in  bed,  and,  wounded  while  trying  to  es 
cape,  was  taken  prisoner.  The  shots  and  shouts  of 
those  composing  the  scaling  party  notified  their  com 
rades  below  of  their  success,  and  the  advance  of  the 
main  body  was  at  once  ordered.  Apparently  this 
could  not  have  really  begun  until  4.30  at  least;  and 
yet  before  6  o'clock  5000  men  were  in  line  of  battle 


350         A   PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

on  the  Plains  of  Abraham.  Before  9  o'clock,  more 
over,  they  had  also  hauled  up  by  hand  at  least  two 
pieces  of  artillery,  besides  more  or  less  camp  equipage. 
These  facts  speak  for  themselves.  Any  one  who  has 
ever  participated  in  military  movements  knows  that 
for  5000  men,  carrying  their  arms,  ammunition,  knap 
sacks  and  rations,  to  scale  a  steep  ascent  of  at  least 
half  a  mile  in  the  short  space  of  ninety  minutes, 
they  must  have  been  able  to  swarm  up,  not  in  file, 
nor  by  twos  and  threes,  but  in  a  tolerably  solid  mass. 
No  one,  viewing  the  locality,  would  seek  to  detract 
from  Wolfe's  achievement,  —  daring  in  conception,  it 
was  firmly  executed.  Throughout,  it  showed  the  hand 
of  a  true  soldier.1  But  that  is  not  in  question.  The 
point  is  that  it  was  a  boldly  desperate,  rather  than  a 
physically  difficult,  undertaking.  Like  the  night  as 
sault  of  any  place  rendered  by  nature  or  art  hard  of 
access,  the  success  of  the  attempt  was  purely  a  matter 
of  surprise  and  defence  ;  and  at  Quebec,  the  surprise 

1  The  last  word  in  the  Quebec  campaign  of  1759  is  to  be  found  in 
the  recently  published  volume  of  Colonel  Townshend,  The  Military 
Life  of  Field-Marshal  George,  First  Marquess  Townshend,  1724-1807 
(pp.  142-251).  From  this  it  appears  that  the  famous  operation,  which 
resulted  in  the  fall  of  Quebec,  was  not  designed  by  Wolfe,  but  was 
adopted  by  him,  contrary  to  his  own  judgment,  on  the  formal  recom 
mendation  of  his  subordinates  in  command.  From  a  purely  military 
point  of  view,  this  should  not  detract  from  Wolfe's  fame.  He  was 
then  a  very  sick  man,  probably  dying ;  a  physical  wreck,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  fatigues  and  anxieties  he  had  undergone.  None  the 
less,  so  to  speak,  game  to  the  last,  he,  by  adoption,  made  the  plan  his 
own,  and  carried  it  out  with  spirit  and  determination.  He  then  had 
the  great  good  fortune  to  be  killed  in  the  hour  of  victory.  The  pro 
blem  of  the  Quebec  campaign  was,  on  a  very  small  scale,  the  same  as 
that  which  confronted  Grant  in  his  Vicksburg  campaign,  more  than 
a  century  later.  It  was  solved  by  precisely  the  same  strategic  move 
ment.  Grant's  campaign  was,  however,  of  a  far  higher  and  more 
difficult  strategic  order  than  Wolfe's  venturesome  escalade. 


A   PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         351 

of  the  defenders  being  perfect,  the  ascent  presented 
no  great  obstacle.  It  was  neither  narrow  nor  pre 
cipitous,  as  was  proved  by  the  fact  that  within  two 
hours  artillery  and  munitions  were  dragged  up,  fol 
lowing  5000  men.  Provided,  therefore,  the  much- 
discussed  gorge  was  undefended,  as  was  the  case, 
Wolfe's  famous  escalade  was  a  by  no  means  unprece 
dented  military  operation.  Even  had  the  gorge  been 
defended,  and  by  a  fairly  adequate  force,  the  very 
steepness  of  the  ascent,  as  any  experienced  military 
authority  would  appreciate,  and  as  we  repeatedly 
found  in  our  Civil  War,  would  have  enabled  those 
composing  the  attacking  party  to  scale  the  cliff  with  no 
great  degree  of  personal  danger.  The  enemy  from 
far  above  would  almost  inevitably  have  fired  over  the 
heads  of  their  assailants.  In  such  case,  the  resistance 
to  be  effective  must  be  determined  and  by  an  ade 
quate  force ;  a  force,  moreover,  which  does  not  await 
attack  at  the  summit,  but  stubbornly  contests  every 
foot  of  ground  from  bottom  to  top. 

Having  now  got  Wolfe,  with  5000  men  in  battle 
array,  upon  the  Plains  of  Abraham,  only  ninety 
minutes  after  leaving  their  boats,  the  thing  which 
next  bewildered  me  was  why  Montcalnl  played  into 
his  opponent's  hands  as  he  did,  by  hastily  attacking 
him  the  next  morning,  —  risking  the  fate  of  Quebec 
and  of  Canada,  not  upon  the  result  of  protracted  mil 
itary  operations,  but  on  the  cast  of  sudden  battle. 
What  in  Montcalm's  mind  led  to  this  decision  ? 
Here  again  the  judgment  of  the  skilful  military  his 
torian  would  be  of  great  value.  On  the  face  of  things, 
I  was  unable,  as  I  stood  on  the  Plains  of  Abraham,  to 
see  how  Wolfe  had  greatly  bettered  his  situation  by 


352         A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

getting  there  instead  of  remaining  in  his  camp  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river,  provided  always  his  opponent 
availed  himself  to  the  uttermost  of  his  advantages. 
The  escalade  was  effected  on  the  morning  of  Septem 
ber  13.  Three  days  before,  on  the  10th,  the  uneasy 
British  naval  commanders  had  held  a  council,  and 
decided  that  the  lateness  of  the  season  required  the 
fleet  to  leave  the  St.  Lawrence  without  delay.  Among 
the  experienced  French  authorities  some  would  hardly 
allow  their  opponents  a  week  longer  of  campaigning 
weather,  while  Montcalm  conceded  them  only  a  month. 
It  was  merely  a  question  of  a  few  days  more  or  a  few 
days  less,  and  the  French  could  count  on  the  Cana 
dian  winter  as  a  grim  and  irresistible  ally,  just  as 
surely  as  did  the  Russians  half  a  century  later.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  British  fleet,  delaying  to  the  last 
moment  in  view  of  the  success  of  Wolfe's  operations, 
did  not  leave  Quebec  until  "  it  was  past  the  middle  of 
October,"  as  Parkman  again  expresses  it,  about  five 
weeks  after  the  escalade.  It  was,  therefore,  a  ques 
tion  of  prolonging  the  defence  that  amount  of  time 
only. 

When  the  breaking  of  an  equinoctial  day  revealed 
Wolfe  securely  planted  on  the  heights  west  of  Quebec, 
the  outlook  for  him  was,  consequently,  far  from  clear. 
It  is  true  he  had  with  him  a  force  of  5000  very  reli 
able  troops,  drawn  up  within  striking  distance  of  the 
land-side  defences  of  Quebec ;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
provided  he  was  not  attacked  by  the  covering  army, 
the  lateness  of  the  season  left  one  course,  and  one  only, 
open  to  him.  He  must  endeavor  to  storm  those  de 
fences.  And  not  only  must  he  endeavor  to  storm  for 
tifications  in  his  front,  but,  in  so  doing,  he  must  prepare 


A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         353 

to  be  attacked  both  on  his  flank  and  rear  by  an  enemy 
who,  when  his  detachments  were  all  concentrated,  num 
bered  nearly  double  his  own  force,  though  greatly  in 
ferior  to  it  in  fighting  qualities  on  an  open  field.  Thus, 
without  any  sufficient  artillery,  Wolfe  was  confronted 
with  the  difficult  problem  of  immediately  capturing  a 
stronghold,  while  subject  to  attack  by  a  numerous 
covering  force,  much  better  supplied  than  he  with 
artillery.  So  far  as  I  can  yet  see,  the  only  thing  his 
opponent  had  to  do  was  to  wait  until  Wolfe  began  his 
necessary  assault.  It  would  have  involved  for  him 
great  risk. 

Under  these  circumstances,  why  did  Montcalm  decide 
to  take  the  immediate  initiative  ?  Without  artillery, 
without  even  waiting  until  his  entire  force  had  been 
concentrated,  he  made  a  noisy,  futile  rush  at  the  Brit 
ish,  as  if  for  him  there  was  no  other  course  open.  Yet 
his  so  doing  was  exactly  what  Wolfe  must  most  have 
hoped  for.  The  result  we  all  know.  On  this  most 
interesting  point,  however,  Parkman  is  curiously  vague. 
He  is  even  contradictory  ;  thus  betraying  the  lack  of 
professional  insight.  At  first  he  says  of  Montcalm, 
when  the  French  commander  saw  the  English  army  in 
line  of  battle  behind  Quebec,  —  "  He  could  not  choose. 
Fight  he  must,  for  Wolfe  was  now  in  position  to  cut 
off  all  his  supplies "  (p.  293).  Leaving  the  immi 
nence  of  winter  out  of  consideration,  this  is,  in  a  way, 
plausible  ;  but  a  little  farther  on  Parkman  says  of 
Montcalm's  immediate  successor  in  command  of  the 
beaten  Canadian  army :  —  "  There  was  no  need  to 
fight  at  once.  .  .  .  By  a  march  of  a  few  miles  he  could 
have  [concentrated  the  covering  force],  and  by  then 
intrenching  himself  he  would  have  placed  a  greatly 


354         A   PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

superior  force  in  the  English  rear,  where  his  position 
might  have  been  made  impregnable.  Here  he  might 
be  easily  furnished  with  provisions,  and  from  hence 
he  could  readily  throw  men  and  supplies  into  Quebec, 
which  the  English  were  too  few  to  invest "  (p.  306). 
If  this  was  the  situation  the  day  after  Montcalm  suf 
fered  defeat,  why  was  it  that  officer  had  "  no  choice  " 
but  to  fight  at  once,  thirty-six  hours  before  ? 

Parkman  fails  to  tell  us. 

To  supply  the  tantalizing  omission,  even  were  I  com 
petent  so  to  do,  is  no  part  of  my  present  plan.  The 
omission  amounts,  none  the  less,  in  itself,  to  a  "  Plea 
for  Military  History  ;  "  for  I  submit  that  a  trained 
military  historian,  after  a  careful  examination  of  the 
locality  and  every  record  of  the  battle,  could  form 
a  presumably  correct  estimate  of  the  considerations 
which  acted  on  Montcalm,  and  thus  caused  France 
the  loss  of  the  key  to  a  continent. 

Coming  now  to  a  later  period  and  events  nearer 
home,  I  propose  to  illustrate  my  thesis  by  a  brief  refer 
ence  to  four  battles  in  our  own  history,  two  from  the 
War  of  Independence  and  two  from  that  of  1812-15, 
-  the  engagements  at  Bunker  Hill  and  Long  Island 
in  the  one  case,  and  those  of  Bladensburg  and  New 
Orleans  in  the  other.  None  of  these  incidents  in  our 
history  have,  so  far  as  I  know,  been  treated  by  any 
writer  competent  to  handle  them  from  a  distinctively 
military  point  of  view,  as,  for  instance,  Captain  Mahan 
has  handled  the  naval  operations  of  Nelson. 

Recurring  to  Bunker  Hill,  the  mistakes  and  con 
troversies  which  have  arisen  among  historians  and 
critics  in  regard  to  that  engagement  have  well-nigh 
partaken  of  the  ludicrous.  There  has,  in  the  first 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         355 

place,  been  an  almost  endless  discussion  as  to  who  was 
in  command,  —  a  discussion  which  would  have  caused 
no  man  of  military  training  a  moment's  pause.  It  has 
been  elaborately  contended  that  General  Putnam  must 
have  been  in  command,  because  he  was  the  officer  of 
the  highest  grade  upon  the  ground,  obviously  outrank 
ing  Colonel  Prescott.  The  proposition  is  simply  absurd, 
as  being  contrary  to  the  first  and  elementary  principles 
of  military  subordination.  General  Putnam  was,  it  is 
true,  on  the  ground  ;  but  he  was  on  the  ground  as  an 
officer  having  a  Connecticut  commission  only,  and  in 
command  of  a  detachment  from  that  province.  He 
held  no  commission  from  Massachusetts,  much  less  any 
Continental  commission.  Colonel  Prescott,  command 
ing  a  Massachusetts  regiment,  had  received  his  orders 
from  his  military  superior,  Major-General  Ward, 
an  officer  also  in  the  Massachusetts  service.  Ward 
thus  was  Prescott's  superior  officer  ;  Putnam  was  not. 
During  the  operations  which  ensued,  it  was  open  for 
Putnam  to  make  to  Prescott  any  suggestion  he  saw 
fit ;  and  Prescott,  acting  always  on  his  own  responsi 
bility,  might  give  to  such  suggestions  the  degree  of 
weight  he  deemed  proper  ;  but  he  could  report  only 
to  his  superior  in  the  same  service  as  himself,  —  his 
military  commander.  Prescott,  therefore,  showed  per 
fectly  well  that  he  knew  what  he  was  about  when  he 
offered  the  command  to  Warren,  who  had  been  com 
missioned  by  the  Massachusetts  authorities  as  a  major- 
general,  when  Warren  appeared  upon  the  field.  War 
ren,  very  properly,  declined  the  command,  remaining 
purely  as  a  volunteer.  But,  so  far  as  Putnam  was 
concerned,  he  was  in  command  merely  of  such  Connect 
icut  troops  as  were  cooperating  with  the  Massachusetts 


356         A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

detachment ;  and  for  a  Massachusetts  officer  to  have 
received  an  order  as  such  from  him  would  have  sub 
jected  that  officer  to  a  court-martial.  All  this  is  ele 
mentary,  —  the  very  alphabet  of  the  military  organiza 
tion,  —  and  yet  the  lay  historians  who  have  written 
upon  that  battle  have  contended  over  the  question  for 
years. 

The  extraordinarily  bad  tactics  of  both  sides  in  the 
affair  of  Bunker  Hill  I  have  dealt  with  elsewhere,1  — 
the  opportunity  which  the  British  lost,  the  accidental 
advantage  which  the  Americans  gained.  Luck,  com 
bined  with  good  marksmanship,  on  the  one  side,  and 
blundering,  bull-headed  persistence  on  the  other,  were 
the  predominating  elements  of  the  occasion  ;  and  to 
those  features  of  it  the  historians  have  given  scant 
consideration.  The  cause  of  American  independence 
owed  much  that  day  to  Yankee  pluck  and  straight 
shooting ;  but  more  yet  to  genuine  British  bulldog 
stupidity.  The  race  learns  slowly.  Its  representa 
tives  then  did  just  what  they  have  recently  attempted 
in  South  Africa. 

Nevertheless,  the  effect  of  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill 
upon  that  on  Long  Island  fourteen  months  later  is, 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  interesting  and  very 
worthy  of  study.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the 
experience  of  the  earlier  absolutely  changed  the  fate 
of  the  subsequent  day ;  and,  on  the  17th  of  June,  1775, 
Colonel  Prescott  not  only  saved  from  destruction  Gen 
eral  Washington  and  the  American  army  on  the  27th 
of  August,  1776,  but  he  saved  the  cause  of  American 
independence  itself.  Sir  William  Howe  commanded 
at  Bunker  Hill ;  he  also  commanded  at  Long  Island. 

1  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  i.  pp.  401-413  ;  April,  1896. 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         357 

Upon  the  latter  field  of  operations  his  movements, 
though  slow,  were  skilfully  planned  and  well  carried 
out.  For  a  wonder,  he  had  recourse  to  a  flanking 
movement,  which  was  successfully  executed  by  Clin 
ton  ;  and,  as  the  result  of  it,  Howe  found  himself  in 
the  early  hours  of  that  August  day  in  an  admirable 
position  to  deliver  an  assault,  with  the  chances  at 
least  four  out  of  five  in  his  favor.  But  the  bloody 
experience  at  Bunker  Hill  was  fresh  in  his  mind ; 
and  so,  having  his  enemy  completely  in  his  grasp,  he 
hesitated.  He  allowed  his  opponent  to  elude  him; 
and  that  opponent  chanced  to  be  Washington. 

When,  some  years  ago,  I  had  occasion  to  make  a 
study  of  operations  about  New  York  in  August,  1776, 
I  was  amazed  at  the  mistakes,  from  a  military  point 
of  view,  of  which  Washington  was  then  guilty.  Even 
more  amazing,  however,  was  the  partisanship  of  the 
American  historians.  In  their  unwillingness  to  see  any 
blemish  in  the  career  of  Washington,  their  narratives 
amounted  to  little  less  than  a  falsification  of  history, 
—  a  literary  misdemeanor,  not  to  say  crime,  for  which 
the  only  plea  in  justification  possible  for  them  to  enter 
would  be  lack  of  technical  knowledge.  Suppressing 
incontrovertible  facts,  they  gave  credence  to  absurd 
stories.  So  much  was  I  at  the  time  surprised  at  the 
conclusions  to  which  I  found  myself  compelled  that  I 
took  my  narrative  in  the  manuscript  to  Mr.  Ropes,  told 
him  of  my  perplexity,  and  asked  him  to  read  my  paper 
and  give  me  the  benefit  of  an  outspoken  criticism.  I 
found  him  singularly  well  informed  on  the  subject  in 
a  general  way,  and  he  readily  assumed  the  task.  A 
few  days  later  he  returned  me  my  manuscript  with 
an  emphatic  written  indorsement  of  the  conclusions  I 


358         A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

had  reached.  Subsequently  the  paper  was  printed  in 
the  American  Historical  Review^  and  may  there  be 
consulted. 

Time  and  space  do  not  permit  of  my  now  entering 
again  upon  this  subject,  nor  would  it  be  worth  your 
or  my  while  were  I  so  to  do.  Suffice  it  to  say  that 
during  the  latter  part  of  August,  1776,  Washington 
appears  to  have  disregarded  almost  every  known  prin 
ciple  of  strategy  or  rule  of  tactics,  some  of  them  in  a 
way  almost  grotesque.  For  instance,  while  lying  on 
Long  and  Manhattan  islands  awaiting  the  sluggish 
movements  of  Howe,  a  body  of  Connecticut  cavalry 
appeared,  volunteering  their  services.  Substantial, 
well-mounted  men,  they  were  some  400  in  num 
ber.  Washington  declined  to  accept  their  services 
as  mounted  men,  on  the  extraordinary  ground  that 
operations  being  then  conducted  on  islands,  there 
could  be  no  occasion  for  cavalry.  Men,  however, 
were  greatly  needed,  and  he  suggested  that  members 
of  the  troop  should  send  back  their  horses,  and  agree 
to  serve  as  infantry.  When  they  declined  so  to  do, 
he  roughly  dismissed  them.  In  reaching  this  decision 
it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  Washington  betrayed  a 
truly  singular  ignorance  of  what  cannot  be  regarded 
otherwise  than  as  the  elementary  principles  of  military 
movements.  It  was  true  the  operations  then  in  hand 
were  necessarily  conducted  on  islands ;  but,  as  it  sub 
sequently  appeared,  the  American  army  did  not  have 
the  necessary  mounted  men  to  do  orderly  and  courier 
duty.  More  than  that,  the  disaster  of  the  27th  of 
August  on  Long  Island,  involving,  as  it  did,  the  need 
less  destruction  of  the  very  flower  of  the  American 
1  Vol.  i.  pp.  050-670 ;  July,  1896. 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         359 

army,  was  wholly  due  to  the  lack  of  a  small  mounted 
force.  There  were  on  that  occasion  three  roads  which 
led  from  Gravesend,  whence  the  British  began  their 
movement,  to  Brooklyn,  where  Washington  was  in 
trenched.  We  will  call  these  the  eastern,  the  middle, 
and  the  western  roads.  Of  these  three  roads,  two,  the 
western  and  the  middle,  the  Americans  had  occupied 
in  force.  The  eastern  road  they  wholly  neglected. 
It  was  assumed,  apparently,  that  the  enemy  would 
never  go  so  far  out  of  the  direct  way.  There  is 
unquestionably  a  well-developed  propensity  in  British 
commanders  to  butt  their  own  heads  and  those  of 
their  soldiers  directly  against  any  obstacle  their  ene 
mies  may  see  fit  to  put  in  their  front.  They  can 
generally  be  counted  on  so  to  do.  Unfortunately  for 
the  American  army,  it  so  chanced,  as  I  have  already 
said,  that  for  once  a  flanking  movement  suggested 
itself  to  some  one  in  the  British  army  at  Gravesend, 
probably  not  Sir  William  Howe.  Accordingly,  hav 
ing  reconnoitred  their  front,  a  British  division,  under 
the  command  of  Clinton,  made  a  night  move  on  Brook 
lyn  by  the  easternmost  of  the  three  roads.  That  road, 
under  any  known  rules  of  warfare,  even  the  most 
elementary,  should  have  been  picketed,  and  watched 
by  a  mounted  patrol.  Twenty-five  men  would  have 
sufficed  ;  fifty  would  have  been  ample.  Four  hundred 
men  could  have  picketed  the  whole  of  Washington's 
front,  and,  holding  the  enemy  in  check,  have  given 
ample  notice  of  his  approach.  To  neglect  such  an 
obvious  precaution  was  so  unpardonable  as  not  to 
admit  of  explanation.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  road 
in  question  was  left  not  only  uncovered,  but  it  was 
not  even  observed.  The  American  army  had  no  cav- 


360         A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

airy,  its  commander  having  sent  the  mounted  men 
offered  him  home  on  the  curiously  suggestive  ground 
that  they  could  be  of  no  possible  service,  as  on  islands 
"horses  cannot  be  brought  into  action."  By  this 
unconsciously  innocent  remark  the  trained  military 
expert  learns  that,  at  the  time  it  was  made,  Washing 
ton  had  no  conception  of  the  duties  and  functions  of 
a  mounted  force  in  connection  with  any  extended 
military  operations ;  and,  accordingly,  the  fact,  not 
otherwise  comprehensible,  is  explained  that  during  the 
short  summer  night  of  August  26-27,  1776,  Clinton 
moved  forward  not  only  unopposed  but  actually  un 
observed,  until,  in  the  early  morning,  he  had  got  him 
self  between  the  defences  at  Brooklyn  and  the  right 
wing  of  Washington's  army  under  Stirling  and  Sulli 
van,  thrown  forward  to  cover  the  western  and  the 
middle  roads.  As  a  result,  that  whole  wing  of  the 
army,  its  flower,  was  crushed  between  Howe,  ad 
vancing  directly  from  Gravesend,  and  Clinton,  who, 
by  a  slightly  circuitous  night  march  to  the  eastward, 
had  got  in  its  rear.  The  disaster  was,  as  I  have  said, 
wholly  due  to  the  lack  of  cavalry  on  Long  Island,  and 
a  consequent  defective  outpost  service.  Yet  these 
facts,  so  pregnant  with  both  inferences  and  conse 
quences,  are  not  even  alluded  to  by  any  general  his 
torian  of  the  operations.  The  writers  of  so-called 
history  did  not  in  their  turn  realize  the  functions  of 
cavalry  in  warfare,  or  observe  that  the  American  army 
in  and  before  New  York  had  no  mounted  service, 
or  why  it  had  none.  The  disaster  of  August  27  on 
Long  Island  just  failed  to  bring  irretrievable  ruin  on 
the  cause  of  American  independence.  Even  as  it  was, 
gravely  compromising  Washington,  its  influence  was 


A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         361 

perceptible  on  the  whole  course  of  military  operations 
during  the  succeeding  three  years.  To  Washington 
it  was  a  lesson  from  which  he  learned  much.  Thence 
forth  he  adopted  Fabian  tactics. 

Turning  now  to  the  war  of  1812-15,  the  influence 
of  the  battle  of  Bladensburg,  and  the  consequent  cap 
ture  of  the  city  of  Washington,  is  not  less  apparent  in 
the  operations  which  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  Paken- 
ham  before  New  Orleans  and  the  failure  of  the  British 
expedition  against  Louisiana  than  was  the  sharp  lesson 
of  Bunker  Hill  in  Howe's  cautious  movement  against 
the  American  lines  at  Brooklyn.  The  affair  at  Bla 
densburg  occurred  on  the  24th  of  August ;  the  assault 
on  Jackson's  lines  before  New  Orleans  was  delivered 
on  the  8th  of  January  following.  Those  engagements, 
and  the  tactics  pursued  in  them,  are,  moreover,  of 
peculiar  interest  just  at  this  time  in  connection  with 
what  is  taking  place  in  South  Africa.  A  recurrence 
to  the  events  of  eighty-five  years  ago  will  show  how 
very  tenacious  are  military  traditions,  with  the  British 
at  least,  and  how  racial  characteristics  assert  them 
selves,  no  matter  how  much  conditions  change,  and  in 
spite  of  experience.  It  also,  if  taken  in  connection 
with  the  other  and  earlier  operations  I  have  referred 
to,  illustrates  very  curiously  the  slight  degree  of  reli 
ance  which  can  be  placed  on  the  fundamental  rules  of 
strategy  when  it  comes  to  their  practical  application. 
They  are,  in  fact,  about  as  dangerous  to  apply  as  they 
are  to  disregard ;  for,  when  all  is  done  and  written, 
in  warfare  almost  everything  depends  on  the  character 
of  the  man  at  the  head  —  on  his  insight  into  the  real 
facts  of  the  situation,  including  the  topography  of  the 
country,  and  the  quality  of  the  material  at  his  com- 


362         A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

mand  and  of  that  opposed  to  him.  The  really  great 
military  commander,  as  in  the  case  of  Napoleon  in  his 
earlier  days,  effects  his  results  quite  as  much  by  ig 
noring  all  recognized  rules  and  principles  as  by  acting 
in  obedience  to  them.  New  Orleans  was  a  case  in 
point.  At  New  Orleans,  Jackson  had  no  right  to 
succeed ;  Pakenham  had  no  excuse  for  failure.  The 
last  brought  defeat  on  his  army,  and  lost  his  own 
life,  while  proceeding  in  the  way  of  tradition  and  in 
obedience  to  accepted  principles  of  strategy ;  the  for 
mer  achieved  a  brilliant  success  by  taking  risks  from 
which  any  reasonably  cautious  commander  would  have 
recoiled. 

In  the  first  place,  however,  to  understand  the  why 
and  the  wherefore  of  what  took  place  at  New  Orleans 
eighty-five  years  ago  in  January,  it  is  necessary  to 
recall  to  mind  what  occurred  at  Bladensburg  and  in 
Washington  eighty-five  years  ago  last  August.  The 
general  in  command  of  the  British  army  had  been 
changed,  for  Ross  was  killed  before  Baltimore,  and 
Pakenham,  fresh  from  the  battlefields  of  the  Penin 
sula,  had  succeeded  him ;  but  the  regiments  which 
had  simply,  with  a  volley,  a  shout  and  a  rush,  walked 
over  the  American  line  at  Bladensburg,  all  took  part 
in  the  attempt  to  walk  over  a  similar  line  before  New 
Orleans.  The  tactics,  if  such  they  deserve  to  be  called, 
were  the  same  in  each  case  —  those  of  the  football 
field.  In  other  words,  at  Bladensburg  the  British 
officers,  proceeding  in  conformity  with  their  simple 
traditions  and  good  old  rules,  endeavored  to  do,  and 
succeeded  in  doing,  exactly  what  they  intended  to  do 
and  failed  in  doing  at  Bunker  Hill;  that  is,  they 
marched  directly  up  in  front  of  the  defending  force, 


A   PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         363 

carried  the  position  with  little  loss,  routed  their  oppo 
nents,  and  then,  as  a  matter  of  course  in  the  case  of 
Washington,  captured  the  city  those  opponents  were 
there  to  cover.  The  proceeding  was  perfectly  simple, 

-  very  much,  in  fact,  what  we  have  seen  recently  in 
the  Philippines,  —  a  body  of  superior  troops  carrying 
by  front  assault  weakly  defended  defensive  points,  and 
this  with  insignificant  loss  to  themselves.  At  both 
Bladensburg  and  New  Orleans  the  attempt  indicated 
an  overweening  self-confidence  in  the  attacking  party, 
due  to  a  dangerous  contempt  for  their  opponents. 
The  veterans  of  Wellington's  Peninsular  campaigns 
had  to  do  with  raw  American  levies.  They  regarded 
them  very  much  as  our  own  volunteers  have  recently 
regarded  the  Filipinos. 

Thus  New  Orleans  was  the  sequel  of  Bladensburg ; 
it  goes  far  also  to  explain  the  recent  battle  on  the 
Tugela.  Thirty-four  years  after  New  Orleans,  Charles 
James  Napier,  brother  of  the  historian  of  the  Penin 
sular  war,  writing  in  a  reminiscent  mood  of  the  Span 
ish  battle  of  Busaco,  said  of  Pakenham,  —  and  he 
and  Pakenham  had  both  been  wounded  at  Busaco, 

—  "  Poor  fellow !  He  was  a  heroic  man,  that  Edward 
Pakenham,  and  it  was  a  thousand  pities  he  died  in 
defeat ;  it  was  not  his  fault,  that  defeat."  This 
may  possibly  be,  and  Napier  was  unquestionably  a 
high  authority  on  such  a  point.  None  the  less  there 
is  a  large  class  of  military  commanders  commonly 
known  in  camp  parlance  as  "  butt-heads,"  and  it  is 
not  at  once  apparent  why  Major-General  Sir  Edward 
Pakenham  should  not  be  included  therein.1  James 

1  See,  also,  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society^ 
Second  Series,  vol.  xiii.  pp.  412-423. 


364         A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

Parton  was,  by  birth,  English,  and  in  his  life  of  Jack 
son  —  one  of  the  most  picturesque  and  vivid  biogra 
phies,  be  it  said,  in  the  language  —  Parton  speaks 
thus  of  Pakenham,  using  forty  years  ago  language 
curiously  applicable  to  operations  in  South  Africa 
eighty-five  years  after  those  I  am  criticising :  "  The 
British  service  seems  to  develop  every  high  and  noble 
quality  of  man  and  soldier  except  generalship.  Up  to 
the  hour  when  the  British  soldier  holds  an  independ 
ent  command,  he  is  the  most  assured  and  competent 
of  men.  Give  him  a  plain,  unconditional  order,— 
'  Go  and  do  that ! '  —  and  he  will  go  and  do  it  with 
a  cool,  self-forgetting  pertinacity  of  daring  that  can 
scarcely  be  too  much  admired.  All  of  the  man  below 
the  eyebrows  is  perfect.  The  stout  heart,  the  high 
purpose,  the  dextrous  hand,  the  enduring  frame,  are 
his.  But  the  work  of  a  general  in  command  demands 
head  —  a  cool,  calculating  head,  fertile  in  expedients  ; 
a  head  that  is  the  controlling  power  of  the  man.  And 
this  article  of  head,  which  is  the  rarest  production  of 
nature  everywhere,  is  one  which  the  brave  British 
soldier  is  apt  to  be  signally  wanting  in ;  and  never  so 
much  so  as  when  responsibility  rests  upon  him."  For 
the  intelligent  student  of  military  operations  it  is  not 
any  easier  now  than  it  was  for  Parton  half  a  century 
ago  to  advance  any  sufficient  reasons  for  the  tactics 
pursued  by  the  British  commander  when,  on  the  8th 
of  January,  1815,  he  went  to  his  own  death  while 
thrusting  his  storming  columns  against  breastworks 
bristling  with  artillery  and  swarming  with  riflemen. 
It  was  simply  the  wanton  throwing  away  of  life  to 
accomplish  a  result  which  could  have  been  accom 
plished  in  another  and  more  scientific  way  absolutely 


A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         365 

without  loss ;  for  New  Orleans  was  then  within  the 
easy  grasp  of  the  British. 

Had  Pakenham,  as  he  perfectly  well  could  have 
done,  passed  a  division  of  his  army  over  to  the  west 
ern  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  and  then  threatened  New 
Orleans  from  that  side  of  the  river,  operating  upon 
Jackson's  flank  and  rear,  Jackson  would  have  had  no 
choice  but  to  vacate  his  lines  and  allow  New  Orleans 
to  fall.  This,  when  too  late,  Jackson  himself  perfectly 
appreciated  ;  but  the  British  commander  preferred  the 
desperate  chance  of  an  assault.  The  recollection  of 
Bladensburg  lured  him  to  destruction. 

In  reading  the  literature  of  that  campaign,  it  is  curi 
ous  to  come  across  the  footprints  of  this  fact.  Paken 
ham  joined  the  army  before  New  Orleans  on  the  morn 
ing  of  Christmas-day,  1814,  only  two  weeks  before 
the  battle.  The  English  had  then  already  met  with 
much  stiffer  resistance  than  they  had  anticipated,  and 
those  whom  Pakenham  relieved  of  command  recog 
nized  the  difficulty  of  the  problem  before  them  to  solve. 
Nevertheless,  as  the  reinforcements  the  new  com- 
mander-in-chief  brought  with  him  stepped  on  shore, 
not  a  few  of  them  expressed  their  fears  lest  they 
should  be  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  advance,  as 
they  thought  New  Orleans  would  be  captured  before 
they  could  get  into  line.  On  the  7th  of  January,  the 
day  before  the  fight,  as  one  of  the  Bladensburg  regi 
ments  was  somewhat  sulkily  moving  to  the  rear  for 
the  less  valued  service  across  the  river,  several  of  its 
officers  grumbled  in  passing,  a  new  arrival  wrote,  that 
"  it  would  be  now  our  turn  to  get  into  New  Or 
leans,  as  they  had  done  at  Washington."  Among 
those  who  had  been  at  "Washington,  not  one  had  been 


366         A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

more  conspicuous  than  Admiral  Cochrane,  as,  a  naval 
officer,  mounted  on  a  brood  mare,  white,  uiicurried, 
with  a  black  foal  trotting  by  her  side,  he  rode  around 
personally  superintending  the  work  of  destruction. 
And  now,  when  the  brave  and  unfortunate  Pakenham 
hesitated  in  face  of  the  obstacles  in  front  of  him, 
Cochrane,  so  the  story  goes,  egged  him  on  with  a 
taunt,  telling  him,  with  Bladensburg  fresh  in  mind, 
that  "  if  the  army  could  not  take  those  mud-banks, 
defended  by  ragged  militia,  he  would  do  it  with  2000 
sailors,  armed  only  with  cutlasses  and  pistols." 

On  the  other  hand,  Jackson  on  this  occasion  evinced 
one  of  the  highest  and  rarest  attributes  of  a  great 
commander ;  he  read  correctly  the  mind  of  his  oppo 
nent  —  divined  his  course  of  action.  The  British  com 
mander,  not  wholly  impervious  to  reason,  had  planned 
a  diversion  to  the  west  bank  of  the  river,  with  a  view 
to  enfilading  Jackson's  lines,  and  so  aiding  the  pro 
posed  assault  in  front.  As  this  movement  assumed' 
shape,  it  naturally  caused  Jackson  much  anxiety.  All 
depended  on  its  magnitude.  If  it  was  the  operation 
in  chief  of  the  British  army,  New  Orleans  could  hardly 
be  saved.  Enfiladed,  and  threatened  in  his  rear,  Jack 
son  must  fall  back.  If,  however,  it  was  only  a  diver 
sion  in  favor  of  a  main  assault  planned  on  his  front, 
the  movement  across  the  river  might  be  checked,  or 
prove  immaterial.  As  the  thing  developed  during 
the  night  preceding  the  battle,  Commodore  Patterson, 
who  commanded  the  American  naval  contingent  on 
the  river,  became  alarmed,  and  hurried  a  despatch 
across  to  Jackson,  advising  him  of  what  was  taking 
place,  and  begging  immediate  reinforcement.  At  one 
o'clock  in  the  morning  the  messenger  roused  Jackson 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         367 

from  sleep,  stating  his  errand.  Jackson  listened  to  the 
despatch,  and  at  once  said  :  —  "  Hurry  back  and  tell 
Commodore  Patterson  that  he  is  mistaken.  The  main 
attack  will  be  on  this  side,  and  I  have  no  men  to  spare. 
General  Morgan  must  maintain  his  position  at  all  haz 
ards."  To  use  a  vernacular  but  expressive  term,  Jack 
son  had  "sized"  Pakenham  correctly,  —  the  British 
commander  could  be  depended  on  not  to  do  what  a 
true  insight  would  have  dictated,  and  the  occasion 
called  for.  He  would  not  throw  the  main  body  of  his 
army  across  the  river  and  move  on  his  objective  point 
by  a  practically  undefended  road,  merely  holding  his 
enemy  in  check  on  the  east  bank.  Had  he  done  so, 
he  would  have  acted  in  disregard  of  that  first  princi 
ple  both  of  tactics  and  strategy  which  forbids  the 
division  of  a  force  in  presence  of  an  enemy  in  such  a 
way  that  the  two  parts  are  not  in  position  to  support 
each  other  ;  but,  not  the  less  for  that,  he  would  have 
taken  New  Orleans.  An  attack  in  front  was,  on  the 
contrary,  in  accordance  with  British  military  tradi 
tions,  and  the  recent  experience  of  Bladensburg.  He 
acted,  accordingly,  as  Jackson  was  satisfied  he  would 
act.  In  his  main  assault  he  sacrificed  his  army  and 
lost  his  own  life,  sustaining  an  almost  unexampled 
defeat ;  while  his  partial  movement  across  the  river 
was  completely  successful,  so  far  as  it  was  pressed, 
opening  wide  the  road  to  New  Orleans.  A  mere 
diversion,  or  auxiliary  operation,  it  was  not  persisted 
in,  the  principal  attack  having  failed. 

Possibly  it  might  by  some  now  be  argued  that,  had 
Pakenham  thus  weakened  his  force  on  the  east  side  of 
the  river  by  operating,  in  the  way  suggested,  on  New 
Orleans  and  Jackson's  flank  and  rear  on  its  west  side, 


368         A   PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

a  vigorous,  fighting  opponent,  such  as  Jackson  unques 
tionably  was,  might  have  turned  the  tables  on  him 
for  thus  violating  an  elementary  rule  of  warfare  — 
the  very  rule,  by  the  way,  so  dangerously  ignored  by 
Washington  at  Brooklyn.  Leaving  his  lines  and 
boldly  taking  the  aggressive,  Jackson,  it  will  then  be 
argued,  might  have  overwhelmed  the  British  force  in 
his  front,  thus  cutting  the  column  operating  west  of 
the  river  from  the  fleet  and  its  base  of  supplies  —  in 
fact,  destroying  the  expedition.  Not  improbably 
Pakenham  argued  in  this  way ;  if  he  did,  however,  he 
simply  demonstrated  his  incompetence  for  high  com 
mand.  Failing  to  grasp  the  situation,  he  put  a  wrong 
estimate  on  its  conditions.  It  is  the  part  of  a  skilful 
commander  to  know  when  to  secure  results  by  making 
exceptions  to  even  the  most  general  and  the  soundest 
rules.  Pakenham  at  New  Orleans  had  under  his  com 
mand  a  force  much  larger,  in  fact  nearly  double  that 
confronting  him.  While,  moreover,  his  soldiers  were 
veterans,  the  Americans  were  hardly  more  than  raw 
recruits ;  but,  like  the  Boers  of  to-day,  they  had  in 
them  good  material,  and  were  individually  accustomed 
to  handling  rifles.  As  one  of  the  best  of  Jackson's 
brigadiers,  General  Adair,  afterwards  expressed  it,  — 
"  Our  men  were  militia  without  discipline,  and  if  once 
beaten,  they  could  not  be  relied  on  again."  They 
were,  in  fact,  of  exactly  the  same  temper  and  stuff  as 
those  who  were  stampeded  by  a  volley  and  a  shout  at 
Bladensburg;  and  the  principle  of  military  morale 
thus  stated  by  General  Adair  was  that  learned  by 
Washington  on  Long  Island.  Troops  of  a  certain 
class,  when  once  beaten,  cannot  be  relied  on  again. 
They  are  not  seasoned  soldiers.  The  force  Pakenham 


f    UNI  Y    ] 


A   PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         369 

had  under  his  command  before  New  Orleans  was, 
on  the  other  hand,  composed  of  seasoned  soldiers  of 
the  best  class.  In  the  open  field,  and  on  anything 
approaching  equality  of  position,  he  had  absolutely 
nothing  to  fear.  He  might  safely  provoke  attack  ;  in 
deed,  all  he  ought  to  have  asked  was  to  tempt  Jackson 
out  from  behind  his  breastworks  on  almost  any  terms. 
So  fully,  moreover,  did  he  realize  all  this  that  it  in 
spired  him  to  his  assault.  It  is  useless,  therefore,  to 
suggest  that  he  hesitated  to  divide  his  command,  over 
estimating  Jackson's  numbers  and  aggressive  capacity. 
Had  he  done  so,  he  would  hardly  have  ventured  to 
assail  Jackson  in  front.  On  the  contrary,  Pakenham's 
trouble  lay  not  in  overestimating,  but  in  underesti 
mating  his  adversary.  He  failed  to  operate  on  what 
were  correct  principles  for  the  conditions  which  con 
fronted  him,  not  because  he  was  afraid  so  to  do,  but 
because  he  did  not  grasp  the  situation. 

In  case,  then,  dividing  his  command,  Pakenham  had 
thrown  one  half  of  it  across  the  river  to  assail  New 
Orleans  in  force,  so  turning  Jackson's  rear,  and  then 
with  the  other  half  held  his  position  on  the  east  bank, 
keeping  open  his  communications  with  the  British  fleet, 
the  only  possible  way  in  which  Jackson  could  have 
taken  advantage  of  the  situation  would  have  been  by 
leaving  his  lines,  and  attacking. 

Now,  it  so  happens  that  resisting  attack  under  just 
such  circumstances  is  the  position  in  which  the  British 
soldier  has  always  developed  his  best  staying  qualities. 
Quebec  was  a  case  directly  in  point.  Again,  the  men 
under  Pakenham  before  New  Orleans  were  even  more 
reliable  than  those  who  only  five  months  later  at 
Waterloo,  after  the  auxiliary  troops  had  been  swept 


370         A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

from  the  field  by  the  fury  of  the  French  attack,  held 
their  position  from  noon  to  a  June  sunset  against  an 
assaulting  force  of  nearly  twice  their  number  com 
manded  by  the  Emperor  himself.  Indeed,  the  tena 
city  of  the  English  infantry  under  such  circumstances 
is  well  known,  —  it  is  even  now  receiving  new  illustra 
tion.  But  concerning  it  there  is  a  statement  of  the 
French  marshal  Bugeaud  which  is  so  curious,  and 
which  bears  upon  its  face  such  evidence  that  it  was 
written  by  a  military  man  of  practical  experience,  that 
I  cannot  refrain  from  quoting  it.  It  is  not  the  utter 
ance  of  a  "  bookish  theorick,"  but  of  one  who  knew  of 
that  whereof  he  spoke.  Marshal  Bugeaud,  in  making 
this  statement,  referred  not  to  Waterloo,  but  to  the 
operations  in  the  Peninsular  war,  —  that  school  in 
which  the  soldiers  under  Pakenham  had  learned  their 
business.  What  he  says  reveals,  moreover,  a  curious 
insight  into  the  characteristics  of  the  French  and  Eng 
lish  infantry :  — 

"  The  English  generally  occupied  well-chosen  defen 
sive  positions,  having  a  certain  command,  and  they 
showed  only  a  portion  of  their  force.  The  usual  artil 
lery  action  first  took  place.  Soon,  in  great  haste, 
without  studying  the  position,  without  taking  time  to 
examine  if  there  were  means  to  make  a  flank  attack, 
we  marched  straight  on,  taking  the  bull  by  the  horns. 
About  one  thousand  yards  from  the  English  line  the 
men  became  excited,  spoke  to  one  another,  and  hurried 
their  march  ;  the  column  began  to  be  a  little  confused. 

"  The  English  remained  quite  silent,  with  ordered 
arms,  and  from  their  steadiness  appeared  to  be  a  long 
red  wall.  This  steadiness  invariably  produced  an 
effect  on  the  young  soldiers. 


A  PLEA   FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         371 

"  Very  soon  we  got  nearer,  shouting,  *  Vive  1'Em- 
pereur,  en  avant !  a  la  bayonette ! '  Shakos  were 
raised  on  the  muzzles  of  the  muskets ;  the  column 
began  to  double,  the  ranks  got  into  confusion,  the 
agitation  produced  a  tumult  ;  shots  were  fired  as  we 
advanced. 

"  The  English  line  remained  still,  silent  and  im 
movable,  with  ordered  arms,  even  when  we  were  only 
three  hundred  paces  distant,  and  it  appeared  to  ignore 
the  storm  about  to  break. 

"  The  contrast  was  striking ;  in  our  inmost  thoughts 
each  felt  that  the  enemy  was  a  long  time  in  firing, 
and  that  this  fire,  reserved  for  so  long,  would  be  very 
unpleasant  when  it  did  come.  Our  ardor  cooled. 
The  moral  power  of  steadiness,  which  nothing  shakes 
(even  if  it  be  only  in  appearance)  over  disorder  which 
stupefies  itself  with  noise,  overcame  our  minds.  At 
this  moment  of  intense  excitement  the  English  wall 
shouldered  arms,  an  indescribable  feeling  rooted  many 
of  our  men  to  the  ground  — they  began  to  fire.  The 
enemy's  steady  concentrated  volleys  swept  our  ranks ; 
decimated,  we  turned  round,  seeking  to  recover  our 
equilibrium ;  then  three  deafening  cheers  broke  the 
silence  of  our  opponents ;  at  the  third  they  were  on 
us,  pushing  our  disorganized  flight.  But,  to  our  great 
surprise,  they  did  not  push  their  advantage  beyond  a 
hundred  yards,  retiring  calmly  to  their  lines  to  await 
a  second  attack." 

Those  thus  vividly  described  by  an  hereditary  race 
opponent,  who  had  himself  confronted  them,  were  the 
identical  men  Jackson  would  have  had  to  attack  on 
their  own  ground  had  fye  found  himself  compelled  on 
the  8th  of  January  to  leave  his  lines  and  assume  the 


372         A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

aggressive,  as  the  only  possible  alternative  to  a  pre 
cipitate  retreat  and  the  abandonment  of  New  Orleans. 
Certainly,  that  day  Andrew  Jackson  was  under  great 
obligations  to  Edward  Pakenham. 

I  have  referred  to  Washington's  operations  on 
Long  Island  and  the  short  Bladensburg  campaign  as 
interesting  military  studies  in  connection  with  New 
Orleans,  or  as  directly  influencing  the  course  of  events 
there.  But  there  is  another  and  far  more  memorable 
and  momentous  American  campaign  which  is  deserv 
ing  of  mention  in  the  same  connection.  I  refer  to 
our  own  army  movements  on  the  Mississippi  nearly 
half  a  century  later.  I  have  in  this  paper  contended 
that  at  New  Orleans  one  half  of  the  British  force 
there  assembled  would  have  been  fully  equal  to  hold 
ing  its  own  against  an  assault  in  front  from  any  force 
Jackson  could  have  brought  against  it.  Pakenham's 
flank  operations  in  front  of  New  Orleans  could,  there 
fore,  in  1815  have  been  conducted  with  quite  as  much 
safety  as  were  those  of  Grant  before  Yicksburg  in 
May  and  June,  1863.  In  fact,  the  positions  in  the 
two  cases  were  much  the  same.  Like  Pakenham  at 
New  Orleans,  Sherman,  it  will  be  remembered,  before 
Grant's  flanking  operations  began,  assailed  the  works 
at  Vicksburg  in  front,  meeting  with  a  disastrous  re 
pulse.  Subsequently,  Grant  devised  his  brilliant,  sci 
entific  movement  by  Grand  Gulf  and  the  Big  Black, 
crossing  the  Mississippi  twice  and  taking  his  oppo 
nents  in  the  rear,  exactly  as  Pakenham  could  have 
done  from  below  New  Orleans,  though  on  a  much 
larger  scale  and  incurring  far  greater  risks.  He  thus 
forced  Pemberton  to  come  out  from  behind  his  works, 
to  take  the  chance  of  even  tattle,  in  order  to  pre- 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         373 

serve  his  line  of  communication.  He  then  whipped 
him. 

And  this  brings  us  face  to  face  with  what  is,  after 
all,  the  fundamental  condition  behind  all  principles 
and  theories  of  warfare,  the  individuality  and  tactical 
or  strategic  aptitudes  —  for  they  are  very  different 
things  —  of  commanders.  It  was  the  Confederate 

O 

general  Forrest,  I  believe,  one  of  the  born  fighters 
developed  in  our  Civil  War,  who  defined  strategy  as 
the  art  in  warfare  of  "  getting  there  first  with  most 
men."  The  definition  is  rather  general ;  but  in  it 
there  is  much  native  shrewdness,  and,  moreover,  it 
smacks  strongly  of  practical  experience.  Grant  illus 
trated  its  truth  in  one  way  in  1863,  just  as  poor  Pak- 
enham  illustrated  its  obverse  in  1815.  The  trouble, 
however,  with  most  books  of  so-called  history  is  that 
the  industrious,  but,  as  a  rule,  quite  inexperienced, 
writers  thereof,  fail  conspicuously  to  get  at  what  may 
be  called,  for  want  of  a  better  term,  the  true  inward 
ness  of  any  given  situation.  They  tell  of  what  oc 
curred,  after  a  fashion ;  they  fail  to  show  why  it 
occurred.  The  sequence  is  not  revealed.  So,  where 
such  are  not  written  with  a  distinct  bias  of  patriotism 
or  hero  worship,  they  are  apt  to  repeat  in  a  stereotyped 
sort  of  way  accepted  traditions  or  conventional  theories; 
and  when,  with  this,  is  combined  a  lack  of  familiarity 
and  practical  experience,  the  result  is  apt  to  be  what 
we  are  very  familiar  with  when  a  clergyman  sets  out 
to  explain  difficult  problems  of  constitutional  law,  or 
some  excellent  man  of  affairs  feels  impelled  to  impart 
in  some  public  way  his  views  upon  art. 

As  I  have  sought  to  show,  Wolfe  at  Quebec,  Wash 
ington  on  Long  Island,  Jackson  at  New  Orleans,  are 


374         A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

all  still  interesting  studies,  studies  than  which  few 
are  more  interesting.  But  as  chance  and  occasion 
have  led  me  to  look  into  them,  the  result  has  been,  in 
the  first  place,  as  I  stated  when  I  began,  a  distinct 
access  of  historical  scepticism,  followed  by  grave 
doubts  as  to  the  real  value  of  what  are  known  as  gen 
eral  histories,  written  on  the  plan  heretofore  in  vogue. 
They  fail  to  bear  the  test  of  rigid  special  analysis. 
Accordingly,  I  cannot  help  fancying  that  in  some 
future,  not  now  very  remote,  a  new  historical  method 
must  be  developed,  a  method  the  general  character  of 
which  I  have  this  evening  illustrated  from  a  special 
point  of  view.  Pursuing  in  other  fields  of  knowledge 
the  line  of  thought  I  have  tried  to  develop  in  connec 
tion  with  a  few  familiar  military  episodes,  the  general 
historian  on  a  large  scale  will  seek  to  draw  his  narra 
tive  not  from  his  inner  consciousness,  or  his  assumed 
personal  knowledge  of  military  operations  as  of  every 
thing  else,  or  from  any  supposed  natural  aptitudes 
which  he  may  infer  exist  in  himself.  On  the  contrary, 
he  will  turn  to  others,  and,  like  some  good  occupant 
of  the  judicial  chair,  he  will  bring  his  judgment  to 
bear,  not  upon  the  problems  themselves,  but  upon  the 
degree  of  reliability  to  be  placed  on  the  conclusions 
reached  by  those  specially  qualified  for  the  task,  who 
have  undertaken  to  speak  on  the  problems,  —  the 
laborious  writers  of  scientific  monographs.  In  mili 
tary  affairs  as  in  others,  the  day  of  the  historian  of 
the  Oliver  Goldsmith  type,  —  the  facile  writer  who 
knows  it  all,  who  is  at  once  a  statesman,  a  diplomat,  a 
parliamentarian,  a  lawyer,  a  theologian,  a  physician, 
a  biologist,  a  mechanician,  an  architect,  a  linguist,  and, 
though  neither  last  nor  least,  a  military  and  naval 


A  PLEA  FOR  MILITARY  HISTORY         375 

strategist,  —  the  day  of  the  historian  of  this  class  is 
practically  a  thing  of  the  past ;  for  even  historical 
writers  begin  to  realize  that  no  man  can  be  a  specialist 
in  everything ;  neither  is  it  any  longer  given  to  one  of 
finite  powers  to  take  all  knowledge  for  his  province, 
and  to  be  a  generalizer  besides. 


VI 

"SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE  ?"i 

"  Whom  doth  the  king  delight  to  honour  ?  that  is  the  question  of 
questions  concerning  the  king's  own  honour.  Show  me  the  man  you 
honour ;  I  know  by  that  symptom,  better  than  by  any  other,  what  kind 
of  man  you  yourself  are.  For  you  show  me  there  what  your  ideal 
of  manhood  is ;  what  kind  of  man  you  long  inexpressibly  to  be,  and 
would  thank  the  gods,  with  your  whole  soul,  for  being  if  you  could." 

"  Who  is  to  have  a  Statue  ?  means,  Whom  shall  we  consecrate 
and  set  apart  as  one  of  our  sacred  men  ?  Sacred  ;  that  all  men  may 
see  him,  be  reminded  of  him,  and,  by  new  example  added  to  old  per 
petual  precept,  be  taught  what  is  real  worth  in  man.  Whom  do  you 
wish  us  to  resemble  ?  Him  you  set  on  a  high  column,  that  all  men, 
looking  on  it,  may  be  continually  apprised  of  the  duty  you  expect 
from  them."  —  THOMAS  CARLYLE  :  Latter-Day  Pamphlets  (1850). 

AT  about  three  o'clock  of  the  afternoon  of  Septem 
ber  3,  1658,  the  day  of  Worcester  and  of  Dunbar,  and 
as  a  great  tempest  was  wearing  itself  to  rest,  Oliver 
Cromwell  died.  He  died  in  London,  in  the  palace  of 
Whitehall ;  the  palace  of  the  great  banqueting-hall 
through  whose  central  window  Charles  L,  a  little  less 
than  ten  years  before,  had  walked  forth  to  the  scaffold. 
A  few  weeks  later,  "  with  a  more  than  regal  solemnity," 
the  body  of  the  great  Lord  Protector  was  carried  to 

1  Oration  delivered  before  the  Beta  of  Illinois  Chapter  of  the  Phi 
Beta  Kappa  Society,  at  the  University  of  Chicago,  on  Tuesday,  June 
17,  1902.  This  address  was  the  natural  sequence  and  complement 
of  the  paper,  entitled  "Lee  at  Appomattox"  (supra,  pp.  1-19),  read 
before  the  American  Antiquarian  Society,  at  Worcester,  Mass.,  on  the 
19th  of  the  previous  October.  It  was  compressed  in  delivery,  occupy 
ing  one  hour  and  thirty  minutes. 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE  ?"     877 

Westminster  Abbey,  and  there  buried  "  amongst 
kings."  Two  years  then  elapsed  ;  and,  on  the  twelfth 
anniversary  of  King  Charles's  execution,  the  remains 
of  the  usurper,  having  been  previously  disinterred  by 
order  of  the  newly  restored  king,  were  by  a  unanimous 
vote  of  the  Convention  Parliament  hung  at  Tyburn. 
The  trunk  was  then  buried  under  the  gallows,  while 
Cromwell's  head  was  set  on  a  pole  over  the  roof  of 
Westminster  Hall.  Nearly  two  centuries  of  execration 
ensued,  until,  in  the  sixth  generation,  the  earlier  ver 
dict  was  challenged,  and  the  question  at  last  asked : 
"  Shall  Cromwell  have  a  Statue  ? "  Cromwell,  the 
traitor,  the  usurper,  the  execrable  murderer  of  the 
martyred  Charles !  At  first,  and  for  long,  the  sug 
gestion  was  looked  upon  almost  as  an  impiety,  and,  as 
such,  scornfully  repelled.  Not  only  did  the  old  loyal 
king-worship  of  England  recoil  from  the  thought,  but, 
indignantly  appealing  to  the  church,  it  declared  that 
no  such  distinction  could  be  granted  so  long  as  there 
remained  in  the  prayer-book  a  form  of  supplication  for 
"  King  Charles,  the  Martyr,"  and  of  "  praise  and 
thanksgiving  for  the  wonderful  deliverance  of  these 
kingdoms  from  the  great  rebellion,  and  all  the  other 
miseries  and  oppressions  consequent  thereon,  under 
which  they  had  so  long  groaned."  None  the  less,  the 
demand  was  insistent ;  and  at  last,  but  only  after  two 
full  centuries  had  elapsed  and  a  third  was  well  ad 
vanced,  was  the  verdict  of  1661  reversed.  To-day  the 
bronze  effigy  of  Oliver  Cromwell  —  massive  in  size, 
rugged  in  feature,  characteristic  in  attitude  —  stands 
defiantly  in  the  yard  of  that  Westminster  Hall,  from 
a  pole  on  the  top  of  which,  twelve-score  years  ago,  the 
flesh  crumbled  from  his  skull. 


378     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

In  this  dramatic  reversal  of  an  accepted  verdict,  — 
this  complete  revision  of  opinions  once  deemed  settled 
and  immutable,  —  there  is,  I  submit,  a  lesson,  —  an 
academic  lesson.  The  present  occasion  is  essentially 
educational.  The  Phi  Beta  Kappa  oration,  as  it  is 
called,  is  the  last,  the  crowning  utterance  of  the  college 
year,  and  very  properly  is  expected  to  deal  with  some 
fitting  theme  in  a  kindred  spirit.  I  propose  to  do  so 
to-day  ;  but  in  a  fashion  somewhat  exceptional.  The 
phases  of  moral  and  intellectual  growth  through  which 
the  English  race  has  passed  on  the  subject  of  Crom 
well's  statue  afford,  I  submit,  to  the  reflecting  man  an 
educational  study  of  exceptional  interest.  In  the  first 
place,  it  was  a  growth  of  two  centuries ;  in  the  second 
place,  it  marks  the  passage  of  a  nation  from  an  exist 
ence  under  the  traditions  of  feudalism  to  one  under 
the  principles  of  self-government ;  finally,  it  illustrates 
the  gradual  development  of  that  broad  spirit  of  toler 
ance  which,  coming  with  time  and  study,  measures  the 
men  and  events  of  the  past  independently  of  the  pre 
judices  and  passions  which  obscure  and  distort  the 
immediate  vision. 

We,  too,  as  well  as  the  English,  have  had  our  "  Great 
Kebellion."  It  came  to  a  dramatic  close  thirty-seven 
years  since  ;  as  theirs  came  to  a  close  not  less  dramatic 
some  seven  times  thirty-seven  years  since.  We,  also, 
as  they  in  their  day,  formed  our  contemporaneous 
judgments  and  recorded  our  verdicts,  assumed  to  be 
irreversible,  of  the  men,  the  issues,  and  the  events  of 
the  great  conflict ;  and  those  verdicts  and  judgments, 
in  our  case  as  in  theirs,  will  unquestionably  be  revised, 
modified,  and  in  not  a  few  cases  wholly  reversed. 
Better  knowledge,  calmer  reflection,  and  a  more  judi- 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?"     379 

cial  frame  of  mind  come  with  the  passage  of  the  years ; 
slowly  passions  subside,  prejudices  disappear,  truth  as 
serts  itself.  In  England  this  process  has  been  going 
on  for  close  upon  two  centuries  and  a  half  ;  with  what 
result,  Cromwell's  statue  stands  as  proof.  We  live  in 
another  age  and  a  different  environment ;  and,  as  fifty 
years  of  Europe  outmeasure  in  their  growth  a  cycle 
of  Cathay,  so  I  hold  one  year  of  twentieth  century 
America  works  far  more  progress  in  thought  than 
seven  years  of  Britain  during  the  interval  between  its 
Great  Rebellion  and  ours.  We  who  took  active  part 
in  the  Civil  War  have  not  yet  wholly  vanished  from 
the  stage  ;  the  rear  guard  of  the  Grand  Army,  we  lin 
ger.  To-day  is  separated  from  the  death  of  Lincoln 
by  the  same  number  of  years  only  which  separated 
"  the  Glorious  Revolution  of  1688  "  from  the  exe 
cution  of  Charles  Stuart ;  yet  to  us  is  already  given 
to  look  back  on  the  events  of  which  we  were  a  part 
with  the  same  perspective  effects  with  which  the  Vic 
torian  Englishman  looks  back  on  the  men  and  events 
of  the  Commonwealth. 

I  propose  on  this  occasion  to  do  so ;  and  reverting 
to  my  text,  —  "  Shall  Cromwell  have  a  Statue,"  —  and 
reading  that  text  in  the  gloss  of  Carlyle's  Latter-Day 
Pamphlet  utterance,  I  quote  you  Horace's  familiar 
precept,  — 

"  Mutato  nomine,  de  te 
Fabula  narratur,"  —  . 

and  ask  abruptly,  "  Shall  Robert  E.  Lee  have  a 
Statue  ?  "  I  propose  also  to  offer  to  your  considera 
tion  some  reasons  why  he  should,  and,  assuredly,  will 
have  one,  if  not  now,  then  presently. 

Shortly  after  Lee's  death  in  October,  1870,  leave 


380     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

was  asked  in  the  United  States  Senate,  by  Mr.  Mc- 
Creery,  of  Kentucky,  to  introduce  a  joint  resolution 
providing  for  the  return  of  the  estate  and  mansion  of 
Arlington  to  the  family  of  the  deceased  Confederate 
Commander-in-chief.  In  view  of  the  use  which  had 
then  already  been  made  of  Arlington  as  a  military 
cemetery,  this  proposal,  involving,  as  it  necessarily  did, 
a  removal  of  the  dead,  naturally  led  to  warm  debate. 
The  proposition  was  one  not  to  be  considered.  If  a 
defect  in  the  title  of  the  government  existed,  it  must 
in  some  way  be  cured;  as,  subsequently,  it  was  cured. 
But  I  call  attention  to  the  debate  because  Charles 
Sumner,  then  a  Senator  from  Massachusetts,  partici 
pated  in  it,  using  the  following  language :  "  Eloquent 
Senators  have  already  characterized  the  proposition 
and  the  traitor  it  seeks  to  commemorate.  I  am  not 
disposed  to  speak  of  General  Lee.  It  is  enough  to 
say  he  stands  high  in  the  catalogue  of  those  who  have 
imbrued  their  hands  in  their  country's  blood.  I  hand 
him  over  to  the  avenging  pen  of  History."  This  was 
when  Lee  had  been  just  two  months  dead ;  but,  three- 
quarters  of  a  century  after  the  Protector's  skull  had 
been  removed  from  over  the  roof  of  Westminster  Hall, 
Pope  wrote  in  similar  spirit  — 

"  See  Cromwell,  damn'd  to  everlasting  fame ;  " 

and,  sixteen  years  later,  —  close  upon  a  century  after 
Cromwell's  disentombment  at  Westminster  and  re- 
burial  at  Tyburn,  —  a  period  from  the  death  of  Lee 
equal  to  that  which  will  have  elapsed  in  1960,  Gray 
sang  of  the  Stoke  Pogis  churchyard  — 

"  Some  mute  inglorious  Milton  here  may  rest, 
Some  Cromwell  guiltless  of  his  country's  blood." 

And   now,  a  century  and  a  half   later,  Cromwell's 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE!"     381 

statue  looms  defiantly  up  in  front  of  the  Parliament 
House.  When,  therefore,  an  appeal  is  in  such  cases 
made  to  the  "  avenging  pen  of  History,"  it  is  well  to 
bear  this  instance  in  mind,  while  recalling  perchance 
the  aphorism  of  a  greater  than  Pope,  or  Gray,  or 
Sumner,  —  "  and  thus  the  whirligig  of  Time  brings  in 
his  revenges." 

Was,  then,  Robert  E.  Lee  a  "traitor," — was  he 
also  guilty  of  his  "  country's  blood  ?  "  These  ques 
tions  I  propose  now  to  discuss.  I  am  one  of  those 
who,  in  other  days,  was  arrayed  in  the  ranks  which 
confronted  Lee ;  one  of  those  whom  Lee  baffled  and 
beat,  but  who,  finally,  baffled  and  beat  Lee.  As  one 
thus  formerly  lined  up  against  him,  these  questions  I 
propose  to  discuss  in  the  calmer  and  cooler,  and  alto 
gether  more  reasonable  light  which  comes  to  most  men, 
when  a  whole  generation  of  the  human  race  lies  buried 
between  them  and  the  issues  and  actors  upon  which 
they  undertake  to  pass. 

Was  Robert  E.  Lee  a  traitor  ?  Technically,  I  think 
he  was  indisputably  a  traitor  to  the  United  States ; 
for  a  traitor,  as  I  understand  it  technically,  is  one 
guilty  of  the  crime  of  treason  ;  or,  as  the  Century  Dic 
tionary  puts  it,  violating  his  allegiance  to  the  chief  au 
thority  of  the  State  ;  while  treason  against  the  United 
States  is  specifically  defined  in  the  Constitution  as 
"  levying  war  against  them,  or  in  adhering  to  their 
enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort."  That  Robert 
E.  Lee  did  levy  war  against  the  United  States  can,  I 
suppose,  no  more  be  denied  than  that  he  gave  "  aid 
and  comfort"  to  its  enemies ;  and  to  the  truth  of  the 
last  proposition  I  hold  myself,  among  others,  to  be  a 


382     "SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

very  competent  witness.  This  technically;  but,  in 
history,  there  is  treason  and  treason,  as  there  are 
traitors  and  traitors.  And,  furthermore,  if  Eobert 
E.  Lee  was  a  traitor,  so  also,  and  indisputably,  were 
George  Washington,  Oliver  Cromwell,  John  Hamp- 
den,  and  William  of  Orange.  The  list  might  be  ex 
tended  indefinitely  ;  but  these  will  suffice.  There  can 
be  no  question  that  every  one  of  those  named  violated 
his  allegiance,  and  gave  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemies 
of  his  sovereign.  Washington  furnishes  a  precedent 
at  every  point.  A  Virginian  like  Lee,  he  was  also  a 
British  subject ;  he  had  fought  under  the  British  flag, 
as  Lee  had  fought  under  that  of  the  United  States  ; 
when,  in  1776,  Virginia  seceded  from  the  British  Em 
pire,  he  "  went  with  his  State,"  just  as  Lee  went  with 
it  eighty-five  years  later ;  subsequently  Washington 
commanded  armies  in  the  field  designated  by  those 
opposed  to  them  as  "  rebels,"  and  whose  descendants 
now  glorify  them  as  "  the  rebels  of  '76,"  much  as  Lee 
later  commanded,  and  at  last  surrendered,  much  larger 
armies,  also  designated  "  rebels  "  by  those  they  con 
fronted.  Except  in  their  outcome,  the  cases  were, 
therefore,  precisely  alike ;  and  logic  is  logic.  It  con 
sequently  appears  to  follow,  that,  if  Lee  was  a  traitor, 
Washington  was  also.  It  is  unnecessary  to  institute 
similar  comparisons  with  Cromwell,  Hampden,  and 
William  of  Orange.  No  defence  can  in  their  cases 
be  made.  Technically,  one  and  all,  they  undeniably 
were  traitors. 

But  there  are,  as  I  have  said,  traitors  and  traitors, 

—  Catilines,  Arnolds,  and  Gorgeis,  as  well  as  Crom- 

wells,  Hampdens,  and  Washingtons.      To  reach  any 

satisfactory   conclusion    concerning  a   candidate   for 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     383 

"  everlasting  fame,"  -  whether  to  deify  or  damn,  — 
enroll  him  as  saviour,  as  martyr,  or  as  criminal,  —  it 
is,  therefore,  necessary  still  further  to  discriminate. 
The  cause,  the  motive,  the  conduct  must  be  passed  in 
review.  Did  turpitude  anywhere  attach  to  the  ori 
ginal  taking  of  sides,  or  to  subsequent  act?  Was 
the  man  a  self-seeker?  Did  low  or  sordid  motives 
impel  him  ?  Did  he  seek  to  aggrandize  himself  at 
his  country's  cost?  Did  he  strike  with  a  parricidal 
hand  ? 

These  are  grave  questions  ;  and,  in  the  case  of  Lee, 
their  consideration  brings  us  at  the  threshold  face  to 
face  with  issues  which  have  perplexed  and  divided  the 
country  since  the  day  the  United  States  became  a 
country.  They  perplex,  and  divide  historians  now. 
Legally,  technically,  —  the  moral  and  humanitarian 
aspects  of  the  issue  wholly  apart,  —  which  side  had  the 
best  of  the  argument  as  to  the  rights  and  the  wrongs 
of  the  case  in  the  great  debate  which  led  up  to  the 
Civil  War  ?  Before  entering,  however,  on  this  well- 
worn  —  I  might  say,  this  threadbare  —  theme,  as  I 
find  myself  compelled  in  briefest  way  to  do,  there  is 
one  preliminary  very  essential  to  be  gone  through  with, 
—  a  species  of  moral  purgation.  Bearing  in  mind  Dr. 
Johnson's  advice  to  Boswell  on  a  certain  memorable 
occasion,  we  should  at  least  try  to  clear  our  minds  of 
cant.  Many  years  ago,  but  only  shortly  before  his 
death,  Richard  Cobden  said,  in  one  of  his  truth-telling 
deliverances  to  his  Rochdale  constituents,  —  "I  really 
believe  I  might  be  Prime  Minister.  If  I  would  get 
up  and  say  you  are  the  greatest,  the  wisest,  the  best, 
the  happiest  people  in  the  world,  and  keep  on  repeat 
ing  that,  I  don't  doubt  but  what  I  might  be  Prime 


384     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

Minister.  I  have  seen  Prime  Ministers  made  in  my 
experience  precisely  by  that  process."  The  same 
great  apostle  of  homely  sense,  on  another  occasion, 
bluntly  remarked  in  a  similar  spirit  to  the  House  of 
Commons,  —  "  We  generally  sympathize  with  every 
body's  rebels  but  our  own."  In  both  these  respects  I 
submit  we  Americans  are  true  descendants  from  the 
Anglo-Saxon  stock ;  and  nowhere  is  this  more  un 
pleasantly  apparent  than  in  any  discussion  which  may 
arise  of  the  motives  which  actuated  those  of  our  coun 
trymen  who  did  not  at  the  time  see  the  issues  involved 
in  our  Civil  War  as  we  saw  them.  Like  those  whom 
Cobden  addressed,  we  like  to  glorify  our  ancestors  and 
ourselves,  and  we  do  not  particularly  care  to  give  ear 
to  what  we  are  pleased  to  term  unpatriotic,  and,  at 
times,  even  treasonable  talk.  In  other  words,  and  in 
plain,  unpalatable  English,  our  minds  are  saturated 
with  cant.  Only  in  the  case  of  others  do  we  see 
things  as  they  really  are.  Ceasing  to  be  individually 
interested,  we  then  at  once  become  nothing  unless  crit 
ical.  So,  when  it  comes  to  rebellions,  we,  like  Cob- 
den's  Englishmen,  are  wont  almost  invariably  to  sym 
pathize  with  everybody's  rebels  but  our  own. 

Our  souls  spontaneously  go  forth  to  Celt,  Pole, 
Hungarian,  Boer,  and  Hindoo ;  but  when  we  are  con 
cerned,  language  quite  fails  us  in  which  adequately  to 
depict  the  moral  turpitude  which  must  actuate  Confed 
erate  or  Filipino  who  rises  in  resistance  against  what 
we  are  pleased  really  to  consider,  as  well  as  call,  the 
best  and  most  beneficent  government  the  world  has  yet 
been  permitted  to  see,  —  Our  Government !  This,  I 
submit,  is  cant,  —  pure  cant ;  and  at  the  threshold  of 
discussion  we  had  best  free  our  minds  of  it,  wholly,  if 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     385 

we  can ;  if  not  wholly,  then  in  so  far  as  we  can. 
Philip  the  Second  of  Spain,  when  he  directed  his  cru 
sade  in  the  name  of  God,  Church,  and  Government 
against  William  of  Orange,  indulged  in  it  in  quite  as 
good  faith  as  we  ;  and  as  for  Charles  "  the  Martyr  " 
and  the  "  sainted  "  Laud,  for  two  centuries  after  Crom 
well's  head  was  stuck  on  a  pole  all  England  annually 
lamented  in  sackcloth  and  ashes  the  wrongs  inflicted 
by  sacrilegious  hands  on  those  most  assuredly  well- 
meaning  rulers  and  men.  All  depends  on  the  point 
of  view ;  and,  during  our  own  Civil  War,  while  we 
unceasingly  denounced  the  wilful  wickedness  of  those 
who  bore  parricidal  arms  against  the  one  immaculate 
authority  yet  given  the  eye  of  man  to  look  upon,  the 
leading  newspaper  of  the  world  was  referring  to  us  in 
perfect  good  faith  "as  an  insensate  and  degenerate 
people."  An  English  member  of  Parliament,  speak 
ing  at  the  same  time  in  equally  good  faith,  declared 
that,  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  Great 
Britain,  public  sentiment  was  almost  unanimously  on 
the  side  of  "  the  Southerners,"  —  as  ours  was  on  the 
side  of  the  Boers,  —  because  our  "  rebels  "  were  "  fight 
ing  against  one  of  the  most  grinding,  one  of  the  most 
galling,  one  of  the  most  irritating  attempts  to  estab 
lish  tyrannical  government  that  ever  disgraced  the 
history  of  the  world."  : 

Upon  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  these  judgments 
I  do  not  care  to  pass.  They  certainly  cannot  be  recon 
ciled.  The  single  point  I  make  is  that  they  were,  when 
made,  the  expression  of  views  honestly  and  sincerely 
entertained.  We  sympathize  with  Great  Britain's 
rebels  ;  Great  Britain  sympathized  with  our  rebels. 

1  Supra,  pp.  63,  75. 


386     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

Our  rebels  in  1862,  as  theirs  in  1900,  thoroughly 
believed  they  were  resisting  an  iniquitous  attempt  to 
deprive  them  of  their  rights,  and  to  establish  over 
them  a  "  grinding,"  a  "  galling,"  and  an  "  irritating  " 
"  tyrannical  government."  We  in  1861,  as  Great 
Britain  in  1898,  and  Charles  "  the  Martyr  "  and  Philip 
of  Spain  some  centuries  earlier,  were  fully  convinced 
that  we  were  engaged  in  God's  work  while  we  trod 
under  foot  the  "  rebel  "  and  the  "  traitor."  Presently, 
as  distance  lends  a  more  correct  perspective,  and  things 
are  viewed  in  their  true  proportions,  we  will  get  per 
haps  to  realize  that  our  case  furnishes  no  exception  to 
the  general  rule ;  and  that  we,  too,  like  the  English, 
"  generally  sympathize  with  everybody's  rebels  but  our 
own."  Justice  may  then  be  done. 

Having  entered  this  necessary,  if  somewhat  hopeless 
caveat,  let  us  address  ourselves  to  the  question  at  issue. 
I  will  state  it  again.  Legally  and  technically,  —  not 
morally,  again  let  me  say,  and  wholly  irrespective  of 
humanitarian  considerations,  —  to  which  side  did  the 
weight  of  argument  incline  during  the  great  debate 
which  culminated  in  our  Civil  War?  The  answer 
necessarily  turns  on  the  abstract  right  of  what  we  term 
a  Sovereign  State  to  secede  from  the  Union  at  such 
time  and  for  such  cause  as  may  seem  to  that  State 
proper  and  sufficient.  The  issue  is  settled  now ;  irrev 
ocably  and  for  all  time  decided :  it  was  not  settled 
forty  years  ago,  and  the  settlement  since  reached  has 
been  the  result  not  of  reason,  based  on  historical  evi 
dence,  but  of  events  and  of  force.  To  pass  a  fair 
judgment  on  the  line  of  conduct  pursued  by  Lee  in 
1861,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  in  thought  and  im 
agination,  and  see  things,  not  as  they  now  are,  but  as 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     387 

they  then  were.  If  we  do  so,  and  accept  the  judgment 
of  some  of  the  more  modern  students  and  investigators 
of  history,  —  either  wholly  unprejudiced  or  with  a  dis 
tinct  Union  bias,  —  it  would  seem  as  if  the  weight  of 
argument  falls  into  what  I  will  term  the  Confederate 
scale.  For  instance,  Professor  Goldwin  Smith,  —  an 
Englishman,  a  lifelong  student  of  history,  a  friend 
and  advocate  of  the  Union  during  the  Civil  War,  the 
author  of  one  of  the  most  compact  and  readable  nar 
ratives  of  our  national  life,  —  Goldwin  Smith  has  re 
cently  said :  "  Few  who  have  looked  into  the  history 
can  doubt  that  the  Union  originally  was,  and  was 
generally  taken  by  the  parties  to  it  to  be,  a  compact, 
dissoluble,  perhaps,  most  of  them  would  have  said,  at 
pleasure,  dissoluble  certainly  on  breach  of  the  articles 
of  Union."  l  To  a  like  effect,  but  in  terms  even 
stronger,  Mr.  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  now  a  Senator  from 
Massachusetts,  has  declared,  not  in  a  political  utterance 
but  in  a  work  of  historical  character,  —  "  When  the 
Constitution  was  adopted  by  the  votes  of  States  at  Phil 
adelphia,  and  accepted  by  the  votes  of  States  in  popu 
lar  conventions,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  there  was  not  a 
man  in  the  country,  from  Washington  and  Hamilton, 
on  the  one  side,  to  George  Clinton  and  George  Mason, 
on  the  other,  who  regarded  the  new  system  as  any 
thing  but  an  experiment  entered  upon  by  the  States, 
and  from  which  each  and  every  State  had  the  right 
peaceably  to  withdraw,  a  right  which  was  very  likely 
to  be  exercised."  2 

Here  are  two  explicit  statements  of  the  legal  and 
technical  side  of  the  argument  made  by  authority  to 

1  Atlantic  Monthly  Magazine  (March,  1902),  vol.  Ixxxix.  p.  305. 

2  Webster,  American  Statesmen  Series,  p.  172. 


388     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

whiuh  no  exception  can  be  taken,  at  least  by  those  of 
the  Union  side.  On  them,  and  on  them  alone,  the  case 
for  the  abstract  right  of  secession  might  be  rested,  and 
we  could  go  on  to  the  next  stage  of  the  discussion. 

I  am  unwilling,  however,  so  to  do.  The  issue  in 
volved  is  still  one  of  interest,  and  I  am  not  disposed  to 
leave  it  on  the  mere  dictum  of  two  authorities,  however 
eminent.  In  the  first  place  I  do  not  altogether  concur 
in  their  statement ;  in  the  next  place,  this  discussion 
is  a  mere  threshing  of  straw  unless  we  get  at  the  true 
inwardness  of  the  situation.  When  it  comes  to  sub 
jects —  political  or  moral  —  in  which  human  beings 
are  involved,  metaphysics  are  scarcely  less  to  be  avoided 
than  cant ;  alleged  historical  facts  are  apt  to  prove 
deceptive ;  and  I  confess  to  grave  suspicions  of  logic. 
Old  time  theology,  for  instance,  with  its  pitiless  rea 
soning,  led  the  world  into  very  strange  places  and  much 
bad  company.  In  reaching  a  conclusion,  therefore,  in 
which  a  verdict  is  entered  on  the  motives  and  actions 
of  men,  acting  either  individually  or  in  masses,  the 
moral,  the  sentimental,  and  the  practical  must  be  quite 
as  much  taken  into  account  as  the  legal,  the  logical,  and 
the  material.  This,  in  the  present  case,  I  propose 
presently  to  do ;  but,  as  I  have  said,  on  the  facts  even 
I  am  unable  wholly  to  concur  with  Professor  Smith 
and  Mr.  Lodge. 

Mr.  Lodge,  for  instance,  cites  Washington.  But 
it  so  chances  Washington  put  himself  on  record  upon 
the  point  at  issue,  and  his  testimony  is  directly  at 
variance  with  the  views  attributed  to  him  by  Mr. 
Webster's  biographer.  What  are  known  in  history 
as  the  Kentucky  resolutions,  drawn  up  by  Thomas 
Jefferson,  then  Vice-President,  were  passed  by  the 


" SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     389 

legislature  of  the  State  whose  name  they  bear  in 
November,  1798.  In  those  Resolutions  the  view  of 
the  framers  of  the  Constitution  as  to  the  original 
scope  of  that  instrument  accepted  by  Professor  Smith 
and  Mr.  Lodge  was  first  set  forth.  The  principles 
acted  upon  by  South  Carolina  on  the  20th  of  Decem 
ber,  1860,  were  enunciated  by  Kentucky  November 
16,  1798.  The  dragon's  teeth  were  then  sown. 
Washington  was  at  that  time  living  in  retirement  at 
Mt.  Vernon.  When,  a  few  weeks  later,  the  character 
of  those  resolutions  became  known  to  him,  he  was 
deeply  concerned,  and  wrote  to  Lafayette,  — "  The 
Constitution,  according  to  their  interpretation  of  it, 
would  be  a  mere  cipher ; "  and  again,  a  few  days 
later,  he  expressed  himself  still  more  strongly  in  a 
letter  to  Patrick  Henry,  —  "  Measures  are  systemati 
cally  and  pertinaciously  pursued  which  must  eventu 
ally  dissolve  the  Union,  or  produce  coercion."  l  Co 
ercion  Washington  thus  looked  to  as  the  remedy  to 
which  recourse  could  properly  be  had  in  case  of  any 
overt  attempt  at  secession.  But,  so  far  as  the  framers 
of  the  Constitution  were  concerned,  it  seems  to  me 
clear  that,  acting  as  wise  men  of  conflicting  views 
naturally  would  act  in  a  formative  period  during  which 
many  conflicting  views  prevailed,  they  did  not  care 
to  incur  the  danger  of  a  shipwreck  of  their  entire 
scheme  by  undertaking  to  settle,  distinctly  and  in 
advance,  abstract  questions,  the  discussion  of  which 
was  fraught  with  danger.2  In  so  far  as  they  could, 

1  Sparks  :   Writings  of  Washington,  vol.  xi.  pp.  378,  389. 

2  The  discussion  on  this  point  has  hitherto  proved  as  inconclusive 
as  interminable  ;  and  it  seems  likely  so  to  remain.     (See  Proceedings 
of  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  New  Series,  vol.  xvi.  pp.  151-17o, 
May  8,  1902.)     From  the  days  of  Mr.  Webster,  and  his  answer  to 


390     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

they,  with  great  practical  shrewdness,  left  those  ques 
tions  to  be  settled,  should  they  ever  present  them 
selves  in  concrete  form,  under  the  conditions  which 
might  then  exist.  The  truth  thus  seems  to  be  that 
the  mass  of  those  composing  the  Convention  of  1787, 
working  under  the  guidance  of  a  few  very  able  and 
exceedingly  practical  men,  of  constructive  mind, 
builded  a  great  deal  better  than  they  knew.  The 
delegates  met  to  harmonize  trade  differences  ;  they 
ended  by  perfecting  a  scheme  of  political  union 
that  had  broad  consequences  of  which  they  little 
dreamed.  If  they  had  dreamed  of  them,  the  chances 

Hayne,  to  the  present  time,  it  is  all  matter  of  inference  and  argument, 
and  of  surmise.  Meanwhile,  no  one  will  deny  that  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  were  gifted  with  an  entirely  adequate  power  of  express 
ing  themselves,  when  they  thought  fit  so  to  do.  The  defenders  of  the 
principle  of  nationality  scrutinize  the  instrument  in  vain  in  search  of 
any  clause  declaring-  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the  Nation  and  pro 
hibiting-  the  secession  of  a  State,  or  the  dissolution  of  the  compact  by 
a  State ;  or,  under  certain  conditions,  permitting  it  to  such  number,  or 
proportion,  of  States  as  were  prescribed  for  original  adoption.  This 
could  easily  have  been  expressed,  and  would  have  obviated  any  ques 
tion.  It  was  not.  On  the  other  hand,  the  advocates  of  State  Sover 
eignty,  and  defenders  of  the  sovereign  right  of  secession,  make  no 
pretence  of  finding  in  the  Constitution  any  words  expressly  setting 
forth  that  right,  or  distinctly  reserving  the  power  to  one  State,  or  any 
number  of  States,  of  dissolving  what  they  designate  as  ' '  the  com 
pact."  They  have  to  reach  their  results  through  a  process  of  elab 
orate  argumentation.  The  silence  of  the  framers  is  undeniable ; 
the  reason  thereof  is  as  obvious  as  the  fact.  They  wisely  refrained 
from  any  declaration  which,  while  setting  forth  precisely  the  rights 
and  obligations  of  the  parties  to  the  instrument,  would  inevitably 
involve  its  rejection.  They  thus  intentionally  left  the  question  in 
doubt,  to  be  decided  by  the  course  of  events,  and  the  process  of  what 
we  now  know  as  evolution.  Such  seems  to  be  the  only  common- 
sense  conclusion  to  be  derived  from  a  careful  study  of  both  the 
Constitution  and  the  debates  on  its  adoption.  Both  sides  to  the  sub 
sequent  discussion  had,  and  have,  reason ;  neither,  proof.  Nor  will 
proof  ever  be  attainable. 


"SHALL   CROMViELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     391 

are  the  fabric  would  never  have  been  completed. 
That  Madison,  Hamilton  and  Jay  were  equally  blind 
to  consequences  does  not  follow.  They  probably  de 
signed  a  nation.  If  they  did,  however,  they  were  too 
wise  to  take  the  public  fully  into  their  confidence ; 
and,  to-day,  "  no  impartial  student  of  our  constitutional 
history  can  doubt  for  a  moment  that  each  State  rati 
fied  "  the  form  of  government  submitted  in  "  the  firm 
belief  that  at  any  time  it  could  withdraw  therefrom." l 
A  Mr.  Davie,  a  North  Carolina  delegate  to  the  Phila 
delphia  Convention  of  1787,  put  the  case  very  clearly 
in  the  course  of  a  speech  in  favor  of  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution  by  his  own  State.  "  Every  man  of 
common  sense  knows  that  political  power  is  political 
right ;  "  2  and,  well  assured  that  Virginia,  Pennsyl 
vania,  or  New  England  "  could,"  at  any  time,  "  with 
draw,"  -  —  for  who  was  to  withstand  them  in  so  doing  ? 
—  the  men  of  that  day  representing  those  States  were 
not  disposed  to  scrutinize  over  closely  the  legal  aspects 
of  such  withdrawal.  Probably,  however,  the  more  far- 
seeing  —  and,  in  the  long  run,  they  alone  count  — 
shared  with  Washington  in  the  belief  that  in  process 
of  time,  after  the  machine  was  once  put  in  success 
ful  action,  this  withdrawal  would  not  be  unaccom 
panied  by  practical  difficulty.  And,  after  all  is  said 
and  done,  the  legality  of  secession  is  somewhat  of  a 
metaphysical  abstraction  so  long  as  the  right  of  revo 
lution  is  inalienable.  As  matter  of  fact  it  was  to 
might  and  revolution  the  South  appealed  in  1861  ; 
and  it  was  to  coercion  the  government  of  the  Union 
had  recourse.  So,  with  his  supreme  good  sense  and 

1  Donn  Piatt :   George  H.  Thomas,  p.  88. 

2  Elliot :  Debates,  vol.  iv.  p.  238. 


392     "SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

that  political  insight  at  once  instinctive  and  unerring, 
in  respect  to  which  he  stands  almost  alone,  Wash 
ington  foresaw  this  alternative  in  1798.1  He  looked 

1  Washington  seems,  indeed,  to  have  foreseen  it  from  the  com 
mencement.  Hardly  was  the  independence  of  the  country  achieved 
before  he  began  to  direct  his  efforts  toward  the  creation  of  a  nation, 
with  a  central  power  adequate  to  a  coercive  policy  if  called  for  by  the 
occasion.  Thus,  in  March,  1783,  he  wrote  to  Nathanael  Greene  (Ford  : 
Writings  of  Washington,  vol.  x.  p.  203,  note),  "  It  remains  only  for 
the  States  to  be  wise,  and  to  establish  their  independence  on  the  basis 
of  an  inviolable,  efficacious  union,  and  a  firm  confederation."  The 
following  month  he  wrote  in  the  same  spirit  to  Tench  Tilghman  (76. 
vol.  x.  p.  238),  "In  a  word,  the  Constitution  of  Congress  must  be 
competent  to  the  general  purposes  of  Government,  and  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  bind  us  together.  Otherwise  we  shall  be  like  a  rope  of  sand, 
and  as  easily  broken."  Finally,  in  the  Circular  Letter  addressed  to 
the  Governors  of  all  the  States  on  disbanding  the  Army,  June  8,  1783 
(16.  vol.  x.  p.  257),  "There  are  four  things  which,  I  humbly  con 
ceive,  are  essential  to  the  well-being,  I  may  even  venture  to  say,  to 
the  existence  of  the  United  States  as  an  independent  power.  First, 
An  indissoluble  union  of  the  States  under  one  federal  head."  In 
language  even  stronger  he,  July  8,  1783,  —  only  a  month  later,  — 
wrote  to  Dr.  William  Gordon,  the  historian  (Ib.  vol.  x.  p.  276),  "  We 
are  known  by  no  other  character  among  nations  than  as  the  United 
States.  Massachusetts  or  Virginia  is  no  better  defined,  nor  any  more 
thought  of  by  Foreign  Powers,  than  the  County  of  Worcester  in 
Massachusetts  is  by  Virginia,  or  Gloucester  County  in  Virginia  is  by 
Massachusetts  (respectable  as  they  are)  ;  and  yet  these  counties  with 
as  much  propriety  might  oppose  themselves  to  the  laws  of  the  States 
in  which  they  are,  as  an  individual  State  can  oppose  itself  to  the 
Federal  Government,  by  which  it  is,  or  ought  to  be  bound." 

With  the  passage  of  time,  Washington's  feelings  on  this  subject 
seem  to  have  grown  stronger,  and,  March  10,  1787,  he  wrote  to  John 
Jay,  "  A  thirst  for  power,  and  the  bantling  —  I  had  liked  to  have  said 
MONSTER  —  sovereignty,  which  have  taken  such  fast  hold  of  the 
States,"  etc.  (William  Jay :  Life  of  John  Jay,  vol.  i.  p.  259.)  A  year 
earlier,  August  1,  1786,  he  had  written  to  Jay,  "Experience  has 
taught  us,  that  men  will  not  adopt  and  carry  into  execution  measures 
the  best  calculated  for  their  own  good,  without  the  intervention  of  a 
coercive  power.  I  do  not  conceive  we  can  exist  long  as  a  nation 
without  having  lodged  somewhere  a  power,  which  will  pervade  the 
whole  Union  in  as  energetic  a  manner  as  the  authority  of  the  state 
governments  extends  over  the  several  States."  (Ford :  Writings  of 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     393 

upon  the  doctrine  of  secession  as  a  heresy ;  but,  none 
the  less,  it  was  a  heresy  indisputably  then  preached, 
and  to  which  many,  not  in  Virginia  only,  but  in  New 
England  also,  pinned  their  political  faith.  Even  the 
Devil  is  proverbially  entitled  to  his  due. 

So  far,  however,  as  the  abstract  question  is  of  con 
sequence,  as  the  utterances  of  Professor  Smith  and 
Mr.  Lodge  conclusively  show,  the  Secessionists  of 
1861  stand  in  history's  court  by  no  means  without  a 
case.  In  that  case,  moreover,  they  implicitly  believed. 
From  generation  to  generation  they  had  grown  up  in 
doctrinated  with  the  gospel,  or  heresy,  of  State  Sov 
ereignty,  and  it  was  as  much  part  of  their  moral  and 
intellectual  being  as  was  clanship  of  the  Scotch  high- 
landers.  In  so  far  they  were  right,  as  Governor  John 
A.  Andrew  said  of  John  Brown.  Meanwhile,  practi 
cally,  as  a  common-sensed  man,  leading  an  every-day 
existence  in  a  world  of  actualities,  John  Brown  was 
not  right ;  he  was,  on  the  contrary,  altogether  wrong, 
and  richly  merited  the  fate  meted  out  to  him.  It  was 
the  same  with  the  Secessionists.  That,  in  1861,  they 
could  really  have  had  faith  in  the  practicability — the 
real  working  efficacy  —  of  that  peaceable  secession 
which  they  professed  to  ask  for,  and  of  which  they 
never  wearied  of  talking,  I  cannot  believe.  I  find  in 
the  record  no  real  evidence  thereof. 

Of  the  high-type  Southron,  as  we  sometimes  desig 
nate  him,  I  would  speak  in  terms  of  sincere  respect. 
I  know  him  chiefly  by  hearsay,  having  come  in  per- 

Washington,  vol.  xi.  p.  53.)  This,  it  will  be  observed,  was  within  a 
few  days  less  than  seven  months  only  before  the  passage  by  the  Con 
federation  Congress  of  the  resolution  of  February  21, 1787,  calling  for 
the  Convention  which,  during  the  ensuing  summer,  framed  the  present 
Constitution. 


394     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

sonal  contact  only  with  individual  representatives  of 
the  class  ;  but  such  means  of  observation  as  I  have 
had  confirm  what  I  recently  heard  said  by  a  friend  of 
mine,  once  Governor  of  South  Carolina,  and,  so  far 
as  I  know,  the  only  man  who  ever  gave  the  impossible 
and  indefensible  plan  of  reconstruction  attempted 
after  our  Civil  War  a  firm,  fair,  and  intelligent  trial. 
He  at  least  put  forth  an  able  and  honest  effort  to 
make  effective  a  policy  which  never  should  have  been 
devised.  Speaking  from  "  much  and  varied  experi 
ence,"  I  recently  heard  Daniel  H.  Chamberlain  say  of 
the  "  typical  Southern  gentleman  "  that  he  considered 
him  "  a  distinct  and  really  noble  growth  of  our  Amer 
ican  soil.  For,  if  fortitude  under  good  and  under 
evil  fortune,  if  endurance  without  complaint  of  what 
comes  in  the  tide  of  human  affairs,  if  a  grim  cling 
ing  to  ideals  once  charming,  if  vigor  and  resiliency  of 
character  and  spirit  under  defeat  and  poverty  and 
distress,  if  a  steady  love  of  learning  and  letters  when 
libraries  were  lost  in  flames  and  the  wreckage  of  war, 
if  self-restraint  when  the  long  delayed  relief  at  last 
came,  —  if,  I  say,  all  these  qualities  are  parts  of  real 
heroism,  if  these  qualities  can  vivify  and  ennoble  a 
man  or  a  people,  then  our  own  South  may  lay  claim 
to  an  honored  place  among  the  differing  types  of  our 
great  common  race."  Such  is  the  matured  judgment 
of  the  Massachusetts  Governor  of  South  Carolina 
during  the  Congressional  reconstruction  period ;  and, 
listening  to  it,  I  asked  myself  if  it  was  descriptive  of 
a  Southern  fellow  countryman,  or  a  Jacobite  Scotch 
chieftain  anterior  to  "  the  '45." 

The  Southern  statesmen  of   the  old  slavery  days  — 
the  antediluvian  period  which  preceded  our  mid-cen- 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?"     395 

tury  cataclysm  —  were  the  outcome  and  representa 
tives  of  what  has  thus  been  described.  As  such  they 
presented  a  curious  admixture  of  qualities.  Master 
ful  in  temper,  clear  of  purpose,  with  a  firm  grasp  on 
principle,  a  high  sense  of  honor,  and  a  moral  percep 
tion  developed  on  its  peculiar  lines,  as  in  the  case  of 
Calhoun,  to  a  quality  of  distinct  hardness,  they  were 
yet  essentially  abstractionists.  Political  metaphysi 
cians,  they  were  not  practical  men.  They  did  not  see 
things  as  they  really  were.  They  thus,  while  discuss 
ing  their  u  forty-bale  theories  "  and  the  "  patriarchal 
institution  "  in  connection  with  States'  rights  and  nul 
lification,  failed  to  realize  that  on  the  two  essential  fea 
tures  of  their  policy  —  slavery  and  secession  —  they 
were  contending  with  the  stars  in  their  courses.  The 
whole  world  was  moving  irresistibly  in  the  direction 
of  nationality  and  an  ever  increased  recognition  of 
the  rights  of  man  ;  while  they,  on  both  of  these  vital 
issues,  were  proclaiming  a  crusade  of  reaction. 

Moreover,  what  availed  the  views  or  intentions  of 
the  f  ramers  of  the  Constitution  ?  What  mattered  it 
in  1860  whether  they,  in  1787,  contemplated  a  Nation 
or  only  a  more  compact  federation  of  Sovereign  States  ? 
In  spite  of  logic  and  historical  precedent,  and  in  sub 
lime  unconsciousness  of  metaphysics  and  abstractions, 
realities  have  an  unpleasant  way  of  asserting  their  ex 
istence.  However  it  may  have  been  in  1788,  in  1860 
a  Nation  had  grown  into  existence.  Its  peaceful  dis 
memberment  was  impossible.  The  complex  system  of 
tissues  and  ligaments,  the  growth  of-  seventy  years, 
could  not  be  gently  taken  apart,  without  wound  or 
hurt ;  the  separation,  if  separation  there  was  to  be, 
involved  a  teaiing  asunder,  supplementing  a  liberal 


396     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

use  of  the  knife.  Their  professions  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding,  this  the  Southern  leaders  failed  not 
to  realize.  In  point  of  fact,  therefore,  believing  fully 
in  the  abstract  legality  of  secession,  and  the  justice 
and  sufficiency  of  the  grounds  on  which  they  acted, 
their  appeal  was  to  the  inalienable  right  of  revolu 
tion,  and  to  that  might  by  which  alone  the  right 
could  be  upheld.  Let  us  put  casuistry,  metaphysics, 
and  sentiment  aside,  and  come  to  actualities.  The 
secessionist  recourse  in  1861  was  to  the  sword ;  and 
to  the  sword  it  was  meant  to  have  recourse. 

I  have  thus  far  spoken  only  of  the  South  as  a  whole. 
Much  has  been  said  and  written  on  the  subject  of  an 
alleged  conspiracy,  in  those  days,  of  Southern  men  and 
leaders  against  the  Union  ;  of  the  designs  and  ulti 
mate  objects  of  the  alleged  conspirators ;  of  acts  of 
treachery  on  their  part,  and  the  part  of  their  accom 
plices,  towards  the  government,  of  which  they  were  the 
sworn  officials.  Into  this  phase  of  the  subject  I  do 
not  propose  to  enter.  That  the  leaders  in  Secession 
were  men  with  large  views,  and  that  they  had  matured 
a  comprehensive  policy  as  the  ultimate  outcome  of 
their  movement,  I  entertain  no  doubt.  They  looked 
unquestionably  to  an  easy  military  success,  and  the 
complete  establishment  of  their  Confederacy  ;  more 
remotely,  there  can  be  no  question  they  contemplated 
a  policy  of  extension,  and  the  establishment  along  the 
shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  in  the  Antilles  of 
a  great  semi-tropical,  slave-labor  republic ;  finally,  all 
my  investigations  have  tended  to  satisfy  me  that  they 
confidently  anticipated  an  early  disintegration  of  the 
Union,  and  the  accession  of  the  bulk  of  the  Northern 
States  to  the  Confederacy,  New  England  only  being 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?"     397 

sternly  excluded  therefrom  —  "  sloughed  off,"  as  they 
expressed  it.  The  capital  of  the  new  Confederacy  was 
to  be  Washington  ;  African  servitude,  under  reason 
able  limitations,  was  to  be  recognized  throughout  its 
limits  ;  agriculture  was  to  be  its  ruling  interest,  with 
a  tariff  and  foreign  policy  in  strict  accord  therewith. 
u  Secession  is  not  intended  to  break  up  the  present 
government,  but  to  perpetuate  it.  We  go  out  of  the 
Union,  not  to  destroy  it,  but  for  the  purpose  of  get 
ting  further  guarantees  and  security,"  — this  was  said 
in  February,  1861  ;  and  this  in  1900,  —  "  And  so  we 
believe  that,  with  the  success  of  the  South,  the  4  Union 
of  our  Fathers,'  which  the  South  was  the  principal 
factor  in  forming,  and  to  which  she  was  far  more  at 
tached  than  the  North,  would  have  been  restored  and 
reestablished  ;  that  in  this  Union,  the  South  would 
have  been  again  the  dominant  people,  the  controlling 
power."  Conceding  the  necessary  premises  of  fact 
and  law,  —  a  somewhat  considerable  concession,  but, 
perhaps,  conceivable,  —  conceding  these,  I  see  in  this 
position,  then  or  now,  nothing  illogical,  nothing  pro 
vocative  of  severe  criticism,  certainly  nothing  treason 
able.  Acting  on  sufficient  grounds,  of  which  those 
thus  acting  were  the  sole  judge,  proceeding  in  a  way 
indisputably  legal  and  regular,  it  was  proposed  to  re 
construct  the  Union  in  the  light  of  experience,  and 
on  a  new,  and,  as  they  considered,  an  improved  basis, 
without  New  England.  This  cannot  properly  be 
termed  a  conspiracy ;  it  was  a  legitimate  policy  based 
on  certain  assumed  data  legal,  moral,  and  economical. 
But  it  was  in  reality  never  for  a  moment  believed  that 
this  programme  could  be  peaceably  and  quietly  carried 
into  effect ;  and  the  assent  of  New  England  to  the 


398     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

arrangement  was  neither  asked  for,  assumed,  nor  ex 
pected.  New  England  was  distinctly  relegated  to  an 
outer  void,  —  at  once  cold,  dark,  inhospitable. 

As  to  participation  of  those  who  sympathized  in 
these  views  and  this  policy  in  the  councils  of  the  gov 
ernment,  so  furthering  schemes  for  its  overthrow  while 
sworn  to  its  support,  I  hold  it  unnecessary  to  speak. 
Such  were  traitors.  As  such,  had  they  met  their 
deserts,  they  should,  at  the  proper  time,  and  on  due 
process  of  law,  have  been  arrested,  tried,  convicted, 
sentenced,  and  hanged.  That  in  certain  well-remem 
bered  instances  this  course  was  not  pursued,  is,  to  my 
mind,  even  yet  much  to  be  deplored.  In  such  cases 
clemency  is  only  another  form  of  cant. 

Having  now  discussed  what  have  seemed  to  me  the 
necessary  preliminaries,  I  come  to  the  particular  cases 
of  Virginia  and  Robert  E.  Lee.  The  two  are  closely 
interwoven,  —  for  Virginia  was  always  Virginia,  and 
the  Lees  were,  first,  over  and  above  all,  Virginians. 
It  was  the  Duke  of  Wellington  who,  on  a  certain  mem 
orable  occasion,  indignantly  remarked  in  his  delight 
ful  French-English,  —  "  Mais  avant  tout  je  suis  gentil- 
homme  Anglais."  So  might  have  said  the  Lees  of 
Virginia  of  themselves. 

As  respects  Virginia,  moreover,  I  am  fain  to  say 
there  was  in  the  attitude  of  the  State  towards  the 
Confederacy,  and,  indeed,  in  its  bearing  throughout 
the  Civil  War,  something  which  appealed  strongly,  — 
something  unselfish  and  chivalric,  —  worthy  of  Vir 
ginia's  highest  record.  History  will,  I  think,  do  jus 
tice  to  it.  Virginia,  it  must  be  remembered,  while  a 
Slave  State,  was  not  a  Cotton  State.  This  was  a  dis 
tinction  implying  a  difference.  In  Virginia  the  insti- 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     399 

tiition  of  slavery  existed,  and  because  of  it  she  was 
in  close  sympathy  with  her  sister  Slave  States ;  but, 
while  in  the  Cotton  States  slavery  had  gradually  as 
sumed  a  purely  material  form,  in  Virginia  it  still 
retained  much  of  its  patriarchal  character.  The 
"  Border  "  States,  as  they  were  called,  and  among  them 
Virginia  especially,  had,  it  is  true,  gained  an  evil  name 
as  "  slave-breeding  ground ;  "  but  this  was  merely  an 
incident  to  a  system  in  which,  taken  by  and  large,  — 
viewed  in  the  rule  and  not  in  the  exception,  —  the 
being  with  African  blood  in  his  veins  was  not  looked 
upon  as  a  mere  transferable  chattel,  but  practically, 
and  to  a  large  extent,  was  attached  to  the  house  and 
the  soil.  This  fact  had  a  direct  bearing  on  the  moral 
issue  ;  for  slavery,  one  thing  in  Virginia,  was  quite 
another  in  Louisiana.  The  Virginian  pride  was  more 
over  proverbial.  Indeed,  I  doubt  if  local  feeling  and 
patriotism  and  devotion  to  the  State  ever  anywhere 
attained  a  fuller  development  than  in  the  community 
which  dwelt  in  the  region  watered  by  the  Potomac  and 
the  James,  of  which  Richmond  was  the  political  centre. 
We  of  the  North,  especially  we  of  New  England,  were 
Yankees  ;  but  a  Virginian  was  that,  and  nothing  else. 
I  have  heard  of  a  New  Englander,  of  a  Green  Moun 
tain  boy,  of  a  Rhode  Islander,  of  a  "  Nutmeg,"  of  a 
"  Blue-nose  "  even,  but  never  of  a  Massachusettensian. 
The  word  somehow  does  not  lend  itself  to  the  mouth, 
any  more  than  the  thought  to  the  mind. 

But  Virginia  was  strongly  attached  by  sentiment 
as  well  as  interest  to  the  Union.  The  birthplace  of 
Washington,  the  mother  of  States  as  well  as  of  Presi 
dents,  "  The  Old  Dominion,"  as  she  was  called,  and 
fondly  loved  to  call  herself,  had  never  been  affected  by 


400     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

the  nullification  heresies  of  South  Carolina ;  and  the 
long  line  of  her  eminent  public  men,  though,  in  1860, 
showing  marked  signs  of  a  deteriorating  standard, 
still  retained  a  prominence  in  the  national  councils. 
If  John  B.  Floyd  was  Secretary  of  War,  Winfield 
Scott  was  at  the  head  of  the  Army.  Torn  by  conflict 
ing  feelings,  Virginia,  still  clinging  to  the  Nation,  was 
unwilling  to  sever  her  connection  with  it  because  of 
the  lawful  election  of  an  anti-slavery  President,  even 
by  a  distinctly  sectional  vote.  For  a  time  she  even 
stayed  the  fast  flooding  tide  of  secession,  bringing 
about  a  brief  but  important  reaction.  Those  of  us 
old  enough  to  remember  the  drear  and  anxious  winter 
which  followed  the  election  and  preceded  the  inaugu 
ration  of  Lincoln,  recall  vividly  the  ray  of  bright  hope 
which,  in  the  midst  of  its  deepest  gloom,  then  came 
from  Virginia.  It  was  in  early  February.  Up  to 
that  time  the  record  was  unbroken.  Beginning  with 
South  Carolina  on  the  20th  of  December,  State  after 
State,  meeting  in  convention,  had  with  significant 
unanimity  passed  ordinances  of  secession.  Each  suc 
cessive  ordinance  was  felt  to  be  the  equivalent  of  a 
renewed  declaration  of  war.  The  outlook  was  dark 
indeed ,  and,  amid  the  fast  gathering  gloom,  all  eyes, 
all  thoughts,  turned  to  Virginia.  She  represented  the 
Border  States ;  her  action  it  was  felt  would  largely 
influence,  and  might  control  theirs.  John  Letcher 
was  then  Governor,  —  a  States'  Rights  Democrat,  of 
course,  —  but  a  Union  man.  By  him  the  legislature 
of  the  State  was  called  together  in  special  session,  and 
that  legislature,  in  January,  passed  what  was  known 
as  a  convention  bill.  Practically  Virginia  was  to  vote 
on  the  question  at  issue.  Events  moved  rapidly. 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?"     401 

South  Carolina  had  seceded  on  the  20th  of  December ; 
Mississippi,  on  the  9th  of  January ;  Florida,  on  the 
10th  ;  Alabama,  on  the  llth  ;  Georgia  followed  on  the 
19th ;  Louisiana  on  the  26th,  with  Texas  on  the  1st 
of  February.  The  procession  seemed  unending ;  the 
record  unbroken.  Not  without  cause  might  the  now 
thoroughly  frightened  friends  of  the  Union  have  ex 
claimed  with  Macbeth  — 

"  What !  will  the  line  stretch  out  to  the  crack  of  doom  ? 
Another  yet  ?    A  seventh  ?  " 

If  at  that  juncture  the  Old  Dominion  had,  by  a  de 
cisive  vote,  followed  in  the  steps  of  the  Cotton  States, 
it  implied  consequences  which  no  man  could  fathom. 
It  involved  the  possession  of  the  national  capitol,  and 
the  continuance  of  the  Government.  Maryland  would 
inevitably  follow  the  Virginian  lead ;  the  recently 
elected  President  had  not  yet  been  inaugurated ; 
taken  wholly  by  surprise,  the  North  was  divided  in 
sentiment ;  the  loyal  spirit  of  the  country  was  not 
aroused.  It  was  thus  an  even  question  whether,  on 
the  4th  of  March,  the  whole  machinery  of  the  de  facto 
government  would  not  be  in  the  hands  of  the  revolu 
tionists.  All  depended  on  Virginia.  This  is  now  for 
gotten  ;  none  the  less,  it  is  history. 

The  Virginia  election  was  held  on  the  4th  of 
February,  the  news  of  the  secession  of  Texas  — 
seventh  in  the  line  —  having  been  received  on  the 
2d.  Evidently,  the  action  of  Texas  was  carefully 
timed  for  effect.  Though  over  forty  years  ago,  I  well 
remember  that  day  —  gray,  overcast,  wintry  —  which 
succeeded  the  Virginia  election.  Then  living  in  Bos 
ton,  a  young  man  of  twenty-five,  I  shared  —  as  who  did 
not?  —  in  the  common  deep  depression  and  intense 


402     "SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

anxiety.  It  was  as  if  a  verdict  was  to  be  that  day 
announced  in  a  case  involving  fortune,  honor,  life 
even.  Too  harassed  for  work,  I  remember  abandon 
ing  my  desk  in  the  afternoon  to  seek  relief  in  physical 
activity,  for  the  ponds  in  the  vicinity  of  Boston  were 
ice-covered,  and  daily  thronged  with  skaters.  I  was 
soon  among  the  number  gloomily  seeking  unfrequented 
spots.  Suddenly  I  became  aware  of  an  unusual  move 
ment  in  the  throng  nearest  the  shore,  where  those 
fresh  from  the  city  arrived.  The  skaters  seemed 
crowding  to  a  common  point ;  and  a  moment  later 
they  scattered  again  with  cheers  and  gestures  of  relief. 
An  arrival  fresh  from  Boston  had  brought  the  first 
bulletin  of  yesterday's  election.  Virginia,  speaking 
against  secession,  had  emitted  no  uncertain  sound. 
It  was  as  if  a  weight  had  been  taken  off  the  mind  of 
every  one.  The  tide  seemed  turned  at  last.  For  my 
self,  I  remember  my  feelings  were  too  deep  to  find 
expression  in  words  or  sound.  Something  stuck  in 
my  throat.  I  wanted  to  be  by  myself. 

Nor  did  we  overestimate  the  importance  of  the 
event.  If  it  did  not  in  the  end  mean  reaction,  it 
did  mean  time  gained ;  and  time  then,  as  the  result 
showed,  was  vital.  William  H.  Seward,  about  to  be 
come  Secretary  of  State,  was  then  in  the  Senate,  and 
no  one  was  better  advised  as  to  the  true  posture  of 
affairs,  and  the  significance  of  events.  His  son  now 
wrote:  "The  people  of  the  District  are  looking  anx 
iously  for  the  result  of  the  Virginia  election.  They 
fear  that  if  Virginia  resolves  on  secession,  Maryland 
will  follow  ;  and  then  Washington  will  be  seized." 
On  February  3,  Seward  himself  wrote  to  his  wife: 
"  The  election  to-morrow  probably  determines  whether 


"SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     403 

all  the  Slave  States  will  take  the  attitude  of  disunion. 
Everybody  around  me  thinks  that  that  will  make  the 
separation  irretrievable,  and  involve  us  in  flagrant 
civil  war.  Practically  everybody  will  despair."  A  day 
or  two  later  the  news  came  "  like  a  gleam  of  sunshine 
in  a  storm."  The  disunion  movement  was  checked, 
perhaps  would  be  checkmated.  Well  might  Seward 
remark,  with  a  sigh  of  profound  relief :  "  At  least 
the  danger  of  conflict,  here  or  elsewhere,  before  the 
4th  of  March,  has  been  averted.  Time  has  been 
gained."  1  Time  was  gained ;  and  the  few  weeks  of 
precious  time  thus  gained  through  the.  expiring  effort 
of  Union  sentiment  in  Virginia  involved  the  vital 
fact  of  the  peaceful  delivery,  four  weeks  later,  of  the 
helm  of  state  into  the  hands  of  Lincoln. 

Thus,  be  it  always  remembered,  Virginia  did  not 
take  its  place  in  the  secession  movement  because  of 
the  election  of  an  anti-slavery  President.  It  did  not 
raise  its  hand  against  the  national  government  from 
mere  love  of  any  peculiar  institution,  or  a  wish  to 
protect  and  to  perpetuate  it.  It  refused  to  be  precipi 
tated  into  a  civil  convulsion ;  and  its  refusal  was  of 
vital  moment.  The  ground  of  Virginia's  final  action 
was  of  wholly  another  nature,  and  of  a  nature  far 
more  creditable.  Virginia,  as  I  have  said,  made  State 
Sovereignty  an  article  —  a  cardinal  article  —  of  its 
political  creed.  So,  logically  and  consistently,  it  took 
the  position  that,  though  it  might  be  unwise  for  a 
State  to  secede,  a  State  which  did  secede  could  not, 
and  should  not  be  coerced. 

To  us  now  this  position  seems  worse  than  illogical ; 
it  is  impossible.  So  events  proved  it  then.  Yet,  after 

1  Seward  at  Washington,  vol.  i.  p.  502. 


404     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

all,  it  is  based  on  the  great  fundamental  principle  of 
the  consent  of  the  governed  ;  and,  in  the  days  imme 
diately  preceding  the  war,  something  very  like  it  was 
accepted  as  an  article  of  correct  political  faith  by 
men  afterwards  as  strenuous  in  support  of  a  Union 
reestablished  by  force,  as  Charles  Sumner,  Abraham 
Lincoln,  William  H.  Seward,  Salmon  P.  Chase,  and 
Horace  Greeley.  The  difference  was  that,  confronted 
by  the  overwhelming  tide  of  events,  Virginia  adhered 
to  it ;  they,  in  presence  of  that  tide,  tacitly  abandoned 
it.  In  my  judgment,  they  were  right.  But  Virginia, 
though  mistaken,  more  consistent,  judged  otherwise. 
As  I  have  said,  in  shaping  a  practical  outcome  of  hu 
man  affairs  logic  is  often  as  irreconcilable  with  the  dic 
tates  of  worldly  wisdom  as  are  metaphysics  with  com 
mon  sense.  So,  now,  the  issue  shifted.  It  became  a 
question,  not  of  slavery,  or  of  the  wisdom,  or  even  the 
expediency,  of  secession,  but  of  the  right  of  the  Na 
tional  Government  to  coerce  a  Sovereign  State.  This 
at  the  time  was  well  understood.  The  extremists  of 
the  South,  counting  upon  it,  counted  with  absolute 
confidence;  and  openly  proclaimed  their  reliance  in 
debate.  Florida,  as  the  representatives  of  that  State 
confessed  on  the  floor  of  Congress,  might  in  itself  be 
of  small  account ;  but  Florida,  panoplied  with  sov 
ereignty,  was  hemmed  in  and  buttressed  against  assault 
by  protecting  sister  States. 

So,  in  his  history,  James  F.  Rhodes  asserts  that  — 
"  The  four  men  who  in  the  last  resort  made  the  de 
cision  that  began  the  war  were  ex-Senator  Chestnut, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Chisolm,  Captain  Lee,  all  three 
South  Carolinians,  and  Roger  A.  Pryor,  a  Virginia 
secessionist,  who,  two  days  before,  in  a  speech  at  the 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     405 

Charleston  hotel,  had  said,  '  I  will  tell  your  governor 
what  will  put  Virginia  in  the  Southern  Confederacy 
in  less  than  an  hour  by  Shrewsbury  clock.  Strike  a 
blow  ! '  " l  The  blow  was  to  be  in  reply  to  what  was 
accepted  as  the  first  overt  effort  at  the  national  coer 
cion  of  a  Sovereign  State,  —  the  attempted  relief  of 
Sumter.  That  attempt,  —  unavoidable  even  if  long 
deferred,  the  necessary  and  logical  outcome  of  a  sit 
uation  which  had  become  impossible  of  continuance, 
-  that  attempt,  construed  into  an  effort  at  coercion, 
swept  Virginia  from  her  Union  moorings. 

Thus,  when  the  long-deferred  hour  of  fateful  deci 
sion  came,  the  position  of  Virginia,  be  it  in  historical 
justice  said,  however  impetuous,  mistaken,  or  ill-ad 
vised,  was  taken  on  no  low  or  sordid  or  selfish  grounds. 
On  the  contrary,  the  logical  assertion  of  a  cardinal 
article  of  accepted  political  faith,  it  was  made  gener 
ously,  chivalrously,  in  a  spirit  almost  altruistic  ;  for, 
from  the  outset,  it  was  manifest  Virginia  had  nothing 
to  gain  in  that  conflict  of  which  she  must  perforce  be 
the  battle-ground.  True !  her  leading  men  doubtless 
believed  that  the  struggle  would  soon  be  brought  to  a 
triumphant  close,  —  that  Southern  chivalry  and  fight 
ing  qualities  would  win  a  quick  and  easy  victory  over  a 
more  materially  minded,  even  if  not  craven,  Northern 
mob  of  fanatics  and  cobblers  and  pedlers,  officered  by 
preachers ;  but,  however  thus  deceived  and  misled  at 
the  outset,  Virginia  entered  on  the  struggle  others  had 
initiated,  for  their  protection  and  in  their  behalf.  She 
thrust  herself  between  them  and  the  tempest  they  had 
invoked.  Technically  it  may  have  been  treasonable ; 
but  her  attitude  was  consistent, was  bold,  was  chivalrous: 

1  Rhodes :    United  States,  vol.  iii.  p.  349. 


406     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE ?" 

"  An  honourable  murderer  if  you  will ; 
For  nought  did  I  in  hate,  but  all  in  honour." 

So  much  for  Virginia ;  and  now  as  to  Robert  E. 
Lee.  More  than  once  already,  on  occasions  not  un 
like  this,  have  I  quoted  Oliver  Wendell  Holines's  re 
mark  in  answer  to  the  query  of  an  anxious  mother  as 
to  when  a  child's  education  ought  to  begin,  —  "  About 
250  years  before  it  is  born ;  "  and  it  is  a  fact  —  some 
what  necessitarian,  doubtless,  but  still  a  fact  —  that 
every  man's  life  is  largely  moulded  for  him  far  back 
in  the  ages.  We  philosophize  freely  over  fate  and 
free  will,  and  one  of  the  excellent  commonplaces  of 
our  educational  system  is  to  instil  into  the  minds  of 
the  children  in  our  common  schools  the  idea  that  every 
man  is  the  architect  of  his  own  life.  An  admirable 
theory  to  teach ;  but,  happily  for  the  race,  true  only 
to  a  very  limited  extent.  Heredity  is  a  tremendous 
limiting  fact.  Native  force  of  character  —  individ 
uality  —  doubtless  has  something  to  do  with  results ; 
but  circumstances,  ancestry,  environment  have  much 
more.  One  man  possibly  in  a  hundred  has  in  him  the 
inherent  force  to  make  his  conditions  largely  for  him 
self  ;  but  even  he  moves  influenced  at  every  step  from 
cradle  to  grave  by  ante-natal  and  birth  conditions. 
Take  any  man  you  please,  —  yourself,  for  instance ; 
now  and  again  the  changes  of  life  give  opportunity, 
and  the  individual  is  equal  to  the  occasion,  —  the 
roads  forking,  consciously  or  instinctively  he  makes 
his  choice.  Under  such  circumstances,  he  usually 
supposes  that  he  does  so  as  a  free  agent.  The  world 
so  assumes,  holding  him  responsible.  He  is  nothing 
of  the  sort ;  or  at  best  such  only  in  a  very  limited 
degree.  The  other  day  one  of  our  humorists  took 


" SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     407 

occasion  to  philosophize  on  this  topic,  delivering  what 
might  not  inaptly  be  termed  an  occasional  discourse 
appropriate  to  the  22d  of  February.  It  was  not 
only  worth  reading,  but  in  humor  and  sentiment  it 
was  somewhat  suggestive  of  the  melancholy  Jacques. 
"  We  are  made,  brick  by  brick,  of  influences,  pa 
tiently  built  up  around  the  framework  of  our  born 
dispositions.  It  is  the  sole  process  of  construction ; 
there  is  no  other.  Every  man,  woman,  and  child  is  an 
influence.  Washington's  disposition  was  born  in  him, 
he  did  not  create  it.  It  was  the  architect  of  his  char 
acter  ;  his  character  was  the  architect  of  his  achieve 
ments.  It  had  a  native  affinity  for  all  influences  fine 
and  great,  and  gave  them  hospitable  welcome  and  per 
manent  shelter.  It  had  a  native  aversion  for  all  influ 
ences  mean  and  gross,  and  passed  them  on.  It  chose 
its  ideals  for  him ;  and  out  of  its  patiently  gathered 
materials  it  built  and  shaped  his  golden  character. 
. "  And  we  give  him,  the  credit." 
Three  names  of  Virginians  are  impressed  on  the 
military  records  of  our  civil  war,  —  indelibly  im 
pressed,  —  Winfield  Scott,  George  Henry  Thomas, 
and  Robert  Edward  Lee;  the  last,  most  deeply.  Of 
the  three,  the  first  two  stood  by  the  flag ;  the  third 
went  with  his  State.  Each,  when  the  time  came, 
acted  conscientiously,  impelled  by  the  purest  sense 
of  loyalty,  honor,  and  obligation,  taking  that  course 
which,  under  the  circumstances  and  according  to  his 
lights,  seemed  to  him  right ;  and  each  doubtless 
thought  he  acted  as  a  free  agent .  To  a  degree  each 
was  a  free  agent ;  to  a  much  greater  degree  each  was 
the  child  of  anterior  conditions,  hereditary  sequence, 
existing  circumstances,  —  in  a  word,  of  human  envi- 


408     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

ronment,  moral,  material,  intellectual.  Scott,  or 
Thomas,  or  Lee,  being  as  he  was,  and  things  being  as 
things  were,  could  not  decide  otherwise  than  as  he  did 
decide.  Consider  them  in  order  ;  Scott  first :  — 

A  Virginian  by  birth,  early  association,  and  mar 
riage,  Scott,  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  Civil  War, 
had  not  lived  in  his  native  State  for  forty  years.  Not 
a  planter,  he  held  no  broad  acres  and  owned  no  slaves. 
Essentially  a  soldier,  he  was  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States ;  and,  for  twenty  years,  had  been  the  General 
in  command  of  its  army.  When,  in  April,  1861,  Vir 
ginia  passed  its  ordinance  of  secession,  he  was  well 
advanced  in  his  seventy-fifth  year,  —  an  old  man,  he 
was  no  longer  equal  to  active  service.  The  course  he 
would  pursue  was  thus  largely  marked  out  for  him  in 
advance  ;  a  violent  effort  on  his  part  could  alone  have 
forced  him  out  of  his  trodden  path.  When  subjected 
to  the  test,  what  he  did  was  infinitely  creditable  to 
him,  and  the  obligation  the  cause  of  the  Union  lay 
under  to  him  during  the  critical  period  between  De 
cember,  1860,  and  June,  1861,  can  scarcely  be  over 
stated  ;  but,  none  the  less,  in  doing  as  he  did,  it  can 
not  be  denied  he  followed  what  was  for  him  the  line 
of  least  resistance. 

Of  George  Henry  Thomas,  no  American,  North  or 
South,  —  above  all,  no  American  who  served  in  the 
Civil  War,  —  whether  wearer  of  the  blue  or  the  gray, 
—  can  speak,  save  with  infinite  respect,  —  always  with 
admiration,  often  with  love.  Than  his,  no  record  is 
clearer  from  stain.  Thomas  also  was  a  Virginian. 
At  the  time  of  the  breaking  out  of  the  Civil  War,  he 
held  the  rank  of  Major  in  that  regiment  of  cavalry  of 
which  Lee,  nine  years  his  senior  in  age,  was  Colonel. 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?"     409 

He  never  hesitated  in  his  course.  True  to  the  flag 
from  start  to  finish,  William  T.  Sherman,  then  General 
of  the  Army,  in  the  order  announcing  the  death  of  his 
friend  and  classmate  at  the  Academy,  most  properly 
said  of  him  :  "  The  very  impersonation  of  honesty,  in 
tegrity,  and  honor,  he  will  stand  to  posterity  as  the  beau 
ideal  of  the  soldier  and  gentleman."  More  tersely, 
Thomas  stands  for  character  personified  ;  Washington 
himself  not  more  so.  And  now  having  said  this,  let 
us  come  again  to  the  choice  of  Hercules,  —  the  parting 
of  those  terrible  ways  of  1861. 

Like  Scott  and  Lee,  Thomas  was  a  Virginian  ;  but, 
again,  there  are  Virginians  and  Virginians.  Thomas 
was  not  a  Lee.  When,  in  1855,  the  Second  United 
States  cavalry  was  organized,  Jefferson  Davis  being- 
Secretary  of  War,  Captain  Thomas,  as  he  then  was 
and  in  his  thirty -ninth  year,  was  appointed  its  junior 
Major.  Between  that  time  and  April,  1861,  fifty-one 
officers  are  said  to  have  borne  commissions  in  that 
regiment,  thirty-one  of  whom  were  from  the  South  ; 
and  of  those  thirty-one,  no  less  than  twenty-four  en 
tered  the  Confederate  service,  twelve  of  whom,  among 
them  Kobert  E.  Lee,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  and  John 
B.  Hood,  became  General  officers.  The  name  of  the 
Virginian,  George  H.  Thomas,  stands  first  of  the  faith 
ful  seven  ;  but,  Union  or  Confederate,  it  is  a  record 
of  great  names,  and  fortunate  is  the  people,  great  of 
necessity  their  destiny,  which  in  the  hour  of  exigency, 
on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  naturally  develops  from 
the  roster  of  a  single  regiment  men  of  the  ability,  the 
disinterestedness,  the  capacity,  and  the  character  of 
Loe,  Thomas,  Johnston,  and  Hood.  It  is  a  record  which 
inspires  confidence  as  well  as  pride. 


410     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

And  now  of  the  two  men  —  Thomas  and  Lee. 
Though  born  in  Virginia,  General  Thomas  was  not  of 
a  peculiarly  Virginian  descent.  By  ancestry,  he  was, 
on  the  father's  side,  Welsh ;  French,  on  that  of  the 
mother.  He  was  not  of  the  old  Virginia  stock.  Born 
in  the  southeastern  portion  of  the  State,  near  the  North 
Carolina  line,  we  are  told  that  his  family,  dwelling 
on  a  "  goodly  home  property,"  was  "  well  to  do  "  and 
eminently  "  respectable ; "  but,  it  is  added,  there 
"  were  no  cavaliers  in  the  Thomas  family,  and  not  the 
remotest  trace  of  the  Pocahontas  blood."  When  the 
war  broke  out,  in  1861,  Thomas  had  been  twenty-one 
years  a  commissioned  officer ;  and  during  those  years 
he  seems  to  have  lived  almost  everywhere  except  in 
Virginia.  It  had  been  a  life  passed  at  military  sta 
tions  ;  his  wife  was  from  New  York  ;  his  home  was  on 
the  Hudson  rather  than  on  the  Nottoway.  In  his 
native  State  he  owned  no  property,  land  or  chattels. 
Essentially  a  soldier,  when  the  hour  for  choice  came, 
the  soldier  dominated  the  Virginian.  He  stood  by 
the  flag. 

Not  so  Lee ;  for  to  Lee  I  now  come.  Of  him  it 
might,  and  in  justice  must,  be  said,  that  he  was  more 
than  of  the  essence,  he  was  of  the  very  quintessence 
of  Virginia.  In  his  case,  the  roots  and  fibres  struck 
down  and  spread  wide  in  the  soil,  making  him  of  it 
a  part.  A  son  of  the  revolutionary  "  Light-Horse 
Harry,"  he  had  married  a  Custis.  His  children  re 
presented  all  there  was  of  descent,  blood,  and  tradition 
of  the  Old  Dominion,  made  up  as  the  Old  Dominion 
was  of  tradition,  blood,  and  descent.  The  holder  of 
broad  patrimonial  acres,  by  birth  and  marriage  he 
was  a  slave-owner,  and  a  slave-owner  of  the  patri- 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     411 

arclial  type,  holding  "  slavery,  as  an  institution,  a 
moral  and  political  evil."  Every  sentiment,  every 
memory,  every  tie  conceivable  bound  him  to  Virginia ; 
and,  when  the  choice  was  forced  upon  him,  —  had  to 
be  made,  —  sacrificing  rank,  career,  the  flag,  he  threw 
in  his  lot  with  Virginia.  He  did  so  with  open  eyes, 
and  weighing  the  consequences.  He  at  least  indulged 
in  no  self-deception,  wandered  away  from  the  path 
in  no  cloud  of  political  metaphysics,  nourished  no 
delusion  as  to  an  early  and  easy  triumph.  "  Seces 
sion,"  as  he  wrote  to  his  son,  "  is  nothing  but  revo 
lution.  The  framers  of  our  Constitution  never  ex 
hausted  so  much  labor,  wisdom,  and  forbearance  in 
its  formation,  and  surrounded  it  with  so  many  guards 
and  securities,  if  it  was  intended  to  be  broken  by 
every  member  of  the  Confederacy  at  will.  It  is  idle 
to  talk  of  secession."  But  he  also  believed  that  his 
permanent  allegiance  was  due  to  Virginia ;  that  her 
secession,  though  revolutionary,  bound  all  Virginians, 
and  ended  their  connection  with  and  duties  to  the 
national  government.  Thereafter,  to  remain  in  the 
United  States  army  would  be  treason  to  Virginia. 
So,  three  days  after  Virginia  passed  its  ordinance,  he, 
being  then  at  Arlington,  resigned  his  commission,  at 
the  same  time  writing  to  his  sister,  the  wife  of  a  Union 
officer,  —  "  We  are  now  in  a  state  of  war  which  will 
yield  to  nothing.  The  whole  South  is  in  a  state  of 
revolution,  into  which  Virginia,  after  a  long  struggle, 
has  been  drawn  ;  and,  though  I  recognize  no  necessity 
for  this  state  of  things,  and  would  have  forborne  and 
pleaded  to  the  end  for  redress  of  grievances,  real  or 
supposed,  yet  in  my  own  person  I  had  to  meet  the 
question  whether  I  should  take  part  against  my  native 


412     "SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

State.  With  all  my  devotion  to  the  Union,  and  the 
feeling  of  loyalty  and  duty  of  an  American  citizen,  I 
have  not  been  able  to  make  up  my  mind  to  raise  my 
hand  against  my  relatives,  my  children,  my  home.  I 
have,  therefore,  resigned  my  commission  in  the  army  ; 
and,  save  in  defence  of  my  native  State,  I  hope  I  may 
never  be  called  upon  to  draw  my  sword."  Two  days 
before  he  had  been  unreservedly  tendered,  on  behalf 
of  President  Lincoln,  the  command  of  the  Union  army 
then  immediately  to  be  put  in  the  field  in  front  of 
Washington,  — the  command  shortly  afterwards  held 
by  General  McDowell. 

So  thought  and  spoke  and  wrote  and  acted  Robert 
E.  Lee  in  April,  1861.  He  has,  for  the  decision  thus 
reached,  been  termed  by  some  a  traitor,  a  deserter, 
almost  an  apostate,  and  consigned  to  the  "  avenging 
pen  of  History."  I  cannot  so  see  it ;  I  am  confident 
posterity  will  not  so  see  it.  The  name  and  conditions 
being  changed,  those  who  uttered  the  words  of  cen 
sure,  invoking  "  the  avenging  pen,"  did  not  so  see  it 
—  have  not  seen  it  so.  Let  us  appeal  to  the  record. 
What  otherwise  did  George  Washington  do  under 
circumstances  not  dissimilar?  What  would  he  have 
done  under  circumstances  wholly  similar  ?  Like  Lee, 
Washington  was  a  soldier ;  like  Lee,  he  was  a  Vir 
ginian  before  he  was  a  soldier.  He  had  served  under 
King  George's  flag ;  he  had  sworn  allegiance  to  King 
George  ;  his  ambition  had  been  to  hold  the  royal  com 
mission.  Presently  Virginia  seceded  from  the  British 
empire,  —  renounced  its  allegiance.  What  did  Wash 
ington  do  ?  He  threw  in  his  lot  with  his  native  pro 
vince.  Do  you  hold  him  then  to  have  been  a  traitor, 
—  to  have  been  false  to  his  colors  ?  Such  is  not  your 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?"     413 

verdict ;  such  has  not  been  the  verdict  of  history. 
He  acted  conscientiously,  loyally,  as  a  son  of  Virginia, 
and  according  to  his  lights.  Will  you  say  that  Lee 
did  otherwise  ? 

But  men  love  to  differentiate :  and  of  drawing  of 
distinctions  there  is  no  end.  The  cases  were  dis 
similar,  it  will  be  argued ;  at  the  time  Virginia  re 
nounced  its  allegiance  "Washington  did  not  hold  the 
King's  commission,  indeed  he  never  held  it.  As  a 
soldier  he  was  a  provincial  always,  —  he  bore  a  Vir 
ginian  commission.  True !  Let  the  distinction  be 
conceded  ;  then  assume  that  the  darling  wish  of  his 
younger  heart  had  been  granted  to  him,  and  that  he 
had  received  the  King's  commission,  and  held  it  in 
1775;  —  what  course  would  he  then  have  pursued? 
What  course  would  you  wish  him  to  have  pursued? 
Do  you  not  wish  —  do  you  not  know  —  that,  circum 
stanced  as  then  he  would  have  been,  he  would  have 
done  exactly  as  Robert  E.  Lee  did  eighty-six  years 
later  ?  He  would  first  have  resigned  his  commission  ; 
and  then  arrayed  himself  on  the  side  of  Virginia. 
Would  you  have  had  him  do  otherwise?  And  so  it 
goes  in  this  world.  In  such  cases  the  usual  form  of 
speech  is  :  "  Oh !  that  is  different !  Another  case 
altogether !  "  Yes,  it  is  different ;  it  is  another  case. 
For  it  makes  a  world  of  difference  with  a  man  who 
argues  thus,  whether  it  is  his  ox  that  is  gored  or  the 
ox  of  the  other  man ! 

And  here  in  preparing  this  address  I  must  fairly 
acknowledge  having  encountered  an   obstacle   in  my 
path  also.     When  considering  the  course  of  another, 
it  is  always  well  to  ask    one's  self  the  question,  — 
What  would  you  yourself  have  done  if  similarly  placed  ? 


414     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

Warmed  by  my  argument,  and  the  great  precedents 
of  Lee  and  of  Washington,  I  did  so  here.  I  and 
mine  were  and  are  at  least  as  much  identified  with 
Massachusetts  as  was  Lee  and  his  with  Virginia ; 
traditionally,  historically,  by  blood  and  memory  and 
name,  we  with  the  Puritan  Commonwealth  as  they 
with  the  Old  Dominion.  What,  I  asked  myself, 
would  I  have  done  had  Massachusetts  at  any  time 
arrayed  itself  against  the  common  country,  though 
without  my  sympathy  and  assent,  even  as  Virginia  ar 
rayed  itself  against  the  Union  without  the  sympathy 
and  assent  of  Lee  in  1861?  The  question  gave  me 
pause.  And  then  1  must  confess  to  a  sense  of  the 
humor  of  the  situation  coming  over  me,  as  I  found  it 
answered  to  my  hand.  The  case  had  already  arisen ; 
the  answer  had  been  given ;  nor  had  it  been  given 
in  any  uncertain  tone.  The  dark  and  disloyal  days 
of  the  earlier  years  of  the  century  just  ended  rose 
in  memory,  —  the  days  of  the  Embargo,  the  Leopard 
and  the  Chesapeake,  and  of  the  Hartford  Convention, 
The  course  then  taken  by  those  in  political  control 
in  Massachusetts  is  recorded  in  history.  It  verged 
dangerously  close  on  that  pursued  by  Virginia  and 
the  South  fifty  years  later :  and  the  quarrel  then  was 
foreign ;  it  was  no  domestic  broil.  One  of  my  name, 
from  whom  I  claim  descent,  was  in  those  years  promi 
nent  in  public  life.  He  accordingly  was  called  upon 
to  make  the  choice  of  Hercules,  as  later  was  Lee.  He 
made  his  choice ;  and  it  was  for  the  common  country 
as  against  his  section.1  The  result  is  matter  of  history. 

1  "  I  fully  opened  to  [Josiah  Quincy,  then  a  member  of  Congress 
from  Massachusetts]  my  motives  for  supporting1  the  administration 
at  this  crisis  [February  1,  1808],  and  my  sense  of  the  danger  which  a 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?"     415 

Because  he  was  a  Union  man,  and  held  country  higher 
than  State  or  party,  John  Quincy  Adams  was  in  1808 

spirit  of  opposition  is  bringing  on  the  Union.  I  told  him  where  that 
opposition  in  case  of  war  must  in  its  nature  end,  —  either  in  a  civil 
war,  or  in  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  with  the  Atlantic  States  in 
subserviency  to  Great  Britain.  .That  to  resist  this  I  was  ready,  if 
necessary,  to  sacrifice  everything4 1  have  in  life,  and  even  life  itself." 
Memoirs  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  vol.  i.  p.  510. 

"  With  regard  to  the  project  of  a  separate  Northern  Confederacy, 
formed  in  the  winter  of  1803-4,  in  consequence  of  the  Louisiana  ces 
sion,  it  is  not  to  me  that  you  must  apply  for  copies  of  the  correspond 
ence  in  which  it  was  contained.  To  that  and  to  every  other  project 
of  disunion,  I  have  been  constantly  opposed.  My  principles  do  not 
admit  the  right  even  of  the  people,  still  less  of  the  legislature  of  any 
one  State  in  the  Union,  to  secede  at  pleasure  from  the  Union.  No 
provision  is  made  for  the  exercise  of  this  right,  either  by  the  Federal 
or  any  of  the  State  constitutions.  The  act  of  exercising  it  presup 
poses  a  departure  from  the  principle  of  compact,  and  a  resort  to  that 
of  force. 

"  If,  in  the  exercise  of  their  respective  functions,  the  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial  authorities  of  the  Union  on  one  side,  and  of 
one  or  more  States  on  the  other,  are  brought  into  direct  collision  with 
each  other,  the  relations  between  the  parties  are  no  longer  those  of 
constitutional  right,  but  of  independent  force.  Each  party  construes 
the  common  compact  for  itself.  The  constructions  are  irreconcilable 
together.  There  is  no  umpire  between  them,  and  the  appeal  is  to 
the  sword,  —  the  ultimate  arbiter  of  right  between  independent  States, 
but  not  between  the  members  of  one  body  politic.  I  therefore  hold 
it  as  a  principle,  without  exception,  that,  whenever  the  constituted 
authorities  of  a  State  authorize  resistance  to  any  act  of  Congress,  or 
pronounce  it  unconstitutional,  they  do  thereby  declare  themselves  and 
their  State  quoad  hoc  out  of  the  pale  of  the  Union.  That  there  is  no 
supposable  case,  in  which  the  people  of  a  State  might  place  themselves 
in  this  attitude,  by  the  primitive  right  of  insurrection  against  oppres 
sion,  I  will  not  affirm  ;  but  they  have  delegated  no  such  power  to  their 
legislatures  or  their  judges :  and  if  there  be  such  a  right,  it  is  the 
right  of  an  individual  to  commit  suicide,  —  the  right  of  an  inhabitant 
of  a  populous  city  to  set  fire  to  his  own  dwelling-house.  These  are  my 
views."  J.  Q.  Adams,  December  30,  1828  :  Correspondence  between 
John  Quincy  Adams  .  .  .  and  several  citizens  of  Massachusetts  concern 
ing  the  charge  of  a  design  to  dissolve  the  Union  [1829],  pp.  32,  33 ; 
Henry  Adams  :  New  England  Federalism,  pp.  57-8. 

"  Fellow-citizens,  if  there  be  on  this  side  of  the  grave  a  subject  of 


416      "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

driven  from  office,  a  successor  to  him  in  the  United 
States  Senate  was  elected  long  before  the  expiration 
of  his  term,  and  he  himself  was  forced  into  what  at 
the  time  was  regarded  as  an  honorable  exile.  Nor 
was  the  line  of  conduct  then  by  him  pursued  —  that 
of  unswerving  loyalty  to  the  Union  —  ever  forgotten, 
or  wholly  forgiven.  He  had  put  country  above  party  ; 
and  party  leaders  have  long  memories.  Even  so 
broad-minded  and  clear-thinking  a  man  as  Theodore 
Parker,  when  delivering  a  eulogy  upon  J.  Q.  Adams 
forty  years  later,  thus  expressed  himself  of  this  act 
of  supreme  self-sacrifice  and  loyalty  to  Nation  rather 
than  to  State :  "To  my  mind,  that  is  the  worst  act 
of  his  public  life  ;  I  cannot  justify  it.  I  wish  I  could 
find  some  reasonable  excuse  for  it.  ...  However,  it 
must  be  confessed  that  this,  though  not  the  only  in 
stance  of  injustice,  is  the  only  case  of  servile  compli 
ance  with  the  Executive  to  be  found  in  the  whole  life 
of  the  man.  It  was  a  grievous  fault,  but  grievously 
did  he  answer  it ;  and  if  a  long  life  of  unfaltering  re 
sistance  to  every  attempt  at  the  assumption  of  power 
is  fit  atonement,  then  the  expiation  was  abundantly 
made."1 

deep  and  awful  solemnity  to  you  all,  it  is  this.  Here,  in  this  first 
resolution  appended  to  the  final  report  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  is 
the  last  result  of  that  project  which  had  been  fermenting  in  New 
England  at  least  from  the  spring  of  the  year  1804  until  January, 
1815.  Here  it  is  in  its  nakedness  before  you.  It  is  a  recommenda 
tion  to  the  legislatures  of  the  five  New  England  States  to  pass  laws 
for  the  protection  of  their  citizens,  in  direct  and  open  resistance 
against  existing-  acts  of  Congress,  —  against  the  supreme  law  of  the 
land.  ...  To  resist  and  defeat  that  system  of  measures  has  been  the 
greatest  struggle  of  my  life.  It  was  that  to  which  I  have  made 
the  greatest  sacrifices,  and  for  which  I  have  received,  in  the  support 
and  confidence  of  my  country,  the  most  ample  rewards."  Henry 
Adams :  New  England  Federalism,  pp.  300,  301. 
1  Works  (London,  1863),  vol.  iv.  pp.  154,  156. 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     417 

"VV hat  more,  or  worse,  on  the  other  side,  could  be 
said  of  Lee  ? 

Perhaps  I  should  enter  some  plea  in  excuse  of  this 
diversion ;  but,  for  me,  it  may  explain  itself,  or  go  un 
explained.  Confronted  with  the  question,  what  would 
I  have  done  in  1861  had  positions  been  reversed,  and 
Massachusetts  taken  the  course  then  taken  by  Vir 
ginia,  I  found  the  answer  already  recorded.  I  would 
have  gone  with  the  Union,  and  against  Massachusetts. 
None  the  less,  I  hold  Massachusetts  estopped  in  the 
case  of  Lee.  "  Let  the  galled  jade  wince,  our  withers 
are  un wrung ;  "  but,  I  submit,  however  it  might  be 
with  me  or  mine,  it  does  not  lie  in  the  mouths  of 
the  descendants  of  the  New  England  Federalists  of 
the  first  two  decennials  of  the  nineteenth  century  to 
invoke  "  the  avenging  pen  of  History  "  to  record  an 
adverse  verdict  in  the  case  of  any  son  of  Virginia  who 
threw  in  his  lot  with  his  State  in  1861. 

Thus  much  for  the  choice  of  Hercules.  Pass  on  to 
what  followed.  Of  Robert  E.  Lee  as  the  commander 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  —  at  once  the 
buckler  and  the  sword  of  the  Confederacy,  —  I  shall 
say  few  words.  I  was  in  the  ranks  of  those  opposed 
to  him.  For  years  I  was  face  to  face  with  some 
fragment  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and 
intent  to  do  it  harm ;  and  during  those  years  there 
was  not  a  day  when  I  would  not  have  drawn  a  deep 
breath  of  relief  and  satisfaction  at  hearing  of  the 
death  of  Lee,  even  as  I  did  draw  it  at  hearing  of  the 
death  of  Jackson.  But  now,  looking  back  through  a 
perspective  of  nearly  forty  years,  I  glory  in  it,  and  in 
them  as  foes  ;  they  were  worthy  of  the  best  of  steel. 
I  am  proud  now  to  say  that  1  was  their  countryman. 
Whatever  differences  of  opinion  may  exist  as  to  the 


418     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

course  of  Lee  when  he  made  his  choice,  of  Lee  as  a 
foe  and  the  commander  of  an  army  but  one  opinion 
can  be  entertained.  Every  inch  a  soldier,  he  was  as 
an  opponent  not  less  generous  and  humane  than  for 
midable,  a  type  of  highest  martial  character ;  cautious, 
magnanimous,  and  bold,  a  very  thunderbolt  in  war, 
he  was  self-contained  in  victory,  but  greatest  in  defeat. 
To  that  escutcheon  attaches  no  stain. 

I  now  come  to  what  I  have  always  regarded  —  shall 
ever  regard  —  as  the  most  creditable  episode  in  all 
American  history,  —  an  episode  without  a  blemish,  — 
imposing,  dignified,  simple,  heroic.  I  refer  to  Ap- 
pomattox.  Two  men  met  that  day,  representative 
of  American  civilization,  the  whole  world  looking  on. 
The  two  were  Grant  and  Lee  —  types  each.  Both 
rose,  and  rose  unconsciously,  to  the  full  height  of  the 
occasion,  —  and  than  that  occasion  there  has  been  none 
greater.  About  it,  and  them,  there  was  no  theatrical 
display,  no  self -consciousness,  no  effort  at  effect.  A 
great  crisis  was  to  be  met ;  and  they  met  that  crisis  as 
great  countrymen  should.  Consider  the  possibilities, 
think  for  a  moment  of  what  that  day  might  have  been ; 
you  will  then  see  cause  to  thank  God  for  much. 

That  month  of  April  saw  the  close  of  exactly  four 
years  of  persistent  strife,  —  a  strife  which  the  whole 
civilized  world  had  been  watching  intently.  Demo 
cracy  —  the  capacity  of  man  in  his  present  stage  of 
development  for  self-government  —  was  believed  to  be 
on  trial.  The  wish  the  father  to  the  thought,  the 
prophets  of  evil  had  been  liberal  in  prediction.  It  so 
chances  that  my  attention  has  been  specially  drawn  to 
the  European  utterances  of  that  time ;  and,  read  in 
the  clear  light  of  subsequent  history,  I  use  words  of 


"SHALL  CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     419 

moderation  when  I  say  that  they  are  now  both  incon 
ceivable  and  ludicrous.1  Staid  journals,  grave  public 
men,  seemed  to  take  what  was  little  less  than  pleasure 
in  pronouncing  that  impossible  of  occurrence  which 
was  destined  soon  to  occur,  and  in  committing  them 
selves  to  readings  of  the  book  of  fate  in  exact  op 
position  to  what  the  muse  of  history  was  wetting  the 
pen  to  record.  Volumes  of  unmerited  abuse  and 
false  vaticination  —  and  volumes  hardly  less  amusing 
now  than  instructive  —  could  be  garnered  from  the 
columns  of  the  London  Times,  —  volumes  in  which 
the  spirit  of  contemptuous  and  patronizing  dislike 
sought  expression  in  the  profoundest  ignorance  of 
facts,  set  down  in  bitterest  words.  Not  only  were 
republican  institutions  and  man's  capacity  for  self- 
government  on  trial,  but  the  severest  of  sentences  was 
imposed  in  advance  of  the  adverse  verdict,  assumed 
to  be  inevitable.  Then,  suddenly,  came  the  dramatic 
climax  at  Appomattox,  —  dramatic,  I  say,  not  the 
atrical,  —  severe  in  its  simple,  sober,  matter-of-fact 
majesty.  The  world,  I  again  assert,  has  seen  nothing 
like  it ;  and  the  world,  instinctively,  was  conscious 
of  the  fact.  I  like  to  dwell  on  the  familiar  circum 
stances  of  the  day,  —  on  its  momentous  outcome,  on  its 
far-reaching  results.  It  affords  one  of  the  greatest 
educational  object-lessons  to  be  found  in  history ;  and 
the  actors  were  worthy  of  the  theatre,  the  auditory, 
and  the  play. 

A  mighty  tragedy  was  drawing  to  a  close.     The 

breathless  world  was  the  audience.     It  was  a  bright, 

balmy  April   Sunday  in    a   quiet  Virginia    landscape, 

with  two  veteran  armies  confronting  each  other ;  one, 

1  Supra,  pp.  74,  75,  77,  262. 


420     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

game  to  the  death,  completely  in  the  grasp  of  the 
other.  The  future  was  at  stake.  What  might  ensue  ? 
What  might  not  ensue  ?  Would  the  strife  end  then 
and  there?  Would  it  die  in  a  death  grapple,  only 
to  reappear  in  that  chronic  form  of  a  vanquished  but 
indomitable  people  writhing  and  struggling  in  the 
grasp  of  an  insatiate,  but  only  nominal  victor,  —  such 
a  struggle  as  all  European  authorities  united  in  con 
fidently  predicting  ? 

The  answer  depended  on  two  men,  —  the  captains 
of  the  contending  forces.  Grant  that  day  had  Lee 
at  his  mercy.  He  had  but  to  close  his  hand,  and  his 
opponent  was  crushed.  Think  what  then  might  have 
resulted  had  those  two  men  been  other  than  they  were, 

—  had  the  one  been  stern   and  aggressive,  the  other 
sullen  and  unyielding.     Most   fortunately  for  us,  they 
were  what    and  who    they  were,  —  Grant   and  Lee. 
More,  I  need  not,  could  not  say  ;  this  only  let  me  add, 

—  a  people  has  good  right  to  be  proud  of  the  past  and 
self-confident  of  its  future  when  on  so  great  an  occa 
sion  it  naturally  develops  at  the  front  men  who  meet 
each  other  as  those  two  met  each  other  then.     Of  the 
two,  I  know  not  to  which  to  award  the  palm.     Instinc 
tively,  unconsciously,  they  vied  not  unsuccessfully  each 
with  the  other,  in  dignity,  magnanimity,  simplicity. 

"  Si    fractus    illabatur    orbis 
Impavidum  ferient   ruinae." 

With  a  home  no  longer  his,  Lee  then  sheathed  his 
sword.  With  the  silent  dignity  of  his  subsequent 
life,  after  he  thus  accepted  defeat,  all  are  familiar. 
He  left  behind  him  no  querulous  memoirs,  no  excul 
patory  vindication,  no  controversial  utterances.  For 
him,  history  might  explain  itself,  —  posterity  formu- 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?"     421 

late  its  own  verdict.  Surviving  Appomattox  but  a 
little  more  than  five  years,  those  years  were  not  un 
marked  by  incidents  very  gratifying  to  American  re 
collection  ;  for  we  Americans  do,  I  think,  above  all 
things  love  magnanimity,  and  appreciate  action  at 
once  fearless  and  generous.  We  all  remember  how 
by  the  grim  mockery  of  fate  —  as  if  to  test  to  the 
uttermost  American  capacity  for  self-government  — 
Abraham  Lincoln  was  snatched  away  at  the  moment 
of  crisis  from  the  helm  of  state,  and  Andrew  John 
son  substituted  for  him.  I  think  it  110  doubtful  anti 
cipation  of  historical  judgment  to  say  that  a  more 
unfortunate  selection  could  not  well  have  chanced. 
In  no  single  respect,  it  is  safe  to  say,  was  Andrew 
Johnson  adapted  for  the  peculiar  duties  which  Booth's 
pistol  imposed  upon  him.  One  of  Johnson's  most 
unhappy,  most  ill-considered  convictions  was  that  our 
Civil  War  was  a  conventional  old-time  rebellion  ;  that 
rebellion  was  treason  ;  that  treason  was  a  crime  ;  and 
that  a  crime  was  something  for  which  punishment 
should  in  due  course  of  law  be  meted  out.  He,  there 
fore,  wanted,  or  thought  he  wanted,  to  have  the  scenes 
of  England's  Convention  Parliament  and  the  Kestora- 
tion  of  1660  reenacted  here,  as  a  fitting  sequel  of  our 
great  conflict.  Most  fortunately,  the  American  peo 
ple  then  gave  evidence  to  Europe  of  a  capacity  for 
self-restraint  and  self-government  not  traceable  to 
English  parentage  or  precedents.  No  Cromwell's 
head  grinned  from  our  Westminster  Hall  ;  no  con 
victed  traitor  swung  in  chains  ;  no  shambles  dripped 
blood.  None  the  less  Andrew  Johnson  called  for 
"  indictments,"  and  one  day  demanded  that  of  Lee. 
Then  out  spoke  Grant,  General  of  the  Army.  Lee 


422     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A   STATUE?" 

he  declared  was  his  prisoner.  He  had  surrendered 
to  him,  and  in  reliance  on  his  word.  He  had  received 
assurance  that  so  long  as  he  quietly  remained  at  his 
home,  and  did  not  offend  against  the  law,  he  should  not 
be  molested.  He  had  done  so  ;  and,  so  long  as  Grant 
held  his  commission,  molested  he  should  not  be. 
Needless,  as  pleasant,  to  say,  what  Grant  then  grimly 
intimated  did  not  take  place.  Lee  was  not  molested ; 
nor  did  the  General  of  the  Army  indignantly  fling 
his  commission  at  an  accidental  President's  feet. 
That,  if  necessary,  he  would  have  done  so,  I  take  to 
be  quite  indubitable. 

Of  Lee's  subsequent  life,  as  head  of  Washington 
College,  I  have  but' one  anecdote  to  offer.  I  believe 
it  to  be  typical.  A  few  months  ago  I  received  a  let 
ter  from  a  retired  army  officer  of  high  character  from 
which  I  extract  the  following :  "  Lee  was  essentially 
a  Virginian.  His  sword  was  Virginia's,  and  I  fancy 
the  State  had  higher  claims  upon  him  than  had  the 
Confederacy,  just  as  he  supposed  it  had  than  the 
United  States.  But>  after  the  surrender,  he  stood 
firmly  and  unreservedly  in  favor  of  loyalty  to  the 
Nation.  A  gentleman  told  me  this  anecdote.  As  a 
boy  he  ran  away  from  his  Kentucky  home,  and  served 
the  last  two  years  in  the  rebel  ranks.  After  the  war 
he  resumed  his  studies  under  Lee's  presidency  ;  and 
on  one  occasion  delivered  as  a  college  exercise  an 
oration,  with  eulogistic  reference  to  the  *  Lost  Cause ' 
and  what  it  meant.  Later,  General,  then  President, 
Lee  sent  for  the  student,  and,  after  praising  his  com 
position  and  delivery,  seriously  warned  him  against 
holding  or  advancing  such  views,  impressing  strongly 
upon  him  the  unity  of  the  Nation,  and  urging  him 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     423 

to  devote  himself  loyally  to  maintain  the  integrity 
and  the  honor  of  the  United  States.  The  kindly 
paternal  advice  thus  given  was,  I  imagine,  typical  of 
his  whole  post  helium  life."  Let  this  one  instance  suf 
fice.  It  illustrates  all.  Here  was  magnanimity,  phi- 
losophy,  true  patriotism,  —  the  pure  American  spirit. 
Accepting  the  situation  loyally  and  in  manly,  silent 
fashion,  —  without  self -consciousness  or  mental  reser 
vation,  —  he  sought  by  precept,  and  yet  more  by  a 
great  example,  to  rebuild  through  constitutional  action 
the  shattered  community,  of  which  he  was  the  most 
observed  representative,  in  accordance  with  the  new 
conditions  by  war  and  fate  imposed  upon  it.  Talk  of 
traitors  and  of  treason  !  The  man  who  pursued  that 
course  and  instilled  that  spirit  had  not,  could  not  have 
had.  in  his  whole  being,  one  drop  of  traitor's  blood 
or  conceived  a  treacherous  thought.  His  lights  may  -* 
have  been  wrong,  —  according  to  our  ideas  then  and 
now  they  were  wrong ;  but  they  were  his  lights,  and, 
acting  in  full  accordance  with  them,  he  was  right. 

But,  to  those  thus  speaking,  it  is  sometimes  replied, 
"  Even  tolerance  may  be  carried  too  far,  and  is  apt 
then  to  verge  dangerously  on  what  may  be  better 
described  as  moral  indifference.  It  then,  humanly 
speaking,  assumes  that  there  is  no  real  right  or  real 
wrong  in  collective  human  action.  But  put  yourself 
in  his  place,  and  to  those  of  this  way  of  thinking 
Philip  II.  and  William  of  Orange,  Charles  I.  and 
Cromwell,  are  much  the  same ;  the  one  is  as  good 
as  the  other,  provided  only  he  acted  according  to  his 
lights.  This  will  not  do.  Some  moral  test  must  be 
applied,  —  some  standard  of  right  and  wrong. 

"  It  is  by  the  recognition  and  acceptance  of  these 


424     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

that  men  prominent  in  history  must  be  measured,  and 
approved  or  condemned.  To  call  it  our  Civil  War  is 
but  a  mere  euphemistic  way  of  referring  to  what  was 
in  fact  a  slaveholders'  rebellion,  conceived  and  put 
in  action  for  no  end  but  to  perpetuate  and  extend 
a  system  of  human  servitude,  a  system  the  relic  of 
barbarism,  an  insult  to  advancing  humanity.  To  the 
furtherance  of  this  rebellion,  Lee  lent  himself.  Eight 
is  right,  and  treason  is  treason ;  and  as  that  which 
is  morally  wrong  cannot  be  right,  so  treason  cannot 
be  other  than  a  crime.  Why,  then,  because  of  senti 
ment,  or  sympathy,  or  moral  indifference,  seek  to  con 
found  the  two  ?  Charles  Stuart  and  Cromwell  could 
not  both  have  been  right.  If  Thomas  was  right,  Lee 
was  wrong." 

To  this  I  would  reply,  that  we,  who  take  another 
view,  neither  confound,  nor  seek  to  confound,  right 
with  wrong,  or  treason  with  loyalty.  We  accept  the 
verdict  of  time  ;  but,  in  so  doing,  we  insist  that  the 
verdict  shall  be  in  accordance  with  the  facts,  and  that 
each  individual  shall  be  judged  on  his  own  merits,  and 
not  stand  acquitted  or  condemned  in  block.  And, 
in  the  first  place,  Philip  II.  and  William  the  Silent, 
Charles  I.  and  Cromwell,  were  not  much  the  same, 
nor,  indeed,  in  any  respect  the  same.  Characteristics 
cannot  thus  be  left  out  of  the  account ;  individuality 
will  not  be  ignored.  So  long  as  men  differ,  in  one 
we  will  continue  to  see  those  qualities  we  all  seek  to 
commemorate  ;  in  another,  those  we  condemn.  Philip 
II.  was  not  an  admirable  character ;  William  the 
Silent  was.  In  the  second  place,  the  passage  of  the 
centuries  works  wonders,  especially  in  the  views  men 
hold  of  the  causes  and  incidents  of  civil  strife.  We 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     425 

get  at  last  to  see  that  the  right  is  never  wholly  on  one 
side ;  that  in  the  grand  result  all  the  elements  were 
fused.  Things  then  are  seen  with  other  eyes.  Take, 
for  instance,  one  of  the  final  contentions  of  Charles 
Sumner,  that,  following  old-world  precedents,  founded, 
as  he  claimed,  in  reason  and  patriotism,  the  names 
of  battles  of  the  war  of  the  rebellion  should  be  re 
moved  from  the  regimental  colors  of  the  national 
army,  and  from  the  army  register.  He  based  it  on  the 
ground  that,  from  the  republics  of  antiquity  down  to 
our  days,  no  civilized  nation  ever  thought  it  wise  or 
patriotic  to  preserve  in  conspicuous  and  durable  form 
the  mementos  of  victories  won  over  fellow-citizens  in 
civil  war.  As  the  sympathizing  orator  said  at  the 
time  of  Sumner's  death,  "  Should  the  son  of  South 
Carolina,  when  at  some  future  day  defending  the  Re 
public  against  some  foreign  foe,  be  reminded  by  an 
inscription  on  the  colors  floating  over  him  that  under 
this  flag  the  gun  was  fired  that  killed  his  father  at 
Gettysburg  ?  "  This  assuredly  has  a  plausible  sound. 
"  His  father ; "  yes,  perhaps.  Though  even  in  the 
immediately  succeeding  generation  something  might 
well  be  said  on  the  other  side.  Presumably,  in  such 
case,  the  father  was  a  brave,  an  honest,  and  a  loyal 
man,  contending  for  what  he  believed  to  be  right,  — 
for  it,  laying  down  his  life.  Gettysburg  is  a  name 
and  a  memory  of  which  none  there  need  ever  feel 
ashamed.  As  in  most  battles,  there  was  a  victor  and 
a  vanquished  ;  but  on  that  day  the  vanquished,  as 
well  as  the  victor,  fought  a  stout  fight.  If,  in  all  re 
corded  warfare,  there  is  a  deed  of  arms  the  name  and 
memory  of  which  the  descendants  of  those  who  par 
ticipated  therein  should  not  wish  to  see  obliterated 


426      "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

from  any  record,  be  it  historian's  page  or  battle-flag, 
it  was  the  advance  of  Pickett's  Virginian  division 
across  that  wide  valley  of  death  in  front  of  Cemetery 
Ridg'e.  I  know  in  all  recorded  warfare  of  no  finer, 

O 

no  more  sustained  and  deadly  feat  of  arms.  I  have 
stood  on  either  battlefield,  and,  in  scope  and  detail, 
carefully  compared  the  two ;  and,  challenging  denial, 
I  affirm  that  the  much  vaunted  charge  of  Napoleon's 
guard  at  Waterloo,  in  fortitude,  discipline,  and  deadly 
energy  will  not  bear  comparison  with  that  other.  It 
was  boy's  work  beside  it.  There,  brave  men  did  all 
that  the  bravest  men  could  do.  Why,  then,  should 
the  son  of  one  of  those  who  fell  coming  up  the  long 
ascent,  or  over  our  works  and  in  among  our  guns,  feel 
a  sense  of  wrong  because  "  Gettysburg  "  is  inscribed 
on  the  flag  of  the  battery,  a  gun  of  which  he  now  may 
serve?  On  the  contrary,  I  should  suppose  he  would 
there  see  that  name  only. 

But,  supposing  it  otherwise  in  the  case  of  the  son, 

—  the  wound  being  in  such  case  yet  fresh  and  green, 

—  how  will  it  be  when  a  sufficient  time  has  elapsed 
to  afford  the  needed  perspective  ?     Let  us  suppose  a 
grandson  six  generations  removed.      What  English 
man,  be  he  Cavalier  or  Roundhead  by  descent,  did 
his   ancestor  charge  with   Rupert  or   Cromwell,  did 
he  fall  while  riding  with  levelled  point  in  the  grim 
wall  of  advancing    Ironsides,  or  go   hopelessly  down 
in  death  beneath  their  thundering  hoofs,  —  what  de 
scendant  of  any  Englishman  who  there  met  his  end, 
but  with  pride  would  read  the  name  of  Naseby  on  his 
regimental  flag  ?     What  Frenchman  would  consent  to 
the  erasure  of  Ivry  or  Moncontour  ?     Thus,  in  all  these 
matters,  time  is  the  great  magician.     It  both  mellows 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?"     427 

and  transforms.  The  Englishman  of  to-day  does  not 
apply  to  Cromwell  the  standard  of  loyalty  or  treason, 
of  right  and  wrong,  applied  after  the  Restoration ; 
nor  again  does  the  twentieth  century  confirm  the  nine 
teenth's  verdicts.  Even  slavery  we  may  come  to  re 
gard  as  a  phase,  pardonable  as  passing,  in  the  evolution 
of  a  race. 

I  hold  it  will  certainly  be  so  with  our  Civil  War. 
The  year  1965  will  look  upon  its  causes,  its  incidents, 
and  its  men  with  different  eyes  from  those  with  which 
we  see  them  now,  —  eyes  wholly  different  from  those 
with  which  we  saw  forty  years  ago.  They  —  for  we  by 
that  time  will  have  rejoined  the  generation  to  which 
we  belonged  —  will  recognize  the  somewhat  essential 
fact,  indubitably  true,  that  all  the  honest  conviction, 
all  the  loyalty,  all  the  patriotic  devotion  and  self-sac 
rifice  were  not  then,  any  more  than  all  the  courage,  on 
the  victor's  side.  True  !  the  moral  right,  the  spirit  of 
nationality,  the  sacred  cause  of  humanity  even,  were 
on  our  side ;  but,  among  those  opposed,  and  who  in 
the  end  went  down,  were  men  not  less  sincere,  not 
less  devoted,  not  less  truly  patriotic  according  to  their 
lights,  than  he  who  among  us  was  first  in  all  those 
qualities,  —  men  of  whom  it  was  and  is  a  cause  of  pride 
and  confidence  to  say,  "  They,  too,  were  countrymen !  " 

Typical  of  those  men  —  most  typical  —  was  Lee. 
He  represented,  individualized,  all  that  was  highest 
and  best  in  the  Southern  mind  and  the  Confederate 
cause,  —  the  loyalty  to  state,  the  keen  sense  of  honor 
and  personal  obligation,  the  slightly  archaic,  the  almost 
patriarchal,  love  of  dependent,  family,  and  home.  As 
I  have  more  than  once  said,  he  was  a  Virginian  of 
the  Virginians.  He  represents  a  type  which  is  gone, 


428     "SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE?" 

—  hardly  less  extinct  than  that  of  the  great  English 
nobleman  of  the  feudal  times,  or  the  ideal  head  of  the 
Scotch  clan  of  a  later  period ;  but  just  so  long  as  men 
admire  courage,  devotion,  patriotism,  the  high  sense 
of  duty  and  personal  honor,  —  all,  in  a  word,  which 
go  to  make  up  what  we  know  as  Character,  —  just  so 
long  will  that  type  of  man  be  held  in  affectionate, 
reverential  memory.  They  have  in  them  all  the  ele 
ments  of  the'heroic.  As  Carlyle  wrote  more  than  half 
a  century  ago,  so  now  —  "  Whom  do  you  wish  to  re 
semble  ?  Him  you  set  on  a  high  column.  Who  is  to 
have  a  statue?  means,  Whom  shall  we  consecrate  and 
set  apart  as  one  of  our  sacred  men  ?  Sacred ;  that  all 
men  may  see  him,  be  reminded  of  him,  and,  by  new 
example  added  to  old  perpetual  precept,  be  taught  what 
is  real  worth  in  man.  Show  me  the  man  you  honor ; 
I  know  by  that  symptom,  better  than  by  any  other, 
what  kind  of  man  you  yourself  are.  For  you  show  me 
there  what  your  ideal  of  manhood  is;  what  kind  of 
man  you  long  inexpressibly  to  be,  and  would  thank 
the  gods,  with  your  whole  soul,  for  being  if  you  could. " 
It  is  all  a  question  of  time ;  and  the  time  is,  proba 
bly,  not  quite  yet.  The  wounds  of  the  great  war  are 
not  altogether  healed,  its  personal  memories  are  still 
fresh,  its  passions  not  wholly  allayed.  It  would,  in 
deed,  be  cause  for  special  wonder  if  they  were.  But, 
I  am  as  convinced  as  an  unillumined  man  can  be  of 
anything  future,  that  when  such  time  does  come,  a 
justice,  not  done  now,  will  be  done  to  those  descend 
ants  of  Washington,  of  Jefferson,  of  Kutledge,  and 
of  Lee  who  stood  opposed  to  us  in  a  succeeding  gen 
eration.  That  the  national  spirit  is  now  supreme  and 
the  nation  cemented,  I  hold  to  be  unquestionable. 


"SHALL   CROMWELL  HAVE  A  STATUE ?"     429 

That  property  in  man  has  vanished  from  the  civilized 
world  is  due  to  our  Civil  War.  The  two  are  worth 
the  great  price  then  paid  for  them.  But,  wrong  in 
respect  to  these  as  he  may  have  been,  and  as  he  was 
proved  by  events  to  be,  the  Confederate  had  many 
great  and  generous  qualities ;  he  also  was  brave,  chiv 
alrous,  self-sacrificing,  sincere,  and  patriotic.  So  I 
look  forward  with  confidence  to  the  time  when  he,  too, 
will  be  represented  in  our  national  Pantheon.  Then 
the  query  will  be  answered  here,  as  the  query  in  regard 
to  Cromwell's  statue,  put  sixty  years  ago,  has  recently 
been  answered  in  England.  The  bronze  effigy  of 
Robert  E.  Lee,  mounted  on  his  charger  and  with  the 
insignia  of  his  Confederate  rank,  will  from  its  pedestal 
in  the  nation's  capital  gaze  across  the  Potomac  at  his 
old  home  at  Arlington,  even  as  that  of  Cromwell  domi 
nates  the  yard  of  Westminster  upon  which  his  skull 
once  looked  down.  When  that  time  comes,  Lee's 
monument  will  be  educational,  —  it  will  typify  the 
historical  appreciation  of  all  that  goes  to  make  up  the 
loftiest  type  of  character,  military  and  civic,  exempli 
fied  in  an  opponent,  once  dreaded  but  ever  respected ; 
and,  above  all,  it  will  symbolize  and  commemorate 
that  loyal  acceptance  of  the  consequences  of  defeat, 
and  the  patient  upbuilding  of  a  people  under  new 
conditions  by  constitutional  means,  which  I  hold  to  be 
the  greatest  educational  lesson  America  has  yet  taught 
to  a  once  skeptical  but  now  silenced  world. 


INDEX 


ADAMS,  C.  F.,  American  Minister  at 
London,  protests  against  the  con 
struction  of  the  Alabama,  49 ;  pre 
sents  demand  for  reparation,  80, 
81;  on  Russell's  proposal  of  a 
joint  commission,  87 ;  on  reaction 
of  English  policy,  87, 90 ;  interview 
with  Clarendon,  88  ;  with  Forster, 
89;  with  Oliphant,  90;  on  recog 
nition  of  Southern  belligerency, 
92,  97 ;  on  rejection  of  the  John 
son-Clarendon  Convention,  103 ;  on 
Motley,  139 ;  on  the  indirect 
claims,  192. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  on  State  sovereignty, 
414-416  n. ;  personal  effect  of  his 
views,  415. 

Alabama,  keel  laid,  39;  purpose 
patent,  45 ;  preparation  of  equip 
ment,  46 ;  evasion,  50 ;  responsibil 
ity  for  the  evasion,  50  n. ;  equipped, 
50;  purified  of  evasion,  51;  rav 
ages,  60 ;  received  in  British  ports, 
62 ;  destruction,  78 ;  Great  Britain 
disclaims  responsibility,  80 ;  sta 
tus,  197.  See  also  Alabama  claims. 

Alabama  claims,  Great  Britain  re 
fuses  to  consider,  80,  81 ;  Great 
Britain  neglects  a  favorable  op 
portunity  to  settle,  82-87 ;  Derby 
favors  a  settlement,  91;  Sumner 
on  greatness  of  the  controversy, 
95 ;  and  British  withdrawal  from 
America,  104, 147, 156,  159, 162, 177, 
209,  210,  241 ;  retroactive  effect 
on  English  belligerency  proclama 
tion,  115,  207,  209,  211 ;  Fish  on 
basis  of  settlement,  125,  162 ;  in 
fluence  of  Franco-Prussian  War, 


130, 133,  135 ;  Grant's  message  of 
1870  on,  134;  British  comment, 
134 ;  Grant's  proposals,  161 ;  Great 
Britain  ready  to  negotiate,  163, 
177.  See  also  Indirect  claims, 
Johnson-Clarendon  Convention, 
Treaty  of  Washington. 

Alexander  II.  of  Russia,  assassina 
tion,  258. 

Alexander,  E.  P.,  Confederate  gene 
ral,  retentive  memory,  9;  consulta 
tion  with  Lee  after  Sailor's  Creek, 
10,  20,  22;  advises  dispersion  of 
Lee's  army,  11,  22-24 ;  account  of 
Lee  at  Appomattox,  20-30. 

Alexandra  trial,  60. 

American  Historical  Association, 
tabooes  political  discussions,  274 ; 
political  duty,  275,  282,  293,  299, 
303,  336-338  ;  purpose,  275. 

Americans,  English  opinion  during 
the  Civil  War,  35,  61-66,  74-78, 267 ; 
change  in  English  opinion  of ,  261- 
264,  266-273 ;  insight  into  English 
feelings,  264 ;  wealth  and  master 
fulness,  266,  269,  272 ;  transmuta 
tion  of  national  character,  271, 
272.  See  also  United  States. 

Annexation,  Grant's  policy,  109, 113. 
See  also  Canada,  Imperialism, 
Manifest  Destiny. 

Appomattox,  Confederate  army 
blocked  at,  10,  21;  condition  of 
Confederate  army  at,  22,  29 ;  tem 
porary  Confederate  success,  26; 
Custer's  demands,  27;  the  apple 
tree,  28;  meeting  of  Lee  and  Grant, 
28;  importance  of  the  episode, 
418-420.  See  also  Lee,  R.  E. 


432 


INDEX 


Arbitration  of  Alabama  claims, 
Russell  on,  86 ;  Stanley  friendly 
to,  92. 

Arlington,  attempt  to  restore  to  the 
Lee  family,  380. 

Assassination,  of  McKinley,  256, 
259 ;  of  rulers,  lack  of  contempo 
rary  significance  in  recent,  257- 
259 ;  motive,  259. 

Babcock,  0.  E.,  treaty  of  annexa 
tion  with  San  Domingo,  130-132 ; 
Grant's  faith  in,  218. 

Baring,  Sir  T.,  on  reaction  of  Eng 
lish  policy,  70-72. 

Belligerency,  English  recognition 
of  Confederate,  Seward  on,  92,  97, 
100,  101,  202,  203-205 ;  Stanley  on, 
92 ;  checks  negotiations,  92 ;  John 
son-Clarendon  Convention  ig 
nores,  94 ;  undue  haste,  96, 202 ;  no 
unfriendly  intent,  97 ;  supported 
by  international  law,  98 ;  favor- 
able  to  the  United  States,  99,  202 ; 
necessary,  100,  202;  Sumner's  ar 
raignment,  101-103,  114;  and 
Grant's  policy  in  Cuba,  108,  114; 
retroactive  effect  of  Alabama 
claims  on,  115,  207,  209,  211 ;  Fish 
on,  ill,  115,  206-208 ;  Grant  on, 
122  n. ;  and  the  blockade,  199-201 ; 
Palmerston  on,  199 ;  Cockburn  on, 
200;  issue  of  the  proclamation, 
201 ;  Fessenden  on,  209 ;  Edmunds 
on,  211. 

Bentinck,  G.  W.  P.,  on  English  sym 
pathy  for  the  South,  63 ;  on  North 
ern  conduct  of  the  war,  63  n. 

Bernard,  Montague,  on  the  Ala 
bama,  52  n. 

Bigelow,  Poultney,  on  former  esti 
mation  of  colonies,  149. 

Bimetallism,  and  English  opinion 
of  the  United  States,  268 ;  period 
of  national  debate,  281 ;  question 
solved  by  course  of  events,  301 ; 
issue  considered  historically,  305- 
307.  See  also  Currency. 

Bladensburg,  battle  of,  effect  on 
New  Orleans,  361-363,  365. 

Blockade,  and  belligerency,  98, 199- 
201, 207 ;  proclamation,  201. 


Boss  and  the  machine,  297. 

Boutwell,  G.  S.,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  and  the  San  Domingo 
treaty,  142,  222;  at  interview  of 
Sumner  and  Fish,  145  n. ;  on  dis 
placement  of  Sumner,  237. 

Brown,  John,  ethics  of  his  actions, 
393. 

Bryan,  W.  J.,  character  of  his  po 
litical  campaigns,  278,  293. 

Bugeaud,  Marshal,  on  English  in 
fantry,  370. 

Bulloch,  J.  D.,  on  importance  of 
Confederate  naval  operations,  36 ; 
sent  to  England  as  Confederate 
agent,  38 ;  activity,  39 ;  on  con 
struction  of  the  Florida,  44 ;  and 
the  Alabama,^ ;  on  English  sym 
pathy  for  the  South,  63. 

Bunker  Hill,  battle  of,  controver 
sies,  354;  question  of  command, 
355 ;  elements,  356 ;  effect  on  Long 
Island,  356. 

Burchard,  S.  D.,  apothegm,  291. 

Butler,  B.  F.,  suggests  Sumner  as 
Minister  to  Great  Britain,  137 ;  sug 
gests  Phillips,  162 ;  opposes  the 
Treaty  of  Washington,  186. 

Calhoun,  J.  C.,  an  abstractionist,  395. 

Cameron,  Simon,  suggests  Sumner 
as  Minister  to  Great  Britain,  137. 

Campaigns.  See  Political  discus 
sions. 

Canada,  Alabama  claims  and  Eng 
lish  withdrawal  from,  104, 147, 156, 
159,  162, 177,  209, 210, 241 ;  Chandler 
on  annexation,  104,  152;  Grant's 
policy,  109, 113, 153  n. ;  Sumner  on 
annexation,  147,  150-156;  English 
views  on  annexation,  155, 157, 159 ; 
Schurz  on  annexation,  209,  210. 

Cant  and  national  glorification,  383- 
385. 

Carlyle,  Thomas,  on  hero  worship, 
376,  428. 

Carnot,  M.  F.  S.,  President  of 
France,  assassination,  258. 

Chamberlain,  D.  H.,  on  displace 
ment  of  Sumner,  236 ;  as  Governor 
of  South  Carolina,  394;  on  the 
typical  Southron,  394. 


INDEX 


433 


Chandler,  Zachariah, on  annexation 

of  Canada,  104, 152. 

Character  of  the  present  age,  258 ; 
and  assassination  of  rulers,  258- 
260. 

Civil  War,  and  the  South  African 
War,  2-4,  14, 15, 17,  33-36,  63  n.,  195 ; 
European  attitude  during,  34, 418 ; 
English  attitude,  35,  61-65,  74-78, 
268, 385 ;  magnitude,  100, 202 ;  world 
results,  197  ;  contemporary  mis 
understanding  of,  204 ;  effect  of 
success  of,  on  English  opinion  of 
America,  267,  268;  predicted  re 
vision  of  judgments  concerning, 
378, 427-429 ;  final  cause,  402 ;  clem 
ency  at  close,  421.  See  also  Bel 
ligerency,  Confederate  States, 
Great  Britain,  Lee,  Secession. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  English  Foreign 
Secretary,  denies  liability  for  Ala 
bama  depredations,  81,  88 ;  sug 
gests  a  joint  commission,  88  ;  con 
vention  with  Johnson,  93.  See 
also  Johnson-Clarendon  Conven 
tion. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  on  the  Senate's 
exercise  of  treaty  power,  185; 
Venezuelan  diplomacy,  267;  mes 
sage  on  the  tariff,  291. 

Cobden,  Richard,  on  exclusion  of 
belligerent  vessels  violating  neu 
tral  rights,  49 ;  on  right  of  neutrals 
to  build  belligerent  vessels,  54  n. ; 
on  Seward,  55  n. ;  on  sympathy  for 
other  people's  rebels,  62, 270,  384  ; 
on  Canadian  independence,  150 ; 
on  the  spirit  of  war,  319  ;  on  duty 
toward  liberty,  332 ;  on  cant,  383. 

Cochrane,  Admiral  Sir  Alexander, 
at  Washington,  366 ;  at  attack  on 
New  Orleans,  366. 

Cockburn,  Sir  A.  J.  E.,  Lord  Chief 
Justice,  on  right  to  exclude  bel 
ligerents  from  neutral  ports,  49  ; 
on  recognition  of  belligerency, 
200. 

Colonies,  change  in  opinion  of 
value,  149 ;  as  a  trust,  323,  324. 
See  also  Inferior  races. 

Commercial  depression  of  1893  and 
English  opinion  of  America,  268. 


Confederate  States,  condition  in 
April,  1865,  2 ;  believed  uncon 
querable,  3,  13  n. ;  Davis  for  con 
tinued  resistance,  3,  12;  decision 
of  further  resistance  in  Lee's 
hands,  4,  8 ;  general  surrender  of 
armies,  13 ;  conditions  implied  in 
the  surrender,  15;  joy  over  Lin 
coln's  death,  16 ;  probable  result 
of  further  resistance,  17 ;  lack  of 
essentials  of  maritime  warfare, 
37 ;  make  Great  Britain  a  naval 
base,  37,  39,  53;  naval  policy 
checked,  69 ;  faith  in  cotton,  99, 
100  n. ;  self-reliance,  100.  See  also 
Belligerency,  Civil  War,  Great 
Britain,  Lee,  Secession. 

Congress  as  a  recording  machine, 
303.  See  also  Legislative,  Sen 
ate. 

Conkling,  Koscoe,  and  Sumner, 
252. 

Consequential  damages.  See  In 
direct  claims. 

Constitution,  intentionally  silent  on 
secession,  389. 

Cotton,  Southern  reliance  on,  99, 
100  n. 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  death  and  burial, 
376 ;  remains  hung,  377 ;  reversal 
of  opinion  concerning,  377,  380; 
statue,  377. 

Cuban  insurrection,  and  English 
recognition  of  Confederate  belli 
gerency,  108, 114, 117 ;  Grant's  pol 
icy,  109  ;  Fish's  policy,  118,  216 ; 
Grant's  proclamation  of  belliger 
ency,  118 ;  detained  by  Fish,  119- 
121 ;  Grant's  message,  119  n.,  217, 
219. 

Currency  debate,  period  of  national, 
281 ;  phases,  286 ;  in  1876,  288 ;  neg 
lected  historical  aspect,  289 ;  dor 
mant,  290 ;  importance,  302.  See 
also  Bimetallism. 

Curtis,  G.  W.,  on  Sumner,  110  n., 
175  n. 

Gushing,  Caleb,  and  Fish,  114 ;  char 
acter,  114 ;  and  Rose,  123 ;  on  the 
Senate's  share  in  foreign  affairs, 
123  n. 

Custer,  G.  A.,  at  Appomattox,  27. 


484 


INDEX 


Dana,  R.  H.,  on  Sumner,  174. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  Danville  mani 
festo,  2 ;  bent  on  further  resist 
ance,  3, 12  ;  conference  with  John 
ston,  12. 

Davis,  J.  C.  B.,  on  Sumner,  175  n. ; 
and  the  indirect  claims,  187. 

D'ltajuba,  Viscount,  on  seizure  of 
belligerent  vessels  violating  neu 
tral  rights,  48  n. 

DeLeon,  T.  C.,  on  Lee's  return  to 
Richmond,  18. 

Dependencies.  See  Colonies,  Infe 
rior  races. 

Derby,  Lord,  Prime  Minister,  and 
the  Alabama  claims,  91. 

Dred  Scott  decision,  educational 
value,  283. 

Edmunds,  G.  F.,  reference  to  Sum- 
ner's  memorandum,  179;  on  re 
jection  of  Johnson-Clarendon  Con 
vention,  210;  on  displacement  of 
Sumner,  238 ;  on  Suraner's  charac. 
ter,  254. 

Edwards,  S.  P.,  collector  of  the  port 
of  Liverpool,  and  the  evasion  of 
the  Alabama,  50  n. 

Egypt,  effect  of  British  rule,  327. 

Elizabeth,  Empress  of  Austria,  as 
sassination,  258,  259. 

English,  sympathy  during  the  Civil 
War,  35, 61-65, 74-78, 385 ;  tribute  to 
McKinley,  261 ;  change  in  attitude 
toward  Americans,  262-264,  266- 
273;  American  insight  into  their 
feelings,  264 ;  character,  266,  267 ; 
attitude  of  lower  classes  toward 
United  States,  270;  military 
methods,  356,  359,  361,  362,364,367, 
369-371.  See  also  Great  Britain. 

Ethics,  test,  382,  388,  423-425;  of 
John  Brown's  career,  393 ;  of  the 
Southern  cause,  394,  398,  427;  of 
Lee's  career,  423, 424. 

Evolution  and  Imperialism,  315-317. 

Executive  department,  relation  to 
the  legislative,  166,  226,  227,  235. 

Expansion.    See  Imperialism. 

Fenianism  and  the  negotiation  of  the 
Alabama  claims,  147, 159, 179, 186. 


Fessenden,  W.  P.,  on  Sumner's 
speech,  208  ;  on  English  belliger 
ency  proclamation,  209. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  Secretary  of  State, 
and  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  31 ; 
author  not  personally  acquainted 
with,  95 ;  early  relations  with 
Sumner,  106,  112,  113,  156,  245,  246  ; 
instructions  to  Motley,  108,  114- 
116 ;  character,  no ;  and  the  Eng 
lish  belligerency  proclamation, 

111,  114, 206-208 ;  relation  to  Grant, 

112,  113,  119  n.,  143,  144,  247,  252, 
253 ;  and  Gushing,  114 ;  and  Cu 
ban  belligerency,  118, 119, 121,  216, 
217,  219,  223;  unofficial  interview 
with  Rose,  124 ;  on  basis  of  settle 
ment  of  Alabama  claims,  125, 162 ; 
ambition,  125,    135 ;   correspond 
ence  with  Rose  on  Motley's  di 
plomacy,  126-129 ;  favors  negotia 
tions  in  Washington,  129 ;  mina 
tory  paragraph  on  England's  re 
luctance  to  negotiate,  134;   and 
Rose  open  negotiations,  135 ;  dis 
satisfied  with  official  life,  135, 140, 
220-223;   conditions  favoring  his 
negotiations,  136, 144 ;  and  the  re 
call  of  Motley,  136,  140;  confers 
with  Senators   on  the  proposed 
negotiations,  144, 146  n.,  172,  234 ; 
interviews  Sumner  on  Rose's  pro 
posal,  144, 145 ;  on  the  inter  7iew, 
145  n.,  146  n. ;  and  annexation  of 
Canada,  155, 156, 158, 160,  161, 162, 
176 ;  and  Sumner's  memorandum, 
163,  182,  232 ;  break  with  Sumner, 
171,  172,  187,  229,  243,  251 ;  antici 
pates    Sumner's   opposition,  176, 
182,  233 ;  and  the  indirect  claims, 
180,  187, 189  n.,  190  n.,  194 ;  diary, 
215;    and  Hoar,  219,  221,  248;  on 
Sumner's  character,  248-251. 

Fisheries  and  San  Juan  question, 
145  n. 

Fisk,  James,  Jr.,  "Gold  Corner," 
120. 

Florida,  Confederate  cruiser,  con 
tracted  for,  39  ;  inspected  by  Eng 
lish  officials,  43,  44  ;  seized  and 
released  at  Nassau,  44;  status, 
197. 


INDEX 


435 


Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  British, 
original  object,  40 ;  and  interna 
tional  obligations,  40,  42,  55-57  ; 
character,  41 ;  interpreted,  41,  60 ; 
and  the  construction  of  the 
cruisers,  44-46  ;  considered  effect 
ual,  59  ;  dissenting  interpretation, 
66  ;  made  stringent,  79. 

Forster,  W.  E.,  interview  with 
Adams,  89;  on  recognition  of 
Confederate  belligerency,  98 ;  rise, 
124 ;  friend  of  the  United  States, 
124 ;  advocates  settlement  of  Ala 
bama  claims,  125 ;  and  the  in 
direct  claims,  191-194. 

Franco-Prussian  War,  influence  on 
Alabama  controversy,  130,  133, 
135. 

Freeman,  E.  A.,  on  politics  and  his 
tory,  274. 

Garfleld,  J.  A.,  assassination,  258, 
259. 

Geneva  Arbitration,  caution  on  its 
official  papers,  39  n. ;  settles  the 
indirect  claims  question,  194. 

Gettysburg,  battle,  equal  glory,  425 ; 
and  Waterloo,  426. 

Gladstone,  W.  E.,  on  Southern  suc 
cess,  64 ;  on  relations  with  United 
States  in  1869,  128,  212-214;  on 
municipal  law  and  international 
obligations,  214. 

Gould,  Jay,  "  Gold  Corner,"  120. 

Godkin,  E.  L.,  on  change  in  Eng 
lish  sentiment  toward  America, 
263  n. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  Southern  opinion,  17 ; 
Alexander  on,  21,  23 ;  terms  to 
Lee,  25;  meeting  with  Lee,  28; 
attitude  as  president  on  the  Ala 
bama  claims,  104,  126,  134,  161, 188, 
189  n. ;  character  compared  with 
Sumner's,  109;  attitude  toward 
the  Cuban  insurrection  and  Eng 
lish  recognition  of  Confederate 
belligerency,  108, 109, 114, 117-121, 
122  n. ;  as  an  expansionist,  109, 113, 
130,  153  n.,  156,  161,  218;  and  Fish, 
112, 113,  119  n.,  143,  144;  and  Mot 
ley,  116,  117,  121,  137,  140,  168 ;  un 
official  advisers,  117 ;  and  the 


"  Gold  Corner,"  120 ;  and  the  San 
Domingo  annexation  treaty,  131, 
218,  222 ;  seeks  Sumner's  aid  for  it, 
132 ;  rupture  with  Sumner,  133, 136, 
140, 159, 228, 253 ;  on  party  loyalty 
to  the  administration,  142, 166,218; 
military  methods  of  his  adminis 
tration,  142-144,  168;  reason  for 
supporting  Fish's  negotiations, 
144,  164,  169,  180;  on  European 
abandonment  of  America,  160  n. ; 
Sumner's  opposition  to  the  admin 
istration,  166-169 ;  Sumner  at 
tacks,  in  debate,  170 ;  determines 
to  have  Sumner  deposed,  172, 181 ; 
on  troubles  of  official  life,  223; 
apothegm,  285 ;  and  Wolfe,  350  n. ; 
before  Vicksburg,  372 ;  impor 
tance  of  action  at  Appomattox, 
418-420 ;  protects  Lee  from  indict 
ment,  421. 

Great  Britain,  made  a  Confederate 
naval  base,  37,  39 ;  interests  as  an 
ocean  carrier,  42;  divided  inter 
ests  in  1861,  43,  54,  56;  proper 
course  toward  Confederate  cruis 
ers,  47-49;  government  ignores 
the  construction  of  the  cruisers, 
49, 53  n. ;  professed  impotency,  51, 
52  n. ;  dereliction,  51 ;  reaction  of 
its  policy  during  the  Civil  War,  36, 
69-74,  79,  82, 87-92,  130,  158 ;  inter- 
national  obligations  governed  by 
municipal  law,  55-58 ;  policy  based 
on  prediction  of  Southern  success, 
65 ;  the  Laird  rams  detained,  68 ; 
primacy  of  international  obliga 
tions  acknowledged,  68  ;  ceases  to 
be  Confederate  naval  base,  69; 
denies  responsibility  for  cruiser 
depredations,  80,  81 ;  favorable 
opportunity  for  settlement  neg 
lected,  82-87 ;  Derby  ministry,  91 ; 
change  in  opinion  of  value  of  col 
onies,  149;  ready  to  negotiate,  163, 
177 ;  and  the  indirect  claims,  191- 
194;  present  influence  of  Ameri 
can  Revolution  on,  195 ;  resume"  of 
her  policy  during  the  Civil  War, 
195 ;  Gladstone  on  relations  with 
United  States  in  1869,  212-214; 
modern  social  and  economic  con- 


436 


INDEX 


ditions,  266;  expansion,  269;  iso 
lation,  269,  270 ;  result  of  policy 
toward  inferior  races,  326-328, 334 ; 
effect  of  Roman  occupation,  328- 
330.  See  also  Alabama  claims, 
Belligerency,  Canada,  English, 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  Treaty 
of  Washington, 

Greeley,  Horace,  power,  296. 

Green,  J.  R.,  on  effect  of  Koman  oc 
cupation  of  England,  329 ;  defects 
in  his  narrative  of  Wolfe  at  Que 
bec,  348  n. 

Hammond,  J.  H.,  on  political  power 
of  cotton,  100  n. 

Hancock,  W.  S.,  dictum  on  the 
tariff,  290. 

Harcourt,  W.  V.,  on  seizure  of  belli 
gerent  cruisers  violating  neutral 
rights,  48. 

Haskell,  J.  C.,  Confederate  colonel, 
at  Appomattox,  26. 

Hayes,  R.  B.,  candidate  for  presi 
dent,  288 ;  character  of  his  admin 
istration,  289. 

Hayti,  policy  of  United  States  to 
ward,  333.  See  also  San  Domingo. 

Heredity,  influence  on  men's  ac 
tions,  406-408. 

History,  and  politics,  274,  336 ;  as  an 
aspect  in  great  national  debates, 
281;  in  the  slavery  debate,  283, 
284 ;  in  the  currency  debate,  288, 
289 ;  in  the  tariff  debate,  291 ;  and 
the  issues  of  the  campaign  of 
1900, 304-336 ;  field,  339 ;  change  in 
method  of  writing,  339,  340,  374. 
See  also  Military  history. 

Hoar,  E.  R.,  Attorney-General,  and 
the  San  Domingo  treaty,  142 ;  re 
signation,  142,  219,  221;  on  Sum- 
ner's  denunciation  of  Grant,  247 ; 
and  Fish,  248. 

Hoar,  G.  F.,  on  Sumner's  self-con 
sciousness,  253. 

Holland,  Bernard,  on  British  rule  in 
India,  328. 

Hoist,  Hermann  von,  on  Imperial 
ism,  318. 

Howe,  Sir  William,  at  Long  Island, 
356. 


Humbert,  King  of  Italy,  assassina 
tion,  258,  259. 

Imperialism,  impulse,  269,  315-329  ; 
period  of  national  debate,  281; 
issue  considered  historically,  315- 
320,  323-335.  See  also  Manifest 
Destiny. 

Index,  Confederate  organ  in  Lon 
don,  foretells  continued  resist 
ance,  13  ;  despair,  14 ;  on  result 
of  further  resistance,  17  n. 

India,  effect  of  British  rule,  326-328. 

Indirect  claims,  Sumner  on,  101-103, 
114, 151,  182,  191 ;  Adams  on,  103, 
192 ;  Morton  on,  146  n. ;  presented, 
146  n.,  180,  187-190,  190  n.;  disal 
lowed,  146  n.,  194 ;  Grant  on,  188, 
189  n.;  Fish  on,  189  n.,  190  n.; 
effect  in  Great  Britain,  191-194. 
See  also  Belligerency,  Canada. 

Individual  opinion,  value  of,  on 
national  thought,  264. 

Individualism  as  corrective  of  ma 
chine  politics,  299. 

Individuality  and  ethical  tests,  424. 

Inferior  races,  self-dependency  nec 
essary  to  advancement,  324-326, 
330;  British  policy,  326-328,  334, 
335 ;  policy  of  the  United  States, 
331-335 ;  other  policies,  334. 

International  law,  influence  of 
Treaty  of  Washington,  33,  198; 
seizure  of  belligerent  ships  vio 
lating  neutral  rights,  47 ;  and  mu 
nicipal  law,  55-59,  68,  217 ;  status 
of  ships  commissioned  on  the  high 
seas,  72.  See  also  Belligerency, 
Great  Britain. 

Ireland,  English  experience  in,  268. 
See  also  Fenianism. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  reason  for  suc 
cess  at  New  Orleans,  362,  366, 367. 

Japan,  reason  of  advancement,  327. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  as  president,  421. 

Johnson,  Bushrod,  Confederate 
general,  Wise  denounces,  7. 

Johnson,  Reverdy,  American  Minis 
ter  at  London,  92 ;  convention,  93, 
96.  See  also  next  title. 

Johnson-Clarendon  Convention,  93, 


INDEX 


437 


9G;  silent  on  belligerency  ques 
tion,  94, 101 ;  rejected  by  the  Sen 
ate,  95,  208-211 ;  Sumner's  speech 
against,  101-103;  effect  of  rejec 
tion,  105 ;  rejection  as  a  step  to 
ward  annexation  of  Canada,  104, 
209,  210. 

Johnston,  J.  E.,  Confederate  gen 
eral,  council  with  Davis,  12 ; 
against  further  resistance,  13; 
his  surrender  politically  uncon 
ditional,  15. 

Joint  commission,  Kussell  suggests, 
85. 

Laird  rams,  object,  67 ;  price,  67  n. ; 
detained,  68. 

Lecky,  W.  E.  H.,  on  influence  of 
early  American  output  of  pre 
cious  metals,  305. 

Lee,  Fitzhugh,  at  Appomattox,   26, 

2  4 . 

Lee,  R.  E.,  national  obligation  to,  2, 
18 ;  decision  of  further  resistance 
rested  with,  4,  8;  after  Sailor's 
Creek,  5;  condition  of  his  army, 
6,  7,  22, 29 ;  interview  with  Wise, 
6-8;  advised  to  surrender,  7,  10; 
devotion  of  his  army,  8,  23,  29; 
resents  advice  to  surrender,  10; 
blocked  at  Appomattox,  10,21 ;  ad 
vised  to  disperse  his  army,  10, 22- 
24 ;  considers  surrender  the  only 
course,  11, 24-26 ;  his  course  influ 
ences  other  Confederate  com 
manders,  12,  13;  surrender  poli 
tically  unconditional,  14 ;  return 
to  Richmond,  18;  meeting  with 
Grant,  26-28 ;  advice  to  his  sur 
rendered  army,  30 ;  future  statue 
and  its  symbolism,  379, 429 ;  Sum 
ner's  condemnation,  380;  techni 
cal  traitor,  381 ;  treason  compared 
with  Washington's,  382,  412,  413 ; 
hereditary  influences  on,  410 ;  on 
secession,  411 ;  reasons  for  re 
signing  from  the  army,  411 ;  as  a 
commander,  417;  importance  of 
action  at  Appomattox,  418-420; 
pnst-l>e77um  life  and  loyalty,  420- 
423  ;  ethics  of  his  career,  423;  high 
est  type  of  Southern  cause,  427. 


Legislative  department,  relation  to 
the  executive,  166,  226,  227,  235. 
See  also  Senate. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  Southern  joy  at 
his  death,  16  ;  Nicolay  and  Hay's 
biography,  147 ;  blockade  procla 
mation,  201 ;  assassination,  258, 
259,285. 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  on  the  views  on  seces 
sion  of  the  framers  of  the  Consti 
tution,  387;  criticised,  388. 

Long  Island,  battle  of,  influence  of 
Bunker  Hill,  356 ;  effect  of  Wash 
ington's  mistake,  358-361. 

Longstreet,  James,  at  Appomattox, 
26,  28. 

McKinley,  William,  assassination, 
256,  259;  lack  of  contemporary 
significance,  257  ;  English  tribute, 
261. 

McLean,  Wilmer,  at  Bull  Run  and 
Appomattox,  28  n. 

Machine,  political,  modern  predom 
inance,  297 ;  effect,  298 ;  corrective 
agency,  298-300,  303. 

Mahan,  A.  T.,  as  a  writer  of  naval 
history,  346. 

Manifest  Destiny,  Sumner's  views, 
150;  and  evolution,  316;  appeals 
to,  322 ;  test  of  reality  and  devel 
opment,  321-323.  See  also  Im 
perialism. 

Manila  Bay,  battle  of,  effect,  321, 
323. 

Massachusetts,  author  identified 
with,  414 ;  and  State  sovereignty, 
414-417. 

Matches,  government  monopoly  in 
France,  309. 

Mexico,  policy  of  United  States  to 
ward,  332 ;  result,  333. 

Military  commander,  importance  of 
his  ability,  361,  373. 

Military  history,  Tolstoi  as  a  writer 
of,  340 ;  usual  defects,  341,  345, 
373 ;  Ropes  as  a  writer  of,  342-345. 

Mommsen,  Theodor,  on  Imperial 
ism,  317. 

Monopolies,  and  modern  trusts,  308- 
310 ;  dependent  on  governmental 
support,  313. 


438 


INDEX 


Monroe  doctrine,   Sumner's  view, 

150. 

Montcalm.    See  Quebec. 

Morning  Post,  London,  on  Great 
Britain  as  a  Confederate  naval 
base,  65 ;  on  reaction  of  English 
policy,  73 ;  on  the  North,  76,  77  n. 

Morrill,  Justin,  advice  to  Sumner, 
251. 

Morton,  O.  P.,  Fish  consults  on 
Rose's  proposals,  146  n. ;  offered 
ministry  to  Great  Britain,  161. 

Motley,  J.  L.,  Minister  to  Great 
Britain,  Sumner's  appointee,  107 ; 
memoir  of  instructions,  107 ;  Fish's 
instructions,  108, 114-116 ;  reflects 
Sumner's  opinions,  116,  128,  137- 
139,  246 ;  ignores  his  instructions, 
116, 121, 122  n. ;  relieved  of  further 
negotiation,  121, 122 ;  Rose  on  his 
diplomacy,  127  ;  Fish  on,  129 ;  re 
signation  requested,  136-140;  un 
qualified  for  political  life,  138 ;  re 
called,  140. 

Municipal  law  and  international  ob 
ligation,  40,  42,  55-59,  68,  214. 

Napier,  C.  J.,  on  Pakenham,  363. 

Napoleon  III.,  attempted  assassi 
nation,  258. 

Nassau,  Florida  seized  and  re 
leased  at,  44. 

Nation,  New  York,  on  demand  for 
British  withdrawal  from  Amer 
ica,  241 ;  on  displacement  of  Sum 
ner,  242  ;  on  the  Fish-Sumner  quar 
rel,  243. 

Naval  history,  Mahan  as  a  writer 
of,  346. 

Neutrality.  See  Belligerency,  For 
eign  Enlistment  Act,  Great  Brit 
ain,  International  law. 

New  Orleans,  battle  of,  influence  of 
Bladensburg,  361-363,365 ;  English 
blunder,  364,  367  ;  probable  result 
of  a  flank  movement,  365-369,371 ; 
opposing  forces  compared,  368- 
372;  and  the  Vicksburg  cam 
paign,  372. 

Newspaper,  political  influence,  296 ; 
as  an  organ,  296 ;  present  aspect, 
296. 


North  British  Review  on  degener 
acy  of  Americans,  75  n.  . 

Northcote,  Sir  Stafford,  English 
commissioner,  on  Sumner,  184. 

Oliphant,    Laurence,    on    English 

policy  during  the  Civil  War,  90. 
Oreto.    See  Florida. 

Pakenham,  Sir  Edward,  errors  at 
New  Orleans,  362-372. 

Palmer,  Sir  Roundell,  English  At 
torney-General,  on  exclusion  of 
belligerent  ships  violating  neutral 
rights,  47, 48  n. ;  on  municipal  law 
and  international  obligations, 
57  n. ;  on  ships  commissioned  on 
the  high  seas,  73  ;  on  the  British 
and  American  "  Cases,"  190  n. 

Palmerston,  Lord,  Prime  Minister, 
on  right  of  neutrals  to  build  bel 
ligerent  ships,  54 ;  on  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act,  59 ;  on  recogni 
tion  of  Confederate  belligerency, 
199. 

Parker,  Theodore,  on  J.  Q.  Adams, 
416. 

Parkman,  Francis,  defects  in  narra 
tive  of  capture  of  Quebec,  347- 
354. 

Parton,  James,  on  the  English  sol 
dier  and  commander,  364. 

Peabody,  George,  Gladstone's  trib 
ute,  213. 

Pendleton,  W.  N.,  advises  Lee  to 
surrender,  10. 

Phillips,  Wendell,  proposed  as  Min 
ister  to  Great  Britain,  162. 

Philippine  Islands,  choice  of  policy 
toward,  335. 

Pierce,  E.  L.,  biography  of  Sumner, 
147. 

Piracy  and  the  Confederate  cruis 
ers,  40,  72. 

Political  discussions,  and  the  Amer 
ican  Historical  Association,  274, 
275,  282,  293,  303,  336-338 ;  charac 
ter  Of,  in  1900,  277-279,  293-295; 
quadrennial  national  debate,  280 ; 
character  of,  in  1840,  281 ;  periods 
of  great  debates,  281 ;  slavery  de 
bate,  282-284;  character  of,  in 


INDEX 


439 


1864,  284 ;  in  1868,  285 ;  reconstruc 
tion  debate,  285,  286 ;  currency 
debate,  286-290  ;  transient  influ 
ence  of  campaigns  of  1876-1884, 
and  1892,  287,  290,  292  ;  character 
of,  in  1876,  288 ;  tariff  debate,  291 ; 
importance  of  campaigns  of  1896 
and  1900,  292;  character  of,  in 
1896,  292-294 ;  standard  of  recent, 
294 ;  lack  of  pregnant  utterances, 
295 ;  cause  of  low  standard,  295  ; 
influence  of  the  newspaper,  296 ; 
lack  of  influence  on  results  of  pro 
fessional,  300-303 ;  issues  in  1900 
considered,  304-335.  See  also  Ma 
chine,  Politics, 

Politics,  and  history,  274 ;  use  of  the 
term,  274 ;  character  of  Hayes 
administration,  289 ;  decisive  ele 
ment  in,  303.  See  also  Machine, 
Political  discussions. 

Prescott,  William,  in  command  at 
Bunker  Hill,  355. 

President,  term  too  short,  280 ;  influ 
ence  of  personal  element,  287. 
See  also  Executive. 

Price  and  competition  in  relation  to 
trusts,  311-314. 

Putnam,  Israel,  and  the  command 
at  Bunker  Hill,  355. 

Quebec,  capture  of,  effect,  347 ;  de 
fects  in  Parkman's  narrative, 
347 ;  ascent  to  the  Plains  of  Abra 
ham,  348-351  ;  mystery  of  Mont- 
calm's  attack,  351,  353  ;  ques 
tionable  advantage  of  English 
position,  351-353. 

Rawlins,  J.  A.,  Secretary  of  War, 
117;  interest  in  Cuban  insurrec 
tion,  118 ;  death,  121. 

Rebels,  tendency  to  sympathize 
with  other  people's,  62, 270, 384-386. 

Reconstruction  debate,  period  of 
national,  281 ;  character,  285,  286  ; 
unsettled,  288 ;  failure,  302. 

Regimental  colors,  question  of  in 
scribing  civil  war  battles  on,  425- 
427. 

Revolution,  American,  present  in 
fluence  on  Great  Britain,  195. 


Rhodes,  J.  K,  on  final  cause  of  Civil 
War,  407. 

Richmond,  Va.,  evacuated,  2. 

Rome,  effect  of  occupation  of  Eng 
land,  328-330. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  character  of 
his  campaign  in  1900,  278,  293. 

Ropes,  J.  C.,  as  an  expounder  of 
military  history,  342-345. 

Rose,  Sir  John,  career,  122 ;  unoffi 
cial  negotiations  on  Alabama 
claims,  123,  126;  return  to  Eng 
land,  124;  on  Motley's  diplomacy, 
127 ;  opens  negotiations  with  Fish, 
135 ;  proposals  accepted,  169, 177. 

Rosebery,  Lord,  on  Anglo-Saxon 
solidarity,  263. 

Russell,  Earl,  Foreign  Secretary, 
fully  advised  of  construction  of 
the  Alabama,  46 ;  on  the  evasion 
of  the  Alabama,  50  n.,  51 ;  pro 
poses  detention  of  Alabama  in 
colonial  ports,  53  n. ;  on  right  of 
neutrals  to  build  belligerent 
ships,  55  ;  on  municipal  law  and 
international  obligations,  55-59 ; 
sympathy  for  the  South,  64;  de 
clares  Foreign  Enlistment  Act 
defective,  66  n.,  realizes  naval 
policy  of  the  Confederacy,  68; 
fears  reaction  of  his  policy,  69  ; 
answer  to  demand  for  reparation, 
80 ;  neglects  a  favorable  chance 
for  settlement,  82-85;  suggests  a 
joint  commission,  85-871;  and  arbi 
tration,  86 ;  Prime  Minister,  87. 

Salisbury,  Marquis  of,  on  right  of 
neutrals  to  build  belligerent  ships, 
54  n. 

Salt,  government  monopoly  in 
France,  308. 

San  Domingo,  Babcock's  treaty  of 
annexation,  130  ;  reception  by  the 
Cabinet,  131,  142;  Grant's  desire 
for,  132,  218, 222 ;  treaty  rejected, 
144, 168.  See  also  Hayti. 

San  Juan  question  and  the  fisher 
ies,  145  n. 

Schofield,  J.  M.,  tribute  to  Ropes, 
343. 

Scholars,  absence    from   political 


440 


INDEX 


discussions,  293,  295 ;  political 
duty,  300,  304,  336-338 ;  political  in 
fluence,  303.  See  also  American 
Historical  Association. 

Schurz,  Carl,  on  Sumner,  176  n. ;  on 
settlement  with  Great  Britain, 
209 ;  on  instructions  to  Motley, 
210  ;  on  Sumner's  self-conscious 
ness,  253  ;  influence  on  campaign 
Of  1896,  293. 

Scott,  Winfield,  influences  which 
determined  his  loyalty,  408. 

Secession,  issue  settled,  386;  views 
and  actions  of  f  ramers  of  the  Con 
stitution,  387-393;  Southern  be 
lief,  393-395 ;  peaceful,  impossible 
in  1860,  395;  South  realized  im 
possibility  of  peaceful,  396,  411 ; 
comprehensive  policy  of  South 
ern,  396-398;  real  traitors,  398 ;  Vir 
ginia's,  398-406 ;  Lee  on,  411 ;  early 
views  of  Massachusetts,  414-417. 
See  also  Civil  War. 

Second  United  States  cavalry,  re 
cord  of  its  early  officers,  409. 

Seeley,  Sir  John,  on  politics  and 
history,  274. 

Selborne,  Lord.    See  Palmer. 

Self-government,  development  of  ca 
pacity  for,  324-331 ;  policy  of  the 
United  States,  331-334. 

Semmes,  Raphael,  considers  subju 
gation  of  South  impossible,  13  n. 

Senate,  rejects  the  Johnson-Claren 
don  Convention,  95,  208-211 ;  Gush 
ing  on  its  treaty  power,  123  n. ; 
rejects  the  San  Domingo  treaty, 
144,  168  ;  "  courtesy,"  167,  236 ; 
Cleveland  on  its  exercise  of  treaty 
power,  185 ;  status,  226,  235 ;  re 
vision  of  committees,  226,  234,  239. 
See  also  Legislative,  and  next 
title. 

Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions,  Sumner  chairman,  94, 106  ; 
power  of  its  chairman,  94,  132; 
reports  unfavorably  on  the  John 
son-Clarendon  Convention,  95 ;  po 
sition  of  its  chairman,  166,  181, 
229;  attempt  to  reorganize,  169; 
Sumner  removed  from  chairman 
ship,  181,  183;  removal  justified, 


181-183, 225-244 ;  reports  favorably 
on  Treaty  of  Washington,  183. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  Cobden  on,  55  n. ; 
on  English  recognition  of  Confed 
erate  belligerency,  92,  97,  100, 
101,  202-205 ;  ambitious  t&  end  the 
controversy,  93;  accepts  English 
contention  on  belligerency,  93; 
and  Sumner,  106, 175 ;  on  Imperial 
ism,  318 ;  on  Virginia's  [first  vote 
on  secession,  402. 

Shenandoah,  Confederate  cruiser, 
departure  from  London,  80;  sta 
tus,  197. 

Sherman,  John,  on  displacement  of 
Sumner,  239,  240. 

Sherman,  W.  T.,  Southern  opinion 
of,  17 ;  attack  on  Vicksburg,  372. 

Slavery,  in  Virginia,  398;  future 
judgment  concerning,  427.  See 
also  next  title. 

Slavery  debate,  period  of  national, 
281 ;  greatness,  282 ;  literature, 
282;  historical  aspect,  283,  284; 
uniqueness,  284. 

Smith,  Goldwin,  on  early  views  on 
secession,  387. 

South  African  War,  conditions,  1  ; 
and  the  Civil  War,  2-4,  14, 15, 17, 
33-36, 63  n.,  195 ;  effect  of,  on  Eng 
lish  feeling  toward  the  United 
States,  270 ;  American  sympathy, 
384-386. 

Southrons,  qualities,  393,  427^29 ; 
statesmanship,  394.  See  also  Se 
cession. 

Spanish-American  War,  effect  of, 
on  English  opinion  of  America, 
269,  270. 

Spectator,  London,  on  the  North,  76. 

Stanley,  Lord,  Foreign  Secretary, 
on  recognition  of  Confederate 
belligerency,  92 ;  on  arbitration 
of  the  Alabama  claims,  92. 

State  Sovereignty.    See  Secession. 

Stephen,  Leslie,  on  the  Times  dur 
ing  the  Civil  War,  75  n.;  on 
journalism,  296;  on  historical 
sophistry,  316. 

Strategy,  English  methods,  356, 359, 
361,362,  367;  danger  in  rules,  361, 
367. 


INDEX 


441 


Sumner,  Charles,  on  status  of  neu 
tral  built  belligerent  ships,  72; 
chairman  of  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  94,  106 ;  on 
greatness  of  the  Alabama  contro 
versy,  95 ;  opposition  to  the  John 
son-Clarendon  Convention,  95, 101 ; 
on  English  recognition  of  Confed 
erate  belligerency  and  consequen 
tial  damages,  101-103, 114, 151, 180, 
182,  188, 191,  205 ;  and  Seward,  106, 
175 ;  early  relations  with  Fish,  106, 
112, 113, 156, 245, 246 ;  Motley  his  re 
presentative,  107,  116, 128,  137-139, 
155, 165,246 ;  character,  109, 173-176, 
187,  248-255 ;  opposed  to  tropical 
annexation,  113;  objects  to  Mot 
ley's  instructions,  115,  245 ;  know 
ledge  of  international  law,  122  n. ; 
influence,  123  n.,  128, 129,  139, 144, 
166,  179,  183-186;  disregards  a 
hint  on  Motley's  diplomacy,  128 ; 
and  Thornton,  128,  129 ;  Grant 
seeks  his  favor  on  the  San  Do 
mingo  treaty,  132,  228  ;  rupture 
with  Grant,  133,  136-140,  159, 
228,  253  ;  suggested  for  minis 
try  to  Great  Britain,  137 ;  inter 
view  with  Fish  on  Rose's  propo 
sals,  144,  145,  231;  memorandum 
on  the  proposals,  146-149,  165; 
policy  of  British  withdrawal  from 
America  and  annexation  of  Can 
ada,  147,  150-156,  163,  165,  186,  241 ; 
Pierce' s  biography,  147 ;  views  on 
Manifest  Destiny,  150;  effect  of 
the  memorandum  on  Fish,  163; 
and  on  Grant,  164,  169 ;  in  opposi 
tion,  166-169,  236 ;  attempt  to  re 
strict  his  influence,  170,  172  ;  at 
tacks  Grant  in  debate,  170 ;  break 
With  Fish,  171,  172,  187,  229,  243, 
251 ;  Grant  determined  to  have 
him  displaced,  172, 181 ;  his  oppo 
sition  to  the  negotiations  antici 
pated,  173,  176, 182,  233 ;  influence 
and  publicity  of  his  memorandum, 
178-180;  displaced  from  chair 
manship,  181,  183 ;  displacement 
justified,  181-183,  225-244;  impor 
tance  of  his  attitude  on  the  treaty, 
183-187;  disappearance  of  his 


policy,  197 ;  contemporary  opinion 
on  his  displacement,  237-243 ;  de 
nunciations  of  Grant,  247,  251; 
Fish  on  his  character,  248-252  ; 
and  Conkling,  252 ;  on  Lee,  380 ; 
and  the  battle-flag  inscriptions, 
425. 

Supply  and  demand  as  applied  to 
political  discussions,  276. 

Syndicates  as  an  element  in  modern 
life,  296-298. 

Tariff,  period  of  national  debate, 
281 ;  debate  in  1880,  290  ;  in  1888, 
291 ;  outcome,  302 ;  and  trusts,  313. 

Thiers,  L.  A.,  President  of  France, 
asks  good  offices  of  Great  Britain, 
133. 

Thomas,  G.  H.,  character,  408 ;  in 
fluences  which  determined  his 
loyalty,  410. 

Thornton,  Edward,  British  Minister 
at  Washington,  and  Sumner,  128, 
129;  on  England  and  Canada, 
155,  157,  159,  160 ;  on  reaction  of 
British  policy,  196. 

Time  factor  in  judgments  of  civil 
Strife,  378,  424,  426-428. 

Times,  London,  on  subjugation  of 
the  Confederacy,  14  n. ;  on  the 
North,  75 ;  course  during  the  Civil 
War,  75  n.,  419 ;  on  Russell's  sug 
gestion  of  a  joint  commission,  86 ; 
on  Russell's  policy,  91 ;  on  England 
and  Canada,  157, 158. 

Tolstoi,  Count  Leo,  as  a  writer  of 
military  history,  340. 

Townsend,  Meredith,  on  British 
rule  in  India,  327. 

Transvaal.   See  South  African  War. 

Treason,  defined,  381 ;  consideration 
of  motives,  382, 423. 

Treaty  of  Washington,  importance, 
31-33,  196,  198;  influencing  per 
sonal  factors,  105,  113 ;  first  un 
official  step,  123, 125 ;  Rose  opens 
negotiations,  135;  Great  Britain 
ready  to  negotiate,  163,  177 ;  com 
missioners  appointed,  178 ;  nego- 
tiated,  178,  180 ;  sent  to  the  Sen 
ate,  180 ;  favorably  reported,  183 ; 
question  of  indirect  claims,  187- 


442 


INDEX 


194.  See  also  Fish,  Grant,  Sum- 
ner. 

Tribune,  New  York,  former  influ 
ence,  296 ;  present  condition,  297. 

Trusts,  as  an  inchoate  political 
issue,  292;  issue  considered  his 
torically,  307-315 ;  compared  with 
former  monopolies,  307-310;  and 
industrial  evolution,  310;  price 
and  competition  in  relation  to, 
311-314 ;  and  the  tariff,  313. 

"290."    See  Alabama. 

Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  popularity,  283. 

United  States,  obligation  to  Lee,  2, 
18 ;  retaliation  on  policy  of  Great 
Britain,  79 ;  lingering  spirit  of  de 
pendency,  205,  325 ;  polity,  226 ;  as 
a  world  power,  320 ;  direction  of 
the  efforts  as  such,  321 ;  policy  to- 
ward  inferior  races,  331-334.  See 
also  Americans,  Belligerency, 
Civil  War,  Confederate  States,  Se 
cession. 

Venezuelan  boundary  dispute,  ef 
fect  of,  on  English  opinion  of  the 
United  States,  267. 

Verestchagin,  Vasili,  as  a  painter 
of  military  scenes,  341. 

Vicksburg  campaign  and  battle  of 
New  Orleans,  372. 

Virginia,  slavery  conditions,  398; 
State  pride,  399 ;  Union  sentiment, 
399;  importance  of  her  first  re 


fusal  to  secede,  400-403 ;  why  she 
seceded,  403-406. 

War,  irresistibleness  of  its  spirit, 
319.  See  also  Civil  War,  South 
African  War. 

Washington,  George,  blunders  at 
Long  Island,  357-361;  treason 
compared  with  Lee's,  382,  412, 
413 ;  On  secession,  388,  391-393 ; 
hereditary  influences,  407. 

Waterloo,  battle,  and  Gettysburg, 
426. 

West  Indies,  Grant's  annexation 
policy,  130.  See  also  Cuba,  Hayti, 
San  Domingo. 

White,  A.  D.,  influence  on  campaign 

Of  1896,  293. 

Wilkinson,  Spenser,  on  the  Civil 
War  and  South  African  War, 
33. 

Wise,  H.  A.,  Confederate  general, 
character  and  career,  5 ;  despairs 
of  further  resistance,  6 ;  advises 
Lee  to  surrender,  7,  8. 

Wise,  J.  S.,  The  End  of  an  Era,  4; 
interview  with  Lee,  4 ;  on  condi 
tion  of  Lee's  army  after  Sailor's 
Creek,  6 ;  on  interview  between 
his  father  and  Lee,  6-8 ;  on  Con 
federate  joy  over  Lincoln's  death, 
16. 

Wolfe,  James,  credit  for  fall  of  Que 
bec,  350  n. ;  and  Grant,  350  n.  See 
also  Quebec. 


LOAN  DEPT. 

TlsefeJ 


U.  C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


